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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation argues that Canadian foreign policy has undergone a significant 
shift in the past two decades that coincides with the consolidation and internationalization 
of Canadian capital. That shift is manifest most dramatically in an escalation of
1 
the 
Canadian military presence abroad and the ends to which the country's increasingly 
militarized foreign policy are bent towards, particularly its cooperation with the 
machinery of U.S. imperialism to secure the conditions for profitable growth for 
Canadian capital invested in the Global South. 
This project builds that argument by examining in detail the case study of 
Canadian state relations with Honduras, especially following the June 2009 coup d'etat, 
in light of significant investment of Canadian capital in that country. It demonstrates the 
extent to which Canada has supported a military dictatorship since 2009 that has engaged 
in widespread repression of dissent, abuse of human rights, and anti-democratic practices. 
It also highlights the fact that the social movement that has been targeted by the 
dictatorship was working towards political and economic reforms in Honduras that would 
have posed a threat to the profits of Canadian companies invested there. 
As such, this project locates Canadian policy towards Honduras as fitting into a 
long history of colonialism in that country, with Canada taking a role previously held by 
Spain, Great Britain and the United States, that is undermining Honduran democracy and 
social development for the sake of Canadian companies' profits. It is suggested that this 
dynamic, examined in detail in the Honduran case, is reflective of the wider shift! in 
Canadian political economy and foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
1 
In 2005, four years into the Canadian occupation of Afghanistan, Canadian Forces 
General Rick Hillier surprised a gathering of reporters by reminding them that the job of 
the Canadian military was "to kill people."1 The frankness of this admission, and the 
surprise it elicited, suggested that dramatic changes were afoot in a Canada that had long 
imagined itself a great peacekeeper. By 2009, it had emerged that Canada was deeply 
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implicated in the torture of detainees in its Afghan occupation, and the ruling 
Conservative government actually closed the Canadian Parliament early that year in order 
to avoid discussion of the torture scandal. That same ruling party has yet to answer these 
allegations in Parliament but managed to win its first majority government in 2011. In 
the meantime, Canada offered unflinching support to a violent military overthrow of the 
democratic government of Honduras in 2009, placing Canada at odds with almost every 
other state in the western hemisphere, and it has subsequently been that regime's greatest 
ally. In 2013, a journalist at the Globe and Mail reported on Canadian involvement in 
Africa and concluded that it did not look dissimilar from British and French colonialism: 
What do we call the thing Canada is doing in Africa? It involves 
our largest corporations, the federal government, public- and 
private-sector aid agencies, and sometimes the military. And 
their activities are increasingly connected, sometimes by choice, 
often by force of circumstance ... Canada is no longer simply 
"doing business" or "providing aid" in Africa ... [it has] become 
something like a colonial government. 2 
The Globe and Mail is anything but a leftist rag; that it would offer a critical comment on 
the emergent Canadian imperialism is a sure sign that Canada's role in the world is 
changing. 
1 Rick Hillier, quoted in "Hillier surprised that many didn't lmow a soldier's job is to kill," Calgary Herald, 
Oct. 29, 2009. 
2 Doug Saunders, "Canada's African adventure takes a colonial tum," The Globe and Mail, Feb. 2, 2012. 
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Canadians - like their southern neighbours - have long been encouraged to 
believe that their state is a beacon of freedom and democracy for the world to emulate. 
While that discourse has been hard to sustain in the United States, it has stubbornly 
refused to disappear from the Canadian mainstream, where popular media and public 
perception still seems to reflect the belief that Canada is, more or less, one of the "good 
guys" in international affairs. Canada, according to this narrative, is a state that has 
perfected the arts of democracy and good governance, offers freedom to its citizens and 
refuge for foreigners who need it, and promotes peace, stability and human rights in the 
rest of the world. An astonishing 94% of Canadians think their country is well liked 
internationally and 84% believe Canada is a force for good in the world, 3 in spite of the 
increasing mobilizations of popular protest in foreign countries against Canadian policy.4 
In fact, the changes that have marked Canadian foreign policy over the past decade 
appear to many Canadians to reflect simply an increased sense of Canadian "self-
confidence," as though Canada finally feels comfortable going out and asserting its good 
values in the world. The irony of a politics whereby "goodness" is militarized and 
hammered down upon the "less good" is, regrettably, lost in most of these assessments; 
though it appears that much of the international community is beginning to question that 
approach, if Canada's humiliating rejection for a seat on the U.N. Security Council in 
2012 is any indication. 5 
3 Yves Engler, The Black Book of Canadian Foreign Policy, Black Point, Fernwood, 2009, p. 4. 
4 For instance, "Death to Canada" chants have become ubiquitous in Afghanistan, and folk songs in 
Guatemala regularly feature Canada as the chief antagonist. Jerome Klassen, "Introduction: Empire, 
Afghanistan and Canadian Foreign Policy," in Jerome Klassen and Greg Albo, ed., Empire's Ally: Canada 
and the War in Afghanistan, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2013, p. 9. 
5 John lvison, "Canada chose principle over popularity at UN," National Post, October 10, 2012. 
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Michael lgnatieff, political scientist and former leader of the Liberal Party of 
Canada, is among the most articulate Canadian imperial cheerleaders, despite his narrow 
disagreements with the ruling Conservative government. Consider his comments on a 
program for Canadian foreign policy in 2003: 
Peace, order and good government, and the institutions that 
anchor this creed in our national life, have been the guarantors of 
our national independence and our national distinctiveness. The 
success of this creed makes our country one of the most sought-
after destinations for migration in the world. Our capacity to 
resolve our conflicts peacefully mt::ans that we have survived 
where many other multinational, multi-ethnic, regionalized 
societies have failed... I prefer "peace, order and good 
government" to "governance" as an organizing frame for 
Canadian activities simply because it articulates a specifically 
Canadian expression of what governance ought to be about: 
democratic institutions, federalism, minority rights guarantees, 
linguistic pluralism, aboriginal 'self-government and a positive, 
enabling role for government in economic and social 
development. 6 
From this glowing review of "Canadian values," which notably fails to comment on 
inequalities within Canada or Canada's place in the global political economy, lgnatieff 
concludes that Canada should endorse the doctrine of the "responsibility to protect" 
people from their own "failed states," a rhetorical tum that serves to justify all manner of 
international intervention: 
Canadian policy can assist with improving the institutional 
design and operation of governance. Where societies, in John 
Rawls' phrase, are "burdened" with ethnic conflict, religious 
hatred, or a bitter memory of civil war, we need to perfect a tool 
kit of preventive intervention: conflict resolution at the village 
and community level, political dialogue at the national level, 
constitutional change, in the form of devolution to empower 
disenfranchised regions or groups, and minority rights guarantees 
to end discrimination and injustice. No country has managed to 
put all of these elements of prevention - conflict resolution, 
6 Michael lgnatieff, "Peace, Order and Good Government: A Foreign Policy Agenda for Canada," DF AIT, 
Jules Leger Library, available at: http://www.international.gc.ca/odskelton/ignatieff.aspx 
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political dialogue, constitutional change, together with economic 
assistance - into a coherent stand-by capability, bringing together 
NGO, government and professional capacities. That is a 
challenge we should seize as a country, since, as I have argued, 
we have comparative advantage in the politics of managing 
divided societies. Finally, in societies where conflict has reached 
the point of massacre and ethnic cleansing, we have a 
"responsibility to protect," and, with that, a responsibility to 
intervene, if necessary, with military force. 7 
Indeed, on the basis of his superficial, but: sympathetic, assessment of Canada's 
commitment to "good government," Ignatieff claims that Canada has a responsibility to 
interfere considerably in other countries affairs and, ultimately, to intervene militarily 
when it decides that others are not meeting Canadian criteria for "good government."8 
His program, self-described as "muscular multilateralism," would see Canada take such 
pride in its purported successes that it would impose them on others. Indeed, the 
Canadian public is consistently presented with a version of Canada that imagines itself an 
enlightened and benevolent force that would help the rest of the world replicate its own 
success. Increasingly, however, the reality of Canadian policy looks radically different 
from the popular picture presented. 
This dissertation will engage with the changes that have become manifest in 
Canadian foreign policy over the past two decades by building on the emerging literature 
that seeks to find the deep motivations for Canadian policy in a rigorous political 
economic analysis. Contrary to mainstream analyses that would locate the changes in 
Canadian policy by studying the different political parties and personalities of leaders, 
7 lgnatieff, "Peace, Order and Good Government," (emphasis mine). 
8 Interestingly, the rhetorical pillars of Canadian foreign intervention that are peppered through orations 
like lgnatieff s - peace, freedom, democracy, stability- only feature in minor ways in Canada's stated 
foreign policy goals, which, today, typically emphasize free trade and security. For instance, Canada's 
foreign policy re-engagement with the Americas claims to be founded on the three pillars of"increasing 
economic opportunity," "strengthening security and institutions," and "fostering lasting relationships." See 
"The Americas: Our Neighbours, Our Priority," DF AIT, available at: 
http://www.intemational.gc.ca/americas-amerigues/index.aspx?lang=eng 
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and the electoral trends that see one or another fraction of the Canadian elite elected to 
power, this project will examine Canadian fornign policy as a long term process marked 
by continuities and changes that reflect not necessarily the changing of political 
leadership but the shifting class dynamics that animate the Canadian polity and state 
apparatus. That is, rather than imagining foreign policy as a product of the ideas of 
powerful individuals, this dissertation will take foreign policy to be a manifestation of the 
social relations embedded in the Canadian state. More concretely, it will view the 
Canadian state as being fundamentally representative of the interests of a uniquely 
Canadian capitalist class and, as such, it will take the changing exigencies of foreign 
policy to be reflections of the needs of that capitalist class, albeit mediated by a wide 
variety of other factors. 
Applying this type of analysis to Canadian foreign policy will reveal that, having 
overseen the consolidation and concentration of Canadian capital into an influential bloc 
that now requires access to foreign markets in order to maintain profitability, the 
Canadian state has, increasingly since the end of the Cold War, taken on the role of a 
secondary imperial power in the global capitalist world order. That is, as Canadian 
capital has looked outward in search of new profits, the Canadian state has used its 
considerable resources to support that expansion and has successfully carved out 
significant space for Canadian capital to grow. That space, and the profits that come with 
it, has often been taken directly from communities in the Global South. This dissertation 
will demonstrate, in detail, how that process has played out in the context of Honduras, 
one state in which the Canadian imperial influence has been dramatically felt since a 
coup d'etat overthrew its democratic government in 2009. In effect, then, this project 
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offers a detailed look at one compelling case study in the new Canadian imperialism, on 
the premise that this study is representative of the broader dynamics. of contemporary 
Canadian foreign policy. 
Chapter 2 will establish the theoretical foundations for this project by providing 
an overview of the prevailing approaches to the study of Canadian foreign policy and 
political economy, locating my own position within the debates between poli~ical 
economists on the question of the Canadian capitalist class and applying those 
conclusions to the study of foreign policy. In particular, I will argue that the study of 
Canadian foreign policy must be informed by an understanding that the Canadian 
economy is not, as much of this tradition has argued since the 1970s, predominantly 
owned and controlled by U.S. capital. By contrast, I will assert that there is a 
concentrated Canadian capitalist class that not only controls most of the Canadian 
economy but has also, in fact, outgrown its borders and is rapidly expanding 
internationally. The implications are significant, insofar as this suggests that the 
Canadian state is not a pawn of U.S. capital but, rather, is responsive to the needs of 
Canadian capital. This chapter will draw out these theoretical claims and demonstrate 
why this und~rstanding of Canadian foreign policy is more satisfactory than the dominant 
approaches. It will offer a brief re-reading of the history of Canadian foreign policy, 
based in this theoretical approach, that will explain the shift in the past two decades 
towards greater integration with the U.S.-led empire of capital as being part of Canada's 
strategy to maintain the growth and viability of Canadian capital in an increasingly 
volatile capitalist world market. 
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The remaining chapters will tum their attention to the particular case study at the 
heart of this project, beginning with an historical overview of five centuries of 
colonialism in Honduras. Chapter 3 will document the formation of Honduras in the 
genocide that was European conquest of the Americas, and it will provide a synthesis of 
the historiography of Honduras to demonstrate the long process of imp6sed 
underdevelopment to which Honduras has been subject since its founding. The purpose 
will be to demonstrate the continuities that cut across centuries of different imptirial 
powers and different methods of empire, in order to effectively locate the new Canadian 
imperialism in that long history. Chapter 4 will focus on more recent Honduran history, 
placing a particular emphasis on the processes that established the contemporary class 
dynamics in Honduran society, in order to highlight the movements and struggles that 
resisted the imposition of neoliberalism and the role that U.S. imperialism played in 
ensuring its eventual victory. This point is significant, insofar as it is precisely the 
struggle against neoliberalism that has continued to motivate contemporary Honduran 
social movements, and it is those movements that Canada is working to undermine in its 
own imperial adventure in Honduras. 
Chapter 5 will bring the narrative of Honduran history into the present, detailing 
the events that led to the 2009 coup d'etat and its violent aftermath. Drawing from 
original fieldwork in Honduras, I will offer here the first comprehensive academic 
analysis of the Honduran social movements that emerged in the late 1990s in opposition 
to neoliberalism and demonstrate the extent to which their popular struggle was 
interrupted by the coup that overthrew social democratic President Manuel Zelaya. This 
chapter will provide a thorough reconstruction of the coup itself and the unleashing of 
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state terror and political manipulation necessary to sustain the rule of the military regime, 
whose seizure of power provoked a social mobilization in opposition that was 
unprecedented in Honduran history. 
That narrative will then be reviewed in light of Canada's reactions and responses 
to each new phase of the crisis. If the purpose of Chapter 5 is to lay bare the deep 
injustice that permeated every aspect of the coup, the purpose of Chapter 6 will be to 
demonstrate that Canada's reactions fell consistently on the side of injustice. What is _ 
more, this chapter will show that Canada had to work hard to do so; the Canadian state 
was one of the few allies that the Honduran military regime had, and in order to support 
that regime Canada had to categorically ignore critical reports from nearly every level of 
Honduran society that was not directly connected to the section of the Honduran ruling 
class that carried out the coup. This chapter wiH also document post-2009 developments, 
again drawing heavily from interviews and personal experience in Honduras, concluding 
that the social movements in Honduras remain more or less united in their opposition to 
the military government, even while conditions in the country have been deteriorating 
rapidly and as violence and impunity have become the standard. 
The final substantive chapter will explain Canada's decision to consistently 
support the violent coup regime, against the wishes of an embattled popular social 
movement that has the support of an overwhelming majority of Hondurans, by detailing 
the extent of Canadian investment in that country, before and after the coup. Indeed, this 
chapter will demonstrate that Canadian capital found its interests threatened by the 
growing strength of social movements, seeking to create more just and equitable 
structures of governance in Honduras, and saw fit to line itself up with the Honduran far 
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right. In fact, as this chapter will show, Canadian capital and the Canadian state have 
actually ramped up their involvement in Honduras since the coup, as it is clear that 
Canadian investment in Honduras not only tolerates the right wing crackdown, it actually 
benefits from and relies upon it. This final point will plug back into the arguments 
introduced in this chapter and developed in the second chapter, demonstrating that 
Canada has actually constructed a foreign policy wherein imperialism and injustice are 
not just potential incidental factors but, indeed, are at its heart. 
This analysis, as I will argue throughout, grows increasingly urgent as Canada's 
foreign policy becomes ever more deeply enmeshed and committed to its new role as an 
emerging imperial power. Indeed, while this project asserts that the shifting dynamics of 
Canadian policy are reflective of political-economic conditions, it does not imagine those 
conditions to be incontestable; that is, while I will reject the idea that policies are 
designed in the minds of individuals disconnected from their social and material 
conditions, it nevertheless remains fundamentally the case that policies are made by 
people who have organized themselves to engage in a political process. As such, those 
politics and processes can always be contested by organized social movements, and this 
· dissertation is motivated by the need to rebuild the capacities of people and movements in 
Canada to contest the new direction that it is taking. 9 
9 It is worth briefly noting that not all people and movements in Canada consider themselves "Canadian." 
Though the structures that would become the Canadian state were imposed upon Indigenous people by 
English and French colonizers, Indigenous nations never ceded their right to consider themselves nations 
and many do not associate themselves with the Canadian state. Some Quebecois people similarly consider 
their national allegiance to be to Quebec, rather than Canada. Many immigrants and migrants in Canada 
maintain a primary national allegiance outside of Canada and, furthermore, many activists from a variety of 
backgrounds refuse any association with Canadian nationhood. When this dissertation refers to 
"Canadians," then, it does so as a way of referring to all those people who live under the legal jurisdiction 
of the Canadian state, acknowledging that many would not self-identify as "Canadian." 
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There have arguably been moments when the prospects for popular intervention 
in the business of Canadian statecraft were better than they are today. Given this 
project's focus on Canadian policy in Central America, it is instructive to look at the 
work done by the Toronto-based Latin America Working Group (LAWG) and its 
associated civil society and activist organizations in the 1970s and 1980s, which included 
a range of groups that varied in their activist orientation, from the Victoria-based Can~da-
Honduras Information and Support Association (CHISA) to Canadian University Seryice 
Overseas (CUSO). These organizations were rooted in Canadian civil society; tiheir 
members were activists, academics, journalists, students, left-liberal politicos, clergy and 
churchgoers, and transplanted Latin Americans who had come to Canada often as 
refugees from political violence. The solidarity work that groups like LA WG were able 
to mobilize was impressive, both in terms of the principled stand it took with respect to 
U.S. imperialism in Central America and insofar as that work appears to have made an 
appreciable impact on Canadian policy. 10 
LAWG and its associated organizations took a variety of actions to support 
movements in Central America that were struggling against the violent and reactionary 
forces that dominated most of the region in the 1980s, and that were working - with 
direct U.S. support - · to undermine the revolutionary Sandinista government in 
Nicaragua. Speakers were brought from the region to tour Canada and speak about the 
dynamics of the regional wars, and Canadians were encouraged to travel to Central 
America on solidarity and support delegations; one particularly noteworthy example was 
10 The analysis that I offer here of the work of LA WG and associated groups is drawn from a series of 
interviews conducted in 2012 with former activists in those organizations. Notable among those interviews 
were: Alison Acker (February 10, 2012), John Foster (February 18, 2012), George Sorger (February 24, 
2012), Chris Rosene (March 9, 2012), and Suzanne Dudziak (April 7, 2012). 
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a 1983 "Pilgrimage for Peace" launched by a group of Canadian nuns with the support of 
the broader solidarity movement. The "Pilgrimage" saw 11 women, primarily Protestant 
and Catholic sisters, travel to Honduras to establish a peaceful presence at the Nicaraguan 
border, to block Contra fighters from lau~ching violent incursions from Honduras. 11 
Though the Honduran government blocked them from getting off the plane at Toncontin 
Airport, the project garnered much critical media coverage and helped to raise the profile 
of the Contra wars in the Canadian mainstream; the spectacle of elderly nuns b¢ing 
detained on an airplane by heavily armed Honduran soldiers reflected poorly on the 
Honduran state and the U.S. occupation. 12 
Though this is only one example of the work that LA WG did, it is a useful case, 
insofar as it prompted a series of letters between some of the activists and then-Canadian 
Minister for External Affairs Allan MacEachen. LAWG's archives contained copies of a 
long correspondence between MacEachen and Sister Marilyn Matz, who told the 
minister: 
We would greatly appreciate an explanation of how the current 
Canadian aid program, particularly our government-to-
government aid, is meeting the very basic and real needs of the 
Honduran people? This remains a very serious question for us 
and one of some urgency given current articles on the state of 
underdevelopment in that country and the very real toll this is 
taking on the vast majority who are the poor of Honduras. In 
light of the Honduran government's priority on military spending 
and the increase of human rights violations and internal 
repression, how does our aid program benefit the poor majority 
of Honduras? 13 
11 Walter Stefaniuk, "11 leave for Honduras on pilgrimage for peace," Toronto Star, December 4, 1983. 
12 
"Religious Women's Pilgrimage for Peace Denied Entrance into Honduras," Catholic New Times, 
December 25, 1983. 
13 Sister Marilyn Matz, Letter from Religious Women's Pilgrimage for Peace to Allan J. MacEachen, 
February 2, 1984. Retrieved from Latin American Working Group Archives, Scott Library, York 
University. Reproduced as Appendix A. 
12 
MacEachen did not offer an answer that satisfied the sisters, but he did w1ite a series of 
replies, and the fact that such an exchange took place was, itself, noteworthy. Similar 
exchanges between the solidarity activists and high-profile Canadian politicians 
continued throughout the 1980s and even into the early 1990s. Indeed, a number of 
officials in the Canadian state apparatus were actually convinced to offer their support to 
the solidarity movement; some of LA WGs petitions feature names of Canadian Members 
of Parliament, like Bill Blaikie, Lloyd Axworthy, Dan Heap and Stan Keyes. 14 
The efforts of Canadians in solidarity was noticed in Honduras, both by the 
movements that were working with Canadian activists and by the Honduran media 
which, for instance, printed open letters of opposition to the virtual military government 
in Honduras signed by Canadian MPs15 and reported on the presence of North American 
left activists in the country as Hondurans grew more and more disillusioned with the U.S. 
occupation in the 1980s.16 Activists who are, today, among the most prominent figures in 
the Honduran resistance movement were regularly brought to Canada to speak to 
gatherings of Canadian civil society organizations which included public officials. 
Groups like LA WG and CHIS A marshalled their communities' resources to bring 
Hondurans like Juan Almendares and Gladys Lanza to travel across Canada on speaking 
tours; these moments of solidarity are remembered fondly by the Canadians who 
14 
"Asesinato de lideres sindicales Hondurefios provoca gran desilusion e indignaci6n en Canada," Undated 
Open Letter to Honduran President Rafael Callejas, reproduced as Appendix B. 
15 
"Carta Abierta de Cuidadanos Canadienses al Gobiemo, Fuerzas Armadas y Pueblo de Honduras En 
Relacion a la Campana de Amenazas y Calumnias en Contra del Dr. Ramon Custodio y CODER," El 
Tiempo, December 14, 1988. 
16 
"Activistas izquierdistas de EE.DU. en gira por Honduras," La Tribuna, November 3, 1984. 
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organized the events and by the Hondurans who were given space to build support for 
their movements, often speaking directly to members of the Canadian political elite. 17 
That this work had an effect on Canadian policy speaks both to the effective work 
that groups like LAWG were doing, and to the fact that the Canadian state was, at that 
time, in a position to be affected by civil society organizing. LAWG was able to resist 
becoming reliant on government funding, giving it a certain degree of autonomy, and it 
produced some of the most reliable and well-documented research on the region. There 
was, then, good reason for the Canadian political class to pay attention to LAWG's 
work. 18 That said, the success of groups like LAWG must be contextualized and 
understood to have been contingent on a particular configuration of the Canadian state 
that did not feel its interests would be unduly compromised by accommodating some of 
that activist work. That configuration has changed dramatically, and it is instructive to 
consider Liisa L. North's assertion in 1990 that "the Canadian government can and 
should do more to assist Central Americans to construct more just and peaceful 
societies."19 It was at precisely that moment that the space in Canada for progressive 
civil society to influence foreign policy was being closed and, upon reflection, North's 
appeal can be read as a rather prescient and unheeded warning of things to come. 
At the same time, this should not lead us to a kind of fatalism with respect to the 
prospects for activist work. Much is to be learned from the experience of LA WG and, as 
17 I conducted interviews with a number of former LAWG activists who described the organizing of the 
speaking tours and the solidarity efforts, and I also interviewed Juan Almendares and Gladys Lanza, who 
expressed appreciation and warmth towards the Canadian movements that supported their work in the 
1980s while simultaneously lamenting the relative decline in the strength and cohesion of such solidarity 
work today. Interviews with Suzanne Dudziak (April 7, 2012), John Foster (February 18, 2012), Gladys 
Lanza (May 7, 2012), Juan Almendares (May 4, 2012.) 
18 Interview with John Foster, February 18, 2012. 
19 Liisa L. North and CAP A, Between War and Peace in Central America: Choices for Canada, Toronto, 
Between the Lines, 1990, p. 17. 
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I will argue in this dissertation, there is an urgent need for a new mobilization of activism 
confronting the Canadian state and its new imperial politics. The reconfigured Canadian 
state may necessitate different strategies of resistance from those employed in the 1980s, 
but there can be no question that some kind of organized, collective response will be the 
only way for progressive forces to intervene and interrupt the new Canadian imperialism. 
This dissertation, then, represents both a critical intervention in the understanding and 
analysis of Canadian foreign policy at a crucial moment of transformation. It is also a 
call to action, for Canadian activists and academics alike, to take a stand against a set of 
policies that are doing immeasurable harm to those people towards whom they are 
directed and, as I will argue in my conclusions, to Canadians themselves. This project is 
informed by many long hours of conversations with activists in Honduras ~ teachers, 
electricians, taxi drivers, parents, children, artists, lawyers, farmers - who have found 
themselves struggling for justice against a constellation of powerful forces that includes 
Canadian businesses and the Canadian state. Those conversations instilled in me the 
gravity and urgency of building a coherent and committed opposition to Canadian 
imperialism; it is my hope that their voices will speak the loudest in the pages that follow, 
and will help to inspire the resurgent opposition that is so sorely needed. 
NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
It is worth briefly describing how I came to have those conversations, so as to 
make clear my own place in the narrative and analysis that follows. I was in Guatemala 
in 2009, when the Honduran coup took place, and while it only garnered minor reports in 
the North American media, it was front-page news in Central America for weeks. In 
Guatemala, then-President Alvaro Colom was, himself, worried about the prospect of a 
15 
right-wing coup against his own government, and his was among the many governments 
in the region that demanded the immediate reinstatement of Zelaya. I travelled to 
Honduras shortly thereafter to support the peaceful resistance to the coup, as part of a 
Rights Action delegation led by Grahame Russell and Karen Spring. At the time, I had 
not intended to centre my dissertation research on Honduras; instead, my presence there 
was primarily as a journalist and I wrote a number of reports based on interviews .and 
participant observation at that time, including a series of articles during the coup-
sponsored "election" process in November 2009 for Canadian Dimension.2° These 
experiences were formative in my understanding of the Honduran situation, and I draw 
from some of those experiences in this dissertation. 
After two such visits, each motivated primarily by the intention of writing 
journalistic pieces on what was happening, I realised that what was happening in 
Honduras was demonstrating precisely the argument I wanted to make about the new 
Canadian imperialism. As such, I re-designed my dissertation project to put the 
Honduran case study at the centre. In so doing, I was advised by Liisa North to contact 
the former members of LA WG to contrast their experiences with the Honduran 
movement in the 1980s with the current situation. After completing a thorough ethics 
review through the Faculty of Graduate Studies at York University, I did my first official 
interviews with former LAWG activists over several months in 2012. I conducted most 
of these interviews in person in Toronto, though three were conducted over lengthy email 
exchanges, since many of the former LA WG members no longer live in Southern 
Ontario. I was very fortunate to connect, through Liisa North, with Cease Levo, who was 
able to help me contact the people I went on to interview. In the meantime, I also stayed 
20 Tyler Shipley, "Una Frasa, Una Pantomima," Canadian Dimension, November 26, 2009. 
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in touch with people I had connected with in Honduras, and conducted a few interviews 
over email and skype with them in 2011. 
In 2012, I made a third trip to Honduras, where I spent three weeks doing 
exhaustive interviews with people from a wide variety of Honduran civil society. Unlike 
my earlier interviews, these were conducted for the specific purpose of this dissertation 
project and so were directed more to the problem of Canadian imperialism in particul~r. I 
completed an ethics review for these interviews which highlighted the fact that, althoiugh 
many of the people I interviewed do face serious danger from the forces of repression in 
Honduras, no one that I directly quote in the dissertation was placed in any greater 
danger for having spoken to me. 21 Over those three weeks, I travelled with Karen Spring, 
who acted as organizer and facilitator for my interviews, and also did on-the~fly 
translation so avoid any miscommunications that might have resulted from my imperfect 
Spanish. As a result of Karen's many years of mature and consistent solidarity work in 
Honduras, she has become a trusted and respected ally to the social movement and, as a 
result, my connection to her gave me access to the movement in a much more intimate 
way than I might have otherwise had. In addition to doing official interviews, we also 
spent long evenings socializing informally with and among people connected to the social 
movement and, as such, I was able to gain a much more nuanced understanding of the 
dynamics at play. Perhaps more importantly, I strengthed my social connection to the 
movement; in 2012, I met or got re-acquainted with many people whom I have remained 
in touch with. In fact, I conducted several followup interviews over email and skype 
upon my return to Toronto in June 2012. My personal connections with people 
21 Many of the people I interviewed acknowledged the danger that they face as a result of their involvement 
in the social movement and, in the months following our interviews, some of those people have indeed 
been targeted for repression. 
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struggling against injustice in Honduras were a constant reminder of why this project was 
important and kept me motivated to complete it even when I was a long way from 
Honduras and from the sense of urgency that pervaded my time there. I can only hope 
that the following pages will convey that urgency as much as I, myself, felt it. 
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CHAPTER TWO - THE NEW CANADIAN IMPERIALISM 
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The central project of this dissertation will be to advance an underdeveloped 
component in the growing literature that assesses the political economy of Canatlian 
foreign policy. In particular, this project will insist that Canada has emerged since the 
end of the Cold War as an imperial power, a secondary component in a capitalist world 
order dominated by U.S. military and political hegemony. That is, unlike much 
contemporary Canadian political economic analysis, I will argue not that Canada is 
dependent on the U.S. and therefore unable to carve out an independent foreign policy 
but, rather, that Canada is its own imperial actor that chooses to line itself up with 
projects of U.S. imperialism for the benefit of its own ruling classes. To the extent that 
the objectives of Canadian capital are linked into the broader project of imposing a global 
neoliberal order, then, the Canadian state has an interest in deepening its connection to 
the apparatus of U.S. power. At the same time, Canadian capital is in competition with 
other blocs of capital, U.S. or otherwise, for access to the profits made possible by that 
neoliberal order. As such, Canadian capital - and by extension the Canadian state - finds 
itself both cooperating and competing with the United States and the claim that Canada is 
simply a U.S. dependency does not hold up. This chapter will offer a brief overview of 
the literature that seeks to understand Canadian foreign policy in light of a political 
economic analysis and locate the present study within that literature, before turning to the 
particular case study - Canadian policy towards Honduras - that will form the central 
pivot of this project. 
WHY POLITICAL ECONOMY? 
This chapter will review the literature of Canadian political economy and locate a 
position within it; from there, the rest of this dissertation will employ its methodological 
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premises in the examination of Canadian foreign policy in Honduras. This decisio:n is 
informed by a wide engagement with the dominant intellectual strands in Canadian 
politics and international relations which offer a variety of useful tools for understanding 
particular phenomena, but rarely provide satisfactory analyses of the broader political, 
social, and economic dynamics that animate the contemporary world. This is prima~ly 
because the goal of political economy is to understand the deep roots of various 
phenomena, rather than simply assessing their superficial manifestations. Furtherm0re, 
the political economy approach has, especially in its more progressive expression, sought 
not just to understand the world but also to intervene in it. As Wallace Clement and Leah 
Yosko explain in the introduction to Changing Canada: Political Economy as 
Transformation: 
Progressive political economy embodies "uncommon sense." It 
seeks to abandon the common-sense view that certain things (e.g. 
capital or markets) and social and economic formations (e.g. 
capitalism) are irreducible rather than relational and always in 
process or flux. Political economy aims to trouble and challenge 
conventional ways of framing issues, in particular, in the present 
era, the neoliberal paradigm and its project. From a progressive 
political economy perspective, objects and subjects of study 
taken to be fixed or static and unproblematic in the empiricist 
and positivist traditions of political science and neoclassical 
economics are conceived dialectically. They are understood as 
internally contradictory, opening space for analyzing profound 
efforts at mediation, for identifying the forces of stability as well 
as change, and ultimately for the possibility of social 
transformation. 22 
Indeed, then, if political economy seeks to truly understand the prospects for 
transformation, it eschews the notion that analysis can be value-free. Clement and Yosko 
add that this theoretical approach "is motivated by values such as social justice" and 
22 Wallace Clement and Leah F. Yosko, ed., Changing Canada: Political Economy as Transformation, 
Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003, p. xiii. 
21 
makes no attempt to conceal this; rather, in foregrounding those values, it offers a more 
transparent framework for its understanding of the world and the goals behind the work it 
produces. 
My decision to work within the political economy framework is motivated most 
powerfully by the persistent and growing reality of radically unequal levels of wealth, 
power, and privilege both within individual states and across the international 
community. These profound inequalities are empirically indisputable and are articulated 
well by David McNally: 
In a world in which more than two billion people struggle to 
survive on $2 a day or less, the planet's wealthiest people -
represented by the 16.5 percent of global households with more 
than $100,000 to invest - watched their assets soar 64 percent, to 
$84.5 trillion since 2000. The vast bulk of that wealth resides in 
the portfolios of millionaire households. Although they comprise 
just 0. 7 percent of the globe's total households, these millionaire 
households now hold over a third of the world's wealth.23 
These profound inequalities have been consistently ignored, underemphasized, or 
misunderstood by mainstream social science analysis outside of the political economy 
tradition.24 This is particularly notable in the realms of international relations and foreign 
policy studies, where most mainstream analyses struggle - with limited success - to 
explain the systematic domination of certain states and peoples by others without actually 
23 David McNally, Global Slump: The Economics and Politics of Crisis and Resistance, Oakland, PM 
Press, 2011, p. 44-45. There is a vast literature on the astonishing level of inequality within and across the 
capitalist world, and similar evidence can be drawn from, among others, Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: 
The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto, Vintage Canada, 2007. See also Joel Bakan, The Corporation: 
The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power, Toronto, Penguin, 2004. 
24 For instance, the entire discipline of neoclassical economics, which is so hegemonic that it is typically 
taught simply as "economics," has consistently failed to adequately understand or predict the very 
phenomena it takes as its central object of study. Instead, it has functioned to overcomplicate, obfuscate . 
and misdirect attention from the otherwise relatively straightforward dynamics of class and accumulation 
under capitalism. McNally makes this point in Global Slump and elsewhere, and the claim is forcefully and 
clearly articulated by heterodox economists in Robert Chemomas and Ian Hudson, Social Murder and 
Other Shortcomings of Conservative Economics, Arbeiter Ring Publishing, Winnipeg, 2007. 
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speaking directly to that domination or naming it "imperialism."25 Indeed, they assign 
themselves a task that becomes increasingly difficult as the visible manifestations of 
those asymmetrical relationships become ever more vivid and tragic.26 Political 
25 Different traditions within the IR discipline deal with this contradiction differently. Realists pay little 
attention to global inequality outside of the paradigm of inter-state rivalry over power. Kenneth Waltz, 
Theory of International Politics, Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1979. Liberal IR, sometimes labelled 
'idealism,' sees the uneven distribution of wealth as a product of failed institutions, and argues that realjst 
policies of power maximization actually undermine the capacity for global cooperation and the construction 
of institutions that would alleviate poverty and inequality. M. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, New Y 6rk, 
W.W. Norton & Co., 1997. Neoliberal IR theory, like liberalism, asserts that inequality can be 'fixed' by 
institutions, but puts a primary emphasis on the market as the institution that will solve poverty and 
inequality, despite evidence that free market capitalism is, in fact, a primary cause of inequality. 
Neorealists argue that the push for free markets should be tempered by a focus on state security in a context 
of global anarchy and terrorist threats, offering little to the discussion of wealth distribution. M. 
Mandelbaum, The Ideas That Conquered the World, New York, Public Affairs, 2002. To the extent thai 
mainstream IR theory accepts alternatives to these approaches, they fall into a variety of categories that are 
loosely associated with the Marxist tradition; historical sociology and social constructivism focus their 
attention on social norms and the structures of social behaviour; post-positivism critiques the very 
foundations of mainstream IR's claims to knowledge; feminist IR insists upon a gendered reading of 
inequality; and postcolonialism approaches IR from the perspective of those who have traditionally had the 
rules and norms of international affairs imposed on them, rather than developed from within. These latter 
approaches offer significantly more than the mainstream positions, and, indeed, much of the analysis that I 
will provide draws from those traditions, especially the feminist and postcolonial. They remain, however, 
more or less marginal to the dominant IR traditions. Finally, it is worth noting that more directly Marxist-
inspired theories of IR (of which there is much overlap with feminist and postcolonial theory) remain 
present, if also marginal, in the discipline, most notably in the world-systems and neo-Gramscian schools. 
Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order, New York, Columbia University Press, 1987. It is 
noteworthy that introductory IR textbooks - or the more honest ones among them - often admit that the 
Marxist tradition still provides the clearest and most analytically productive interpretations of capitalism. 
Consider this excerpt from a popular text: "Marx's social theory still retains formidable analytic purchase 
on the world we inhabit. The vast bulk of his theoretical efforts consisted of a painstaking analysis of 
capitalism as a mode of production and the basic elements of his account have not been bettered. Indeed, 
with the ever-increasing penetration of the market-mechanism into all aspects of life, it is arguable that 
Marx's forensic examination of both the extraordinary dynamism and the inherent contradictions of 
capitalism are even more relevant now than in his own time ... while [mainstream approaches] portray 
world politics in ways which resonate with those presented in the foreign news pages of our newspapers 
and magazines, Marxist theories aim to expose a deeper, underlying- indeed, hidden- truth ... that the 
effects of global capitalism are to ensure that the powerful and wealthy continue to prosper at the expense 
of the powerless and the poor." Stephen Hobden and Richard Wyn Jones, "Marxist Theories of 
International Relations,'' in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World 
Politics: An introduction to international relations, 4th ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 
144-145. 
26 It would be impossible to choose any single example that could effectively demonstrate this point better 
than any other. The detail this project will provide on the situation in Honduras will present no shortage of 
vivid and tragic manifestations of the current glob~l order. In lieu of plugging in one or another statistic 
demonstrating the profound inequality and injustice that permeates global capitalism, then, I will simply 
offer the words of a friend in Honduras, Edwin Espinal, who said to me in 2012: "We have so many 
problems in our community, the poverty, the violence, there's no jobs, there's no support. We want better 
wages, better jobs, we want the government to help us to fix our communities, the water systems and so on. 
But when we try to push back, to change it, we just get more and more violence, they send the gangs to kill 
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economy, and especially its left traditions, has much less resistance to employing the 
analytical concept of imperialism. McNally, again, offers a compelling definition here 
that captures the broad historical dynamics of imperialism and presents a hel\pful 
framework for this study: 
Imperialism is a system of global inequalities and domination -
embodied in regimes of property, military power and global 
institutions - through which wealth is drained from the labour 
and resources of people in the Global South to the systematic 
advantage of capital in the North.27 
As David !Jarvey rightly notes, effective definitions of capitalism and imperialism have 
a tendency to overlap, and this is, in part, because contemporary capitalism cannot 
function without recourse to imperial projects that satisfy capital's constant, harrowing 
need for dynamic growth.28 
Of course, the claim that the contemporary world order is characterized by 
imperial relationships is significantly less controversial than it was when Cold War 
politics allowed the U.S. to justify its foreign adventures with the rhetoric of protecting 
its neighbours and allies from the "Soviet threat." However dubious those claims, the 
continued - arguably growing - impunity with which the U.S. intervenes around the 
world since the Cold War ended has made it more and more difficult to deny that it is an 
imperial power.29 Positioned at the centre of global capitalism, its overwhelming 
people. Sometimes when they kill somebody, they don't just kill them, they cut their body into small 
pieces and spread them out around the whole neighbourhood so everyone will see, so everyone is scared. 
Can you imagine? And then it's hard to just get everyone to sit down in one place because they are scared. 
So you see the problems we have even just to organize to protect our community." Interview with Edwin 
Espinal, May 5, 2012. 
27 David McNally, "Canada and Empire," New Socialist, No. 54, 2005/2006, p. 5. 
28 David Harvey, The New Imperialism, New York, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 26-33. 
29 Noam Chomsky, World Orders Old and New, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996. See also 
Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, New York, Henry Holt & 
Co., 2000. See also, V.G. Kiernan, America: The New Imperialism from White Settlement to World 
Hegemony, New York, Verso, 2005. 
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economic and military power gives it a disproportionate ability to set, shape, and break 
the rules of international politics as it sees fit, in the defence of what it defines as its 
national interest.30 It has become widely accepted that Washington's willingnes:s to 
exercise that power is an expression of global and hegemonic aspirations, which ar~ no 
longer defined solely by the direct occupation of territory. Even in mainstream s~cial 
science, this is increasingly, if grudgingly, understood as a new form of imperialism. 
While the Marxian political economy tradition has long maintained that imperialism is a 
central feature of capitalism,31 that willingness to name the process as "imperialism" is 
now also taken up by mainstream observers like Niall Ferguson and Michael lgnatieff, 
who, arguably, celebrate the re-emergence of openly imperial politics. lgnatieff, as noted 
in Chapter 1, actually champions Canadian impt::rialism as a kind of "empire lite" and ran 
as a Canadian Prime Ministerial candidate in 2011.32 It is notable that a prominent 
member of Canada's elite political class should produce one of the most significant 
intellectual justifications of contemporary imperialism, given Canada's emergence as a 
significant imperial power. 
Nevertheless, mainstream discussion of imperialism is typically superficial in its 
understanding of the phenomena and/or celebratory of its supposedly progressive project. 
It is only in the political economy tradition - and especially its Marxist-inspired varieti1es 
- that one finds robust and productive debates around the fundamental nature of 
30 Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 2004. See also David Harvey, The New Imperialism, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2003. See also Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World 
Dominance, New York, Verso, 1999. 
31 Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey, London, Routledge, 1980. 
32 Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 2002. Naill Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, London, 
Basic Books, 2002. Michael lgnatieff, Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, New 
York, Penguin, 2002. 
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imperialism as well as normative critique of its harmful and destructive logic and 
consequences. Greg Albo, drawing from Robert Cox and Kees van der Pijl, pioneers of 
the neo-Gramscian school of International Relations theory, argues: 
International relations cannot be examined apart from the world 
market. Economic exchanges and political relations between 
states are formally carried out between equals under the 'law of 
value' and the 'rule of law' - in the interstate system. The world 
market, however, is characterized by 'uneven and combined 
development' and the world order is characterized by a hierarchy 
of states. The study of international relations, then, is the study 
of how imperialism - the structure of political and economic 
domination in the world system - operates between formally 
sovereign entities ... in particular, it must study the way in which 
states and capitalist classes interact with global patterns of 
accumulation and trade and of military and diplomatic conflict. 33 
Honduras, central to the present study, provides a particularly useful example because it 
has been subject to many different forms of imperialism, ranging from the direct colonial 
occupation by the Spanish in the 16th century to the neo-colonial control exercised by 
Britain and the United States in the l 91h century:, to the regional domination of the Cold 
War American "sphere of influence" in the 20th century, all of which will be explored in 
detail in Chapters 3 and 4. In every case, in accord with McNally and Alba's comments 
above, political and especially economic power was held by the foreign metropole, 
assisted by a small cadre of local elite, and the levers of state power were twisted to the 
benefit of metropolitan conquerors and businesses seeking to exploit Honduran land and 
people in order to extract profits. 
It is with this latter form of imperialism that Canada has increasingly aligned 
itself, and it is the political economy tradition that has offered the most satisfactory 
33 Greg Alba, "Fewer Illusions: Canadian Foreign Policy Since 2001," in Jerome Klassen and Greg Albo, 
ed., Empire's Ally: Canada and the War in Afghanistan, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2013, p. 
245. 
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explanations of its dynamics. Dubbed "the ne:w imperialism" in its 21st century variety 
by David Harvey, it is best exemplified by the vigorous - and often violent - imposition 
of neoliberal governance on post-Soviet and Global South states, by their metropolitan 
counterparts, in an effort to create new spaces of potential profits for overaccumulated 
capital. That is, as capital repeatedly finds itself unable to feed its desperate desire for 
dynamic growth - and is thus at risk of slipping into stagnation and slump - it must find 
"new" sources of profits. The political agents of capital, then, will create these new 
spaces by dispossessing states and communities - especially in the Global South - of 
whatever wealth t~ey can, such that it can be snapped up and turned into profits for 
metropolitan capital. 34 The privatization of a state telecommunications company in Latin 
America, hitherto inaccessible to private accumulation, for instance, becomes a source of 
profitable investment for overaccumulated capital in the North, and if enough of these 
sorts of "fixes" can be created to keep capital growing, then recession and depression -
which always carry the prospect of a truly dramatic collapse - can frequently be staved 
off.35 
Naturally, this imperial project is usually undertaken with the cooperation of local 
agents, typically from some combination of the local oligarchy and/or the established 
political and military apparatus, which are willing to further the imperial project in order 
to, themselves, cash in on the benefits of working within what Ellen Wood calls the 
"empire of capital."36 Indeed, the idea that capital, itself, is an imperial overlord rightly 
points to the fact that, in the context of increasingly worrisome crises, capital finds itself 
34 Harvey, The New Imperialism. 
35 McNally, Global Slump, 61-85. 
36 Ellen Meiksins Wood, Empire of Capital, Verso, New York, 2003. 
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compelled towards ever more coordinated fom1s of class struggle.37 Neoliberalism, then, 
can be understood as a class project undertaken by global capital against the global 
working class, and its architecture (as manifest in the apparatus of international trade 
laws, the dictates of the WTO, IMF and World Bank, or in bilateral and multilateral free 
trade agreements) is designed to promote the interests of capital, whatever its national\ity. 
That said, as I will show in the Honduran case, imperialism always operates in 
specific circumstances, intervening in existing social and political formations, working to 
reshape them in unique ways by means of identifying and co-opting local allies and 
enlisting them in its cause. In that sense, it is a general phenomenon with a variety of 
distinct local manifestations. Moreover, the complexity of an imperialism that operates 
largely without direct territorial domination in an era of proliferating nation-states is that 
it necessarily involves intricate networks of collaboration and degrees of competition 
with the dominant imperial power. The dynamism of capitalism is propelled forward 
only by competition between capitals, even while global capital cooperates to manage its 
crises, and that competition is still regulated and shaped by politics and geography. 
CANADIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Within the political economy tradition, of course, there exist a variety of strands. 
This project will concern itself with the most significant tradition in Canadian political 
economy - which I will refer to as left nationalism - and the smaller but growing 
response to that position, of which this dissertation is a part. These two schools offer 
competing visions of the Canadian political and economic landscape that necessarily 
interact with questions of Canadian foreign policy and imperialism, which I will draw out 
37 Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance, New York, Verso, 
1999. See also David McNally, Global Slump: The Economics and Politics of Crisis and Resistance, 
Oakland, PM Press, 2011. 
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more concretely in the next section. The key question here is, fundamentally, whether 
Canada could be an imperialist power. For the left nationalists, Canada is understood as 
an economic dependency of the United States and, consequently, could not chart its own 
foreign policy even if it wanted to. It is in this sense that they earn the label "left 
nationalist," because their conclusions suggest that Canada needs first to assert its 
independence from the United States, in order to regain control of its own policies, which 
it could presumably then tum to better ends. 
Two central figures in the left nationalist tradition are Kari Levitt and Mel 
Watkins, whose work in the 1970s built on the small but significant early Canadian 
political economy pioneered by Harold Innis. Levitt and Watkins developed and adapted 
Innis' early description of Canada as being caught in a "staples trap" in which it produced 
only raw materials. These were exported at low prices to be converted into more 
valuable commodities in Britain or the United States and sold back to Canadians at higher 
prices. Levitt and Watkins asserted that Canada had become a full-fledged dependency 
of the United States and that its burgeoning industrial sector had been, by the 1970s, 
"hollowed out" by a systematic sell-off to U.S. capital. In the book that defined the left 
nationalist position, Kari Levitt's Silent Surrender, Levitt argues: 
In Canada economic resources are allocated primarily to suit the 
requirements of large private corporations, and the majority of 
these are under United States control... The Canadian 
entrepreneurs of yesterday are the coupon clippers and hired 
vice-presidents of branch plants of today ... Meaningful exercise 
of political democracy requires the freedom to fully shape 
Canadian institutions without fear of reprisal by vested corporate 
interest. This is doubly difficult when the power-base of those 
interests is located in the world's most nationalistic country with 
which we share 4,000 miles of backyard fence. 38 
38 Kari Levitt, Silent Surrender, MacMillan, Toronto, 1970, p. 39-40. 
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In other words, Canadian industries were predominantly owned by U.S. firms, which, for 
Levitt and Watkins, implied that the Canadian economy was profoundly dependent on 
U.S. capital and, as such, could potentially be subject to the kinds of imperial discipline 
often imposed on Global South states. 
This led them to the conclusion that Canada was a "rich dependency," cau~t in 
the dynamics that made Global South states beholden to the whims of U.S. policy, but 
uniquely privileged with pre-existing wealth that persisted in the commercial and 
financial sectors. Indeed, the key for Levitt and Watkins - and this argument was fleshed 
out by Daniel Drache, R.T. Naylor, Robert Laxer, Wallace Clement and others - was that 
the Canadian elite was maintaining its wealth by providing commercial and financial 
services to U.S. manufacturing firms, which had seized control of Canadian industry and 
pushed the rest of the Canadian capitalist class into the resource sector. As a result, these 
analyses concluded that Canada could not possibly chart its own policy programs 
independent of the United States since the Canadian economy relied so heavily on U.S. 
investment, which could be punitively withdrawn. In this version of Canadian 
dependency, the Canadian elite had to be understood as something like a rentier class, 
living largely from effective rent-seeking behaviour but typically not directly involved in 
capitalist production. 
Not surprisingly, these conclusions translated, politically, into an assertion that 
Canada needed to regain control of its own capitalist development. This was the 
argument that has earned this group the sometimes-pejorative label "left nationalist," 
since it called for a nationalist project that would take back Canadian assets, such that 
Canada would have the independence to chart a course towards social democracy or 
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socialism. Levitt was aware of the way this was perceived on the left, and looked to 
distance herself from the accusation of "retrogressive flag-waving nationalism. "39 
Nevertheless, her arguments reflected the logic that was regularly employed in Global 
South states that were caught in neo-colonial dynamics with the U.S. A number of Latin 
American countries, for instance, employed the import-substitution model in order to try 
to foster local capitalist development, ostensibly to establish the conditions wherieby 
popular movements would be able to force the state to take a different direction if they 
chose to.40 These were necessarily rooted in a kind of nationalistic project and typically 
mobilized nationalism in building popular support. But those projects also made some 
sense in the context of violent, colonial impositions. Anti-colonial nationalism was 
responding to more than just foreign ownership of local industry; it was an answer to a 
whole range of colonial practices and attitudes designed to assert the dominance of the 
colonizer over the colonized, politically, socially, economically, culturally, and in almost 
every other way imaginable.41 Anti-colonial nationalism, then, to the extent that it is an 
appropriate response to colonial domination, is legitimate because it is responding to a 
totalizing colonial subjugation. 
Thus, for a nationalist response to makt~ sense, one had to accept the idea that 
Canada was a colonized dependency of the United States. But there were many in the 
Canadian political economy tradition who did not even accept the premise that the 
Canadian economy was fully dependent on the United States, and they would certaimly 
39 Levitt, 37. 
40 Import-substitution industrialization was a practice adopted by a number of social democratic 
governments in Latin America, prior to the imposition of ncoliberalism, designed to foster industrial 
development such that foreign imports could be replaced by locally produced goods. 
41 For a sense of the history and dynamics of colonialism as a totalizing system, see Robert Young, 
Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, Oxford, Blackwell, 2001. 
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not buy the notion that Canada could be considered a colonized state. Indeed, to many 
observers, the comparison between Canada and Global South states was wrongheaded at 
best and offensive at worst. In 1975, Steve Moore and Debi Wells published a 
particularly useful critique of the left nationalist position in their short work Imperialism 
and the National Question in Canada, which asserted that Canada was, in fact, still 
significantly more powerful than most Global South countries and was part of a network 
of imperialist powers that were collectively dominating what was then called the 'Third' 
world. To Moore and Wells, the important question was whether Canada was being 
incorporated into the multinational network of imperial powers, centred around - but not 
necessarily subservient to - the United States, that were increasingly cooperating to tum 
the mechanisms of international organizations like the IMF and World Bank· to 
collectively dominate smaller, peripheral states. Indeed, Moore and Wells rightly insisted 
that, viewed in a global rather than continental perspective, the dynamics between 
Canada and the United States did not look so different from those between the U.S. and 
the European imperial powers. 42 That is, while Moore and Wells did not deny that 
Canadian capital did, to some extent, "depend" on its relationships and connections to the 
U.S. economy, they insisted that it be understood as part of the broader dynamics taking 
place among imperial powers: 
"Dependence" on U.S. imperialism is a general trend. It is most 
recognizable in Canada because the trend is more developed 
here. But Europe 'is increasingly facing the same problem ... the 
problem of "dependence" takes place within the context of inter-
imperialist rivalry. Previously, "dependence" has only been a 
phenomenon relating to the status of colonial countries; but 
today, it is an increasingly important aspect of the relations 
between big and small imperialist powers. Imperialist countries 
42 Steve Moore and Debi Wells, Imperialism and the National Question in Canada, Toronto, 1975, p. 21-
24. 
32 
are increasingly dependent on one another through the nexus of 
world trade, multilateral investments in the Third World, and the 
interpenetration of capital among imperial countries.43 
Indeed, Moore and Wells go on to document a variety of measures taken by imperial 
powers collectively to maintain the radically unequal character of global capitalism, and 
Canada consistently participated on the side of the imperial powers whether in the direct 
combining of capitals to dominate industries in the Global South, in the administration of 
international financial organizations like the Vv orld Bank that worked to maintain the 
architecture of global capitalism, or in its participation in military and diplomatic 
alliances with the imperial powers, as in the cases of NATO and NORAD. 
The key question is not whether Canada is a junior or senior 
partner (it is obviously a junior partner), but whether Canada is 
becoming an increasingly important component part of the 
imperialist system or whether Canada is being rejected by 
imperialism i.e., whether Canada is being forced into the status 
of a neo-colony. The above examples indicate that Canada is a 
part of the world imperialist system. 44 
Moore and Wells, then, were among the first to insist that Canada was becoming a 
secondary imperialist power, rightly (and presciently) noting that the particular dynamic 
of U.S. dominance over its imperialist rivals was, in the 1970s, reflective of the 
specificities of the U.S. project of global supremacy. That is, Canada was not uniquely or 
colonially subservient to the United States. Rather, it was one of a number of smaUer 
imperial powers experiencing the assertion of U.S. power within the imperialist camp, an 
assertion that was directed primarily at the growing power of Germany and Japan, and 
that is well documented in Peter Gowan's The Global Gamble.45 Indeed, Moore and 
43 Moore and Wells, 28-29. 
44 Moore and Wells, 3 7. 
45 Gowan argues, quite convincingly, that the U.S. state worked to reconfigure the architecture of global 
capitalism and international relations in the 1970s to make itself an indispensable component of the 
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Wells' work was supported by several Marxist-inspired analyses, which insisted that 
Canada only appeared "underdeveloped" if compared to the United States. In a special 
issue of Studies in Political Economy, both Leo Panitch and David McNally critiqued the 
left nationalist position. Panitch argued that Levitt and Watkins failed to take seriously 
the internal class dynamics that made Canada profoundly different from Global South 
states; as a settler colony with well-established capitalist social relations directly plugged 
into the British - and later the U.S. - economy, Canada had a high-wage working ~lass 
even while U.S. investment poured in. 
American capital came to Canada to secure raw materials, and to 
use Canada as a staging post for exports to the British Empire; it 
did not come in search of cheap labour (in which case it would 
have gone to Mexico or at least much more to Quebec than 
Ontario). But it also came ... to realise surplus value, to secure 
the sale of manufactured goods in Canada's domestic market. 
This was manifestly a different situation from that in Latin 
America where American investment was overwhelmingly 
"supply oriented. "46 
McNally, for his part, offered a critique of Harold Innis' "staples" argument and 
noted that the emphasis that Levitt and Watkins had placed on the "staples" economy 
missed the more important point that Canadian capital in the resource sectors· was 
expanding. For McNally, the claim that Canada was caught in a "staples trap" was an 
example of commodity fetishism, since it took the commodity itself as significant (i.e. it 
drew structural conclusions from the fact that the commodities in question were raw 
materials) rather than critically examining the process and relations of production, which 
functioning of global capitalism. According to Gowan and, later, David Harvey, this was a manifestation 
of inter-imperialist rivalry, undertaken in the context of a significant stagnation of U.S. growth in the l 97;0s 
and the concurrent rise of Germany and Japan as competitors that threatened to outpace the United States. 
Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance, New York, Verso, 
1999. 
46 Leo Panitch, "Dependency and Class in Canadian Political Economy," Studies in Political Economy No. 
6, Autumn, 1981, p. 18. 
34 
revealed a far more advanced capitalist dynamic than Innis - and later Levitt and Watkins 
- imagined. In their approach, as McNally argued, "it is the staple commodities 
themselves that dictate the patterns of historical development and social organization."47 
The presence of dynamic capitalist social relations in mining and energy, for instance, 
undermined the idea that Canada was being "underdeveloped" in the ways that 
dependency theorists had claimed was happening to Latin America. As McNally 
concluded: 
Reliance upon the staple thesis of Harold Innis has directed 
attention away from the kind of questions that should occupy 
centre stage in such a process of inquiry and analysis. It is high 
time that the fetishistic preoccupation with staples was 
abandoned in favour of a concentration on class formation and 
capitalist development in Canada. 48 
William Carroll would take up this point (indeed, he would later detail the 
emergence of "prairie capitalism" centred around resource extraction in Alberta, 
supporting McNally's critique of the "staples" thesis)49 and he, along with Jorge Niosi 
and Bill Burgess, produced a series of crucially important studies, spanning the 1980s, 
1990s and 2000s, on Canadian capitalism and Canadian corporate networks. That work 
consistently demonstrated that, by at least the mid-1980s, a Canadian national capitalist 
class controlled the majority of assets in the Canadian economy and was beginning to 
expand into foreign markets, a point which grew more and more clear as time passed. 50 
The significance of this work, for the present study of Canadian foreign policy, was to 
demonstrate - in concrete terms - that there existed a uniquely Canadian capitalist class 
47 David McNally, "Staple Theory as Commodity Fetishism: Marx, Innis and Canadian Political 
Economy," Studies in Political Economy, No. 6, Autumn, 1981, p. 46. 
48 McNally, "Staple Theory," p. 57. 
49 William K. Carroll, Corporate Power in a Globalizing World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 
88-106. 
50 William K. Carroll, "The Canadian Corporate Elite: Financiers or Finance Capitalists?" Studies in 
Political Economy, No. 8, Autumn, 1982, p. 106-109. 
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which could exert its own pressure on the Canadian state; both domestic and foreign 
policy could be pursued for the purposes of Canadian capital, rather than simply being an 
extra arm for the United States. Niosi's comprehensive assessment of Canadian 
capitalism concluded: 
The Canadian bourgeoisie plays a dominant role in Canada, in 
the private sector, where it controls at least 70 per cent of all 
corporate assets, as well as in the public sector, where most 
government-owned corporations are run by this Canadian 
capitalist class and its key advisors .... almost all of the families, 
individuals and partnership groups in control of large Canadian 
corporations have their roots in the nineteenth century or the 
period of [Canadian] economic expansion that lasted from 1896 
to 1929. Canada does not belong to foreign capital; each year, 
between two thirds and three quarters of the investments made in 
the country are made by companies controlled by the Canadian 
bourgeoisie. 51 
I will return to the matter of actual Canadian foreign policy in this period, but for now it 
is worth emphasizing that what this scholarship did was establish- contrary to the Levitt-
Watkins camp - that it was possible for Canada to pursue its own independent policies, a 
point made consistently and clearly by William Carroll. 52 
The debate has not, however, been put to rest. In fact, the late 2000s saw a 
significant re-emergence of the "left nationalist" analysis, in the work of Mel Hurtig, 
Mario Seccarachia, Andrew Jackson and especially Linda McQuaig, whose 2007 Holding 
the Bully's Coat is one of the most popular left analyses of Canada's foreign policy 
today. Fearing that Canada was slipping into a peripheral or colonial status, they argued 
that Canada had been sold out by a comprador elite that had allowed the U.S. to dominate 
Canadian industry and, as a result, to exert powerful influence over Canadian policy. 
51 Jorge Niosi, Canadian Capitalism: A Study of Power in the Canadian Business Establishment, Toronto, 
James Lorimer and Co., 1981, p. 2, 16. 
52 William K. Carroll, Corporate Power and Canadian Capitalism, Vancouver, University of British 
Columbia Press, 1986. 
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Fundamental to this position was the question of "the freedom of action that Canada 
possesses," and the assumption that that freedom was limited by U.S. ownership of 
Canadian enterprises.53 R.T. Naylor, still convinced that Canada was a "dependent" of 
the U.S., maintained in a 2006 update of his History of Canadian Business that 
dependence was "addictive" and that - once set into motion during a flawed transition 
from mercantilism to industrialization in the pre-war era - U.S. dominance of Canadian 
industry would never be reversed. 54 
If McQuaig is the most notable popular expression of this resurgent left 
nationalist position; its most important intellectual document is the 2007 collection 
Whose Canada? edited by Ricardo Grinspun and Yasmine Shamsie. To be sure, Whose 
Canada? is an impressive collection, which documents the deep integration of Canadian 
and U.S. economic and political affairs since 2001 and offers a much more complicated 
set of arguments than McQuaig, going far beyond simple bourgeois nationalism. 55 ,. That 
said, across a series of essays that reflect a spectrum of critical and less-critical 
perspectives on Canadian foreign policy, the contributors consistently assert that Canada 
lacks. "policy freedom" and insist that Canada needs a project to reassert its sovereignty 
and democracy. Bruce Campbell calls Canada a "colonial supplicant,"56 Murray Dobbin 
claims that we are in the final stage of the "assimilation of the Canadian economy into 
53 Mel Watkins, "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth," in G. Laxer, ed., Perspectives on Canadian 
Economic Development, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 96. 
54 R.T. Naylor, History of Canadian Business 1867-1914, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 2006. 
55 McQuaig' s arguments presuppose a Canadian state that would behave differently - that is, better - if it 
weren't caught up in the necessity of facilitating U.S. imperialism. Thus she is committed to a politics that 
accepts the imagination of a "good" Canada that could be the "helpful fixer" it naturally wants to be. Limda 
McQuaig, Holding the Bully's Coat: Canada and the U.S. Empire, Toronto, Doubleday, 2007. 
56 Bruce Campbell, "Managing US-Canada Relations: An Alternative to Deep Integration," in Ricardo 
Grinspun and Yasmine Shamsie, ed., Whose Canada? Continental Integration, Fortress North America 
and the Corporate Agenda, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007, p. 530. 
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that of the U.S.,"57 and Elizabeth May, then-leader of Canada's Green Party, worries with 
Sarah Dover that "Canadian environmental law [is] unguarded against motivated U.S. 
corporate lobby interests. "58 
May and Dover imagine Canadian politics to be "addicted" to free trade, as 
though all that was needed was more enlightened leadership to de-link Canada from 
global capitalism, and many other authors emphasize the rightward tum of the Liberal 
Party in the early 2000s as a great political "mistake" that continues to harm the Canadian 
polity. Marjorie Griffin Cohen declares that the U.S. is an imperial overlord of Mexico 
and Canada, and even goes as far as to suggest that Mexico may be better equipped in 
some sectors to defend itself against U.S. imperialism than Canada.59 Garry Neil's 
uncompelling lament for "Canadian culture" suggests that U.S. dominance of the 
Canadian economy has given American cultural producers the power to squeeze out their 
Canadian counterparts;60 while it is certainly true that the commodification of art and 
culture leads to a homogenizing of the corporate popular culture that is produced, the 
claim that this is an American assault on Canadian culture misses the point that it is a 
commodified mass culture dominating local and independent culture, regardless of 
nationality. 
57 Murray Dobbin, "Challenging the Forces of Deep Integration," in Ricardo Grinspun and Yasmine 
Shamsie, Whose Canada? Continental Integration, Fortress North America and the Corporate Agenda, 
Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007, p. 503. 
58 Elizabeth May and Sarah Dover, "Breaking the Free Trade Addiction: An Intervention on Environmental 
Grounds," in Ricardo Grinspun and Yasmine Shamsie, Whose Canada? Continental Integration, Fortress 
North America and the Corporate Agenda, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007, p. 432. 
59 Marjorie Griffin Cohen, "Imperialist Regulation: US Electricity Market Designs and their Problems for 
Canada and Mexico," in Ricardo Grinspun and Yasmine Shamsie, Whose Canada? Continental 
Integration, Fortress North America and the Corporate Agenda, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University 
Press, 2007, p. 439-459. 
60 Garry Neil, "Free Trade and Deep Integration in North America: Saving Canadian Culture," in Ricardo 
Grinspun and Yasmine Shamsie, Whose Canada? Continental Integration, Fortress North America and the 
Corporate Agenda, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007, p. 371-389. 
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Other essays in the collection offer significantly weightier arguments around the 
problem of American domination of Canadian politics. Steven Staples' piece on deep 
integration, for instance, gets a number of points right, correctly highlighting the extent to 
which U.S. and Canadian military and security policies have been harmonized.61 
Nevertheless, Staples, too, insists on a re-assertion of Canadian sovereignty, failing to 
grapple with the fact that it is Canadian capital and the Canadian state that have chosen to 
enter into this harmonization. Grinspun and Shamsie, for their part, offer the most sober 
perspective in the collection, demonstrating that the integration of Canadian and U.S. 
politics has been carried out by and for the capitalist classes in both countries and that it 
is working people on both sides of the border who are increasingly hurting. However, in 
spite of its many strengths, their work remains committed to a position that imagines U.S. 
corporate power dominating Canadian politics, noting that "in this volume we pay 
particular attention to the loss of policy autonomy resulting from trade and investment 
agreements."62 
Nevertheless, the evidence for these claims is considerably shakier than it was in 
the 1970s; scanning the work of John Porter in the 1960s, Wallace Clement in the 1970s, 
and Peter Newman in the 1980s, Jerome Klassen demonstrates that Canadian capital was 
increasingly concentrated following the Second World War and that process of 
concentration accelerated during the 1980s, a decade in which there were 7732 merge;rs 
61 Steven Staples, "Fortress North America: The Drive Towards Military and Security Integration and its 
Impact on Canadian Democratic Sovereignty," in Ricardo Grinspun and Yasmine Shamsie, Whose 
Canada? Continental Integration, Fortress North America and the Corporate Agenda, Montreal, McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2007, p. 154-180. 
62 Ricardo Grinspun and Yasmine Shamsie, "Canada, Free Trade, and "Deep Integration," in Ricardo 
Grinspun and Yasmine Shamsie, Whose Canada? Continental Integration, Fortress North America and the 
Corporate Agenda, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007, p. 5. 
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and acquisitions in the Canadian economy. 63 That is, the ownership of Canadian firms 
became increasingly interlocked and concentrated in the hands of a small, powerful 
Canadian capitalist class. 64 Indeed, according to William Carroll's critical 2004 study of 
the Canadian corporate elite, Corporate Power in a Globalizing World, Canada's largest 
250 firms have typically had fewer than 500 different individuals on their boards of 
directors, making the Canadian national bourgeoisie one of the most concentrated in any 
advanced capitalist economy;65 in fact, Canadian firms have a much higher concentration 
of controlling shareholders than does the United States, and have a relatively small 
number of transnational ownership links that interrupt the intra-Canadian matrix of 
ownership. 66 The overlapping and interlocking networks of corporate ownership, 
reproduced graphically in Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, demonstrate the fact that Canada 
hosts what could arguably be called an oligarchy, a small network of incredibly powerful 
and wealthy capitalists who, by virtue of their concentration of corporate power, exert 
significant pressure on the Canadian state. 67 Put simply, the fact that a small number of 
individuals personally control most of Canada:·s wealth makes it very easy for those 
individuals to organize themselves to marshal their collective resources to influence and 
infiltrate the state. 
63 Jerome Klassen, "Canada and the New Imperialism: The Economics of a Secondary Power," Studies in 
Political Economy, No. 83, 2009, p. 180-181. 
64 Murray E.G. Smith, "Political Economy and the Canadian Working Class: Marxism or Nationalist 
Reformism?," Labour/Le Travail, No. 46, Fall, 2000, p. 343-368. 
65 William K. Carroll, Corporate Power in a Globalizing World: A Study in Elite Social Organization, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 17 
66 B. Burgess, quoted in Carroll, Corporate Power in a Globalizing World, p. 44. 
67 I've also included, as Figure 2.4, William Carroll's breakdown of the social composition of the Canadian 
corporate elite, in order to highlight a point that is not explored in this dissertation: that the concentrated 
Canadian capitalist class is overwhelmingly composed of Anglo-Saxon men. Since this point is not raised 
elsewhere, it is worth simply noting that while a more gender-equitable and multi-ethnic capitalist class 
would not, in my opinion, lead to a less violent or imperialist politics, it is nevertheless significant that 
Canadian imperialism is driven by the needs of primarily white men, while its painful and exploitative 
consequences fall disproportionately on women and racialized people. This dynamic adds even greater 
weight to the argument that Canada has embarked on what must be understood as a form of imperialism. 
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Figure 2.1: Intercorporate Ownership Among Top Canadian Corporations, 1996. 68 
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Figure 2.2: Individuals and Corporations in the Network of Thick Inte~personal Ties, 
1996.69 
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Figure 2.3: The Network of Canadian TNCs, 1996.70 
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Figure 2.4: A Social Profile of the Canadian Corporate Elite, 1976 and 1996.71 
Percentage of elite who were ... 1976 1996 
Women 0.6 9.2 
British background 77.9 63.8 
French background 12.7 18.3 
Other background 9.3 17.6 
Members of one or more elite club(s) 89.9 54.3 
Over 65 years old 21.9 30.5 
Without a bachelor's degree 27.3 15.4 
With MBAs or MComms 4.8 13.7 
With other post-baccalaureate or professional degrees 38.5 50.7 
Furthermore, with respect to the left nationalist fear of foreign ownership, Jerome 
Klassen demonstrates that, by 2007, Canada's GDP was the ninth largest in the world a.nd 
U.S. firms only owned around 12% of Canadian assets.72 As noted above, Canadian 
firms have relatively few foreign interruptions in their ownership networks, especially the 
largest and most profitable among them, and this dynamic has been steadily increasing 
since the early 1980s.73 Indeed, Klassen re-asserts Moore and Wells' early claim that 
trade between Canada and the United States would be better understood as similar to 
trade between European powers, and that U.S.-Canadian trade has actually served to 
strengthen the Canadian capitalist class vis-a-vis other international competitors. By 
2006, Canada was the ninth highest source of FD I flows in the world, and Canadian firms 
had more money invested abroad than there was foreign capital invested in Canada. 
While in 2006 around $500 billion in Canadian assets were ·owned by foreign firms, 
71 Table adapted from William K. Carroll, Corporate Power,, p. 18. 
72 Klassen, "Canada and the New Imperialism," p. 177-179. 
73 Todd Gordon, Imperialist Canada, Winnipeg, Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 2010, p. 17. 
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almost $515 billion in foreign assets were owne:d by Canadian firms, pointing towards the 
fact that as the Canadian bourgeoisie has consolidated it has looked outward in order to 
cash in on the spoils of neoliberal globalization. 74 According to Statistics Canada, 
Canada recorded more than a $100 billion surplus in net FDI in 2008, as the graph in 
Figure 2.5 demonstrates. 
Figure 2.5. Net Foreign Direct Investment in Canada75 
Rumours of the demise of the Canadian capitalist class, then, were highly 
exaggerated. To the extent that critical scholarship in international relations addressed 
74 Jerome Klassen, "Canada and the New Imperialism," p. 177. 
75 Paul Kellogg, "From the A vro Arrow to Afghanistan: The Political Economy of Canadian Militarism," in 
Jerome Klassen and Greg Albo, ed., Empire's Ally: Canada and the War in Afghanistan, Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 2013, p. 205. 
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questions of political economy, it noticed the increasing convergence of Canadian forieign 
policy and the needs of it's business elite: Fred Judson noted in 2003 that one member of 
the Chretien government had claimed as early as the mid-1990s that "foreign policy 'is' 
trade policy."76 Indeed, as Carroll and Klassen concluded in 2010: 
Kari Levitt was, as subsequent research showed, entirely wrong 
in her prediction that the Canadian capitalist class would become 
a powerless elite of branch plant managers and coupon clippers. 
She was equally wrong in projecting into the future the late-
1960s hegemony of American capital, as in her prediction that by 
the year 2000 U.S.-based corporations would control 75% of 
. 1· Id 77 capita 1st wor output. 
In fact, in 2008, Canada recorded its first ever surplus in bilateral FDI with the United 
States, investing some $17 billion more in the U.S. than it did in Canada.78 Indeed, as 
Todd Gordon notes, the Canadian capitalist class itself is rather proud of its 
accomplishments and would hardly take seriously the idea that it had been "hollowed 
out." A University of Toronto-based corporate think-tank claimed that, in 2006, seventy-
two Canadian firms were among the "global leaders," up from thirty-three in 1985, 
cutting across a wide variety of sectors beyond simply resource extraction.79 
Even if U.S. ownership of Canadian asst:~ts was greater, it is not self-evident that 
Canada could be called a "dependency;" as Paul Kellogg argued in 2005, foreign 
76 Roy MacLaren, quoted in Fred Judson, "For an Eclectic and Critical Political Economy Perspective on 
Canadian Foreign Economic Policy," Studies in Political Economy, Vol. 71/72, Autumn 2003/Winter 2004, 
p. 109. In addition to Judson, a handful of other critical int1;!mational relations scholars pointed to the 
convergence of political and economic questions in Canadian foreign policy in the 90s and 2000s, often 
through the lens of gender analysis and post-positivist critical security studies, including: Mark Neufeld, 
"Democratization in/of Canadian Foreign Policy: Critical Reflections," Studies in Political Economy, Vol. 
58 (Spring 1999), pp. 97-119. Sandra Whitworth, "Women and Gender in the Foreign Policy Review 
Process," in M. Cameron and M. Appel Molot, (ed.), Canada Among Nations 1995: Democracy and 
Foreign Policy, Ottawa, Carleton University Press, 1995. Deborah Stienstra, "Can the Silence be Broken? 
Gender and Canadian Foreign Policy," International Journal 50 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 103-127. 
77 William K. Carroll and Jerome Klassen, "Hollowing out Corporate Canada? Changes in the Corporate 
Network since the 1990s," Canadian Journal of Sociology, 35 {I), 2010, p. 26. 
78 Todd Gordon, Imperialist Canada, p. 22. 
79 The criteria for the list included, among other things, revenues of over $100 million and being among the 
top 5 most profitable firms in its market sector. Todd Gordon, Imperialist Canada, p. 20. 
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ownership of Canadian industry does not have the same effect as it does in the low wage 
economies of the Global South. Rather, U.S. investment in Canada is better understood 
as being about a broader continental integration and cooperation than domination. In 
fact, it is an integration that Canada has actively sought out, often from a position of 
some strength, in order to better advance its own interests. Indeed, the deep integration 
that Canada has sought with the United States has been a conscious and active strategy of 
Canadian foreign policy since the Second World War, a point carefully and thoughtfully 
articulated by Henry Heller in a review article in Historical Materialism,80 and it is here 
that I intend to tum my attention to applying this political economic approach to the 
realm of foreign policy. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Canadian foreign policy is typically assessed through the two leading traditions in 
mainstream Canadian political science and international relations, realism and liberalism, 
with the latter supplemented by a social democratic tradition that draws from the left 
nationalist politics described above. This section will briefly address and critique those 
three approaches before applying a critical political economy framework to the history of 
Canadian foreign policy, with the aim of building a more convincing explanation for the 
dramatic changes that have been manifest in Canadian policy over the past decade.81 
80 Henry Heller, "Review of Todd Gordon, Imperialist Canada," Historical Materialism 20.2, 2012, p. 228-
230. 
81 Among the best examples of mainstream approaches to Canadian foreign policy, not including those I 
will take up in the text, are: David Dewitt and John Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power, Toronto, Wiley, 
1983. Maxwell Cameron, "Round Table on Canadian Foreign Policy," Canadian Foreign Policy 6 (3) 
1999, p. 1-24. Tom Keating, "Introduction: The Sources of Multilateralism in Canadian Foreign Policy," 
Canada and World Order, 2°d ed., Toronto, OUP, 2002, p. 1-17. Lloyd Ax.worthy, Navigating a New 
World: Canada's Global Future, Toronto, Knopf, 2003. Jennifer Welsh, At Home in the World: Canada's 
Global Vision for the 2F1 Century, Toronto, Harper Collins, 2004. John Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy 
in a Changing World, Toronto, Thomson Nelson, 2007. Of course, there's no better source for mainstream 
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Notwithstanding the different analytical and normative approaches, the thread that 
connects most mainstream and academic understandings of Canadian foreign policy is 
the assumption that Canada has been primarily engaged in the world as a well-intentioned 
force for "good" and that what we need to assess is whether its methods have been 
effective. That is, they present no doubt that Canada means well; the only question is 
whether, and when, its efforts have been successful. 
This is easily observed in any high school or undergraduate-level textbook on 
Canadian history, Canadian politics, or Canadian foreign policy. Take Democracy, 
Diversity and Good Government, an introductory text co-authored by three Canadian 
academics in 2011, which arguably represents a relatively progressive version of 
mainstream discourse on Canadian politics. While the chapter on foreign policy offers a 
few tentative critiques of Canada's retreat from peacekeeping and notes the decline in 
Canadian development assistance programs,82 it nevertheless ascribes to Canada a long-
term - almost innate - desire to do good and, :furthermore, assumes that the rest of the 
world agrees with that assessment. 
Throughout much of the world, Canada enjoys a reputation as a 
country that promotes international harmony, peace, and global 
order. . . Canada as a "middle power" tries to constrain the great 
powers by encouraging (particularly in cooperation with other 
middle powers) the development of international law and 
multilateral organizations such as tht~ United Nations. Through 
such organizations, the great powers can be encouraged to 
respect rules and laws that less powerful countries like Canada 
have a hand in shaping. Canada, particularly during the time 
[Lester] Pearson served as External Affairs minister, became 
analysis of Canadian foreign policy than actual foreign policy statements and newspaper and magazine 
reporting on them, from which this dissertation will draw extensively. 
82 Of course, both of these activities would, themselves, be critiqued by left and postcolonial scholarship for 
being liberal manifestations of colonial politics that assume:s Canada should "help" other countries 
"develop" even while Canada participates in the construction of conditions that create the need for such 
assistance. 
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known as the "helpful fixer" of international problems through 
the use of quiet diplomacy. 83 
Indeed, while the text mentions that peacekeeping has been marginalized in Canadian 
policy for nearly twenty years, it nevertheless introduces the chapter with a special 
feature on Lester Pearson, his 1957 Nobel Peace Prize, and Canada's peacekeeping 
legacy. The assumption that Canada means well in the world is woven into every debate 
that the authors present, and their conclusion is particularly telling: 
Canada's experiences in meeting the challenges of democracy, 
diversity, and good government provide an opportunity for the 
country to take its place in the world as a model for other 
countries striving to satisfy similar goals and aspirations. 84 
Indeed, as with Michael Ignatieff s remarks cited in the previous chapter, the voices that 
set the tone for mainstream understandings of Canadian foreign policy assume that 
Canada has successfully solved the problems of democracy and good governance and 
should now turn to the task of "teaching" everyone else how to do it. This logic will be 
manifest in much of the discourse about Canada and Honduras, and I will address the 
problems and contradictions in this perspective throughout this dissertation. 
Of course, within mainstream discourse on Canadian policy, there are competing 
visions. Greg Albo and Paul Kellogg each offer very useful overviews of the traditional 
readings of Canadian foreign policy in their respective chapters in Empire's Ally, the very 
important 2013 assessment of Canada's occupation of Afghanistan. According to 
Kellogg: 
For liberalism, war and militarism are ethical issues, mistaken 
economically, dangerous politically-· mistakes and dangers that 
can be 'read out' of the international system through appropriate 
83 Eric Mintz, Livianna Tossutti, and Christopher Dunn, Democracy, Diversity, and Good Government: An 
Introduction to Politics in Canada, Toronto, Pearson, 2011:, p. 496. 
84 Mintz, Tossutti, and Dunn, Democracy, Diversity and Good Government, p. 520-521. 
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policies and institutions. Their pessimistic friends in the realist 
tradition disagree. For realism, states are the key unit of the 
international system. States operate, in an anarchic international 
environment, to maximize their own power and position. The 
ultimate instrument of state policy in this competitive 
environment is the milit~. Realistic policy is about preparing 
for war, not eliminating it. 5 
These two intellectual positions are manifest in Canada also as a division between the 
Conservative and Liberal parties, who more or less accept the understanding of their 
respective intellectual traditions and apply them to policy-making, with the New 
Democratic Party walking a line between the liberal vision and the left nationalists. As 
such, Conservatives in Canada will tend towards a more militaristic posture and seek 
integration with the U.S. only insofar as it seems to offer better prospects for the security 
and defence of Canadian assets. Liberals, by contrast, place more emphasis on 
accomplishing the goals of Canadian capital by employing a spectrum of institutions -
from aid agencies to diplomatic missions to international organizations - in order to 
support Canadian capital without resorting to military force unless absolutely necessary. 
The NDP are even less willing to support military adventurism, fearful of the 
marginalization of Canadian goals to the needs of the United States, with a reading of 
·Canadian interests that includes, at least minimally, working people as well as capital. It 
is, of course, a deeply contradictory position that the NDP finds itself attempting to carve 
out; on the one hand, it acknowledges that increased military spending cuts into state 
support for working people and community organizations and public services. 
Nevertheless, it simultaneously accepts, to a certain extent, the logic that Canadian wars 
abroad are necessary, either for "national security" or to promote "freedom and free 
trade," which would bring benefits to Canadian capital and will trickle down to Canadian 
85 Paul Kellogg, Empire's Ally, p. 182. 
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workers. 86 In addition to being logically incoherent, this position necessarily prioritizes 
the needs of Canadian workers above working people from other countries, insofar as the 
NDP is willing to support a collusion of the Canadian military and exploitative 
corporations abroad in the hopes that a stronger Canadian economy will bring advantages 
to Canadian workers.87 For obvious reasons, this has alienated the NDP (and a variety of 
closely affiliated social democratic organizations, including the majority of the organized 
labour movement) from those left organizations that seek trustworthy allies in principled 
opposition to Canadian imperialism. 88 
Progressive political economy, then, is uniquely positioned to respond to the 
rather muddled debates between realists, liberals and social democrats by offering a 
coherent analysis - and a principled normative critique - of the shifts in Canadian foreign 
policy. That analysis usually sees the period from Confederation to the Second Wqrld 
War as being largely about carving out space for an independent Canadian foreign policy 
- independent from Great Britain, that is - and achieving that goal more or less by the 
86 The NDP has been moving in this direction since at least the ascendance of Jack Layton as party leader, 
and the rightward drift has only increased since he passed away in 2011. This is well documented by 
Murray Cooke, who reflected on the 2013 NDP Convention: "like the federal Liberal Party leadership race, 
the NDP policy convention this past weekend proved to be rather anti-climactic. Any expectations (or 
hopes) for a divisive, soul-searching, battle royale over the identity of the NDP fell flat. With minimal 
debate and a decisive vote of 960 to 188, delegates approved a new preamble to the party's constitution 
based in part on Jack Layton's final message to Canadians and removed forward looking references to 
"democratic socialism" and "social ownership." Instead, the new preamble lists the "social democratic and 
democratic socialist traditions" as part of the party's heritage and calls for "a rules based economy." 
Murray Cooke, "The NDP Convention: The Decline and Fall of an Old Preamble (Or A Social Democratic 
Party Becalmed)," The Bullet, No. 807, April 18, 2013. Indeed, as the Liberal Party reorganizes itself 
under the younger, hipper leadership of Justin Trudeau, the current trajectory suggests that the Liberals and 
NDP will continue to split the anti-Conservative vote, which could prompt calls for a merger between them 
to defeat Stephen Harper. 
87 This is a position that Kim Scipes, referring to the AFL-CIO in the United States, calls "labour 
imperialism." Kim Scipes, AFL-CIO 's Secret War against Developing Country Workers: Solidarity or 
Sabotage?, Toronto, Lexington Books, 2010. 
88 Indeed, the NDP in 2013 dropped any references to "socialism" in its party program, even as frustrated 
working people in Canada were demonstrating more and more appetite for discussion of non-capitalist 
alternatives. Rick Salutin, "NDP ditches socialist 'albatross' just when it might be an asset," Toronto Star, 
April 19, 2013. 
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end of the war, after the Canadian state demonstrated its willingness and ability to send 
its own working class people to their deaths in Europe. At the outbreak of WWI, then 
Prime Minister Robert Borden used the war to try to increase his say in British politics; 
the Dominion of Canada sent some 500,000 soldiers to war - about 1 of every 16 
Canadians - and over 60,000 of them never returned. 89 Most were conscripted -
sacrificed by the Canadian state against their will - to fight for Great Britain, after 
Borden and the Leader of the Opposition Wilfred Laurier enthusiastically declared, "our 
answer [to the outbreak of war] goes at once, and it goes in the classical language of the 
British answer to the call of duty: Ready, Aye, Ready!"90 Indeed, Canada was even 
willing to intervene in the Russian Revolution to assert its role in international politics, 
though it is worth noting that the interests of private capital were present in Canadian 
statecraft even then; Canada invaded Russia in 1917 at Archangel and Murmansk and, in 
1919, an army of nearly 5000 Canadians land1~d in Siberia to try to destroy the new 
workers' state.91 Joining the mission was Canadian Trade and Commerce official Dana 
Wilgress, who, as two Canadian historians put it, "had great hopes for a huge Russian 
market after the Revolution was defeated."92 The defeat of Russia's revolution did not 
work out, but nevertheless, at the end of two gre:at wars, Britain was exhausted, Canada 
had asserted its independence, and the U.S. was unquestionably at the head of the 
capitalist world. Subsequently, Canada's foreign policy would seek to cultivate the 
"Middle Power" image, actively protecting its independence by working to establish an 
international architecture that would allow for Canadian capitalist development. 
89 Mintz, Tossutti, and Dunn, Democracy, Diversity and Good Government, p. 507. 
90 Wilfred Laurier, quoted in Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, Empire to Umpire, Toronto, Irwin 
Publishing, 1994, p. 53. 
91 Yves Engler, The Black Book of Canadian Foreign Policy, Black Point, Femwood, 2009, p. 258-259. 
92 Hillmer and Granatstein, Empire to Umpire, p. 70. 
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As such, the immediate post-war moment in Canadian foreign policy was 
characterized most dramatically by the push for the creation of NATO. Indeed, far from 
being roped into an American project, Canada was a driving force behind the creation of 
the organization. The hope was that NATO would serve to strengthen Canapa's 
independence by creating an infrastructure that would protect Canada from being folded 
into the United States. Paul Kellogg, drawing from important empirical work by Jon 
Mclin and Tom Axworthy that examined Canadian-U.S. diplomatic relations in the late 
1940s, demonstrates conclusively that it was Canada, not the U.S., which pushed hardest 
for the creation of NATO. Lester Pearson, then Minister of External Affairs, was clear 
about the advantages NA TO held for Canada, arguing that a defence treaty including :the 
North American and European powers: 
would help to ensure that Canada was not pushed out ahead of 
the United States in the event of war. In the last two wars 
Canada has gone to war more than two years before the United 
States. A treaty commitment by th€:: United States instead of a 
congressional resolution would lessen the danger that this might 
happen again. 93 
Indeed, a 1948 visit to Ottawa by the U.S. Secretary of Defence elicited his surprise at the 
"curious fact" that Canada was pushing fervently the idea for a North Atlantic alliance.94 
That Canada should have been the driving force behind the agreement suggests not 
dependence but, rather, an active strategy for protecting its independence. 
Indeed, NATO served to facilitate the shift in Canadian foreign policy to what 
Kellogg calls "military parasitism," which characterized most of the post-war era. With 
defence alliances firmly in place with the United States, Canada could rely on the U.S. 
Cold War machine to protect western access to markets in its "sphere of influence" 
93 Lester Pearson, cited in Paul Kellogg, Empire's Ally, p. 189. 
94 Paul Kellogg, Empire's Ally, p. 189. 
53 
without maintaining the high military budgets that characterized the U.S. and Soviet 
Union during that period. Indeed, while Canada still maintained a high military budget in 
the early 1950s, and was an active participant in the Korean War, the following two 
decades saw a significant tum away from military spending; in 1951 the military 
represented some 40% of Canadian state expenditure, but by 1971 it was down to aroµnd 
10%.95 Indeed, the story of the scuttling of Canada's "Avro Arrow" project - and the 
concurrent dismantling of Canada's defence industry in the 1950s- is often characteriized 
in Canadian popular culture as a defeat; the story is told as inept Canadian politicians 
colluding with foreign (especially U.S.) military industrialists to bring down a project that 
provided jobs for Canadians and guaranteed military independence. However, this 
episode would be better understood as a strategic decision to re-orient Canadian industry 
away from military aerospace in a moment when there was no real foreign market for its 
products; the only buyer for the Arrow would have been the Canadian military, and with 
U.S. protection guaranteed, Canadian capital stood to gain much more by developing 
alternative industries and keeping a low military budget in order to sustain a welfare state 
that would feed Canadian growth during the heyday of the Keynesian "golden age." 
Arguments that Canadian foreign and military policy was dominated by the 
United States sometimes point to the Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA), 
signed in 1959, as an example of this; on the surface, the agreement locked Canada into 
full integration between the two countries, in tem1s of military production, and meant that 
the direction of Canadian production was dictated by the needs of the U.S. military.96 
Nevertheless, in accord with the analysis above, while the left nationalist tradition has 
95 Paul Kellogg, Empire's Ally, p. 192. 
96 Danford W. Middlemiss and Joel J. Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants, Toronto, 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989. 
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consistently read this as a key moment in the dismantling of Canadian industrial 
development, the DPSA was - again - 'pursued by the Canadian state and served to 
actually reverse Canada's trade deficit with the United States in military hardware. That 
is, by locking the United States into the DPSA, Canada guaranteed that the small-scale 
military production it did encourage could be sold to the U.S. military (for its various 
Cold War conflicts, most notably in Vietnam) while Canada spent relatively little on its 
own military and so, between 1959-1965, Canada recorded a trade surplus of $177.2 
million in military products vis-a-vis the United States.97 It is rather more convincing, 
then, to see the DPSA as a piece of Canada's active strategy of "military parasitism," 
whereby the U.S. would do the work of policing the globe on behalf of global capital, 
even as that capital consolidated within emerging and re-emerging capitalist powers like 
Germany, Japan and, on a smaller scale, Canada.98 
Indeed, even while Canada kept out of the Cold War spotlight, it was nevertheless 
an active benefactor of the U.S. wars of empire. Latin America offers a particularly 
revealing window here; on the one hand, Canada was relatively uninvolved in the near-
constant U.S. aggression in Latin America during the Cold War. Nevertheless, Canadi:an 
capital often benefited from it, especially beginning in the 1970s. Ricardo Grinspun and 
Yasmine Shamsie describe Canadian Latin America policy at the time: 
Since the late 1970s, Canadian foreign policy has followed a 
liberal economic philosophy that emphasizes economic 
competitiveness, the enhancement of trading opportunities, and 
fiscal responsibility. These goals are in full harmony with the 
outward-oriented, market-driven strategy that Ottawa has 
pursued in the region. Its support for [structural adjustment 
policies] has been evident in its active participation in the 
region's key multilateral organizations, through its bilateral 
97 Paul Kellogg, Empire's Ally, p. 189. 
98 Paul Kellogg, Empire's Ally, p. 181-209. 
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relations with individual countries, and through its vigorous 
support of Canadian corporations active in the region. In fact, by 
1989, Canada's International Development Agency (CIDA) had 
unreservedly adopted this policy set and "came to regard suppo1t 
for structural adjustment as a first priority."99 
Canada stubbornly continued to promote these policies throughout the disastrous decades 
I 
of the 1980s and 90s and, indeed, Canadian companies reaped the benefits where they 
could, as I will detail in the Honduran case. But with the United States doing all of the 
"dirty work" of empire, Canada was able to, more or less, slip under the radar while it 
grew its capital in the blood-soaked earth of the Americas. ioo 
What is more, the rewards of a "military parasitism" were also manifest in the 
realm of international diplomacy, where Canada was able to cultivate its image as a force 
for peace and multilateral dialogue in global affairs, an image that still retains its 
ideological power. As Canada more or less withdrew from direct participation in 
America's secret and not-so-secret wars, it avoided the political "taint" that came with 
them; Washington's aggression in Iran, Guatemala, Chile, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, 
Afghanistan and so many other places made it an obvious target for global anti-imperilal 
discontent and further limited its capacity to achieve its goals without the use or threat of 
force. Canada, by contrast, was perceived as having no colonial history and no active 
99 Ricardo Grinspun and Yasmine Shamsie, "Missed Opportunity: Canada's Re-engagement with Latin 
America and the Caribbean," in Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Vol. 35, No. 
69, 2010, p. 175. 
100 This language reflects the descriptions that come from Latin American scholars themselves, and those 
North Americans whose work has attempted to grapple with the violence of Latin America's experience of 
the 20th century. Please see Eduardo Galeano, The Open Veins of Latin America, New York, Monthly 
Review Press, 1997. Greg Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation, London, Duke 
University Press, 2000. James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 
2J51 Century, Halifax, Femwood, 2001. For more details on the central U.S. role in Latin America's wars, 
see also Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic, New 
York, Henry Holt & Co., 2004. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, New 
York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1972. 
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role in Cold War aggression, 101 and it earned political and diplomatic capital, especially 
among the emerging postcolonial states, that gave it a stronger voice at international 
forums and made it a more important ally for the United States. This period, arguably 
ushered in during Canada's mediation of the Suez Crisis in 1956, represented the fruition 
of Canada's "military parasitism," and created what is perhaps best described as the 
"peacekeeping moment" in Canadian foreign policy. Notably, this course was plotted in 
contradiction to the wishes of the United States; as Kellogg argues: 
Interestingly, the Canadian government made these decisions 
despite considerable pressure from its principle ally, the United 
States, to go the other direction - to become a warfare, not a 
welfare, state. But successive Canadian governments 
successfully resisted this pressure... thus the 'leaders of a 
secondary state,' Canada, accommodated themselves to the 
military preoccupations of the hegemon. But they did so in such 
a way as to advance Canada's economic interest at the expense 
of the hegemon. 102 
It is perhaps instructive to note that, while the left nationalist tradition insists on 
imagining Canada as "dependent" since it is not the primary imperialist power, IR 
scholars outside of the political economy tradition have, at times, actually hit upon the 
fact that secondary states routinely accommodatt~ hegemonic powers not simply because 
they are coerced but in order to gain some advantage of their own. In the case of 
IOI Of course, the claim that Canada had no colonial history is absurdly and rather offensively inaccurate; 
thousands of Indigenous nations were colonized and sometimes exterminated in the processes that created 
Canada as a modem nation-state. In fact, the claim that Canada has no colonial history it itself a 
manifestation of Canadian colonialism, insofar as it erases from history the very nations it colonized. 
Nevertheless, the claim is still ubiquitous in Canadian popular and political culture, and was famously 
reproduced by Prime Minister Harper at the 020 summit in Pittsburgh in 2009. David Ljunngrun, "Every 
020 Nation Wants to be Canada, insists PM," Reuters, September 25, 2009. This claim is repeated by the 
Canadian ruling classes at every opportunity, as if by repeating the statement it can somehow become true. 
In a 2010 issue of the Canadian Military Journal, for instance, the highest ranking officer in the Canadian 
Armed Forces tries to convince his readers that "with no history as a colonizer, [Canada is] a credible and 
trusted partner for the countries of the region." Walter Natyncyk and Nancy MacKinnon, "Canada and the 
Americas: Defending Our Backyard," Canadian Military Journal, Vol IO, No 3, Summer 2010, p. 9. On 
Canada's profoundly and fundamentally colonial history, please see Howard Adams, Prison of Grass: 
Canada From a Native Point of View, Saskatoon, Fifth House Publishing, 1989. 
I02 Paul Kellogg, Empire's Ally, p. 198. 
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neorealists like Robert Keohane and John Kirton, the argument is obviously rooted in the 
incomplete realist framework of zero-sum power games between states, but it is 
noteworthy that they at least grapple with the presence of secondary, but not dependent, 
powers. 103 This idea is articulated with more clarity, and with more attention to the 
central role of capital in determining power relations between states, in David Harvey's 
seminal work in The New Imperialism, which insisted that the contemporary U.S. empire 
relied on a mixture of consent and coercion of its allies. 104 There are fut1her geshlres 
towards this argument in the neo-Gramscian school of critical IR;105 for the purposes of 
this chapter, what is important is the idea that Canada - while influenced by the United 
States - was not dominated by it. To the contrary, Canada adopted strategies that 
allowed it to take advantage of its relationship with the United States to further its own 
aims, most notably the development and consolidation of Canadian capital, a project 
which was so successful, in fact, that it ultimately dictated the shift in Canadian foreign 
policy underway today. 
STATE AND CAPITAL 
It is here, in the shift from the "peacekeeping moment" to the new Canadian 
imperialism, that a political economic analysis of Canada's foreign policy becomes most 
crucial. I will explore this shift - the move to a more aggressive, militaristic and 
103 The American IR scholar Robert Keohane is a pioneer of the neorealist camp, but there is, indeed, a 
growing stream of neorealists in Canadian foreign policy scholarship, who effectively locate Canada as a 
secondary power that participates in its alliances with larger powers like the U.S. in order to maintain its 
own power vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Indeed, there is a kernel of truth to this reading, though it 
remains theoretically uncomplicated and incomplete for its lack of any understand of how power is accrued 
in international politics and what dynamics drive the establishment and shifts of those power relations. 
John Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World: Toronto, Thomson Nelson, 2007. See also 
Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1984. 
104 David Harvey, The New Imperialism, p. 183-213. 
105 Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1991. 
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imperialist Canadian foreign policy - in greater detail in this section. I insist on a critical 
political economy approach, which is crucial both in explaining what might otherwise 
appear as an irrational change or one driven by particular personalities, and in laying the 
groundwork for the ways we would seek to confront that change. Indeed, mainstream 
realist and liberal analyses tend to explain this transition in terms of the new threats to 
"global security" posed by "international terrorism" since 9/11, and debate with one 
another over what ought to be the appropriate response. Realists typically endorse 
increased military and defence spending and deployment to root out potential "terrorist 
threats," while liberals respond with a more balanced policy framework that mixes 
military force with more effective international mechanisms for conflict resolution and 
poverty relief in order to forestall the emergence of "terrorist threats" in the first place. 106 
Nevertheless, both of these responses rest upon an analysis that sees Canadian foreign 
policy as being shaped primarily by the competing ideals of individual realists and 
liberals. Shifts in Canadian policy, then, are understood simply as reflecting shifts in 
electoral trends, and the primary political agents of Canadian policy are considered to be 
the ruling parties themselves. 
Leading examples of these mainstream understandings of the genesis of Canadian 
policy are anything but inspiring, often ranging somewhere between the realm of 
academic inquiry and pure ideology. Storied Canadian historians Jack Granatstein and 
Norman Hillmer's 1994 Empire to Umpire is a dated, but emblematic, account of the 
106 This is a debate that, arguably, misses the point somewhat; as Colleen Bell argues convincingly, these 
traditions fundamentally share a similar view on how national and international politics should function and 
differ only to the extent that they imagine different ways of protecting and policing the current order. 
Bell's work adds a key piece, focusing primarily on the post-WI I security regime in Canada, and 
demonstrating the extent to which the entire apparatus of liberal democracy is being redefined in order to 
facilitate the colonial violence necessary - within and beyond Canadian borders - to maintain the capitalist 
world order. Colleen Bell, The Freedom of Security: Governing Canada in the Age of Counter-Terrorism, 
University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 2011. 
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history of Canadian foreign policy and relations with the United States, that consistently 
fails to assess policy at a level that goes deeper than the competing quirks and 
personalities of top level politicians. Instead, it relies on sweeping generalizations about 
"Canadian attitudes," as though the state could be imagined as one person, struggling to 
make up his/her mind about how to act in the world. Ultimately, it reifies a variety of 
theoretically dubious claims about Canada, Canadians, morality, and "common sense:~' 
Few Canadians would want their governments to sacrifice 
national advantage for the sake of international morality, but it 
serves a purpose to fret about the implications of every one of 
our actions abroad. For Canadians, it is also apparently essential. 
Jaded Canadians also forget that, troubled as their country might 
be by division and economic problems, it is one of the world's 
few success stories. Domestic prosperity aside, Canada has a 
reputation for trying to solve global problems, for contributing to 
world betterment, and for attempting to improve the lot of people 
in the Third World. We are not the world arbiter we sometimes 
pretend to be, unfortunately, but if the superpowers and mad-dog 
nation states had exercised anything like the good sense that 
Canadians have shown in the last century then possibly, just 
possibly, the world might be a better place. 107 
This type of analysis sets the tone for much of mainstream debates around Canadian 
foreign policy, as in the 2011 textbook described above; should Canada maximize its 
self-interest or try to "do good" in the world? It is a false - and rather absurd -
dichotomy, filled with unsubstantiated and ill-defined terms and concepts. It offers no 
sense of the distinctions within Canadian society - the hierarchies of class, race and 
gender that determine whose interests are defined as "Canadian" - nor does it offer any 
framework for what constitutes "good" behaviour in the world. The latter point is 
important. Since Hillmer and Granatstein praise Canada's "domestic prosperity," we 
must assume that they consider the profoundly unequal development engendered by 
107 Hillmer and Granatstein, Empire to Umpire, p. 350-351. 
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industrial capitalism to be a "good" thing. It would seem to follow that imposing that 
system on the rest of the world would be an example of "good" behaviour. The 
"international morality" and "good sense" described above surely does not have universal 
applicability; indeed, Canadian colonization of hundreds of Indigenous nations involved 
the violent assertion of "Canadian" moral codes over those of their victims, and' the 
assumption that "Canadian values" should be universal is, itself, a rather troubling 
manifestation of a colonial attitude. 108 
The type of work produced by Hillmer and Granatstein is, in fact, a cornerstone 
for most popular writing on Canadian foreign policy. A cursory scan of popular history 
and Canadian media reveals the same inattention to detail and deep understandings of 
superficial phenomena. Andrew Cohen's 2003 While Canada Slept is one example, 
among many, of popular analysis of Canadian foreign policy that is analytically and 
I 
theoretically shallow, and unrigorous in its research. 109 Though a finalist for a Governor 
General's Literary Award, Cohen's book fails to develop an analysis that goes deeper 
than the average political campaign speech. Indeed, it offers a vacuous platform based on 
a patchwork of mythologies and misreadings (Canada trades with the United States 
because they speak English and observe the rule of law and democracy) and treats 
"Canada" as though it were a wayward child, navigating its relationship with its "best 
friend" the United States and "maturing" into a greater "self-confidence:" 
Modesty is no virtue for a country in search of influence, and 
excellence is no vice. We have to tn; harder and speak louder, 
even if it is only to ourselves about ourselves ... at the end of the 
day, we can have the world's best small army, its most efficient, 
generous aid program, and its most imaginative foreign service. 
108 Howard Adams, Prison of Grass. 
109 His work has, incidentally, no citations whatsoever. Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We Lost 
Our Place In The World, Toronto, McLelland and Stewart, 2003. 
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We can reject mediocrity ... what we do abroad will enrich us at 
home. 110 
On the last point, of course, Cohen stumbles into a rather profound truth: Canadian 
capital has made riches abroad. But his analysis neither explains how or why that is the 
case and, as such, is profoundly ill-equipped to assess it normatively. Indeed, despite 
much rhetoric about Canada's historical commitment to promoting peace, liberty and 
prosperity in the world, Cohen has absolutely no explanation for why the Canadian state 
would choose to promote these things, beyond some essential Canadian "character" 
embedded within its politicians. Cohen's emphasis on Canadian "character" is, 
unfortunately, not uncommon, even in some supposedly political economy approaches. 
Stephen Clarkson and Maria Banda, in Whose Canada?, describe Canadian diplomatic 
efforts in the aftermath of 9/11 as "reverting to its instinctive helpful fixer role. "111 
Progressive political economy demands a more complicated understanding of the 
genesis of state policy, rooted in the concrete ways that the modem state reproduces 
itself. Jerome Klassen articulates this brilliantly: 
From a theoretical perspective, Canadian foreign policy must be 
linked to the patterns of accumulation through which the state is 
reproduced as an institutional configuration of capitalist class 
power. In this conceptualization, the state is structurally 
connected to the relations of exploitation that constitute the 
capitalist mode of production. The state guarantees private 
property, issues the money form, regulates class relations, 
mediates all cross-border transactions and taxes various points of 
exchange. With this in mind, the 'autonomy' of the state is 
110 Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept, p. 203. 
111 Stephen Clarkson and Maria Banda, "Paradigm Shift or Paradigm Twist? The Impact of the Bush 
Doctrine on Canada's International Position," in Ricardo Grinspun and Yasmine Shamsie, Whose Canada? 
Continental Integration, Fortress North America and the Corporate Agenda, Montreal, McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 2007, p. 118. 
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rooted in the particular institutionalization of capitalist social 
relations. 112 
Klassen, drawing from Ellen Wood and Nicos Poulantzes, goes on to note that the 
arrangement works when the state allows the privatization of the production process but 
takes on the role of regulating the macroeconomy; a bifurcation of class power that relies 
upon the material wealth created by the capitalist production process. Capital and the 
state, then, are interdependent, and exercise only "relative autonomy" from one another. 
Klassen continues: 
In this context public policies and the governments that devise 
them are inextricably connected to the accumulation process and 
its class relationships. The state is institutionally separate from 
the concrete processes of value production and exchange, yet 
simultaneously operates as the guarantor and ultimate manager 
of these processes. The task of a critical social science, then, is 
to highlight the ways in which government agents and policies 
express the economic and political interests of social classes 
within domestic "power blocs."113 
Drawing from the long theoretical tradition of historical materialism, this mode of 
analysis insists that the material world is not shaped simply by the ideas of people, who 
devise and enact policies, but, rather, ideas themselves are shaped by the social-material 
conditions in which their dreamers are embedded. That is, the social-material context in 
which the state is embedded is a crucial factor in determining the types of ideas that 
emanate from it. 
This should not lead to the conclusion that a straight and direct line can be drawn 
between state policy and the capitalist class forces it represents. There are a variety of 
factors that complicate this picture, not the least of which is the fact that states often 
112 Jerome Klassen, "Introduction: Empire, Afghanistan and Canadian Foreign Policy," in Jerome Klassen. 
and Greg Albo, ed., Empire's Ally: Canada and the War in Afghanistan, Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 2013, p. 17. 
113 Jerome Klassen, Empire's Ally, p. 18. 
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represent a variety of class actors, themselves in contradiction. Indeed, at any given 
moment, the state encompasses a wide range of interests - mediating those interests \s its 
very purpose - and the struggles within the state between those forces are certainly of 
some significance. Furthermore, even states that are thoroughly dominated by a 
particular class are subject to contestation from outside; a Canadian state held solidly by a 
concentrated Canadian capitalist class still has to contend with the forces that would 
struggle against it, from working class organizations to civil society institutions to 
popular media and so on. The point, then, is not to deny that the state is a profoundly 
complicated network of interests. Rather, it is to assert - as Klassen does above - that the 
modem nation state is fundamentally a formation designed to protect and promote the 
interests of capital in general and national capital in particular. 
THE CONTEMPORARY TURN - MILITARISM AND IMPERIALISM 
With this in mind, and recalling the arguments by Carroll, Burgess, and others 
that the Canadian capitalist class has consolidated into a coherent formation that can exert 
its unique pressure on the Canadian state, I will now tum to the concrete shift in 
Canadian foreign policy that began in the early 1990s but has become manifest most 
dramatically in the past decade. Indeed, if one were to pick up the narrative of Canadian 
foreign policy from the "peacekeeping moment" and try to connect it to contemporary 
Canada, one would find a profound rupture. As Stephen Staples has documented, 
Canada's participation in peacekeeping went into rapid decline in the 1990s and has all 
but disappeared completely from Canadian policy today. In 1991, Canada contributed 
around 10% of U .N. peacekeeping personnel; by 2006, that number had dropped to less 
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than 0.01 %. 114 To the extent that "peacekeeping" is still mobilized rhetorically to justify 
Canadian militarism, it has gone from an exaggeration to an outright myth. 
Documenting the full extent of the new Canadian imperialism requires multiple 
volumes. A few attempts have been made already to build this scholarship, including 
Todd Gordon's Imperialist Canada and Jerome Klassen and Greg Albo's Empire's 4-fly, 
both of which I have drawn from significantly in this chapter. Nevertheless, the project is 
in its infancy, and this dissertation looks to addl a crucial piece of what must necessarily 
be a long and exhaustive process. Rather than attempt to document the new Canadian 
imperialism in detail, I will simply note a series of key interventions that highlight the 
shift, and draw out a few of the structural changes in Canadian policies and institutional 
frameworks that have accompanied the shift and that suggest an attempt to cement the 
new imperialism as a pillar of Canadian politics over the middle term. I will also offer a 
few brief thoughts on why these changes have taken place in this particular moment. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, Canada became increasingly engaged in military 
adventures beyond its borders. Canada was an active participant in the war against Iraq 
in 1991, though it expressed reservations, and it also played a role in the continuous 
bombing campaigns in that country throughout the decade. In 1993, Canada intervened 
in Somalia, ostensibly in a peacekeeping role, and left in disgrace after its soldiers were 
implicated in sadistic torture of Somali prisoners. Canada took a lead role in NATO's 
bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, became a prominent part of the occupation of 
Afghanistan in 2001, and made a variety of contributions to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 
114 Steven Staples, "Marching Orders: How Canada abandoned peacekeeping - and why the UN needs us 
now more than ever," Ottawa, Council of Canadians, 2006, p. 1. 
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2003, despite a rhetorical stance that suggested otherwise. 115 In 2004, Canada played a 
key military role in the overthrow of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and 
subsequently stayed on as a semi-permanent force, propping up the regime that replaced 
Aristide and training the Haitian police to carry out violent counter-insurgency actions 
against Aristide supporters. In 2011, Canada carried out bombing raids against Libya, 
and in 2013, the Canadian military was in Mali supporting a French invasion. 116 
There is much to say about each of these interventions: the scale of civilian 
casualties and human suffering inflicted, the degree of institutional and infrastructural 
damage doled out, the range of spurious justifications offered in each case, the colonial 
logic and tactics employed, and how dramatically these actions contradict the rhetoric of 
"freedom, democracy and good governance" that Canadian politics and policy typically 
deploys. Moreover, this is simply a sketch of the most obvious examples where Canada 
has used direct military intervention as a tool of foreign policy. They do not cover the 
wide range of imperial relationships that Canada has cultivated without resorting to using 
its own military forces. This dissertation, of course, will detail the case of Honduras, 
which fits into this latter category. As such, my assessment of those particular 
interventions will be sparse; rather, I seek here to briefly locate this new posture within 
115 It is, certainly, noteworthy that Canada refused to join the so-called "coalition of the willing" to invade 
Iraq. Indeed, it prompted an angry reaction from the Canadian far right, as evidenced in an impromptu live 
debate between hockey pundits Ron McLean and Don Cherry, the latter of whom chastised the Canadian 
government for refusing to support the U.S. invasion. Nevertheless, while Canada's decision not to join 
George W. Bush's war seems to be inconsistent with the pattern, it actually demonstrates the extent to 
which Canadian "deep integration" with the United States is limited by the actual independence of 
Canadian foreign policy. Canada's decision not to join the "coalition of the willing," then, illustrates that 
could have similarly refused to participate in a variety of other military adventures with the United States. 
Canada's decision to distance itself from the war in Iraq, moreover, should not be overstated; Canadians 
did, in fact, participate in that campaign in a variety of capacities (more detail below) and it is well 
understood that Canada took on a larger role in Afghanistan to take pressure off U.S. and British forces 
being re-deployed to Iraq. 
116 This is a very broad sketch of Canada's military entanglements in the past two decades. For a more 
comprehensive treatment of these details, please see Yves Engler, The Black Book of Canadian Foreign 
Policy, Black Point, Fernwood, 2009. 
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the broader political economic trajectory in Canada to provide a framework for my 
analysis of Canada's actions in Honduras. 
It is no coincidence that as Canadian capital has turned outward, Canadian foreign 
policy has become increasingly- and increasingly violently- focused on the creation and 
protection of market-friendly regimes in the Global South. It is similarly unsurpri1sing 
that this project has necessarily entailed closer collaboration with the United States, 
whose government has more or less the same macroeconomic goal, even if its capitalists 
find themselves periodically in competition with Canadian firms. Indeed, . the 
consolidation of Canadian capital, as described above, has put it in a position to expand 
into the Global South in the hopes of procuring ever-greater profits, and that expansion is 
reflected in the growth of Canadian FDI. What must not be forgotten, however, is that 
while "searching for profits" may, perhaps, sound innocuous, the concrete process 
through which this takes place is anything but. Marx's descriptions in the first volume of 
Capital, of the violence - physical, structural, material, and spiritual - inherent in "so-
called primitive accumulation," or the creating of conditions for capitalist production, is 
instructive: 
In actual history, it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, 
robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part... the 
capital-relation presupposes a complete separation between the 
workers and the ownership of the conditions for the realization of 
their labour. As soon as capitalist production stands on its own 
feet, it not only maintains this separation, but reproduces it on a 
constantly expanding scale ... So-called primitive accumulation, 
therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing 
the producer from the means of production ... the history of their 
expropriation is written in the annals of mankind in letters of 
blood and fire. 117 
117 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, London, Penguin, 1990, p. 874-875. 
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And while some of the specific circumstances change, the overarching dynamics remain 
the same with Canada's foreign enterprises today; indeed, the very act of investing capital 
abroad is predicated on the idea that there are greater profits to be made there tham by 
comparable investments at home, and this calculation is almost always based on the 
availability of cheap and easily exploitable labour. 118 It is, then, an inherently violent 
process in the first place. 
The violence of the profit-seeking behaviour of Canadian corporations abrpad 
engenders resistance virtually wherever it goes. This is hardly a surprise. Peqple 
generally do not like being subject to violence without their consent and typically 
organize against it, as several centuries of class struggle demonstrate. 119 What would 
come as a surprise to those who accept Canadian rhetoric about freedom, democracy, 
peace, etc., is the fact that the Canadian state now employs all manner of violent tactics to 
smother the dissent generated by its corporations' behaviour. Interventions in local 
politics, including the overthrow of governments, assassinations of activists organizing 
against Canadian firms, support for repressive institutions that defy popular will, and 
even military intervention are all part of Canada's toolkit in those places where its capital 
is invested and even some places where it is not. 
These activities are well-documented and it will suffice to mention only a few of 
them here. In April 2013, Alberto Rotondo, head of security for the San Rafael mine in 
Guatemala, owned by Canadian mining company Tahoe Resources, ordered the 
118 Of course, it is not only about labour. In the contemporary mining sector, for instance, the key 
component is, increasingly, the access to resources and the ability of foreign companies to access those 
resources in the cheapest and quickest way possible. This usually means employing mining practices that 
are devastating to the environment upon which local and regional communities rely. These problems will 
be explored in greater detail across this dissertation. 
119 David McNally, Another World is Possible: Globalization and Anti-Capitalism, 3rd ed, Winnipeg, 
Arbeiter Ring, 2009, p. 267-403. 
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assassination of Guatemalan activists protesting the company's social and environmental 
record. 120 Similar stories dog the activities of Canadian companies across Latin America. 
In Mexico, after a leading community activist against Calgary-based Blackfire 
Exploration was murdered, the Canadian government ignored some 1400 letters of 
concern about the Blackfire-sanctioned (and likely Blackfire-ordered) murder. Instead, 
the Department of Foreign and International Affairs and Trade (DFAIT) worked with the 
company to help it sue the local government that had suspended its activities after the 
assassination. According to a Mining Watch report: 
Mere days after a damning report about the company was 
circulated to the highest echelons of the Canadian government, 
Canadian authorities sought advice for the company about how 
to sue the [Mexican subnational] state of Chiapas under NAFT A 
for having closed the mine. 121 
Canadian companies operating in Central America appear to have plenty of support from 
the Canadian state in asserting their rights against local governments, even when their 
behaviour is engendering all manner of social hatm and opposition. Environmental codes 
in Costa Rica were strengthened by its government in 2011, leading to the halt of 
operations of the Las Crucitas gold mine, owned by Calgary-based Infinito, which did not 
meet the new environmental criteria set by the government. The company is currently 
building momentum to launch a $1 billion lawsuit against the government of Costa Rica 
under the terms of the Canada-Costa Rica free trade agreement. 122 Even CIDA - tfue 
Canadian government organization that was ostensibly most committed to doing 
"development" work abroad until its disbanding in 2013 - was implicated in imperial 
120 
"Alberto Rotondo ejecutivo de minera dio orden para matar," La Hora Guatemala, May 9, 2013. 
121 Rick Arnold, quoted in Mining Watch Canada, "Report Reveals how Canadian Diplomacy Supported 
Deadly Blackfire Mining Project," May 6, 2013. 
122 L. Arias, "Canadian firm threatens $1 billion lawsuit against Costa Rica," Tico Times, April 4, 2013. 
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violence. As Toby Moorsom argued, a growing portion of CIDA funding was diverted 
over the past two decades to firms - sometimes themselves Canadian - that built the 
military hardware that repressed activists struggling against Canadian mining 
companies. 123 
While the attention of Canadian imperialism has been most typically focused on 
those places where significant amounts of capital are invested, the shift in Canadian 
foreign policy is far deeper than simply working to protect particular firms' investments. 
As Greg Albo details in Empire's Ally, the Canadian state has made a conscious decision 
to integrate more deeply with the machine of U.S. imperialism, on the understanding that 
Canadian firms will benefit from that cooperation. While "military parasitism" was once 
an effective strategy for building the capacitit;$ of the Canadian capitalist class and 
mediating class conflict at home, three factors have worked to change that: first, the 
consolidation and growth of Canadian capital has meant that it, like all capitalist classes, 
has had to contend with periodic crises of overnccumulation, setting in whenever there 
are not immediately available sources of profitable investment. As David Harvey details 
in The New Imperialism, one solution to this problem is geographic expansion into 
Global South states where a variety of violent practices can make possible an 
"accumulation by dispossession," whereby profits can be sustained and expanded on the 
basis of plunder, bullying of governments, and greater exploitation. 124 Second, a 
sustained neoliberal assault has flattened out the prospects for working class organizing 
in Canada, leaving the state in a position to worry far less about protecting the welfare 
state and freeing up resources to expand its military. Finally, the end of the Cold War put 
123 Toby Moorsom, "Canada's tough-guy cop to 'aid' world's poor," Al-Jazeera Online, April 4, 2013. 
124 David Harvey, The New Imperialism, p. 137-183. 
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the United States in a position to redefine the nature of its alliances; no longer facing 
existential danger in the spectre of an international communist revolution, the United 
States is now able to discipline its allies by insisting that they contribute to the military 
aggression that is necessary to maintain the inequalities of the world market system. 125 
Canada, anxious to ensure that it continues to have access to the markets where its firms 
make some of their greatest profits, has made :it a priority to demonstrate to the United 
States that it is a willing and able component of the new imperial order, such that it may 
reap its rewards. 126 
Canada, then, has emerged as a secondary component of the new imperialism. As 
Albo concludes: 
The Canadian state recognized the continental relationship as the 
means by which it preserves a secondary position in the world 
order and, therefore, the necessity of following U.S. dictates and 
doctrines in matters of foreign policy. In fact, in recasting its 
foreign policy after 9/11, the Canadian state had the support of a 
wide range of economic interests - notably the Canadian Council 
of Chief Executives and the C.D. Howe Institute ... to this end, 
Canadian governments sought to increase the operational 
capacity of the military, to subordinate other international 
activities to concerns of national and continental security, and to 
reorganize the administrative apparatus of the state 
accordingly. 127 
Crucial here is the nuanced way in which Albo addresses continental integration - which 
is an undeniable development of post-Cold War and especially post-9/11 Canadian 
foreign policy - as a function not of Canada's weakness but, rather, as a conscious 
125 There is no consensus among scholars of contemporary empire on whether the U.S. state can maintain 
its dominant position for much longer. Arguably, its adventures in the Middle East over the past decade 
have left it with less capacity to police that region, as perhaps evidenced in its inability to control the 
dynamics of the Arab Spring and its subsequent revolutionary movements. Nevertheless, it is clear that, at 
least for the time being, the United States remains central to the smooth functioning of global capitalism 
and, as such, it can still make significant demands upon those states which, like Canada, find themselves 
secondary components in the U.S.-centred imperial order. 
126 Greg Albo, "Empire's Ally," Canadian Dimension 40, No. 6, 2006, p. 54-60. 
127 Albo, Empire's Ally, p. 255. 
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strategy of a capitalist state seeking to position itself most effectively for its own 
reproduction. This is an important corrective to the work cited above from the Whose 
Canada? collection, which saw this integration as being primarily imposed on Canada 
from outside, rather than chosen from within. 
Nevertheless, both sides of this debate agree that the changes inherent in the 
"deep integration" project are profound and structural, and that they are designed to 
recast Canadian foreign policy for years to come. Over the past decade, institutional 
power has been increasingly centred around the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the 
Department of National Defence (DND) as a variety of other state structures have been 
forced to fall into subordinate positions, most notably the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DF AIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), whose 
merger into one department was announced in 2013.128 As early as 2006, Canadian 
policy-making was being actively embedded in continental security projects and placed 
under the oversight of the security apparatus, evt::n as the DND has dramatically increased ·· 
its funding for strategic studies in Canadian universities through the Security and Defence 
Forum, 129 buttressing an increasingly influential right wing pro-military stream within the 
discipline of International Relations, especially in Canadian Foreign Policy and Security 
Studies.130 As Canadian foreign policy is increasingly being brought under the control of 
the military, that apparatus is engaged in the _much-maligned "deep integration" project 
with the U.S. defence apparatus, especially in the "Fortress North America" linkages 
128 
"CIDA's Dead-End Merger," The McLeod Group, May 18, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.mcleodgroup.ca/2013/05/18/cidas-dead-end-merger/ 
129 Steven Staples, "Fortress North America," p. 162-163. 
130 Even York University's ostensibly critical version of Security Studies maintains close links to the 
Canadian military establishment; military recruiters are invited to the campus to entice graduate students 
into their programs with the promise of lucrative scholarships, and the York Centre for International 
Security Studies (YCISS) regularly invites the organic intellectuals of Canada's military to speak as 
panellists and keynotes at its conferences. 
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designed to securitize the geography of accumulation at home. 131 Canada has joined the 
United States in missile defence system planning, has harmonized much of its maritime 
security apparatus with the U.S., and has entered into a variety of intensified continental 
military command chains at the recommendation of the Bi-National Planning Group 
(BPG), an advisory council established under NORAD to concretize many of the "deep 
integration" plans. 132 Indeed, as Neil Braganza. noted in 2006, the BPG and much of the 
Canadian military intelligentsia argued throughout the 2000s that the Canadian Forces 
needed to increase its "interoperability" with the U.S. military, though Braganza is 
careful not to fall into the left nationalist trap: 
Far from weakening the Canadian state, interoperability with the 
U.S. gives it a special role to play in the imperial order. What is 
more, fears that interoperability threatens Canadian autonomy 
can actually fuel arguments for more defence spending. 133 
Indeed, the Canadian military itself is growing faster than ever; in the most 
obvious manifestation of the growing militarization of the Canadian state, the actual 
numbers of soldiers have steadily increased and have now reached over 100,000 in 
regular and reserve forces. Meanwhile, the military itself has seen substantial renovation 
and reformulation, both in terms of its operational capacity (increasingly organized to 
fight urban counterinsurgency wars on multiple fronts) and the networks of 
interoperability noted by Braganza (devised to make the Canadian military adaptable to 
collaborating with continental allies as well as local military and police forces wherever it 
may be deployed.) In addition, of course, the last decade has seen the most dramatic 
escalation of military budgeting since the Second World War, with the Canadian state 
131 Greg Albo, "Empire's Ally," p. 55-59. 
132 Steven Staples, "Fortress North America," p. 163-170. 
133 Neil Braganza, "The Canadian Military Order," New Socialist, No. 54, November-January 2005/2006, p. 
18. 
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spending over $18 billion on the military in 2008/09 alone and sparking some 
controversy with a proposal to spend an additional $25 billion on a new fleet of fighter 
jets. 
It is worth pausing on those figures briefly to take stock of their n~mg 
simultaneously to the financial crisis that engendered a wholesale adoption of the 
austerity agenda. Indeed, the spike in military spending has taken place alongside a 
concerted imposition of austerity on working Canadians, as jobs have been slashed, 
wages have been hammered down, and strikes have been broken. 134 The Canadian 
corporate elite continues to enjoy relatively lax taxation, but user-fees and taxes have 
been raised for everyone else, ranging from transit systems to privatized health services 
and rising tuition fees. Federally funded organizations that provide valuable services to 
communities are being scuttled or starved of resources; Indigenous, environmental, 
LGBT and women's organizations have been pruticularly targeted. 135 Direct support for 
people is diminishing, as reflected in decreases in social housing and assistance; for 
instance, after significant structural changes, less than half of unemployed Canadians 
today even qualify for Employm~nt Insurance (EI.) In sum, working poverty and 
precarity are becoming more and more common -· over 10% of Canadians are now living 
134 In Ontario, for instance, a string of public sector unions had strikes ended by back-to-work legislation, 
beginning with part-time academic workers at York University, of which I was a member, whose targeting 
for strikebreaking legislation was condemned by the International Labour Organization as unwarranted. 
CUPE, "Ontario Government condemned for abusing back-to-work legislation," Canadian Union of Public 
Employees, Press Release, June 20, 2011. Available at: http://cupe.ca/govemment/ontario-govemment-
condemned-abusing . Since that time, unions have been forced back to work by federal and provincial 
legislation, from pilots and flight attendants to transit workers to librarians to postal employees and 
teachers. 
135 Among many organizations that have faced cuts: Climate Action Network, Native Women's 
Association, Sisters in Spirit, Canadian Child Care Federation, Centre for Spanish Speaking Peoples, 
Statistics Canada, Canadian Arab Federation, First Nations Child and Family Caring Society, Canadian 
Council for International Cooperation. 
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below the poverty line and almost half of the Canadian workforce works precariously -
even as there is less and less support for those who are struggling. 136 
The disjuncture between increased military spending and support for working 
Canadians has aroused some criticism, but that criticism has been muted and diluted by a 
variety of factors. Notable among them are, first, the persistence of the left nationalist 
argument that Canada is an unfortunate "victim" of U.S. domination, which absolves the 
Canadian state of agency in its imperial shuffle. The second is a remarkable 
militarization of Canadian culture - a matter I plan to explore in my post-doctoral 
_ research - which manifests itself in a new Canadian patriotism and a "support the troops" 
discipline hitherto absent in Canadian popular consciousness. Perhaps the best example 
of this dynamic is to be found in the spectacle of Canadian hockey, and the collaboration 
between the military, the National Hockey League, the individual franchise owners, and 
the Canadian media, especially the public Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC),. in 
relentlessly celebrating the Canadian Armed Forces at hockey games, a cultural 
phenomena undeniably woven into the fabric of Canadian popular culture. 137 
Of course, the ideological discipline being increasingly imposed on Canadians is 
incomplete, and the inequalities and injustices of Canadian politics continue to engender 
resistance. Indeed, an emblematic figure of that reaction is Yves Engler, a former hockey 
player turned political activist whose work has sought to expose the dark underbelly of 
Canadian foreign policy. Engler's research is driven by a sense that the Canadian 
136 
"It's More Than Poverty," report by United Way Toronto and McMaster University, February 2013. 
For more detail on the assault on working people in Canada, including immigrant and migrant workers, 
please see Thom Workman, If You 're In My Way I'm Walking: The Assault on Working People Since 1970, 
Winnipeg, Femwood, 2009. 
137 Tyler Shipley, "Militarism and Sports, Part II (A Response)," Left Hook, April 4, 2013. Available at: 
http://lefthookjoumal.wordpress.com/2013/04/04/militarism-and-sports-part-ii-a-response/ 
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government has betrayed the ideals he was taught as a child. It is powerful work insofar 
as it mobilizes a wealth of empirical data on the injustices of Canadian military and 
diplomatic behaviour. In the introduction to The Black Book of Canadian Foreign 
Policy, Engler entreats Canadians to take responsibility for "what is done in our name" 
and insists upon a revision of the old mythology of peacekeeping and the assumed 
benevolence of Canadian intentions. 
Nevertheless, Engler's work, while clitical, probing, and valuable, remains 
theoretically inconsistent and insufficient; Engler appears convinced that Canadian policy 
could be better if the right people, with the right ideas, simply got hold of the reins. 
A primary cause of Canada's poor behaviour around the world is 
allowing particular self-interest to take precedence over doing 
what's right ... the rule oflaw is weak in foreign affairs. There 
are few enforceable regulations governing the international 
behaviour of governments, corporations and their 
organizations ... so a primary task of Canadian foreign policy 
should be to promote the rule of law in international aff airs. 138 
Engler is right that certain liberal international regulations are not enforced but he is 
wrong if he thinks that there is no regulation or discipline in international affairs. Quite 
the contrary, the very foreign policy decisions he decries - overthrowing a government in 
Haiti or participating in the invasion of Iraq - are examples of the rules of global 
capitalism being enforced. Canada is not contributing to a "weakening" of international 
structures, it is actively building its capacity to impose and sustain them. 
Indeed, without a theory of how the Canadian state functions and who it 
represents, Engler, like so many critical Canadians, is unable to offer a satisfying 
theorization of Canadian imperialism, even as he assembles an empirical rap sheet that 
demonstrates rather unequivocally that Canada behaves as an imperial power. While this 
138 Engler, Black Book, 238-239. 
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latter project is certainly important, it is crucial that it be supplemented by a complex 
theoretical understanding of these dynamics. Without it, we are left with the 
contradictory and incomplete conclusions offered by mainstream and left nationalist 
analyses. Engler unwittingly falls into the former camp when he proposes that Canadian 
foreign policy ought to do a better job of enforcing international regulations. After• all, 
one might just as easily say that capitalists ought to share their wealth and wars ought to 
be outlawed; people committed to social justice would certainly agree, but without a 
comprehensive theorization of why things are the way they are, we can come no closer to 
actually making the changes we wish to see. What Engler misses is that the Canadian 
state will not change its behaviour simply because he and many others want it to; the state 
is an institution that - by its very nature - is responsible to capital and will continue· to 
represent the interests of capital unless and until there is a truly radical rupture either in 
the form of the state or in the functioning of capitalism. 
This dissertation is, by no means, equippe:d to propose a programmatic alternative 
to the types of conclusions that Engler offers. Clearly, the theorization I am proposing 
gestures towards the need for profound and radical change that would de-link Canada 
from the network of capitalism, in what would necessarily have to be part of a broader 
global break from the imperatives of capitalism and a shift to a different mode of 
production that would offer greater prospects for radical democracy, personal freedom, 
creative expression, and social justice. Sustained discussion of this ambitious objective is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation and, as such:. will not be sketched out in any detail. 
In fact, in lieu of proposing a concrete revolutionary strategy, this project might easily 
appear similar in its conclusions to Engler; after all, it would be better if Ottawa behaved 
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less aggressively in the world and if there is no movement building to radically alter the 
course of Canadian politics, surely minor adjustments are better than nothing. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that this project actually implies certain policy 
changes, I would insist that they be understood as precursors to the broader changes that 
will be necessary if there is to be any long-temt change. I defer here to Greg Albo, who 
offers a useful articulation of this compromise. After detailing five points of action that 
the Canadian state should take, which do not look so different from those proposed by 
Engler and include immediate withdrawal from Afghanistan and support for stronger 
international regulations on capital, Albo argues: 
These proposals constitute a minimal platform for remaking 
Canadian foreign policy. This platform would reinforce 
democratic sovereignty and advance the struggle for an 
equalizing world order. It stands opposed to the neoliberal 
system built around the internationalization of capital and the 
disciplinary militarism of Canadian and western imperialism. To 
put forward such a democratic and egalitarian agenda in the 
current world order means confronting U.S. hegemony and, more 
directly, the domestic political and social relations that underpin 
Canadian imperialism. A voiding the need for radical social 
transformation in the hope of returning to a more U.N.-centred 
· multilateralism is to fall prey to the fictions of a liberal world 
order. Indeed the belief that Canadian foreign policy has been -
or can be - a force for a more just or balanced world has been 
one of the most crippling illusions of political life in Canada, 
particularly in progressive circles. 139 
Indeed, while Albo' s particular demands of Canadian policy - reducing the military, 
separating foreign aid from foreign investment, etc - are not so different from those put 
forward by liberal and left nationalist camps, his broader project is fundamentally 
different because his understanding of the Canadian state is so different. For Albo, 
foreign policy is not a disconnected pursuit driven by particular individuals' ideas; it is a 
139 Albo, Empire's Ally, p. 268. (Emphasis mine.) 
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direct manifestation of domestic and international social relations, a product of the 
dynamics of global capitalism. As a result, changes to that foreign policy can only be 
superficial and short term if they are not part of a broader challenge to the social relations 
from which they are derived. 
CANADA'S MISSED OPPORTUNITY? 
All of this has raised the question - pos1ed often in the past few years by scholars 
looking at Canadian relations with Latin America - of whether Canada has "missed an 
opportunity," opened up by the end of the Cold War, for more progressive engagement 
with the Global South, or whether it has, indeed, seized upon the opportunity it was really 
looking for: to extract ever greater wealth from foreign land and people. Ricardo 
Grinspun and Yasmine Shamsie raise this question in a 2010 article in the Canadian 
Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, reviewing the developments since 
Canada's 2007 "re-engagement" with the Americas. They argue that, despite proposing 
three key priorities for the region that included the promotion of democracy and the 
advancement of social justice, Canada has only actually pursued one goal: the deepening 
of the neoliberal development model that has so consistently and completely failed to 
bring equitable or sustainable economic growth for Latin America. 
We contend that Canadian support for democracy, human rights, 
and sustainable development is being weakened by ( 1) the 
government's persistent adherence to a neoliberal development 
model and (2) its steadfast support for U.S. geostrategic interests 
in the continent, even when they run counter to humane 
internationalism objectives. 140 
The primary institutions of the Canadian ruling class, and the media and intellectual 
strands that represent them, continue to talk about Canadian engagement in Latin 
140 Ricardo Grinspun and Yasmine Shamsie, "Canada's Missed Opportunity," p. 174. 
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America as being benevolent. The Canadian .Military Journal boasts that Canada is a 
positive role model in Latin America and that it collaborates with Latin American 
militaries because they are often "the only reHable organ of government that has the 
ability to maintain order or mount a credible force against transnational threats." The 
Canadian Forces, they insist, "help build operational and institutional capacities" of the 
countries to which they are sent, and "have a role to play in advancing the government's 
agenda under the security pillar of [Canada's] engagement [in Latin America.]"141 
Grinspun and Shamsie, by contrast, articulate what many in the community of 
Canadian scholarship on Latin America and the Caribbean have been saying since 2007: 
that Canada has prioritized its commitment to its own neoliberal agenda over its other 
goals in Latin America and that the Canadian military is often used to bolster that agenda. 
That is, they argue that the role of the military has increasingly been to support the 
imposition of neoliberalism, especially as Canada has quickly become the world's third 
largest investor in the region. 142 Nevertheless, Grinspun and Shamsie, like many in the 
field, cling to the assumption that Canada pushes that neoliberal model because it 
believes neoliberalism will bring positive development for people in Latin America; that 
is, they rightly critique Canadian emphasis on neoliberal development models but 
attribute Canada's messianic adherence to that model to a misreading of its results, at 
best, or a conservative political preference, at worst. 143 In either case, the assumption, 
again, is that Canadian policy could be different - could be a force for "good" - if only 
the policymakers would listen to those of us who are researching the effects of 
141 Walter Natyncyk and Nancy MacKinnon, "Canada and the Americas," p. 6-10. 
142 Todd Gordon, "Positioning Itself in the Andes: Critical Reflections on Canada's Relations with 
Colombia," Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies Vol. 35, No. 70, p. 56. 
143 Ricardo Grinspun and Yasmine Shamsie, "Canada's Missed Opportunity," 179. 
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neoliberalism in Latin America. This critique, and the assumptions behind it, has 
animated much of the discussion and debate that has taken place at the last three annual 
congresses of the Canadian Association of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 
(CALACS) of which I have been a part. 
I submit, in contrast to that prevailing position, that Canada has not simply 
prioritized the goals of neoliberal capital accumulation over other goals but, rather, that 
the project of capital accumulation is in fundamental contradiction with the advancement 
of true democracy or social justice. Indeed, it is the contention of this dissertation that 
Canadian policy, stemming as it does from the relations of production in which Canada is 
embedded, has long been invested in reaping the benefits of an imperial world order. 
But, as a result of changes in the global political economy in which Canadian capital is 
located, Canadian policy has become increasingly aggressive in its particular adaptations 
of imperialism and Canada has emerged as a crucial, secondary component in the 
imperial system. This has been manifest in a whole variety of policy shifts over the past 
two decades and in the dramatic restructuring of the Canadian state and military to 
facilitate an escalation and institutionalization of those shifts. 
Mainstream understandings of Canadian politics have consistently failed .to 
acknowledge or comprehend these shifts, and left nationalist analyses have seized upon 
the symptoms of the shifts but failed to recognize their genesis, leading them to 
wrongheaded conclusions that would seek to strengthen Canadian sovereignty and 
independence in the realm of policy making. What they miss is that Canada is already 
sovereign and independent and is using that power to pursue an imperialist foreign policy 
that adapts, foments, creates and relies upon profound social injustice in order to 
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accomplish its aims. From this starting point, then, the remainder of this dissertation will 
document in detail the manifestations of Canadian imperialism in one country, Honduras, 
and compare the actions of the Canadian ruling classes to the rhetoric it µiobilizes, to give 
detail, nuance, and urgency to the analysis provided in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE - FIVE CENTURIES OF IMPERIALISM IN HONDURAS 
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Figure 3.1: Political Map of Honduras144 
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144 Source: Richard Lapper, Honduras: State For Sale, London, Latin American Bureau, 1985, p. iv. 
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This dissertation is, fundamentally, an assessment of Canadian foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, no such assessment can proceed without a complicated understanding of 
the places and peoples that are affected by the policies in question. Indeed, one of the 
critiques that has often been made of Canadian policy in Central America is that it 
consistently fails to reflect an understanding of Central American realities in their 
appropriate historical context and, as a result, it proceeds with decisions and initiatives 
that undermine the needs and interests the people it most directly affects. 145 This critique, 
of course, assumes much about the general goals of Canadian foreign policy; as Chapter 
2 argues, the idea that the Canadian state can be counted on to pursue even well-
intentioned policy options is one that looks increasingly unlikely. Indeed, what I hope· to 
show in this study is that the failure to understand context is not simply a failure of 
knowledge and understanding, but the inevitable result of a foreign policy based on soctal 
interests antagonistic to those of the people of the region. This claim, however, can only 
be advanced on the basis of a solid foundational understanding of the conditions in which 
Canadian foreign policy is intervening; without that basis it would be impossible to 
adequately assess those policies. As such, the analysis of Canadian policy towards 
Honduras will proceed only following a discussion of Honduran history and the legacy of 
colonialism and foreign interference that - as I will argue in Chapters 5 and 6 - Canada is 
now actively perpetuating. This chapter, then, wiH trace the legacy of the initial conquest 
145 This is a generous interpretation, but one that carried considerably more validity when it was being 
made in the 1970s and 1980s, as per the analysis I offer of the Latin America Working Group (LAWG) in 
Chapter 1. For instance, in 1990, Tim Draimin, Cecelia Rocha and Liisa North argued that Canadian 
development assistance programs were contributing to a worsening of conditions for people in Central 
America, in part because policy makers and parliamentarians failed to fully grasp the complexity of the 
causes of poverty, explaining that "they have not fully recognized that poverty in the region is a 
consequence of the unequal distribution of resources and political power." Tim Draimin, Cecelia Rocha 
and Liisa North, "Canada's Development Assistance Programs and Economic Relations with Central 
America," in Liisa North and CAP A, ed., Between War and Peace in Central America: Choices for 
Canada, Toronto, Between the Lines, 1990, p. 95. 
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of Indigenous civilizations and Honduras' unique historical trajectory within Central 
America, while chapter 4 will detail contemporary problems and the immediate context 
of the June 2009 coup with which this dissertation is preoccupied. 
SPANISH COLONIZATION AND GENOCIDE 
To say that nearly all of Honduran history has been forged in the fires of colonial 
occupation is not hyperbole but historical fact; even the word 'Honduras' itself, which 
translates from Spanish as 'the watery depths,' was given by none other than Spanish 
conquistador Christopher Columbus himself, 146 as he and his crew thanked their god in 
1502 for delivering their ships from the depths off the north coast. 147 Of course, prior to 
Columbus' arrival - before there was a 'Honduras' - there were thousands of years of 
social, political, and cultural history with records of human civilization dating as far back 
as the second millennium B.C.E. 148 Civilizations like the Maya, Lenca, Pipil, Nahuatl, 
Jicaque, Paya, Chorotega, and Sumu149 - the surviving descendants of whom we refer to 
as Indigenous peoples - varied as much in size and scope as in political and cultural 
forms, such that generalizing about them is an exercise in futility, though Europeans have 
long done so under the label of 'lndians.' 150 Noteworthy among these civilizations was 
146 James A. Morris, Honduras: Caudillo Politics and Military Rulers, Boulder, Westview Press, 1984, p. 
1. 
147 This was also how the Honduran department of 'Gracias a Dios' (thanks to God) got its name. Robert S. 
Chamberlain, The Conquest and Colonization of Honduras, 15 02-15 5 0, New York, Octagon Books, 1966, 
p. 10. 
148 Ralph Woodward Jr, Central America: A Nation Divided, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 
10. 
149 It is worth noting that the Sumu experience had unique consequences. Although most of the Sumu lived 
in what is now Nicaragua, it was a sub-group of the Sumu who lived on the Atlantic Coast (near what is 
now Gracias a Dios) whose intermarriage and social mixing - under the auspices of colonial domination -
with European sailors and colonists, as well as escaped African slaves whose ship landed at Gracias a Dios 
in the 16th century, led to the emergence of a separate ethnic and social identity, known as the Miskitu. The 
formation of the Miskitu is addressed in Claudia Garcia, The Making of the Miskitu People of Nicaragua, 
Doctoral Dissertation at Uppsala University, 1996. 
150 Linda Newson, The Cost of Conquest: Indian Decline in Honduras Under Spanish Rule, London, 
Westview Press, 1986. 
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that of the Maya which, at its height around 500 C.E., was among the most complex 
tributary societies in the world. One of its greatest city-states was Copan, located in 
contemporary Honduras near its western border with Guatemala, where some of the great 
Mayan accomplishments took place, including the development of detailed calendars and 
numerical systems, the construction of courts and arenas that could host over fifty-
thousand people, and the nurturing of the study of astronomy that allowed Mayan priests 
to predict solar eclipses and calculate the revolutions of the planet Venus. As Friedrich 
Katz described in 1969: 
The Maya demonstrate the highest intellectual achievements to 
be found in pre-Columbian America: the calendar, mathematics 
and graphology reached a stage of development among them that 
no other American people, except maybe the Olmecs, equalled ... 
the classic period in the region of the Maya is distinguished by a 
spectacular flowering of architecture, sculpture, painting and 
1 . 151 earnmg. 
These accomplishments are often portrayed as archaeological oddities; witness 
the 2012 feature exhibit Maya: Secrets of their Ancient World at the Royal Ontario 
Museum (ROM) in Toronto, which presented Mayan civilization as ancient and 
mysterious, a relic of an era of mysticism and superstition so backward and irrational that 
it may hold the key to primeval secrets about th1e nature of humanity or the meaning of 
life, long forgotten by the fast-moving modcern society constructed by European 
civilization.1 52 Before returning to this characterization, it is worth noting that these 
religious, artistic, or scientific advances were not the product of some vaguely-alien 
mystical force but, rather, of a complex social and political system that was able to 
sustain a large population and create the conditions under which some people cou1d 
151 Friedrich Katz, The Ancient American Civilizations, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972, p. 56, 60. 
152 Justin Jennings, Martha Cuevas Garcia and Roberto Lopez Bravo, Maya: Secrets of their Ancient World, 
Toronto, Royal Ontario Museum Press, 2011. 
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pursue a variety of activities that were not directly related to survival. In her remarkable 
survey Indians of the Americas, pre-eminent historian and activist Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz 
has described the complicated civilizations that had risen and fallen in the western 
hemisphere prior to European conquest. Of the Maya, she writes: 
During the five centuries that the Mayan state prospered [ ... ] a 
nobility and a priesthood made up the ruling group, the nobility 
owning cocoa plantations and salt-mines. There was a distinct 
commercial class, and the cities were authentic urban centres, not 
simply bureaucratic or religious ones; but ordinary Mayans 
retained the fundamental features of a clan structure in their 
communities. They were required to work in the nobles' fields 
and to pay them rent for use of their land, and also to contribute 
to the building of roads, temples, noblemen's houses and other 
structures. 153 
Adding to this picture of a complex tributary society, David Freidel has argued 
that evidence now suggests that the Mayan civilization constructed complex agricultural 
systems, which many Eurocentric historians had previously deemed impossible given the 
'backwardness' of their society: "an enthusiastic new consensus has formed around the 
notion that the Mayas not only practiced intensive irrigation and drained field agriculture 
but outdid their contemporaries in Mesoamerica in this regard."154 He goes on to argue 
that shifts towards less complex agricultural techniques, around the time of Spanish 
conquest, were likely the result of that conquest itself, including Spanish "scorched-
earth" tactics, the decimation of populations, and the need to prepare and withstand siege 
attacks.1 55 This new scholarship sits awkwardly alongside previous work that insisted 
that the Mayan city-state system had largely collapsed under the pressures of its own 
153 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, London, Zed Books, 1984, p. 6. 
154 David Freidel, "Lowland Maya Political Economy: Historical and Archaeological Perspectives in Light 
oflntensive Agriculture," in Murdo J. MacLeod, ed., Spaniards and Indians in Southeastern Mesoamerica: 
Essays on the History of Ethnic Relations, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1983, p. 41. 
155 Freidel, 43. 
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conflicts and contradictions by the time of the European conquest. It is beyond the scope 
of this work to determine precisely what statie the Maya civilization was in when the 
conquerors arrived, but it will suffice to note that Freidel' s evidence of such complicated 
agricultural processes indicates that Mayan civilization, far from the bizarre, irrational 
construction of Eurocentric historiography, actually possessed a complicated tributary 
structure, even if that structure was weakened by the 14th century. 156 
But the ancient and mystical framing:, exemplified by the ROM exhibit but 
ubiquitous in Eurocentric scholarship and popular culture, serves only to undermine the 
actual complexity of Mayan social, political, and economic structures, and to relegate that 
society to an earlier stage in an imagined teleology of human development where 
contemporary liberal democratic capitalism is the most advanced stage and any state that 
has not implemented that model is necessarily lower on the ladder of development. 
Furthermore, by construing Mayan civilization as ancient and mysterious, it turns 
attention away from the fact that the Maya still existed at the time of European conquest, 
albeit weakened by the combined disruptions of internal conflict and war with other 
Indigenous groups157 (among other factors which I will return to in a moment.) Indeed, 
the Maya still exist and fight a ceaseless struggk, in the present, to protect what is left of 
their civilization. 
To be sure, the ROM exhibit - curated in partnership with the Instituto Nacional 
de Antropologia y Historia in Mexico - is careful to acknowledge the persistent existence 
of the Maya, which is presented as a final panel surprise to viewers who had been 
encouraged all along to imagine it a civilization long buried by 'history.' The exhibit 
156 For a comprehensive overview of the characteristics of tributary societies, please see Samir Amin, 
Eurocentrism (2nd Ed.), New York, Monthly Review Press, 2009, p. 221-232. 
157 Katz, 76-82. 
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concludes with a reference to Rigoberta Menchu and popular movements to assert Mayan 
identity, especially in Guatemala, and the accompanying booklet makes an effort to 
incorporate the language of identity politics and development studies into its presentation 
of the contemporary situation. 158 But these am, in the first place, inadequate to capture 
the historical weight of colonization and genocide, and, what is more, buried as footnotes 
and sidebars to the central themes of mystery, antiquity and inscrutability. Indeed, the 
exhibit still refuses to speak to the systematic and wilful destruction of the Indigenous 
civilizations of Central America, including what was left of the Maya, whether by 
European conquerors in the 16th century or the militarized states of the 1980s, preferring 
to focus on a cultural collapse or mixing, rather than violence and murder. The exhibit 
guidebook limits its discussion of contemporary Maya to the following: 
Protected in places by an almost impenetrable wilderness, the 
last of the Maya were not brought into the Spanish Empire until 
1697 C.E. The conquest shattered many longstanding Mayan 
traditions. Classic Maya culture, having been re-shaped by 
elements introduced during the Post-Classic Period, was now 
more radically altered by the addition of Christian and Spanish 
ideas. Cattle, pigs and chickens were: introduced, new saints and 
sacraments transformed religious lifo, and the Roman alphabet 
replaced glyphs. Despite all these changes, critical aspects of 
Mayan culture and the echoes of the Classic Maya can still be 
seen in today's Maya communities. The languages they speak, 
the ritual calendar that they follow, and the striking profiles of 
their faces represent just a few of the connections between the 
present-day Maya and their ancestors. 159 
158 Jennings, Cuevas Garcia, and Lopez Bravo, 7-15. 
159 Jennings, Cuevas Garcia, and Lopez Bravo, 14. 
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What could be called the 'archaeologizing,' then, of the Maya serves to subtly avoid what 
Ward Churchill has called the "little matter of genocide" that began in earnest with 
Spanish colonization but which continues to this day. 160 
Indeed, the genocide by European conquerors of the Indigenous peoples of North 
America is well documented and must be counted among the greatest acts of systematic 
violence in human history. The actual scale of the collapse of Indigenous populations 
was contested from the outset, but received a jolt of clarity in the 1960s and 70s, with the 
thorough and important work of Sherburne F. Cooke and Woodrow W. Borah, whose 
analyses of the population declines were particularly useful in the cases of Mexico and 
the island of Hispaniola (contemporary Haiti and the Dominican Republic). Tiley 
understood that their work on pre-conquest demographics held enormous politi:cal 
significance in terms of the relative 'guilt' it conferred to European colonizers. 161 In 
Central Mexico, Cook and Borah demonstrated that there was a monumental collapse in 
the Indigenous population from some 25 million in 1518 to barely 1 million in 1605162 
and on Hispaniola, they confirmed Bartolome de Las Casas' initial claims - dismissed at 
rhetoric in the 16th century when he made them - that at least 4 million people were 
wiped out in less than a century. 163 
Similar work was taken up by historical demographers like N.D. Cook and 
Jaramillo Uribe for different regions in Latin America and was brought together into a 
coherent and convincing picture, in 1974, by Nicolas Sanchez-Albornoz, whose careful 
160 Ward Churchill, A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas, 1492 to the 
Present, City Lights Books, 1997. 
161 Woodrow W. Borah, "The Historical Demography of Aboriginal and Colonial America: An Attempt at 
Perspective," in William M. Denevan, The Native Population of the Americas in 1492, Madison, University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1976, p. 19. 
162 Sherburne F. Cook and Woodrow Borah, Essays in Population History: Mexico and the Caribbean, Vol 
I, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971, p. viii 
163 Cook and Borah, 407. 
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conclusions lent much credence to the supposition - put forward by Henry F. Dobyns in 
1966 and reproduced by Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz in 1984 - that the civilizations of the 
Americas on the eve of the arrival of Columbus were populated by at least 100 million 
people, nearly twice the population of Europe at the time. 164 Sanchez-Albornoz builµs a 
convincing case that the rate of decline seen in Central Mexico could be connected with 
populations figures elsewhere and cautiously generalized to the entire region, such that an 
estimated reduction in the Indigenous population to less than 10 million in the space of a 
century and a half is not an unreasonable claim. 165 As Sanchez-Albornoz puts it, "it is 
hard to grasp what these cold figures mean in human terms."166 
Eurocentric scholarship spent much of the last five centuries denying the size and 
scope of the destruction of Indigenous civilization. As recently as 1954, A. Rosenhlat 
insisted that the decline had been from around 13 million to 10 million. 167 When that 
discourse has failed to convince, it has often emphasized the role played by the spread of 
"old world" diseases like smallpox and plague, framing the collapse as "historical 
accident" emerging from the contact between distinct cultures with different 
immunities. 168 It is clear that European conquerors knew that disease was decimating 
Indigenous civilizations and, at times, actively worked to spread disease for precisely that 
164 Dunbar-Ortiz, 8. 
165 Sanchez-Albornoz, 39-66. 
166 Sanchez-Albornoz, 48. 
167 Sanchez-Albornoz, 39. 
168 Most of the historical demography on the subject fits - more or less - into this framework though some, 
like Cook and Borah and Sanchez-Albornoz, are much more measured in their approach to the causes of 
Indigenous population decline. Nevertheless, even the introduction to Murdo MacLeod's important primer 
Spanish Central America, an otherwise important and useful benchmark for the study of the region between 
conquest and independence, falls into this discourse, privileging a discussion of the spread of disease over 
the forms of colonial aggression that made such a holocaust possible. See Murdo J. MacLeod, Spanish 
Central America: A Socioeconomic History, 1520-1720, Austin, University of Texas Press, 2008, p. 1-20. 
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end, 169 but it is also undeniable that disease - rather than direct slaughter - was "the main 
cause of the catastrophic fall in the Indian population. "170 Nevertheless, Sanchez-
Albornoz, Dunbar-Ortiz, and other critical scholars rightly insist that active colonial 
practices, applied consciously and deliberately, were a necessary condition for the 
destruction of Indigenous civilizations. The manifestations of that colonial project, 
according to Dunbar-Ortiz, included "overwork in the mines, massacres, starvation or 
malnutrition with the breakdown of subsistence food production, loss of will to live or 
reproduce, infanticide, suicide and abortion, and massive deportations as slave labour,"171 
all of which contributed to bodies weakened and unable to fight off diseases old and new. 
As Sanchez-Albornoz concludes, "the social and economic disturbance caused by 
European domination rendered the Indians even more susceptible to disease-carrying 
germs [and] the breakup of their cultural life deprived them of the vitality needed to 
preserve their ethnic identity."172 
The creation of what would be called Honduras was one part of the genocidal 
story that began with the establishment of capitalist social relations and the modem state 
form in Europe. While much inter-oceanic travel had taken place prior to 1492, what 
169 Anthony J. Hall reports, for instance, that British Major-General Jeffrey Amherst wrote to his superiors, 
in the mid-18th century, "could it not be contrived to send some small pox among the tribes of the Indians?" 
Amherst, quoted in Anthony J. Hall, The Bowl With One Spoon: The American Empire and the Fourth 
World, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003, p. 332. Ward Churchill presents exhaustive 
evidence from the voices of colonizers themselves that disease was deliberately spread for the purpose of 
extermination and, while this evidence applies to North America and not directly to the region that is the 
focus of this study, it is certainly relevant in any discussion of the genocide in the Americas. Furthermore, 
given that germ warfare - as manifest in the weaponized delivery of plague-infected bodies to enemies -
was present in Europe as early as the 14th century, Churchill's demonstration of a conscious effort to 
exterminate Indigenous people with disease in North America certainly raises the possibility that similar 
tactics might have been considered in Central America as well. Ward Churchill, A Little Matter of 
Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas, 1492 to the Present, San Francisco, City Lights Books, 
1997. 
170 Sanchez-Albornoz, 65. 
171 Dunbar-Ortiz, 8. 
172 Sanchez-Albornoz, 65. 
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distinguished the European arrival was the emphasis it placed on the accumulation of 
precious metals, which was arguably a major piece of what Marx would describe as the 
"so-called primitive accumulation" that would become an important component of the 
establishment of the material basis for the expansion of global capitalism.173 As Dunbar-
Ortiz explains: 
Gold-fever was the ruling ideology of all colonizing ventures, at 
first in pursuit of the metal in its raw form, but then becoming 
more sophisticated, establishing whatever conditions were 
necessary to acquire as much gold as possible, that is, 
accumulation of wealth. While investors, monarchies and 
parliamentarians determined, controlled and understood the 
processes of accumulation and power, the ideology of gold-fever 
173 It is well beyond the scope of this project to offer a comprehensive account of the rise of capitalism, but 
it is certainly worth acknowledging that many scholars consider the vast plunder of riches from the "New 
World" to Europe to be a crucial foundation for world capitalism, insofar as it was this tremendous transfer 
of wealth that was seized upon by the emerging capitalist classes in Europe and turned towards the 
establishment of unequal relations - the separation and maintenance of a class of people who own the 
means of production and those who do not - that is so central to capitalism. As Marx notes, "the treasures 
captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement, and murder flowed back to the mother 
country and were turned into capital there." Karl Marx, Capital, Vol I, London, Penguin, 1990, p. 918. Jim 
Blaut has argued that "[the conquest] inaugurated a set of world historical processes that gave European 
protocapitalists enough capital and power to dissolve feudalism in their own region and begin the 
destruction of competing protocapitalist communities everywhere else." James M. Blaut, "Political 
Geography Debates No. 3: On the Significance of 1492." Political Geography, Vol. 11, Issue 4, July 1992, 
p. 355. Recent scholarship has called the position articulated by Blaut into question: Ellen Wood has 
insisted that the conquest of the Americas cannot be a causal factor in the emergence of capitalism since 
Spain, the dominant early colonial power, "amassed huge wealth from South American mines, and was 
well-endowed with 'capital' in the simple sense of wealth, [but it] did not develop in a capitalist direction," 
instead expending its massive colonial wealth "in essentially feudal pursuits." Ellen Wood, The Origin of 
Capitalism: A Longer View, New York, Verso, 2002, p. 148. McNally agrees that Spanish metal wealth 
was used not to develop capitalism but "to finance wars." David McNally, Another World is Possible: 
Globalization and Anti-Capitalism, Winnipeg, Arbeiter Ring, 2006, p. 144. Henry Heller concurs; though 
his explanation for the rise of capitalism diverges significantly from Wood's, he agrees that the conquest of 
America is not what created capitalism: "the power of colonial expansion," he insists, "depended on the 
growing strength of capitalism." Henry Heller, The Birth of Capitalism: A Twenty-First Century 
Perspective, Winnipeg, Fernwood, 2011, p. 168. Samir Amin, nevertheless, in his masterful work in 
Eurocentrism, accuses the entire tradition of western social science of downplaying the role of colonialism 
in establishing the unequal power relations that are maintain{:d by capitalism: "the dominant currents of 
Western social thought stress the internal transformations of European society [in the establishment of 
capitalism] and are content to note that identical transformations were not realised elsewhere, placing the 
blame almost exclusively on factors internal to those non-European societies." Samir Amin, Eurocentrism, 
2nd ed, New York, Monthly Review Press, 2009, p. 185. It is unclear precisely what role the colonization 
of the Americas - and, in particular, the early Spanish zeal for precious metals - played in the 
establishment of a world capitalist system. But it is clear that this tremendous transfer of wealth played 
some role; it was, arguably, a necessary condition for the rise of capitalism, though most certainly not a 
sufficient condition. · 
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was the bait that allowed them to mobilize the masses of settlers 
and soldiers. Subjugating entire societies and civilizations, 
enslaving whole countries, and slaughtering the entire population 
of village after village did not seem too high a price to pay, nor 
did it appear inhumane, in the logic of the prevailing ideology. 174 
Dunbar-Ortiz's presentation here should be understood as reflecting her own political 
moment and project as a member of the American Indian Movement in the 201h century; 
she opts to highlight the most scathing portrayal possible, in part, to counteract the weight 
of contemporary historical amnesia that lets the brutality of the conquest slip away in 
annual U.S. celebrations of Columbus Day. To be sure, her analysis needs to be 
complicated by the fact that many of the colonizing Spaniards were wary of killing too 
many Indigenous people, lest they should undermine their dwindling supply of slave 
labour. It should be added, furthermore, that a critique of Spanish conquest should not 
fall into the trap of the Leyenda Negra - the Black Legend - that Spanish colonialism 
was brutal and barbaric while the colonial projects of other European powers were 
relatively peaceful or benign. The notion that other colonizing forces were 'gentler,' 
propagated wherever possible by those other European powers, was and remains 
profoundly false. A focus on the Spanish, here:, is a function only of their more direct 
relevance to the history of Honduras. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that Spanish conquistadors' greed for gold and 
silver was often matched by a terrifying savagery towards the people they encountered, 
who would often be forced into immediate slavery for the Spanish or, if they resisted 
enslavement, brutally slaughtered. Sanchez-Albornoz suggests that, "the Spaniards were 
possessed of a tradition of conquest," which they brought to bear with ferocity against 
what they knew was a much more numerous population that they had made their 
174 Dunbar-Ortiz, 10. 
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enemy. 175 The Spanish colonizers quickly established themselves in what is now Mexico 
and Panama, and moved into Central America largely from those flanks. 176 Indigenous 
people living in what became Honduras were seized and set to work either in gold and 
silver mines or sent on ships from the Bay of Honduras to the Spanish colonies in the 
Caribbean, especially Cuba, to work on sugar plantations, or even seized to be slaves in 
Spain itself. 177 Nonetheless, it is worth remembering that savagery alone could not 
account for such a systematic decimation of civilizations so large and complex; to draw 
once more from Dunbar-Ortiz: 
The key to such massive destruction is not the capacity for 
violence, nor is it technology, but rather, organization and 
administration. These were the elements that made colonization 
a vehicle of genocide. The prior development of capitalism and 
the state in Europe allowed for this new organizational 
capacity. 178 
Naturally, campaigns of such violence required a set of justifications. Much like 
imperial armies of today, which outfit their occupying forces with all manner of 
meaningless quasi-legal procedures to create the appearance of "due process" in foreign 
occupation, 179 Spanish conquistadors were furnished with a requerimiento - a statement 
of "requirement" for Christian conversion - which they were to read to so-called Indians 
before they attacked, captured, and enslaved them. The requerimiento was designed in 
1513 and explained that the only way for Indigenous people to avoid this violent fate was 
to immediately submit to conversion and to the Christian god; as Honduran historian 
175 Sanchez-Albornoz, 3 8. 
176 MacLeod, 49. 
177 MacLeod, 50-51. 
178 Dunbar-Ortiz, 11. 
179 Occupation forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, p1eriodically read "rights" to detained prisoners, 
in an effort to legitimize their occupation. This process is satirized in the 1999 film Three Kings, in which 
American soldiers read Iraqi prisoners of war their 'rights' in English and punish them violently when they 
fail to comply with instructions that they cannot understand. 
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Longino Becerra notes, the requerimiento was established after Spanish brutality had 
already begun, and was set up only out of "the necessity of justifying the manner of their 
conduct."180 Bartolome de las Casas, a Spanilsh missionary famous for his critique of 
Spanish brutality in the Americas, considered the requerimiento an absurdity and 
described it as follows: 
[Indigenous people were] confronted with a demand that they 
convert on the spot, without their ever hearing the Word or 
having Christian doctrine explained to them; and should they 
show any reluctance to do so and to swear allegiance to a king 
they have never heard of nor clapped eyes on, and whose 
subjects and ambassadors prove to be cruel, pitiless and 
bloodthirsty tyrants, they should immediately surrender all their 
worldly goods and lose all rights to their land, their freedom, 
their womenfolk, their children and their lives. Such a notion is 
b d . . .d 181 as a sur as 1t 1s stup1 ... 
Furthermore, Las Casas described a variety of occasions in which the requerimiento was 
read to Indigenous villages at night, quietly, from afar, in order to justify a murdercius 
invasion the following moming. 182 Las Casas was present among the Spanish from the 
beginning of the conquest and spent much of his adult life critiquing the savagery and 
inhumanity of the conquistadors; his work was to occupy a central role in the Leyenda 
Negra, with complicated consequences. But Las Casas' position was, by no means, a 
rejection of colonization writ large. He began in 1502 as an encomendero himself, an 
overlord to several Indigenous servants 'gifted' to him by the Spanish crown, and even 
after he rejected the encomienda system (more on this below) he continued to believe that 
180 Longino Becerra, Evolucion Historica de Honduras, Tegucigalpa, Baktun Editorial, 1983, p. 54-55. 
(Translated from Spanish. All translations by the author unless otherwise indicated.) 
181 Bartolome de las Casas, A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies, New York, Penguin, 2004, p. 
32-33. 
182 de las Casas, 33. 
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Indigenous people were in need of a less bloody brand of Christian guidance, spiritual 
awakening, and 'peaceful colonization,' describing the Americas as: 
Kingdoms granted and entrusted by God and His Church to the 
Spanish Crown so that [their Indigenous inhabitants] might be 
properly ruled and governed, converted to the Faith, and tenderly 
nurtured to full material and spiritual prosperity. 183 
His critique, then, was limited to the methods and manner of the conquest rather than the 
conquest itself, of which he was an active participant; Las Casas, in fact, founded a 
missionary settlement in the Verapaz region of contemporary Guatemala, which sought -
unsuccessfully - to put his dream of a more just colonialism into action. 184 The 
insistence on a more 'peaceful' colonization is an argument that has echoes in much of 
contemporary Canadian policy, which seeks to extend Canadian power, wealth, and 
influence by a variety of seemingly 'peaceful' means, a point which I made in chapter 2 
and to which I will return in chapter 6. 185 
THREE CENTURIES OF SPANISH RULE 
Spanish conquest of Central America was more or less consolidated by the 1520s; 
the areas that came to be Honduras were among the least effectively occupied in the early 
stages of colonization, in part because Indigenous groups in Honduras were not united 
under one tributary society that could be demonstrably conquered - as was the case with 
Cortes' defeat of the Aztec - and, in part, because Spanish conquistadors focused their 
183 de las Casas, 6. 
184 Anthony Pagden describes the failure of the Verapaz settlement in his introduction to Las Casas' Short 
Account of the Destruction of the Indies. Pagden, in Las Casas, p. xv. 
185 It is beyond the scope of this project to survey the vast literature that makes of what is now called the 
postcolonial tradition, but in this project I will insist- following that tradition- that 'peaceful colonization' 
must be understood as a contradiction in terms, since colonization is, by its nature, a violent process. A 
useful primer on postcolonial theory can be found in Robert Young's Postcolonialism, in which Las Cases 
is understood as one of the first European liberal anti-colonial theorists, whose legacy can - and has - been 
employed both to advocate projects of colonial assimilation and to justify anti-colonial struggle. Robert 
J.C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2001, p. 75-77. 
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attention on places that seemed to offer more immediate wealth. 186 As such, Spanish rule 
in Honduras was focused at first on the capture and transport of slaves, an 'industry' that 
decimated communities, tore apart families, and produced incalculable violence, 
destruction, and heartbreak; untold numbers were killed resisting enslavement, or in the 
abysmally arduous sea voyages, or in the brutal conditions at their destinations. 187 By 
mid-century, the numbers of Indigenous people~ in Honduras had been catastrophically 
reduced and the prospects for further enslavement were dim; 188 as Spanish conquerors 
began to establish themselves they wanted to use the remaining Indigenous labour 
themselves, in Honduras, especially as it became apparent that gold and silver could be 
found there. 
So, as Spanish control tightened, the: conquenng authorities set to work 
establishing more permanent dominion over the people whose labour they would need to 
extract wealth from the earth, in the fields, the mines, and the ranches. 189 Three primary 
strategies were used to obtain Indigenous labour during the period of Spanish rule: the 
encomienda, the repartimiento, and 'free' capitalist wage labour. In the former, 
Indigenous people were 'granted' to one or another Spanish colonizer, as noted above, 
and they functioned as servants to the individual encomendero who had 'received' them. 
In 1549, the Spanish Crown banned almost all encomiendas (exceptions were made for 
government officials and clergy) in the hopes of creating a free labour market, through 
186 MacLeod, 41-45. 
187 MacLeod, 50-55. 
188 MacLeod, 55. 
189 I have chosen, here, to skip over much of the narrative describing the wrangling between various 
Spanish conquistadors for control over this part of Central America. Much detail on this can be found in 
Robert S. Chamberlain's The Conquest and Colonization of Honduras, a largely celebratory study of 
Columbus, Cortes, Alvarado and the other conquerors; Cortes' violent march from Mexico to Honduras, for 
instance, is described as "one of the most spectacular of his many great deeds." Chamberlain, 16. A more 
critical but less detailed account can be found in Murdo MacLeod's Spanish Central America. 
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which all Spanish colonists would be able to exploit Indigenous labour. But this 
presented a problem, as Linda Newson explains: 
The Crown intended that the abolition of [the encomienda] 
should open the way for the establishment of a free labour 
market to which both encomenderos and non-encomenderos 
would have access. Nevertheless, it was fearful that, if the 
Indians were given the freedom to work, they would refuse. As 
such, a system of forced labour known as the repartimiento was 
introduced. 190 
Under the repartimiento, Indigenous villages would be expected to give a certain quantity 
of tribute and labour to various enterprises at fixed wages under the supervision of one or 
another Spanish colonist; Indigenous communities themselves would determine who 
would be sent, and representatives of the Crown would allocate them to particular 
projects for predetermined lengths of time. 191 These conscripted labourers would be kept 
in a constant rotation so that Spanish colonists could count on a regular supply of labour, 
and while employers of repartimiento workers were supposed to be responsible for 
providing food and decent treatment to their workers, overwork, malnourishment, and 
injury were regular parts of the work experience, and even the fixed wages set by the 
Crown were regularly ignored. 192 
This super-exploitative semi-feudal arrangement amounted to slavery by another 
name, and it was to be a fixture of the colonial relationship throughout the three centuries 
190 Newson, 178. This should, again, call to mind the important passages in Volume I of Marx's Capital on 
"so-called primitive accumulation," in which Marx describes the absolute refusal of many peasant farmers· 
in England during the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries to submit themselves to wage labour and market-
dependence. In these stirring passages, Marx describes the process by which capitalist property relations 
were forced upon people "under circumstances of ruthless terrorism," and describes the "bloody 
legislation" that was enacted to impose violent punishment on dispossessed peasants who refused to enter 
into wage labour. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol I, London, Penguin, 1990, p. 873-904. This is further taken up 
and elaborated in David McNally's Another World is Possible, in which he demonstrates that people faced 
with any alternative to capitalist wage labour have overwhelmingly pursued those alternatives, even when 
they have imposed all manner of hardship and difficulty. David McNally, Another World Is Possible, 
Winnipeg, Arbeiter Ring, 2006, p. 90-91. 
191 Newson, 8-10. 
192 Newson, 183. 
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of Spanish dominion, especially in mining and agriculture. Nevertheless, the 
repartimiento would be gradually replaced by capitalist forms of free labour, whereby 
Spanish landowners would hire Indigenous workers outside of the repartimiento at 
slightly higher wages and with large advances for housing and food, in an effort to draw 
Indigenous people into a form of debt-slavery; 193 given the shock, dislocation, and 
disarray that Spanish conquest had beset upon Indigenous people and their own political 
and economic structures, the prospects for survival outside of the newly imposed Spanish 
infrastructure were increasingly bleak. As a result, Spanish colonists hoped they would 
find a relatively steady supply of Indigenous labourers prepared to enter into profoundly 
unfair waged labour relations - which would be better described as debt peonage - in 
which the Indigenous workers would be expected to work in order to pay back the debt 
that they incurred when they accepted their employers' advances. 194 These 'free' labour 
arrangements began as early as the late 1500s, but they failed to attract many Indigenous 
workers. Following the historical pattern of most impositions of capitalist social 
relations, people chose almost any option over entering into the wage relationship, and 
even as the repartimiento system faltered and Spanish employers offered higher wages to 
draw people in, they still complained of their inability to find willing Indigenous 
workers. 195 
Nonetheless, with their own societies crumbling under the weight of the genocidal 
Spanish conquest, by the late 1700s Indigenous people could find fewer and fewer 
alternatives to selling their labour save letting themselves perish - which they sometimes 
193 Newson, 188. This practice was technically made illegal in 1584, but the Crown was either unable or 
unwilling to crack down on the practice, especially at first when it was applied to a relatively small portion 
of the total Indigenous labour force. 
194 Newson, 187-188. 
195 Newson, 188. 
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did choose over working for the Spanish. 196 Those who survived were increasingly 
shifted away from the repartimiento system, which went into relative decline as 
dynamics in Spain led to a diminished capacity to govern its own empire. By the dawn of 
the 19th century, exploitative capitalist wage labour had eclipsed the repartimiento as. the 
dominant system of extracting Indigenous labour. 197 Prior to the Spanish invasion, 
Indigenous peoples had relied upon complex social-agricultural systems for their 
survival; people grew com, beans, squash, and other staple crops on land consigned by a 
local leader, a cacique, who took some tribute but left most of the yield in the hands of 
the direct producers. 198 But Spanish colonization had forced Indigenous people - either 
by direct coercion or by the de-population of their communities and subsequent 
impossibility of survival by traditional means - to offer their labour to the new Spanish 
occupiers, who dramatically re-oriented the economy, over three centuries, away from 
subsistence production towards the production of exports in order to bring wealth to 
themselves and the Spanish crown. 199 
Naturally, this imposition was not acceptt::d without resistance. As early as 1515, 
Central American Indigenous people, enslaved and sent to work in the Caribbean, were 
considered 'unsatisfactory workers' in large part due to their refusal to accept 
enslavement; one group of slaves seized a ship in Cuba and sailed it back to their home 
on the Bay Islands. 200 On the mainland, resistance first mounted in the west, where in the 
1530s it was coordinated by an Indigenous leader named Cocumba; pitched battles were 
196 Dunbar-Ortiz, 8. 
197 Newson, 189. 
198 John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade and Thomas W. Walker, Understanding Central America: Global 
Forces, Rebellion, and Change, 5th ed, Boulder, Westview Press, 2010, p. 48. 
199 Booth, Wade and Walker, 48. 
200 MacLeod, 50. 
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fought in the Ulua Valley, ending in brutal massacre at the hands of the Spaniards led by 
Pedro de Alvarado.201 The resentment sown by Alvarado blew up again between 1537-
39, when a Lenca leader called Lempira - whose name is now given to the Honduran 
currency - raised an army 30,000 strong, refust::d the repartimiento, and made a dramatic 
stand at the Pefiol de Cerquin.202 This inspired Indigenous revolts across the province, 
centred around Comayagua and San Pedro, on such a scale that the Spanish 
administration had to send for help from neighbouring colonial centres. One account of 
Lempira' s uprising cites him claiming to be invincible and calling upon all Indigenous 
people to drive the Spaniards out, declaring it to be "shameful, that so many valiant men 
should be held in bondage by so few."203 It is imclear how seriously this account should 
be taken, written, as it was, by an admirer of the Spanish occupation, Robert S. 
Chamberlain, but it is certainly clear that Lempira inspired confidence in his followers 
and led the largest rebellion against the Spanish conquerors in the history of the conquest 
of Central America. 
When even a siege of Lempira' s Cerquin stronghold could not defeat the uprising, 
the Spanish turned to trickery in order to kill Lempira and dishearten the rebellion. 
Lempira was lured into false peace negotiations and then· shot by a hidden gunman. 
Chamberlain describes the events, emphasizing Lempira's arrogance and his followers' 
fanaticism in typical Orientalist fashion,204 as follows: 
201 Newson, 96-97. 
202 Julio Cesar Pinto Soria, in Edelberto Torres Rivas, ed, Hi.storia General de Centroamerica, Torno 2, 
Madrid, Sociedad Estatal Quinto Centerario, 1993, p. 64-65 .. 
203 Lempira, quoted in Chamberlain, 80. 
204 Edward Said's Orienta/ism does well to demonstrate a consistent pattern in Eurocentric writing and 
scholarship on 'the Orient,' the logic of which can be applied to anywhere outside of the European 
tradition, which attributes a variety of 'backwards' characteristics to non-Europeans and emphasizes the 
rationality and progressiveness of European civilization. A great deal of the English-language writing on 
Honduras fits well into this category. Edward W. Said, Orienta/ism, New York, Vintage Books, 1978. 
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In the spring of 1538 Caceres finally decided to eliminate 
Lempira, the heart and soul of resistance, by fair means or foul. 
Caceres knew that not only Lempira but also his followers 
fanatically regarded him as invincible, a conviction that offered 
the Spanish captain a way to his own ends. He therefore plotted 
to invite Lempira to a parley and there assassinate him. [ ... ] With 
perfect faith in his destiny, Lempira accepted Caceres' invitation. 
He approached the Spanish lines at the appointed hour, 
resplendent in a plumed helmet, rich cotton armour, and insignia 
befitting his rank. [ ... ] While the parley was progressing and 
Lempira was delivering haughty defiance, the arquebusier took 
careful aim, fired, and killed the. great Indian lord with a ball 
through his forehead. The sudden and unworthy death of their 
inspired leader, whom they had thought unconquerable and 
impervious to enemy arms, caused instant and utter panic among 
the defenders of [Cerqufn].205 
Chamberlain's account implicitly justifies the European colonial project, highlighting the 
Indians' supposed fanaticism and irrationality - and their leader's arrogance - and 
lauding the Spaniards use of trickery and inte:llect to undermine the rebellion. The 
implication is that the Spaniards were modem and rational and, while Lempira's rebels 
may not have liked handing over their sovereignty, it was ultimately in their best interest 
since the Spanish represented the forward march of civilization.206 
It is clear from their continued resistance that Indigenous civilizations in 
Honduras did not agree with Chamberlain's assessment.207 But what Chamberlain did 
205 Chamberlain, 89. 
206 Chamberlain, 69-99. 
207 Naturally, Chamberlain is just one example of the standard European framing oflndigenous people. 
J.L. Stephens was an American archaeologist who travelled in Central America in the 1840s and whose 
descriptions of the sites of abandoned Mayan cities are still popular (and are featured in the ROM exhibit 
described above); he brags about the fact that he 'bought' the ruins at Copan for fifty dollars and has the 
following to say about Indigenous people in 1843: "the North American Indian is by drinking made 
insolent, ferocious and brutal, and with a knife in his hand he is always a dangerous creature; but the 
Indians of Yucatan when intoxicated are only more docile and submissive. All wear machetes, but they 
never use them to do harm." J.L. Stephens, Incidents o/Travel in Yucatan, New York, Dover Publications, 
1963, p. 203. These types of descriptions were typical of the colonial and postcolonial era and remain 
popular among settlers and their descendents today serving, .as they do, the purpose of justifying the 
colonial project itself. A useful collection of some of these racist assertions can be found in Berkhofer' s 
The White Man's Indian, though I do not fully accept the conclusions he draws from his survey. Robert F. 
Berkhofer Jr., The White Man's Indian, New York, Vintage Books, 1978. 
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get right was that after the fall of Lempira andl the 153 7 rebellion, few uprisings would 
achieve significant success against the increasingly firmly planted Spanish colonial 
apparatus. Especially in the west, rebellions were quickly and violently repressed by 
colonial forces, and it was only in the eastern provinces, where Spanish settlement took 
place more gradually, that resistance could be sustained. Between 1542-1546, for 
instance, there were a number of loosely connected uprisings in Olancho and Gracias a 
Dios, many of which united both Indigenous and recently-imported African slaves 
against the Spanish;208 they were defeated by colonial armies, but similar uprisings 
continued with limited success throughout the period of Spanish rule, especially under 
th . d d . . 209 e encomzen as an repartzmzentos. 
While the Spanish rulers of Honduras used violence and terror to maintain their 
dominion over Indigenous peoples, they quarreHed amongst themselves over the various 
territories of their American Empire - which would be gradually taken over by the 
increasingly powerful Great Britain. Having never intended Honduras to be a genuine 
settler colony, the Spanish made little attempt to advance local capitalist development or 
industry; instead, they used various forms of slavery to extract natural resources -
especially precious metals - from the earth to be shipped for sale in European markets. 
Honduran urban development, then, was to be shaped by the boom and bust cycles of 
particular non-renewable exports; rapid development around the village of Gracias w:as 
halted when the gold ran out. Tegucigalpa initially expanded as a base for silver mining, 
but as the silver became difficult to extract, the city fell into stagnation.210 Spanish 
attempts to impose production of other exports, from balsam to sarsaparilla to cacao, all 
208 Chamberlain, 220-226. 
209 Newson, 116. 
210 MacLeod, 148. 
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proved ineffectual and unsuccessful. These dynamics were similar in most of the Central 
American countries (with the exception of Costa Rica) and, as historians John Booth, 
Christine Wade, and Thomas Walker argue, "it is small wonder that the four republics of 
northern Central America are typified to this day by wide social and economic disparities 
generated by centuries of control by socially-imesponsible economic elites."211 
SOVEREIGNTY WITHOUT INDEPENDENCE 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, Honduras was sparsely populated, either 
by Spanish colonists, who could find few easy sources of wealth, or by Indigenous people 
whose populations had been in steady decline since the initial conquest. The country was 
politically weak and fragmented between greedy Spanish overseers who fought over 
regional fiefdoms at the cost of centralized power. The colonists had destroyed much of 
the social and economic structure that preceded Spanish conquest but had failed to 
replace it with any effective local capitalist development.212 And the expansion of the 
political, military, and economic power of other European states meant that the Spanish 
Empire was in decline, being gradually parceBed out to more powerful competitors, 
especially Great Britain. Little Spanish attention, then, was paid to Honduras, which was 
left to rot in the sloughs of the under-development that had been imposed upon it. 
As Britain gradually increased its colonial influence in the Caribbean and Central 
America, the Spanish could mount only feeble resistance. The British raided and 
sometimes seized Spanish colonies -Trujillo in 1643, Jamaica in 1655, Havana in 1762 -
and began establishing their own presence on the mainland. That presence was manifest 
in the creation of British Honduras (now Belize) and the Protectorate of Miskitu, both of 
211 Booth, Wade and Walker, 50. 
212 Alison Acker, Honduras: The Making of a Banana Republic, Toronto, Between the Lines, 1988, p. 32-
35. 
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which were carved out of what were to become Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua in 
order to protect British interests in mining and timber,213 and from which they laun~hed 
or encouraged attacks on the Spanish colonies in Central America.214 With Spainish 
power in decline, its Honduran territories were increasingly vulnerable; at various points 
in the 18th century, the British seized and controlled different sections of Honduras, from 
Roatan Island to San Pedro Sula. As Honduran historian Rafael Heliodoro Valle 
describes it, "if any country in America were to demonstrate the bad policies of Spain ... it 
would be Honduras,"215 though one could hardly make a case that Spanish policy in the 
other Central American colonies was much better. 
When independence from Spain finally arri~ed, it was under the auspices of 
moderate liberal reformers from the criollo elite (of Spanish ancestry but born in Central 
America) who were looking to imitate the American Revolution and separate themselves 
from the Spanish Crown while leaving the fundamental class structure intact. Edelberto 
Torres Rivas explains: 
The struggles for independence [ ... ] were always isolated 
outbreaks by an intellectual elite who could not succeed in 
articulating a long-term popular insunection. The absence of the 
masses in the Central American independence struggles 
213 Booth, Wade and Walker, 53-54. 
214 The process of British interference in the politics of Central America and the Caribbean typically 
followed the pattern described in C.L.R. James' history of the Haitian Revolution, The Black Jacobins. 
The dynamics are masterfully recreated in Gillo Pontecorvo:•s brilliant 1969 film, Burn!, which is inspired 
by James' book but takes place on a fictitious island nation, in which a British adventurer (played by 
Marlon Brando) in the employ of the trading companies encourages and supports local resistance to 
Spanish colonialism, while simultaneously cooperating with outgoing Spanish officials and local 
compradors in securing their elite positions in the postcolonial arrangement - the purpose being to play 
both sides against one another and secure British economic mastery over whomever should come out on 
top. Brando's character could easily be based on Frederick Chatfield, British agent in Central America 
from 1834-52. 
215 Rafael Heliodoro Valle, Historia de la Cultura Hondurefza, Tegucigalpa, Ediciones Universitarias, 
1981, p. 123. 
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contrasted with victories achieved in other Spanish dominions, 
especially Mexico.216 
As movements for independence were growing in strength, these landed elites were 
particularly conscious of the fact that revolutionary movements, in Mexico and especially 
in Haiti, had sought and perhaps succeeded in effecting a radical break from the old 
hierarchies and recognized the receptiveness with which those revolutions might be 
received by the ladino (people of mixed Spanish and Indigenous ancestry), African, and 
Indigenous labouring classes of Central America. As Hector Perez Brignoli explains: 
This was a case of a general terror, which occupied the dominant 
classes in Central America, at the possibility that popular 
movements for independence. would reach the same degree of 
radicalism as in Mexico or Haiti.217 
With the Spanish Empire crumbling and the newly independent Mexico threatening to 
annex all of Central America, the landed elilte in the Central American provinces 
organized a tenuous union to declare their own independence from both Spain and 
Mexico, writing the region's first constitution in 1824. This was a document modelled 
after those in Mexico and the United States though, notably, the United Provinces of 
Central American banned the practice of direct slavery, some 19 years prior to Great 
Britain and 41 years before the United States.218 
216 Edelberto Torres Rivas, History and Society in Central America, Austin, University of Texas Press, 
1993, p. 1. 
217 Hector Perez Brignoli, in Edelberto Torres Rivas, ed, Historia General de Centroamerica, Torno 3, 
Madrid, Sociedad Estatal Quinto Centerario, 1993, p. 84. 
218 In Central America, slavery would re-emerge only briefly in 1855 in Nicaragua under the dictatorship of 
U.S. adventurer William Walker, who also made English the official language, despite there only being a 
tiny minority in the country who spoke it. In 1857 he was toppled by an alliance of the Central American 
states and fled with American protection, but when he returned to try to orchestrate another takeover in 
1860 he was captured by Honduran authorities and executed. See Booth, Wade and Walker, p. 54. Dating 
the abolition of slavery in Great Britain and the United States is necessarily imprecise, since it was a 
gradual and complicated process; for the purposes of this project, I'm using the Slavery Act of 1843 in 
Britain and the 13th Amendment in the United States as the key moments. 
108 
While the ruling classes in Central America squabbled amongst themselves over 
how power should be divided in their new Union, they actively discouraged any popular 
mobilization, lest it lead to demands for more radical change. As journalist Alison Acker 
notes, the governor of Honduras "prohibited the ringing of bells to celebrate Central 
American independence, in case it should generate mass enthusiasm."219 Nonetheless, it 
was a Honduran - a privileged criollo from Tegucigalpa named Francisco Morazan -
who would lead an army to Guatemala City to consolidate the union of Central American 
states in 1827. Though canonized in official Honduran histories as a hero of liberty and 
democracy, Morazan's project looked not too dissimilar from that of Simon Bolivar in 
South America - a union of liberal capitalist republics modelled after those in Europe that 
would carry on business-as-usual from a position of political equality with the European 
states from whence, according to this narrative, they came. 
But Morazan's vision could hardly be called democratic; when peasants and 
priests refused to submit to a poorly coordinated. cholera quarantine in 183 7, he marched 
in with the military220 - one of 21 such military ventures in his 11 years of unelected 
'presidency.' Nor could it be meaningfully described as promoting liberty; the 
Indigenous people conscripted to build 'more humane' prisons could hardly be blamed 
for questioning this version of 'freedom. ' 221 Indeed, it was a ladino leader with roots in 
Indigenous communities in Guatemala - Jose Rafael Carrera - who eventually defeated 
Morazan in 1838 on the strength of a major mobilization of popular support; support that 
Morazan could rarely call upon. In fact, while Morazan more or less had the backing of 
Great Britain and the United States, Carrera's supporters were, at least in the beginning, 
219 Acker, 40. 
220 Woodward, 104. 
221 Woodward, 103. 
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primarily drawn from Central America's Indigenous and ladino communities, most of 
them peasants. 
In a noteworthy comparison, well-known U.S. archaeologist J.L. Stephens, who 
travelled in Central America in the 1840s, called Morazan "the best man in Cenitral 
America" while describing Carrera as "ignorant, fanatic, sanguinary and the slave to 
violent passions, wielding absolutely the physical force of the country and that force 
entertaining a natural hatred of the whites,"222 a description reminiscent of Chamberlain's 
writings on Caceres and Lempira. Carrera ultimately amounted to a fairly typical 
caudillo of the day, but the reaction against him from the foreign elite - based largely on 
his race and his invocation of resistance to the racialized hierarchies of power that 
Morazan perpetuated - is suggestive of the extent to which Carrera was viewed as a 
much more serious threat to the established colonial and postcolonial order and points to 
the serious limitations of Morazan's United Central America.223 This is well described 
by E. Bradford Bums, who describes the rise of Carrera: 
The many grievances of the Indians reached a climax in 183 7 
with the outbreak of a violent cholera epidemic, the final proof to 
the Indians that the government sought to eliminate them in order 
to give their lands to immigrants. At that point a popular revolt 
broke out... among the many things that popular rebellion 
signified, it voiced the refusal of the Indians to countenance any 
further exploitation and destruction through Europeanization ... 
Carrera appreciated the Indians opposition to the process of 
Europeanization imposed by the liberals. He regarded it as his 
222 J.L. Stephens, Incidents of Travel in Central America, Chaipas and Yucatan, New York, Dover, 1841, p. 
212. 
223 This, of course, did not stop European agents from playing all sides of Central American conflicts 
against one another, even when they had a preferred victor in mind. British agent Frederick Chatfield 
actually supplied arms to the Conservatives in Guatemala, who had sided with Carrera against Morazan, as 
he had become concerned about the prospect of a united Central America able to stand up to British 
interference. See Mario Rodriguez, A Palmerstonian Diplomat in Central America: Frederick Chatfield, 
Esq., Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1964. 
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principal duty to allow "the peopl1e to return to their customs, 
their habits, and their particular manner of living."224 
Carrera's success, then, was in his very refusal to participate in the liberal project that 
was at the heart ofMorazan's enterprise. 
It is unhelpful, then, to imagine that the Morazan era was idyllic for the majority 
of the people who were now considered independent Hondurans. Nonetheless, the failure 
of a United Central America under the Honduran-born Morazan left the country in an 
even more precarious position vis-a-vis the rapacious new colonizers from Britain and the 
U.S., whose gaze had fallen on Honduras as a possible site for a trans-isthmus canal. 
After Carrera's victory over Morazan, the Central American republics were once again 
independent, though Carrera was sure to install caudillos in each country that would be 
agreeable to his rule in Guatemala. Meanwhil1e, as the British flexed their muscles -
demanding the return of African slaves escaped from Belize, for instance - weak 
Honduran governments routinely capitulated, knowing that they relied on the British 
whose banks owned their debt, whose capitalists owned their mines, and whose ships 
now monopolized most of the trade on the Caribbean Sea. 225 Infamous British agent 
Frederick Chatfield - who had secretly undermined Morazan's attempts to build a united 
Central America - continued to plot against the independent Central American states and 
play them against one another in order to maintain British influence. Among these 
intrigues was support for Costa Rica's disputed claim to the Nicaraguan city of San Juan; 
fomenting of war between Guatemala and Honduras in 1850 by supporting a rebellion 
against President Juan Lindo; and undermining of the 1851 Pact of Leon between 
224 E. Bradford Bums, The Poverty of Progress: Latin American in the Nineteenth Century, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1980, p. 97-98. 
225 Becerra, 116-120. 
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Honduras and El Salvador, designed to re-ignite the idea of Central American unity.226 
As Booth, Wade, and Walker describe it, "foreign intervention exacerbated the Central 
American nations' well-established penchant for interfering in each others' internal 
affairs and led to international disputes within the region and overt and covert military 
and political intervention by outside powers."227 
Indeed, alongside the de-stabilizing meddling, U.S. and British statesmen 
scrambled across Central America in the 1840s and 50s, staking 1claims to strategic points 
on the coasts in order to position themselves favourably for any railroad or canal that 
would be built, often invoking the threat of armed conflict for interference in their 
sovereign territories, despite the fact that the territories in question belonged to Honduras, 
Nicaragua and, later, Colombia.228 After British troops under Chatfield invaded the 
Honduran port of Trujillo and Tigre Island, as mentioned above, it was the United States, 
invoking the Monroe Doctrine, that forced them out; Honduran President Juan Lindo -
harried by Chatfield's interference - promptly invited the U.S. to remain on Tigre Island 
for 18 months to protect it against British interference, marking the first of many long-
and short-term U.S. occupations of Honduran territory.229 This point signalled a key shift 
in the colonial order in Central America; the Spanish were gone and the British were now 
being supplanted by the United States.230 
As the British faded from the scene, competing U.S. investors looked to establish 
possession of the means of transporting goods across the isthmus; Cornelius Vanderbilt 
226 Rodriguez, 319. 
227 Booth, Wade and Walker, 54. 
228 Becerra, 111-112. 
229 Booth, Wade and Walker, 54. 
230 Robert Freeman Smith, in Leslie Bethell, ed., The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol 4, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 84-87. 
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and William Walker struggled over who should own the concession to build a railroad 
across Nicaragua, with Vanderbilt winning out, after the four Central American nations 
united briefly to defeat Walker when he invaded and appointed himself President.231 
Eduardo Galeano describes it with characteristic clarity: 
Walker robbed, killed, burned and in successive expeditions 
proclaimed himself president of Nicaragua, El Salvador and 
Honduras. He restored slavery in areas that suffered his 
devastating occupation, thus continuing his country's 
philanthropic work in the states that had just been seized from 
Mexico. He was welcomed back to the United States as a 
national hero.232 
Another American, Ephraim George Squier, signed a charter with Honduran President 
Jose Trinidad Cabanas in 1853 to build a railroad across Honduran territory, using cost-
free - forced - Honduran convict labour. 233 The charter gave Squier one thousand square 
miles of Honduran land at no cost and guaranteed rights to U.S. citizens to travel in 
Honduras without a passport and to work in Honduras without paying taxes - a condition 
that has reflections in contemporary economic policy. As Becerra describes, "the 
document was signed ... with onerous conditions placed on Honduras, but nevertheless, 
North American bankers lost interest in the projec:t."234 The railroad failed to find outside 
financiers and came to nothing, but these events indicated the extent to which Honduran 
governments were willing to prostrate themselves to the needs of foreign capital. 
COLONIALISM TO NEOCOLONIALISM 
The railroad debacle - the first of many -· was to set the tone for the century of 
North American interference that was to follow; direct colonization was a thing of the 
231 Woodward, 136-146. 
232 Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins of Latin America, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1997, p. 107. 
233 Acker, 53. 
234 Becerra, p. 118. 
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past but distinct forms of neo-colonialism wern taking shape and would profoundly affect 
all aspects of Honduran life, as they still do today. After the failure of Central American 
unity, Honduras sunk into political chaos as successive governments were pushed and 
pulled by the whims of British and American foreign policy, which routinely collaborated . 
with various factions of the weak and divided. Honduran ruling class in its internecine 
conflicts, such that from 1824 to 1900 the country went through no less than 98 changes 
of government, each lasting, on average, k~ss than one year.235 Most of these 
governments were established in military coups, as one caudillo after another gained the 
support of the foreigners, looted the treasury, and tried his hand at ruling the country. 
Some historians describe the period as one of 'civil war,' but it would be a 
mistake to imagine that there were two distinct camps fighting for power; rather, the 
Honduran ruling classes were swept up in a st:::ries of loosely connected conflicts that 
often spilled across national borders and were driven by the changing fortunes of 
individual caudillos and their personal armies. 236 These militias were sometimes armed 
or otherwise supported by the British or Americans, and they tore up and down Central 
America for decades, leaving much destruction -· but little development - in their wake. 
Even more than in neighbouring countries, the period of chaos and conflict left traditional 
Honduran social structures devastated, left its fledgling capitalist development uttedy 
disarticulated, and left very little by way of a political apparatus that could stand up to 
235 Robert H. Holden, Armies Without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America, 
1821-1960, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, 68. 
236 Robert Holden's impressive work Armies Without Nations details the chaos that typified this period in 
Honduras, noting both the lack of consistent and effective centralized political power and the absence of 
any similarly centralized military forces. Instead, caudillo aft:er caudillo would rise to power by way of 
their personal armies, declare that the era of the caudillo must end, and then be overthrown by another 
caudillo. Holden, 68-75. Torres Rivas complicates that picture by arguing that if there were two 'poles' in 
the civil wars of post-union Central America they could be described as anarchy and dictatorship. Torres 
Rivas, 3. 
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foreign interference. As William I. Robinson has described it, "the chaotic disequilibria 
among internal social forces for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries led to the 
extreme instability and precariousness of the Honduran state and polity. "237 Furthermore, 
that very disarticulation only encouraged more aggressive competition for state power, as 
Robinson continues: 
Given the limited possibilities for enrichment through economic 
activity, the upper classes gravitated towards politics and 
engaged in ferocious struggles for power and the spoils of office. 
Government by caudillo became an institutional fixture of the 
political system from independence until the rise of the military 
to power in 1956.238 
Not surprisingly, the cycle of internal weakness and external interference 
reinforced itself. Robinson, comparing Honduras to its neighbours in Central America, 
again describes it well: "the weakness of Honduran social forces and the state allowed for 
the vulgar domination of the country by foreign companies, making Honduras the 
quintessential 'Banana Republic. "'239 Undaunted by the first failure to build a trans-
isthmus railroad, for instance, the 'modernizing' liberal government of Marco Aurelio 
Soto - enamoured as it was with the spirit of enterprise and the dream of a modem, 
capitalist, Honduras - borrowed nearly 6 million pounds from British money-lenders 
between 1867-70 to try again. The project - and it's only completed bridge - promptly 
collapsed in 1872 with only fifty miles of track laid. It was a swindle and, without the 
means to pay off the debt, successive Honduran governments left it to collect interest, so 
that by the 1920s Honduras' external debt had grown to over 30 million pounds, leaving 
237 William I. Robinson, Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change and Globalization, 
London, Verso, 2003, p. 119. 
238 Robinson, 119. 
239 Robinson, 119. 
115 
the country at the mercy of international capital.240 This serves as a striking illustration 
of how quickly and easily foreign and local ruling classes could team up to punish 
ordinary Hondurans, then as now, and it represented an important turning point as it 
marked the first great push by Honduran leaders to attract foreign investment. No 
government prior to Soto's had been so keen to dole out its own territory for foreign 
capital. 241 
And this was but the beginning. In 1880, President Soto joined with financiers 
from New York to form the Rosario Mining company, which within twenty years would 
come to dominate the Honduran gold and silver mines, originally dispersed by the state 
as concessions to some 276 mostly foreign companies.242 Rosario, which ultimately 
controlled 87% of Honduran mining, was completely exempt from Honduran taxes and 
paid next-to-nothing in wages to its local workers. After a series of calamitous accidents 
at Rosario mines near San Juancito in 1909, workers went on strike for better pay and 
protection; police and military were brought in by President Davila to attack the strikers, 
quickly ending the standoff.243 The company continued to extract wealth from the 
ground and from the people and made riches for its foreign owners, along with a handful 
of Honduran oligarchs and a scattering of Arab, French and German businessmen who 
gradually formed a small merchant class, but when the market for silver dropped off 
around the tum of the century, the mines were closed and the money taken elsewhere.244 
240 Bulmer-Thomas, in Bethell, 192. 
241 Booth, Wade and Walker, 160-161. 
242 Morris, 4. 
243 Becerra, 151. 
244 Bulmer-Thomas, in Bethell, 192. 
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Over as quickly as it had begun, the mini-boom in mining left, as Alison Acker describes, 
little more than "unemployment, ravaged hillsides and an empty national treasury. "245 
As economist Victor Bulmer-Thomas notes, "Tegucigalpa was the only capital 
city in Central America not served by a railway," and against this dismal backdrop it is 
not hard to understand the enthusiasm with which the liberal elite greeted the banana 
. h" h . d 246 compames, w 1c amve next. The banana plantations were major growing 
operations - undertaken along Honduras' north coast - that required thousands of 
workers, major modifications to the topography, and the capacity and infrastructure to 
transport the fruit to a consumer market quickly. Few Hondurans could pony up the 
capital to undertake these projects, so the banana plantations, too, were almost 
exclusively foreign-owned, with the infamous United Fruit Company leading the way. 
The plantations were sites of extreme exploitation; companies whose annual profits were 
in the millions paid workers as little as $24 a month. In the typical pattern of capitalist 
entrenchment, the wages initially seemed like riches to peasants who had hitherto lived 
off the land, used paper money rarely, and engaged in the market only for non-essential 
goods.247 
However, as peasants migrated to the north coast to work on the plantations, they 
quickly discovered that their wages would not go far; dislocated from their communities 
245 Acker, 59. 
246 Bulmer-Thomas, in Bethell, 192-193. 
247 To borrow Ellen Wood's framework from The Origin of Capitalism, this use of the market could be 
described as the market as 'opportunity,' since people did not rely on the market for survival, they freely 
chose to engage in it only when they had something to trade or wanted a particular non-essential good or 
service. This is to be distinguished from the market imperatives that would become entrenched once 
peasants were denied their access to land and became dependant on the market for their survival, which 
forced them to accept wage labour and to accept whatever wages they could get from owners of capital. In 
the Honduran context, then, the fruit companies represented an acceleration of the emerging dynamic of 
proletarianization, which recorded its first tremors in the move away from repartimiento labour in the early 
19th century. See Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism, London, Verso, 2002. 
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and social supports, most workers quickly spent their way into debt, on drinking and 
gambling but especially on the expensive goods at the company stores which were 
needed to supplement the measly provisions they were given. English was the language 
of authority and the seat of Honduran government in Tegucigalpa seemed a world away 
from the real power vested in the banana companies.248 Between overcrowded, 
unsanitary living conditions and hard days of supervised - and therefore ceaseless -
physical labour, it is easy to see why workers quickly came to view the plantation, as per 
Ramon Amaya Amador' s description, as a prisi6n verde (green prison), especially since 
the debts they were drawn into were owed to the company and made them dependant on 
their wages in order to pay back their debts; an echo of the 'free' labour market under 
Spanish rule. Workers typically lasted an average of just twelve years before their bodies 
succumbed and they ceased to be useful to the banana empires (more on this below).249 
Meanwhile, as the new export-industry grew in the 1890s, Honduran governments 
tried to learn from the mistakes they had made with earlier foreign concessions and 
moved to enact laws that would bring some of the banana profits back to the Honduran 
treasury and improve the prospects for local growers. A tax levied in 1893 sought to 
impose two cents on every banana stem exported, and laws passed in 1897 would 
structure foreign land purchases in such a way as to discourage the consolidation of major 
estates.250 But the mostly American banana growers were not prepared to allow any of 
their profits to be diverted. The 1897 laws to prevent consolidation were easily 
sidestepped by a combination of legal trickery and naked force, which was especially 
248 For more on the unique development of Honduras' North Coast, see Dario A. Euraque, Reinterpreting 
the Banana Republic, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1996. 
249 Roger Burbagh and Patricia Flynn, Agribusiness in the Americas, New York, Monthly Review Press, 
1980, p. 159. 
250 Becerra, 14 7. 
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easy when it was small farmers the companies were up against. As for the tax on banana 
stems, it would be repealed after a 1911 U.S.-1.ed coup installed Manuel Bonilla - in the 
employ of the Cuyamel Fruit Company - as President. 
Indeed, as the banana empires grew, conflict between the American companies 
was routinely played out through political violence in Central America. The three 
companies that would emerge atop the heap were the Standard Fruit, Cuyamel, and 
United Fruit Companies. Standard Fruit arrived in 1902 and came to own companies in 
dozens of different industries, including banking; they owned the bank that became 
Banco Atlantido (today controlled by Chase Manhattan), one of Honduras' largest 
banks.251 Sam Zemurray's Cuyamel Company got started in 1905 but didn't really take 
off until after he orchestrated a coup d'etat in 1911; having plotted with former caudillo 
President Manuel Bonilla in New Orleans, the pair sailed for Trujillo with an army of 
mercenaries in January 1911. Zemurray's anny had the support of the U.S. State 
Department and, by March, President Davila had been overthrown, to be replaced by 
Manuel Bonilla, and Cuyamel Company finally received the land and railroad 
concessions it had previously been denied. 252 This was but one of the many military 
interventions and occupations that the United States would effect in Honduras during this 
period; in a now infamous confession in 1935, US General Smedley D. Butler 
acknowledged that his work in the US Marine Corps had amounted to being "a racketeer 
for capitalism" and that he and his troops had "helped make Honduras 'right' for 
American fruit companies in 1903."253 
251 Bulmer-Thomas, in Bethell, 193. 
252 Bulmer-Thomas, in Bethell, 194. 
253 Smedley D. Butler, quoted in Galeano, 108. 
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The third and most important banana empire was that of the infamous United 
Fruit Company, implicated in repressive, anti-democratic, and counter-revolutionary 
activity throughout the region (not least the coup d'etat that overthrow the democratic 
government of Guatemala in 1954.)254 Despite Cuyamel' s victory in gaining the 
Honduran presidency in 1911, United Fruit was always the larger company - it had a 
wider range of operations, deeper pockets, and more fixed relationships in Washington. 
The two companies squared off on a number of occasions in the 1910s and 20s, usually 
with each company backing a rival caudillo in a struggle for the presidency, until 
Zemurray finally sold his company to United Frnit in 1929, just before the stock market 
crash. Just four years later, he would affect a dramatic, profanity-laden return to be 
named the president of his old competitor, United Fruit, and would rule his empire in 
Central America until 1950.255 Banana exports grew throughout these internecine 
struggles, from around 1.5 million bunches in the 1890s to some 29 million bunches in 
1929.256 As James Morris describes: 
[The banana companies] had control over large expanses of the 
most fertile lands in northern Honduras ... and in the context of 
the expanding capitalist world economy, foreigners were more 
able to take advantage of the investment opportunities than were 
Hondurans. 257 
The banana companies diversified into railroads, docks and shipping, electricity, ice 
plants, communications systems, sugar mills, soap factories and, crucially, banking.258 
As Edelberto Torres Rivas puts it, "in the first quarter of [the 20th] century, Honduras' 
254 James Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus: A Political History of Modern Central America, London, 
Verso, 1988, p. 148-152. 
255 William Krehm, Democracies and Tyrannies of the Caribbean, Westport, Lawrence Hill, 1984, p. 87. 
256 Ciro F.S. Cardosa, in Bethell, ed. The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. 5, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 213. 
257 Morris, 6. 
258 Morris, 6. 
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Atlantic Coast, for all practical purposes, was occupied by the three great banana 
companies. "259 
Meanwhile, the grand struggles between the fruit companies might be read in U.S. 
history as the exciting hustle-and-bustle of capitalist enterprise; how thrilling, indeed, to 
see the captains of industry, pressing forward the march of progress by allowing their 
competitive self-interest to guide them into the ruthless struggle for more productive and 
efficient wealth creation! 260 But this capitalist propaganda does little to capture the lived 
experience of such 'progress.' For Hondurans, there was very little to celebrate as 
American banana magnates tore up their physical and social geography, raising armies of 
Hondurans into deadly conflicts with other Hondurans for the right to exploit more 
Hondurans; deplorable conditions, coercive intimidation, legal manipulation and trickery 
all marshalled for the benefit of foreign owners. Gabriel Garcia Marquez's 1967 
masterpiece of historical fiction, Cien Anos de Solidad (One Hundred Years of Solitude), 
knits together several pieces of the Latin Ame:rican experience of foreign domination 
with anecdotal subtlety. In it, the banana companies occupy an important role; after a 
strike at the plantation, which had been supported by large sections of the town, is ended 
by a terrible massacre, Garcia Marquez writes: 
259 Torres Rivas, 34. 
260 One of many examples of this attitude can be found in gushings of American writer William Sydney 
Porter, pseudonym 0. Henry, who escaped from the United States, where he was a fugitive, to Honduras 1n 
1895. His Cabbages and Kings is a romantic account of grc::at adventures undertaken by Americans-
usually connected to the fruit companies - in Central America, replete with all manner of racist and 
Orientalist discourse, comparing Afro-Caribbean workers to 'black panthers,' and describing an Indigenous 
man as possessing 'inherited sloth.' As for American 'free enterprise,' he describes its arrival as follows: 
"The little opera bouffe nations play at government and intrigue until some day a big, silent gunboat glides 
into the offing and warns them not to break their toys. And with these changes comes also the small 
adventurer with empty pockets to fill, light of heart, busy-brained- the modern fairy prince, bearing an 
alarm clock with which, more surely than by the sentimental kiss, to awaken the beautiful tropics from their 
centuries' sleep." 0. Henry, Cabbages and Kings, New York, Doubleday, 1904, p. 9. 
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The official version, repeated a thousand times and mangled out 
all over the country by every means of communication the 
government found at hand, was finally accepted: there were no 
dead, the satisfied workers had gone back to their families, and 
the banana company was suspending all activity until the rains 
stopped.261 
Garcia Marquez is referring most directly to a massacre in 1928 in Colombia that took 
place at the behest of United Fruit and, although no comparable event took place in 
Honduras, it is instructive of the attitude of company owners, which was manifest in 
Honduras as everywhere else. While capitalist ideologues might dress up the banana 
companies' behaviour as a case of the mobilization of self-interest to contribute to the 
greater good, the companies' owners themselves knew and - in the early days - spoke 
openly about the nature of their project. A 1920 letter from Zemurray's vice-president to 
the company lawyer lays out in detail the steps that Cuyamel was to take in order to 
maximize its profits in Honduras. The full letter can be found in Appendix D and is 
worth reading, but for the immediate purposes it is enough to highlight point nine: 
We must disrupt the growing economy of this country and 
increase its problems in order to favour our own aims. We must 
prolong its tragic, stormy life, plaguedl with revolution; the wind 
must blow only upon our sails and the waves wet only our 
keels.262 
The stunting and undermining of Honduran social:, political and economic possibilities by 
foreign imperial capital, then, was neither progressive nor accidental and it will be worth 
261 Taking such a small piece of what is a profound and heartbreaking piece of Garcia Marquez's history of 
the fictional town of Macondo does injustice to the at once evocative and thorough picture he paints of the 
totality of the banana companies intrusion, destruction and domination of the places they went. A series of 
these evocative passages is reproduced in Appendix C. Gabriel Garcia Marquez, One Hundred Years of 
Solitude, Toronto, Harper Books, 2006, p. 309-310. 
262 Quoted in Becerra, p. 149-150. It bears acknowledging that the authenticy of this letter has been called 
into question, primarily because it seems too forthcoming about the nature of the banana companies' 
project and because Becerra does not offer any information about his source. Nevertheless, in my reading 
ofBecerra's work, I have not come across any inconsistencies or discrepancies between his historical 
record and other similar scholarship, so I have no reason to doubt that the letter was real. 
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bearing this in mind as we continue to examine these imperial relationships, especially in 
the contemporary context. 263 
Whatever 'development' took place was for the benefit of the fruit companies 
alone; Daniel Faber notes that "the railroads built by these companies led directly from 
263 The argument I am putting forward here, with respect to Honduras' historical trajectory and the legacy 
of foreign intervention, owes obvious debt to the so-called 'dependency theory' variant of postcolonial 
theory and, as such, I would be remiss not to locate the inflluence of this school of thought on my work. 
'Dependency theory,' or the argument that the colonized peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America had 
been forced by coercion into a situation of chronic dependence on metropolitan states, emerged most 
prominently in response to programs and scholarship on 'development,' which often suggested that poor 
countries ought to try to replicate the processes through which metropolitan countries, themselves, became 
wealthy. The response was to argue that this was not possible, since metropolitan wealth was itself 
dependent on the domination and the imposition of dependence onto poor countries. Among the key 
proponents of this explanation of continued dominant relationship of metropolitan countries over 
postcolonial countries were Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Walter Rodney, Immanuel Wallerstein and 
Eduardo Galeano, whose Open Veins of Latin America was an attempt to demonstrate the continuity of 
Euro-American domination over Latin American peoples and states (a variant of this school of thought has 
been applied to Canada, a claim that I find unconvincing and which is taken up in Chapter 2.) Even in the 
context of the Global South, 'dependency theory' has been rightly critiqued for oversimplifying 
complicated colonial relationships; ignoring the crucial role played by local elite who collude and 
cooperate with colonial power to enhance their internal class position, for instance, has served to flatten the 
picture of class divisions internal to colonized or postcolonial states and deflect culpability for economic 
inequality from local leadership. Similarly, it sometimes offers little space for understanding class 
divisions internal to metropolitan states, especially as neoliberal globalization has dramatically increased 
the pressures that lead to massive migrations of people from Global South to North in search of work. 
Furthermore, many observers today argue that national capital is a thing of the past and that all capital has 
become 'transnational,' rendering the idea of state-directed forced-dependence less satisfactory in 
explaining ongoing colonial trajectories (this I find an unconvincing critique, as per my arguments in 
Chapter 2). Finally, it could be argued that the dependency school's critique of 'development' fails to 
break away from a capitalist teleology in which accumulation of capital on a mass scale represents 
'development' and is necessarily 'good;' after all, both the metropolitan centres of capitalism and its so-
called 'dependent' peripheries are both spaces of capital accumulation and, in both cases, inequality and 
poverty are prevalent. Nevertheless, much 'dependency' scholarship, including that of some of the above-
mentioned figures, is able to overcome some of all of these limitations and offer convincing insight into the 
dynamics that have maintained a relatively consistent global geography of wealth and power distribution 
since the initial conquest and colonization of the Western Hemisphere and the related establishment and 
entrenchment of capitalist social relations. This is especially true of Central America; Victor Bulmer-
Thomas writes, in his foreword to the English translation ofEdelberto Torres Rivas' seminal work History 
and Society in Central America, "it was no accident that Torres Rivas' book first appeared in Chile. At the 
time, many of the leading social scientists in Latin America ... were working in Santiago, developing the 
basic ideas of the dependency school. Much of the research done then has not survived the test of time, but 
[this book] is different for two reasons. First, Central America fits the ideas of the dependency school 
better than many other regions and countries to which dependency theory was applied. In the case of the 
banana industry, for example, controlled for all this century in Central America by foreign companies, the 
claim that the development of the centre and underdevelopment of the periphery are really two sides of the 
same coin is not unreasonable. Second, Torres Rivas allows his research to be infused with, but not 
dictated by, the methodology of the dependency school." Following Torres Rivas, then, I continue to draw, 
periodically and selectively, on the rich tradition that the 'dep~mdency' school has provided, especially 
when its relevance touches quite directly on questions of Honduran history, but with a careful eye to its 
methodological and theoretical pitfalls. Victor Bulmer-Thomas, in Torres Rivas, x. 
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the coastal ports to the banana plantations and failed to integrate the rest of the 
country."264 Indeed, the railroad situation was perhaps one of the best indications of the 
dominance of foreign interests in Honduran development; a U.S. newspaper in 1921 
mused whimsically about the absurdity and backwardness of the country, pointing to the 
fact that Tegucigalpa was "the only capital in the North American continent that '.has 
never echoed to the more or less musical blast of the railroad locomotive and [was] one 
of the few railroadless capitals in the western hemisphere."265 In fact, Tegucigalpa would 
never be served by a railroad; the north coast rail network wasn't even connected to the 
capital by anything more than a '~art path' until U.S. military engineers completed a 
highway in the 1940s.266 This was but one example of the myriad ways that state 
infrastructure reflected Honduras' continued colonial subjugation, a process mirrored in 
colonial situations across a variety of contexts.267 As Ciro Cardosa explains it: 
The enclave economies of Central America had little dynamic 
effect on the national economies as a whole ... this was 
particularly the case in Honduras, where the banana plantations 
and exports were the core of the national economy. In 1917-18, 
the exemptions granted to the fruit companies surpassed the total 
revenue of the Honduras state (emphasis mine).268 
Of course, this imposition of underdevelopment did not take place without 
contest. Beginning in 1916, just as the struggle between the various banana companies 
was heating up, the workers on the plantations began to resist the dreadful conditions 
264 Daniel Faber, Environment Under Fire: Imperialism and the Ecological Crisis in Central America, New 
York, Monthly Review Press, 1993, p. 34. 
265 
"Tegucigalpa, New National Capital Has No Railroad: Honduras Has Mules And Carts To Convey Its 
Travellers," Schenectady Gazette, Nov. 18, 1921. 
266 Dunkerley, 526. 
267 For instance, today, in Canada's north, colonization of mostly-Indigenous northern communities is 
reflected in the fact that these communities often do not have roads connecting them; rather, all roads 
connect northern communities (and sites of enclave production like diamond mines) to major capitalist 
centres in the south. 
268 Cardosa, in Bethell, 214. 
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imposed on them. Six hundred workers struck at a Cuyamel plantation that year, and 
while the company could rely on the support o:f a compliant Honduran state to break the 
strike eventually, it discovered with some surprise that local policing agencies were not 
wholly sympathetic; the commander of the prison at Omoa released the workers who 
were brought there, insisting that their demands were legitimate.269 A major strike at 
Standard Fruit saw over a thousand workers walk off the job in 1920 and another in 1925 
at Cuyamel demonstrated that workers were not going to suffer in silence. In both cases, 
armed forces were brought to bear against the strikers, and the strikes were blamed in 
American and some Honduran newspapers on 'foreigners' infected with 'anti-
Americanism.' This would be part of an important strategy of the alliance of foreign and 
local elite; in order to keep the working class divided between those on the plantations 
and those in the cities, the plantation workers would be characterized as 'lawless' and 
violent foreigners. 270 The strategy was successful, for a time. 
It is worth noting, however, that the circumstances facing the peasantry and 
working classes in Honduras were significantly different from those in neighbouring 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Unlike those countries, where the establishment 
of a well-defined local ruling class had, by the opening of the 20th century, emerged 
around the expanding coffee-growing industry, both the ruling and subordinate classes in 
Honduras were less coherent and stable - the least developed in Central America, 
according to William Robinson.271 This is sometimes referred to as the 'absent Honduran 
269 Victor Meza, Historia de! Movimiento Obrero Hondurefio, Tegucigalpa, Guaymuras, 1980, p. 13. 
270 Meza, 208. 
271 Robinson, 118 
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oligarchy' thesis, developed by Edelberto Torres Rivas272 to explain Honduras' very 
different path to neoliberal globalization in the latter half of the 20th century. Robinson 
draws from Torres Rivas at length: 
According to this thesis, Honduras' lack of the rich volcanic soils 
of its neighbours, its geographical isolation, and a chronic labour 
shortage ever since the relatively small Indian population was 
decimated in the aftermath of Spanish conquest, stymied the rise 
of an agro-export oligarchy or of a national bourgeoisie tied to 
world markets. Whereas the introduction of coffee in the other 
Central American republics in the :nineteenth century spawned 
the rise of a powerful coffee oligarchy and liberal revolutions, in 
Honduras there was no comparable process of internal 
accumulation that could develop the social structure. 273 
As a result, there was not the same kind of push, by an emerging local elite, to seize land 
from peasants in order to grow coffee or other export crops like sugar or cotton. Much of 
Honduran land, at the opening of the twentieth century, was held in the form of the ejido 
- a traditional Indigenous communal landholding system that was legally established in 
1846 but had existed parallel to the Spanish colonial apparatus.274 Many of the 
Indigenous communities that were given official ejido titles had seen dramatic declines in 
population and had, over time, mixed with ladino communities to such an extent that they 
ceased to identify as Indigenous, despite holding ejido title.275 But the land was still held 
272 As Robinson makes extensive use of Torres Rivas in this section, I will continue to draw from Robinson 
here, but Torres Rivas' original formulation can be found in the above-mentioned History and Society in 
Central America. 
273 Robinson, 119. 
274 William S. Stokes, "The Land Laws of Honduras," in Agricultural History, Vol 21, No 3, July 1947, p. 
151-152. 
275 James Dunkerley argues, following Brignoli, that at the time the ejido was permanently re-introduced rn 
Honduran law in the 1870s, ladinos outnumbered Indigenous people by 263,000 to 69,000. See Dunkerley, 
19. However, questions ofindigenaity and identity are never straightforward, especially in parts of Latin 
America where repression and assimilation were intense. A thorough discussion of this problem lies 
outside the scope of this project, but Liisa North provides a useful note on this in Between War and Peace, 
explaining: "considerable controversy exists concerning the sizes of the Indigenous populations of Central 
American countries, especially since race is largely a question of self-definition in the region, as in Latin 
America in general. With racial mixing and the melding of Indigenous and European traditions, an 
individual can choose to become part of the dominant culture by learning Spanish and assimilating. In this 
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as communal holdings of peasant communities, ladino and Indigenous, and even when 
the banana plantations were introduced in the early twentieth century, they were typically 
established in areas that were thinly populated in the first place - often coastal 
swampland that was otherwise unoccupied. 
This meant that while the peasantry was not yet a well-organized social force, 
neither was it under attack in the ways that peasants elsewhere in Central America were, 
and many Honduran peasants were able to maintain their smallholdings until well into the 
twentieth century. As late as 1952, some 85% of Hondurans still lived directly off the 
land, and fully 52% of Honduran land was still held by the national state or as ejido 
communities, meaning that agrarian reform could proceed without immediately 
antagonizing the landowning classes.276 With comparatively fewer peasants being 
dispossessed of their lands, proletarianization was delayed and the problem for the mostly 
foreign capitalists in Honduras was actually chronic labour shortages. As Booth, Wade 
and Walker describe: 
The banana industry developed along the sparsely populated 
northern coast and displaced few peasant or indigenous 
communal holdings. Indeed, though generally poor in quality, 
land was nearly always plentiful. Thus, poor peasants could 
usually find free or cheap land to :farm. Virtually no land 
shortage developed until the mid-twentieth century, when foreign 
market demands and urban population growth led wealthier 
Hondurans to begin a process of concentrating landownership.277 
Thus, in a context of chronic labour shortage, the first half of the twentieth century saw 
Honduran workers in a position of some strength, when they could get organized and 
stand up to violent coercion. Despite efforts by the banana empires to divide urban and 
context, the tenacity of the remaining Indigenous peoples in holding on to their language and cultural 
practices is all the more remarkable." North and CAP A, 90. 
276 Richard Lapper, Honduras: State For Sale, Latin American Bureau, London, 1985, p. 49. 
277 Booth, Wade and Walker, 160. 
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rural workers, organizing continued, and by the late 1920s, there were two maJor 
workers' federations. The Honduran Federation of Unions (FSH) was the more radical of 
the two and organized not only against workplace injustice but, moreover, against 
capitalism at large. FSH unions were concentrated in the north, among the banana 
workers, but as their strikes grew in size and frequency and in the scale of the repression 
they evoked, workers in other industries in the north began to join and support them. In 
1932, strikes broke out on the plantations and at the ports where the bananas were to be 
shipped; railroad workers joined in solidarity and the strikebreakers hired as scabs 
quickly joined the strike.278 
The experience of workers on the banana plantations is beautifully and tragically 
depicted in Ramon Amaya Amador' s above-mentioned Pris ion Verde, one of the great 
classics of Honduran literature, first published in 1950 and a key document of the rising 
class consciousness among banana workers which was to come to a head in the general 
strike of 1954. Indeed, as Armando Garcia argues, Prisi6n Verde "has been the most 
persecuted book in the country ... many workers lost their lives or ended up in jail for 
daring to hold it, lend it, read it, give it away or sell it."279 Amaya Amador - whose son 
Carlos has re-published many of his works andl is today an activist in the Honduran 
resistance - weaves together the stories of a variety of banana workers caught in the 
sweep of injustices perpetrated by the companies, their foreign owners, and their local 
agents in a powerful - albeit stylized and stereotyped - fashion. Gringo plantation 
owners trick local peasants into selling their land, who only find themselves working for 
someone else on the land that was once theirs. Peasants that hold out on their land are 
278 Faber, 38. 
279 Armando Garcia, "Medio siglo de Prisi6n Verde," La Prensa, Nov 25, 1995. 
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forcibly evicted by the thugs of the governing dictatorship. Gringo bosses are abusive 
and violent, and periodically rape Honduran women and abandon the children fathered by 
their violence. Deputized Honduran supervisors adopt gringo accents in symbolic 
deference to the real power on the plantations. When a worker is killed in a crane 
accident, the bosses get angry with the dead worker for the damage done to the 
machinery. When this injustice sparks a spontaneous strike action, it is brutally repressed 
and its leaders are killed.280 
Amaya Amador' s oeuvre includes nearly 40 novels, essays, and plays and covers 
a wide range of themes that struck at the heart of Honduran social and political struggles 
of the 20th century in a complicated and nuanced manner.281 Prisi6n Verde, in particular, 
is reminiscent of Ecuadorian novelist Jorge Icaza' s beautifully tragic Huasipungo, which 
similarly sketches an amalgam of exploitation and suffering that, in its blend of fantasy 
and reality, is open to accusations, by its detractors, of exaggerating the struggles of its 
protagonists.282 Nevertheless, Amaya Amador's story reflects many of the realities of the 
banana fields, depicting them as spaces of complicated political contestation. While 
some of the workers insist upon forming a union, building a workers' movement, and 
ultimately leading a revolution, different groups of workers react with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm to these proposals. Amaya Amador is anxious to demonstrate that the 
colonial project implicates people in a variety of complex ways that often act to 
280 Ramon Amaya Amador, Prision Verde, El Progreso, Editorial Ramon Amaya Amador, 2002. 
281 Operacion Gori/a, for instance, offers a parable of the 1963 overthrow of President Ram6n Villeda 
Morales, as orchestrated by the armed forces and banana companies, whose executives celebrate in the final 
scenes of the book, drinking to the destruction of the guerrillas and exclaiming: "we will never permit 
another Cuba in Latin America!" In Biografia de un Machete, Amaya Amador chronicles a campesino 
family in their struggle to maintain possession of their land arid livelihood in the 1960s in the face of 
violence and pressure from the state and the oligarchy. El Seiior de la Sierra presents an account of 
Lempira's stand against Spanish conquistadores Alvarado and Caceres. 
282 Bernard M. Dulsey, "Introduction," in Jorge Icaza, Huasipungo, Southern Illinois University Press, 
Carbondale, Illinois, 1964, p. ix. 
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undermine the construction of collective solidarity. He also stresses the importance of 
thoughtful and considered strategy, alongside the passion and emotional expression that 
is necessarily part of resistance, in his depiction of a strike called too soon; the story's 
central hero, Maximo Lujan, tries to persuade the workers to choose their moment more 
carefully but their outrage wins the day, and the strike takes place in a way that op·ens 
itself to the repression that follows. Nevertheless, despite the tragedy of the stories he 
tells, Amaya Amador closes with a call to action. After Lujan is assassinated by the 
company "because he brought the truth and the light to the hearts and minds of the 
workers," Amaya Amador reminds his reade:rs that "not all is dark in the green 
prison ... your own voice will determine the struggles of the future. "283 
Nonetheless, the banana companies had the full toolkit of US imperialism at their 
disposal, and repression was efficient when it came down. When full scale armed assault 
seemed unlikely to break the will of the strikers, US officials and banana company 
representatives used a combination of bribery and coercion to acquire names of union or 
strike leaders, who would then be rounded up individually and deported or imprisoned.-
And by the mid-1930s, they had found their man in Honduras. Tuburcio Carias, 
Honduran caudillo who ruled from 1932 to 1948, was quick to demonstrate his 
commitment to the success of the banana empires, shutting down all unions, closing all 
newspapers, and banning public demonstrations. 284 Those who disobeyed these laws 
were punished severely, as when over 100 peacefol protestors were killed by the military 
in San Pedro Sula in 1944. Indeed, his presidency was marked by strict and terroristic 
repression; he established complete National Party dictatorship over the country, with 
283 Amaya Amador, 297. 
284 Faber, 38. 
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local party officials set up as regional comandantes de armas who governed by force~ He 
celebrated his most vicious comandantes; of Carlos Sanabria, who was accused of wiping 
out entire villages in the Department of Colon, Carias said: "would that I had seventeen 
Sanabrias, one for every department of Honduras. "285 His Ley Fernanda empowered 
armed forces to arrest untold hundreds on suspicion of aiding communism, and he even 
moved to ban baseball, lest people should tum their bats against his regime. 286 
Carias cultivated the friendship and mutual support of neighbouring dictators -
Generals Ubico and Martinez in Guatemala. and El Salvador respectively - and 
considered the support of the United States his most important asset. As such, he ensured 
that his policies largely satisfied US interests as, for instance, when he established an 
internal passport and spy network with the support of United Fruit, whose management 
was keen to confront workers' organizing drives.287 In particular, Carias invited the 
United States to help him build, train, and equip an air force, such that in the 1930s and 
40s, no other Central American dictator relied so heavily on air power and none could 
challenge its supremacy. Between 1933-1947, US colonels ran the aviation school, and 
four of the six instructors at the school were American. Their position guaranteed that 
they virtually commanded that wing of the military; one such US Captain reported in 
1940 that he was "in absolute command of th1e Air Force" and reported directly to 
President Carias. The eight planes which made up the fleet - including heavy bombers 
and gunners - were all sold to Carias by the United States, and were used in many of his 
brutal campaigns, "sowing panic and death" in the words of his War Ministry.288 
285 Krehm, 91. 
286 Krehm, 91. 
287 Holden, 78. 
288 Holden, 78-79. 
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THE 1954 STRIKE AND THE FOUNTAIN OF HONDURAN HISTORY 
Nevertheless, worker militancy, especially in the context of continued labour 
shortages, was not defeated. While many labour organizations were disbanded, unofficial 
ties remained, especially those established within or around the communist parties -
accustomed as they were to operating clandestinely.289 After Carias stepped down in 
1948, and the political system re-opened somewhat, organizing was reinvigorated and the 
ensuing period of mobilization would lead to the general strike of 1954 from which, 
according to Dana Frank, "all of modem Honduran history flows."290 
The strike began on the banana plantations, with workers at United Fruit 
demanding double-time pay for work during the Sunday of Holy Week. Port and hospital 
workers were the first to actually strike, after a worker was fired for dropping - as the 
perhaps exaggerated story goes - a single stem of bananas at Puerto Cortes. Soon all of 
the stevedores at the docks at Tela were on str.ike, and the banana plantations near El 
Progreso and La Lima were next; by May 5, 1954, all of the workers of the two primary 
banana empires - United Fruit and Standard Fruit - were on strike. A week later, they 
were joined by workers at Rosario Mining, the Honduras Brewery, and British American 
Tobacco Company, such that the total number of strikers was somewhere near 50,000.291 
As Alison Acker describes, "peasant families fed the strikers, telegraph workers cut the 
line to Tegucigalpa, students, teachers and small tradesmen contributed to the strike fund. 
The campaign became an unprecedented show of worker solidarity."292 Nevertheless, it 
is important to note that while the solidarity was impressive, the strike itself maintained, 
289 Acker, 82. 
290 Dana Frank, "Hondurans' Great Awakening," The Nation, April 5, 2010. 
291 Dunkerley, 529. 
292 Acker, 83. 
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as Dunkerley asserts, "a resolutely syndicalist form throughout its course [ ... ] despite 
Guatemalan influence and [Honduran Communist Party] involvement,"293 which is 
significant in light of subsequent accusations of communist-inspiration by the United 
States and its local allies (more on this below.) 
The outcome of the strike - both its victories and defeats - was to have enomious 
consequences for the Honduran labour movement. The 50,000-strong strike was able to 
demand significant, though certainly not adequate, pay increases and secured the creation 
of an official union for United Fruit workers (SITRA TERCO) as well as gaining a 
number of specific terms of employment. The strike and its aftermath also paved the way 
to the creation of the first Honduran labour code in 1959, with all of the contradictory 
advantages and disadvantages such legislation typically brings. 294 But those 
contradictions were even more acute in the Honduran case because of the conditions 
under which the strike was ended. As the US began to rapidly increase its presence in 
Honduras to counter the reforming Arbenz government in Guatemala (more on this 
below), it encouraged hysteria among the Honduran elite and, indeed, even labour 
activists about the dangers of a communist takeover. This hysteria would be stoked, 
among the Honduran strikers themselves, by US trade unionists ostensibly brought in to 
demonstrate solidarity and assist with logistics. 
293 Dunkerley, 529. 
294 I am referring here to the fact that the institutionalization of labour relations into codes of law both 
protects workers from certain forms of exploitation but also ireifies, naturalizes and codifies the labour 
relation itself, thus weakening the ability of labour movements to think - and act - outside of the logic of 
the labour relation. Thom Workman builds a compelling case for this contradictory consequence of 
codified labour laws in the Canadian context, wherein he celebrates the victories that protected workers 
against the harshest and most inhumane expressions of labour exploitation but also laments the fact that th6 
increasingly complicated legal apparatus in which labour operates lends itself to the creation of labour 
bureaucracies and enmeshes workers' organizing efforts in a whole host of legal spider webs designed to 
contain workers' demands and clearly delineate (and limit) the strategies they can use to achieve them. 
Please see Thom Workman, If You 're In My Way, I'm Walking: The Assault on Working People Since 
1970, Winnipeg, Femwood Books, 2009. 
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In what became a typical pattern of interference,295 the American Federation of 
Labour (AFL) - a bureaucratic business union organization in the US - established itself 
among Honduran labour, ostensibly as an ally, in order to encourage a passive and non-
confrontational line within the Honduran labour movement.296 First, they helped 
i 
convince the workers at Standard Fruit to accept a deal that satisfied a few demands put 
left many others ignored and which, crucially:, failed to include language that would 
protect union activists from post-strike reprisals.297 Predictably, then, key organizers1 of 
the strikes were laid off when the strike was over, as part of the purge of more radical 
elements of the labour movement.298 Meanwhile, as anti-communist panic reached a 
fever pitch, the strike committee at United Fruit began to break down, mired in back-and-
forth accusations of communist sympathies. A second strike committee was eventually 
struck, handpicked and sympathetic to the AFL, which settled with United Fruit in early 
July. AFL President George Meany played both sides, encouraging concessions on the 
workers' side and pressuring United Fruit to ne:gotiate a deal quickly, lest the unions 
should "fall into the hands of militant communists, which would have disagreeable 
consequences for our country's position in Latin America."299 Again, the strikers did 
make gains, but the victory was limited and certainly did not reflect the power of a strike 
of 50,000 people. Moreover, it established the conservative presence of the AFL, which 
would set up shop in Honduras and use it as its base of operations in Central America 
thereafter. 
295 For more on this pattern, please see Kim Scipes, AFL-CIO 's Secret War against Developing Country 
Workers, Toronto, Lexington Books, 2010. For more detail on the AFL-CIO in Central America in 
particular, see Tom Barry and Deb Preusch, AIFLD in Central America: Agents as Organizers, 
Albuquerque, The Resource Centre, 1986. 
296 Liisa North and CAP A, 84-85. 
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The AFL's preferred instrument in Central America was its Inter-American 
Regional Organization (ORIT), which was established in 1951 and played a key role in 
the settlement of the United Fruit strike. The ORIT advisors cultivated good 
relationships with the directors of the fruit companies and with the emerging military as it 
was being reorganized under the auspices of the United States. ORIT was a branch of the 
AFL but got funding from the CIA and USAID, the latter spending tens of thousands of 
dollars building offices for the now GRIT-controlled unions at both United Fruit and 
Standard.300 While militant workers tried to fight for independence, compliant and 
cooperative workers were offered lucrative positions as union leaders and given 
expensive training in the United States. Independent unions were largely squeezed out, 
and the labour code of 1959 made it illegal for more than one union to operate at any 
workplace; one of the contradictions noted above, then, was that the labour code which 
ought to have helped protect Honduran workers from American employers actually le.ft 
them at the mercy of American trade unionists with an imperialist agenda.301 
Indeed, 1954 was a watershed for Honduras and for Central America at large, 
with the CIA-orchestrated overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz playing a 
crucial role. Arbenz, who took aim at the United Fruit Company in Guatemala and was 
working to build a more social-democratic state and economy, was an anathema to US 
interests in the region and the decision to have him overthrown was less a matter of "if' 
but "how and when." In 1952, the CIA chose Carlos Castillo Armas, a Guatemalan 
colonel exiled in Honduras, to lead the invasion :from Honduras. Honduran president 
Galvez was quick to collaborate but expected US military protection should Castillo 
300 Lapper, 39. 
301 Dunkerley, 530-532. 
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Annas be defeated and chased by the Guatemalan army into Honduras. These concerns 
grew during 1953 when Castillo Annas made little secret of his plans, which, by early 
1954, were known to Arbenz and had been publilshed in Guatemalan newspapers. 302 
As the US worked to up the pressure on Arbenz, it made no secret of using 
Honduras as its launching pad, and when the general strike broke out in April 1954, it 
was immediately framed as part of an Arbenz-led communist conspiracy; after all, 
Arbenz and the strikers had a common enemy in the United Fruit Company. When, in 
May, a Swedish ship arrived in Honduras with a shipment of arms destined for Arbenz's 
government, US president Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles discussed the 
prospect of dropping some 4000 marines into Honduras to intervene. 303 Instead, on May 
20, an agreement was signed with Galvez for major military assistance from Washington 
- organization, equipment, and training for a new, professional infantry unit - for which 
materials began arriving just five days later in a very public demonstration of American 
power in the region. 304 
The new US-trained infantry unit was to be established quickly, given the rapidly 
escalating developments in Guatemala and the continued general strike in Honduras, 
taking place on the eve of what was expected to be a contentious election, which featured 
former dictator Carias and candidate Ramon Villeda Morales of the Liberal Party, which 
the US (incorrectly) believed to have been infiltrated by communists loyal to Arbenz. 
The US Ambassador, Whiting Willauer, demanded. that the new infantry unit be prepared 
for action by October, when the elections would take place, attributing likely election 
disorder to "communist infiltration of the Honduran labour movement," which could 
302 Holden, 178-179. 
303 Holden 179 
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"require extraordinary internal security measures at any time between now and the 
forthcoming elections. "305 Willauer had a clear vision of his goals for Honduras - for 
which he was singled out for praise by Secretary of State Dulles later - and described 
them as follows: 
[We had to] keep the Honduran government - which was scared 
to death about the possibilities of themselves being overthrown -
keep them [sic] in line so they would allow this revolutionary 
activity [the CIA's training of the Castillo Armas forces] to 
continue, based in Honduras. 306 
To that end, the US had to ensure that Honduras had military capabilities and that it was 
in control of them. Furthermore, it had to keep a lid on any potential popular movements, 
whether rooted in labour or the Liberal Party, that might threaten the US grip on 
Honduras, which was so essential for maintaining its control of the region. 
A picture begins to emerge, then, of the ways in which the development of the 
Honduran ruling elite - stunted in comparison to its neighbours - relied more heavily 
perhaps than any in the region on the support of imperial power even while i:ts 
subordinate classes were less organized and defiant than elsewhere. Unlike in 
Guatemala, El Salvador, or Nicaragua, Honduras did not have a functional, autonomous, 
and unified national military force until it was established by the United States in the 
1950s.307 Nor did it have the massive social dislocations associated with intensive 
export-oriented capitalist development as experienced elsewhere and, as a result, social 
movements of peasants and working classes rarely came together in unified action before 
the general strike of 1954. The response to collective action was typically a combination 
of accommodation and repression - in contrast to the swift and brutal repression 
305 Whiting Willauer, quoted in Holden, 180. 
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experienced in other parts of Central America - and meant that much of the hyper-
violence of the regional civil wars of the 1960s, 70s and 80s was to be avoided in 
Honduras. 
Nonetheless, contemporary Honduras is arguably one of the most violent 
countries in the western hemisphere and undeniably one of the poorest, and one major 
element of the explanation for that is the pattern of foreign domination that dates back to 
Honduras' beginnings but which intensified dramatically after the pivotal events of the 
mid-1950s and during the US Contra Wars in the: 1980s. This period, which provides the 
immediate context for the June 2009 coup, and during which Canada became more 
directly involved in Honduran affairs, will be the subject of Chapter 4. Nonetheless, it is 
worth concluding this chapter with the reminder that Honduran history has, from the 
moment of European conquest, been heavily influenced by the politics of colonial rule. 
Even after gaining formal independence, Honduran people and resources have 
consistently been targeted as potential sources of profit for European and North American 
interests. This is a crucial context for an understanding of Canadian foreign policy in 
Honduras - and the dynamics into which Canada has inserted itself - and it is a context 
that Hondurans themselves are well aware of. Indeed, what will become most apparent 
over the course of this dissertation is precisely the continuity between the dynamics 
described in this and the next chapters and those which Canadian foreign policy is driving 
today. 
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CHAPTER FOUR- HONDURAS' TWENTIETH CENTURY 
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A central purpose of the previous chapter was to offer a sketch of Honduran 
history that highlights the very complicated and diverse forms that colonial and 
imperialist impositions on this country have taken, in order to show continuity between 
those original forms and the ones that can be seen in Canada's policies towards Hondqras 
today. If imperialism took only one basic form - that of direct colonial occupation c:md 
domination - it would no longer make sense to speak of imperialism in Honduras since 
the country has been formally independent since the 19th century. Nor would it be 
sensible to call Canada's current role in Honduras imperialist, since Canada is not 
engaged in any long term military occupation of Honduran territory. As such, it is crucial 
to this project to establish that the dynamics of imperialism can be - and have been -
played out in a variety of forms. This chapter will describe in detail the contemporary 
forms of imperialism that have manifest in Honduras in the last fifty years, with 
particular emphasis on the neo-colonial dynamics that persist into the present. Indeed, 
this chapter will highlight the many ways in which local Honduran power structures have 
linked themselves into imperialist projects - sometimes with progressive intentions, 
sometimes in order to reinforce their own privile:ge, sometimes both - making it more 
difficult to separate foreign interference from the local exercise of power. This 
complexity can serve to obscure the ongoing imperial relationships that continue to bear 
heavily on local structures of power. This chapter will demonstrate how those dynamics 
have played out over the past half-century andl insist that they require a complex 
theorization in order to understand the current moment - and the role Canadian 
imperialism is playing in it - in Honduras. 
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SO-CALLED "PROGRESSIVE BONAPARTISM" 
Before returning to the matter of direct foreign intervention, which becomes a 
central axis upon which Honduran history in the second half of the twentieth century 
turns, it is worth looking quickly at the development of the two-party political system in 
Honduras. Both the Liberal and National (conservative) Parties were formed near the end 
of the nineteenth century, though the party labels did not hold much significance until 
well into the twentieth. During the period of upheaval prior to the Caria to (a name used 
to describe the period of the Carias dictatorship), the parties simply gave legitimacy to 
one caudillo or another, signifying more about where his supporters came from than what 
they held as program or ideology. The Carias dictatorship itself established the National 
Party in Honduran politics, as Carias doled out rngional military - and therefore political 
- leadership posts to the comandantes de armas from the National Party. The Liberal 
Party, though periodically cast as a haven for communists, was never anything near that 
characterization. Rather, it was the party of the modernizing elite - those in the ruling 
class who sought to emulate the European and North American paths of capitalist 
development - and it, too, had little compunction a.bout seizing power by force. 308 
After Carias stepped down in 1948 and elections became more regular, both 
parties had some popular support, but the military - established largely by the United 
States in the 1940s and 50s - routinely intervened if it determined that a given president 
from either party was taking the country down what it considered to be the wrong path, a 
point to which I will return. After the early 1980s, other political parties were allowed to 
participate in the elections, but the Liberal and National Parties continued to gain the 
most support, in part because of the continued practice of patronage and the relatively 
308 Booth, Wade and Walker, 180-181. 
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large resource pool those parties could draw from in currying favour; when electoral 
turnout was at its peak in the early 1980s, it had more to do with the fact that the major 
parties were giving away untold tons of meat to their supporters than any excitement 
around party platforms. 309 
It is worth keeping this in mind, as we tum our attention to the major changes ~hat 
beset Honduras during this period, as a reminder that these developments could hardly be 
claimed to flow from the ideologies of the offic:ial parties or, what is more, any kind of 
quasi-democratic electoral process. Instead, Honduran politics after the 1954 strike came 
to be dominated by a constellation of social forces - the foreign-owned banana 
companies, the office-seeking politicos, an emt::rging Honduran oligarchy, the church, 
and to a much lesser extent the peasantry and working classes - all under the watchful 
eye of the newly professionalized and increasingly autonomous Honduran military and its 
closest allies in the U.S. State Department. Indeed, no chief of the Honduran armed 
forces retired between 1954-1981 without first serving a stretch as Honduran president. 
William Robinson describes the political impotence of the Honduran elite in the 
period leading up to and following the events of 1954: 
The inability of the civilian elite to manage the tensions of 
capitalist development in the post-WWII period underlay the 
military coup d'etat of 1956. The coup signalled the 
transformation of the military from a corrupt constabulary in the 
pay of the oligarchy and the banana companies into a politicized 
and institutionally autonomous corporate body mediating class 
and intra-elite conflict. 310 
The primary conflict this new military apparatus would have to navigate was the sudden 
scarcity and struggle over land, and the ensuing process of agrarian reform, which some 
309 Elvia Alvarado, Don't Be Afraid, Gringo: A Honduran Woman Speaks.from the Heart, Food First, San 
Francisco, 1987, p. 120. 
310 Robinson, 120. 
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have argued was crucial in forestalling the kind of guerrilla struggles that emerged 
elsewhere in the region. 311 Beginning in the 19.SOs and accelerating in the 1960s, the fruit 
companies began to mechanize, shedding workers and expanding the size of their 
plantations. They - alongside an emerging Honduran oligarchy - also began to diversify 
their operations into more land-intensive crops like cotton and sugar or into cattle 
ranching.312 Combined, this meant that many plantation workers, who had formerly been 
peasants, went back to their communities to find their traditional holdings under attack. 
As ranchers and increasingly large landowners began a new round of enclosures - in 
some cases literally erecting barbed-wire fencing: around formerly peasant-held land - the 
number of evicted peasants and laid-off plantation workers swelled and was amplified by 
an influx over several decades of up to 300,000 peasant refugees fleeing the same 
policies, imposed with even more aggression, in neighbouring El Salvador. 313 
For the first time, land scarcity had become a serious problem in Honduras. 
Peasant organization followed quickly, given the experiences of many former plantation 
workers with organizing in the unions, and three separate peasant organizations had 
become significant by the 1960s. The National Federation of Honduran Peasants 
(FENACH) was the most militant and had close ties with the various communist 
movements that had persisted in the face of repression throughout the early twentieth 
century. A rival group, the Association of Honduran Peasants (ANACH), was created 
under the auspices of the APL-sponsored ORIT labour unions and used all manner of 
underhanded tactics to undermine FENACH and seize control of the peasant 
311 Bulmer-Thomas, in Bethell, ed., p. 223. 
312 North and CAP A, 85. 
313 North and CAP A, 74. 
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movement.314 A third group, the National Union of Peasants (UNC) was organized 
around the Catholic Church and offered an alternative to ANACH though it, too, was 
anti-communist and somewhat less militant than FENACH.315 
With both large landowners and peasant organizations demanding that the 
government protect their access to contested land, the H~nduran military often became 
the arbiter between the various classes, allowing certain presidents to enact limited 
agrarian reform while cutting them off - generallly by effecting a military coup - if they 
took the process far enough to significantly alienate the foreign and local oligarchy.316 In 
general, a limited degree of land reform had the support of the military and its allies in 
the United States as a way of avoiding the perceived communist-inspired social struggles 
in neighbouring countries. But there was no way to satisfy the demands of both the 
banana companies and landed oligarchy, on the one hand, and the increasing numbers of 
landless peasants on the other. The military found its solution to the problem in the 
scapegoating of Salvadoran refugees for the land crisis - egged on by the newly-formed 
landowners association, the National Federation of Honduran Cattlemen and Farmers 
(FENAGH), who insisted that the scarcity and conflict was caused by "foreigners who 
were usurping rural territories."317 The so-called "Futbol War" of 1969 would be the 
illogical conclusion of this pressure for land. 
314 For instance, since ANACH was sponsored by the U.S. trade unions and worked closely with the 
Honduran state, it was able to offer campesinos a certain amount of land without the threat of violent 
repression (which was often the case when FENACH occupied lands), thus drawing campesinos into its 
orbit with the promise of peaceful land reform which would ultimately prove to be limited in scope and 
which undermined and further isolated the more politicized FENACH and the broader platform of 
emancipatory struggle it offered. For more on ANACH's undermining ofFENACH, see Dunkerley, 538-
565. 
315 North and CAP A, 85. 
316 Booth, Wade and Walker, 162. 
317 FENAGH, quoted in William H. Durham, Scarcity and Survival in Central America: Ecological Origins 
of the Soccer War, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1979, p. 162. 
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The "Futbol War" - a chaotic five-day battle so named because its immediate 
spark came from a riot at a World Cup qualifying match - was initiated by the Honduran 
state's decision to approve a measure to seize lands in Honduras held by Salvadoran 
campesinos and redistribute them to Honduran nationals. Nevertheless, this clumsy non-
solution to the land crisis backfired; the Salvadoran army invaded and the skirmish 
quickly became a rout of Honduran forces, cut short only by the intervention of the OAS 
to demand a Salvadoran retreat.318 What is more, most of the casualties of the conflict 
were campesinos - Salvadoran and Honduran alike - in the areas targeted for the 
Salvadoran invasion, near Ocotopeque and Langue, and many who escaped the 
immediate violence were nonetheless displaced during the high season, contributing to 
major crop failures. Counter-attacks by the Honduran army, though ineffectual in 
repelling Salvadoran forces, sowed no small degree of panic amongst Salvadoran 
campesinos, of whom another 60,000 fled back to El Salvador, which did, in fact, help to 
ease land tensions in Honduras briefly; the second half of 1969 saw the greatest single 
period of land re-distribution at any time before or after.319 Meanwhile, the nationalist 
fervour stoked by the conflict temporarily flattened out some of the class-based tensions, 
safely diffusing them into patriotic cooperation between the military, the state, and the 
trade unions and - ironically - the defeat of Honduran forces built popular support for a 
strong military unlike ever before. 320 
But conflict over land quickly re-emerged, and throughout the 1970s land reform 
proceeded, with the military overseeing various presidents in navigating between the 
318 Dunkerley, 547-549. 
319 Dunkerley, 549. That said, it only ramped up the pressure on land in El Salvador, contributing to the 
growing tensions that would explode into major violence in 1he 1980s. 
320 Dunkerley, 548-550. 
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oligarchy and peasant organizations in a manner that was heavily tilted towards the 
landowners but which managed to diffuse enough tension to forestall any major armed 
upnsmgs. The military government of Oswaldo Lopez Arellano, for instance, was 
installed in a coup in 1972 and proceeded with a program that James Dunkerley has 
referred to as 'progressive Bonapartism,' inspired in part by Peru's 'military 
revolutionaries,' which included land redistribution, the establishment of a minimum 
wage, and strengthened labour laws. 321 Agrarian reform proceeded, then, and although 
plenty of conflict emerged (more on this below) the reforms were enough to avert the 
kinds of disasters that resulted from conflict over land in other parts of the region. 
Indeed, as Richard Millett argues in Lowenthal and Fitch's important survey of the role 
of militaries in mid-20th century Latin America, "while the Honduran military openly 
ruled the nation from 1963 through 1981, it always allowed civilian politicians some 
power,"322 a fact that no doubt played a further ro1e in forestalling civil war in Honduras. 
Nonetheless, it is worth briefly noting that the trend in scholarship on Honduras to 
write its history in a comparative analysis with the other republics of Central America, 
while quite sensible and natural on a number of levels, often has the effect that discussion 
of Honduras tilts on the question of how and why Honduras avoided the violent guerrilla 
struggles and counter-revolutionary genocides that plagued its neighbours. 323 This is, 
obviously, a worthwhile and instructive question, but it can inadvertently lead to the 
conclusion that things were altogether not bad in Honduras, .an assumption that can be 
321 Marvin Barahona, Honduras en el siglo XX, Tegucigalpa, Editorial Guaymuras, 2005, p. 220-226. 
322 Richard Millett, "The Central American Militaries," in Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch, ed., 
Armies and Politics in Latin America, Revised Ed., New York, Holmes and Meier, 1986, p. 216. 
323 This is true of almost all of the good regional studies - many of which are among the very best resources 
on Honduras and are routinely cited in this project- including those of Torres Rivas, Dunkerley, Bulmer-
Thomas, Woodward, Robinson and Booth, Wade and Walker. 
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sustained only if Honduras is viewed in relation to those other countries. Taken out of 
the context of the hyper-violence characteristic of much of Central America in the second 
half of the twentieth century, the violence in Honduras must still be considered severe 
and deeply traumatic and must be central to any examination of contemporary problems -
especially as the historical trajectory in Honduras has seen a slide into violence that, 
today, is as bad or worse than in any of the other Central American countries. 
The 1960s and 1970s, then, while a placid period relative to neighbouring 
countries, were nonetheless a troubled time for Honduras. Land reform, though it did 
proceed, did not do so without violence and difficulty. The role of the military as arbiter 
should not lead to the assumption that it acte:d with restraint;324 as noted above, it 
generally still sided with the landowners and used violence to keep the peasant 
movements at bay. In 1963, the military cracked down on FENACH, destroying offices 
I 
and imprisoning leaders - many of whom were tortured - at El Progreso; the organization 
would be wiped out for good in 1965 when military President Lopez Arellano sent troops 
to El Jute to kill FENACH leader Lorenzo Zelaya and many other key members of the 
group. 325 In 1972, eight peasants were massacred at Talanquera during an attempted land 
occupation, which had asked for the presence of a Catholic priest; Father Luis Henas, 
shaken with terror after discovering the bodies and hearing first-hand accounts of the 
324 Booth, Wade and Walker, for instance, describe the military as having "behaved, although not well, 
more benignly than its counterparts in neighbouring states." Though true on some level, this framing 
allows for a too sympathetic reading of the military' s role in Honduras, especially as it was being equipped 
and trained by the United States and carrying out a degree of violent repression that must still be considered 
intolerable and, most certainly, Honduran social movements considered it so. In fairness to Booth, Wade 
and Walker, they do emphasize that the repression was only comparatively less violent, and the _critique I 
offer here is one that suggests the problem as being located in the nature of comparative analysis of Central 
America in the 19 80s, not in any irresponsibility of individual scholars. 
325 Dunkerley, 542. 
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attack, offered a full testimony of his experience, but, like many of his brethren, was too 
intimidated to offer continued direct support to the peasant movements. 326 
Indeed, the clergy themselves - originally strong supporters of the peasant land 
occupations - began to be targeted in the mid- l 970s and, in a particularly gruesome 
attack, two priests were murdered in Olancho in 1975; Father Ivan Betancur and Father 
Jerome Cypher were kidnapped and taken to the estate of Jose Manuel Zelaya, whose 
son, Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales, was the very man elected president in 2005 and 
overthrown in the 2009 coup - an irony to which I will return in chapter 5. Alison Acker 
describes the horrific attack: 
Both priests were stripped and beaten. Cypher was castrated and 
shot. Betancur had his eyes gouged out, his fingernails, tongue 
and teeth pulled out, his hands, feet and testicles slashed off. The 
bodies of the two men were thrown down a well with those of the 
five peasants [killed in a related attack] and the two women 
[kidnapped with Betancur] were thrown in alive. The soldiers 
sealed the well off with a blast of dynamite. The landowners and 
military went on to pillage every church, convent and parish 
house in the Department of Olancho, arresting or expelling 
thirty-two priests and nuns. 327 
The attack had been initiated by FENAGH - which had put a price on the two priests' 
heads - and carried out with military support, leaving the two priests and seven peasants 
who had been grabbed at a UNC training centre dead; nine others were found buried in 
the walls or burned to death in bread ovens at a ranch near Juticalpa. 328 Though some of 
the officers involved in this attack were charged and sentenced to prison terms, many 
church groups were intimidated away from supporting peasant movements and the 
attacks continued with frightening regularity. Just two years later, when the Las Isletas 
326 His full testimony is reprinted in Becerra, 197-198. 
327 Acker, 97. 
328 Dunkerley, 557. 
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peasant banana cooperative ran afoul of Standard Fruit, the military, led by soon-to-be 
infamous then-Col. Gustavo Alvarez, intervened to dismantle the cooperative, jailing and 
torturing hundreds of peasants who had been members. 329 
This not-so-idyllic period of "progressive Bonapartism," or military-directed 
corporatism from above, was able to avert the: collapses into genocide and horror that 
befell Honduras' neighbours, but it did not resolve Honduras' land crisis nor did it 
eliminate the growing tensions between insurgent subordinate classes and recalcitrant 
foreign and local oligarchs. But it did serve to ease those tensions and to allow certain 
outlets for them; unlike in neighbouring countries, the state did not clamp down 
completely on political parties, unions, peasant organizations, and the press, and there 
was thus still some space for these groups to fonction, forestalling the impetus toward 
guerrilla struggle. As Booth and Walker argue, "the state never sufficiently repress1ed 
legitimate mass mobilization to the point of triggering armed resistance as a last resort;" 
although one might disagree with their definiltions of what constitutes 'legitimate' 
mobilization and how armed resistance may or may not fit into that, it is most certainly 
the case that the repression elicited by guerrilla struggles elsewhere in Central America 
led to incalculable bloodshed, destruction, and hardship, and Hondurans were the better 
for having avoided the worst of it.330 Even still, by the end of the 1970s, military rule 
was discredited and all social classes were dissatisfied. Indeed, as Honduran historian 
Marvin Barahona notes, 
Military reformism lived with the consequences of the principal 
contradiction manifest in the developmental state, as expressed in 
the permanent conflict between the social forces pushing for 
329 Richard Lapper, Honduras: State For Sale, Latin America Bureau, London, 1985, p. 80. 
330 Booth, Wade and Walker, 167. 
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reform and the classes and sector resisting that chan~e. The 
military reformist regime could not escape this conflict.3 1 
It became increasingly clear that the compact of the 1960s and 1970s could not be held 
together any longer and the issue at hand was to determine what would replace it. 
It is worth remembering, of course, tha1t the compact of that period was always 
one that suited best the interests of foreign capital, which had tolerated the development 
of an autonomous Honduran military on the understanding that it would answer, in the 
final analysis, to the U.S. state. For foreign capital, then, it was simply a matter of 
keeping the U.S. state on side, bribing the right Honduran officials at the right moments, 
and demanding the cooperation of the military when necessary. In 1975, for instance, 
when the Honduran state was considering a proposal to impose a one-dollar tax on every 
45-pound crate of bananas exported, the fruit companies revolted. Standard Fruit 
destroyed thousands of boxes of bananas in protest and United Brand attempted to buy 
off the Honduran economic minister with a brib{~ of $1.25 million. Had the bribe - and 
the so-called 'Bananagate" scandal that followed ·- not been discovered after the dramatic 
suicide of one of United Brand's top officials, it might well have succeeded; as it 
happened, the scandal brought down the Arellano government, which was replaced by 
Gen. Alberto Melgar Castro from the National Party who quickly dropped the tax and 
invited company people to be part of his cabinet.332 
Most crucially, the United States maintained significant influence over the 
Honduran military, which, as discussed above, was the political authority of last resort in 
this period. As it had in the early days of the Honduran Air Force, the entire military was 
brought under the wings of U.S. advisors in the 1950s, and between then and the late 
331 Barahona, 226. (Translated from Spanish. All translations by the author unless otherwise indicated.) 
332 Dunkerley, 556-558. 
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1970s over 1000 Honduran officers received direct U.S. training.333 Booth and Walker 
have noted, with some irony, that "although [during this period] there was virtually no 
guerrilla opposition to the Honduran government, much of the military training of the era 
dealt with counterinsurgency and put a strong emphasis on 'national security, "'334 which 
would have enormous consequences for developments later on and which fit the pattern 
of U.S. interference in the region as national militaries were being developed not so much 
to protect against outside invasion but to make war against their own people. The 
notorious School of the Americas in Panama, where the U.S. military trained various 
Latin American regimes in the most brutal forms of repression and state terror between 
1946 and 1986, is an instructive example of the Monroe Doctrine in practice during this 
period.335 Many Hondurans were trained there, though the majority of Honduran trainees 
came through the Francisco Morazan Military School, established by the U.S. military in 
Honduras in 1952. 336 
Direct U.S. influence in matters of state was exercised irregularly but decisively. 
When a civilian government was overthrown in a violent coup in 1963 - as described in 
Ramon Amaya Amador' s Operacion Gori/a -- that saw fighting in the streets of 
Tegucigalpa, the U.S. did nothing to intervene and then-Secretary of Defence Robert 
McNamara claimed, "the United States cannot be everywhere simultaneously." 
Nevertheless, despite this cynical deflection, joint American-Honduran training exercises 
were routine in the 1960s and 1970s - the large-scale "Operation Brotherhood" 
333 Booth, Wade and Walker, 161. 
334 Booth, Wade and Walker, 161. 
335 The infamous School of the Americas was founded in 1946 in the U.S.-controlled Panama Canal Zone 
and trained some 60,000 Latin American military and police officers, many of them implicated in some of 
the worst atrocities of Latin America's counter-revolutionary reactions of the 20th century. Chalmers 
Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire, Henry Holt & Co, New York, 2004, p. 136-137. 
336 Dunkerley, 533. 
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simulating an attack at Toncontin airport had taken place in 1962, only months before the 
coup - and the U.S. took every opportunity to use Honduras in its anti-communist 
activity, as in the establishment of a radio station in northern Honduras to project 
propaganda to Cuba.337 Of course, U.S. involvement in Honduras for the purposes of 
carrying out its regional objectives had only just begun; between 1978 and 1980, the U.S. 
spent some $10 million beefing up the Honduran armed forces, 338 and the invasion of 
Guatemala in 1954 from Honduras would be a model for Honduras' role in America's 
wars in Central America in the 1980s. 
As the 1970s were drawing to a close, then, social and economic pressures were 
finally starting to boil over into significant social unrest; 68% of Hondurans were unable 
to meet their basic daily needs. 339 Military rule in Honduras was approaching the nadir 
of its utility for the foreign and local elite, just at the moment that Honduras was to 
become central to U.S. military aims in the region. This apparent contradiction would 
play itself out in one of Honduras' darkest chapters, a time during which the country 
would come to be disparagingly dubbed the 'U.S.S. Honduras.' 
CONTRA WARS AND THE U.S.S. HONDURAS 
In 1980, the Honduran military peacefully relinquished political power, a move 
that was designed - by the military and its allies in the U.S. - to forestall more dramatic 
civil unrest. Certainly the peaceful transfer of nominal power was remarkable in contrast 
to the rest of Central America; fearing a civil war that could undermine the strength of the 
armed forces, the military chose to hand over power peacefully rather than risk its own 
destruction in the effort to hold on. A constitutional assembly was struck in 1980 and 
337 Becerra, 173. 
338 Booth, Wade and Walker, 169. 
339 North and CAP A, 83. 
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wrote a constitution in 1981, which called for elections later that year. Those elections 
were held and, rather than install their own man, the military surprised some observers: by 
allowing the winner to come from the Liberal Party. 
Roberto Suazo Cordova took office in 1982 and immediately established clmse 
relations with the new government in Washington, led by Ronald Reagan. As Honduras 
became the base of American operations against revolutionary movements in other parts 
of Central America - especially Nicaragua - it also became the focal point of military 
spending and training. As a result, just as political power was supposedly being 
transferred to civilian authorities, the military was growing in size and strength and so, 
not surprisingly, the head of the armed forces, Col. Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, became 
the de facto head of Honduras, exercising more real power than the president or 
congress. 340 Nationalists within the Honduran armed forces would grow weary of 
Alvarez's catering to U.S. interests and, in 1984, he was ousted from his position. But 
civilian governance did not flow from Alvarez's departure; in 1985, Suazo Cordova 
attempted to establish himself for a second tenn in office and was blocked by the 
military, which interceded in order to force a new set of elections in which north coast 
neoliberal Jose Azcona Hoyo won on behalf of the Liberal Party. 341 
Azcona's term began at the height of U.S. involvement in Honduras, during the 
period in which neoliberal reform was first being systematically imposed on countries 
and peoples of the Global South. Honduras would be no exception, but with U.S. 
economic and military aid flowing in order to maintain support for the American 
occupation, Azcona was not pressured to enact neoliberal reform as hard as elsewhere. 
340 Booth, Wade and Walker, 163. 
341 Booth, Wade and Walker, 168-171. 
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But once the Sandinistas were defeated in Nicaragua and U.S. regional involvement 
began to decrease, the full force of Honduras' e:conomic underdevelopment in the era of 
globalization would be felt, and Azcona's successors, Rafael Callejas and then Carlos 
Roberto Reina, were pressured by the IMF and USAID to implement the neoliberal 
'medicines' that typified the moment. By the mid-1990s, civilian governments began, to 
curtail the power of the military and transferrt:d the national police forces to civilian 
control, signalling a meaningful shift away from military rule, just as the full 
neoliberalization of Honduras - and the dramatic polarizations of wealth associated with 
it - was taking hold; this was no coincidence. 
But before turning to the neoliberalization of Honduras, it is worth looking in 
more detail at the 1980s, the period in which foreign domination of the country was 
perhaps never so visible and violent; indeed, the period is commonly described as one of 
full U.S. occupation, and it set the stage for the contemporary era of North American 
imperialism in Honduras. In the first place, the incomplete transfer of power from 
military to civilian rule has to be understood as being part of a broader strategy - on the 
part of a dominant section of the U.S. and Honduran elite - to transform, not eliminate, 
the system of domination in Honduras. Washington, understanding that it needed 
Honduras as a compliant base from which to organize its wars of counterinsurgency in 
the region, sought to construct an edifice of political legitimacy in the state where its 
influence would be the most visible, on the so-called 'U.S.S. Honduras.' Nominally 
clean elections in 1981 and the establishment of civilian governance in 1982 would be a 
key element of that project; the transition helped to diffuse tensions among labour and 
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peasant organizations and established the parameters under which the U.S. and its allies 
in Honduras could manage social conflict with a mixture of coercion and consent. 
Between 1980-1992, the U.S. spent some $1.6 billion in military and economic 
aid to Honduras, intended to establish the apparatus of repression, buttress the institutions 
of political power and infiltrate and co-opt the civil society organizations that were best 
positioned to harness social unrest. 342 Robinson describes the project as follows: 
The U.S. strategy was based on converting Honduras into a 
platform and rearguard for region-wide counterinsurgency and 
counter-revolution, given that it bordered on all three countries 
facing revolutions. The strategy involved three dimensions: 1) 
the development of a functioning polyarchic system; 2) a 
dramatic expansion and modernization of the military, including 
the further militarization of the Honduran state and society (even 
though this objective was in contradiction with the first); and 3) 
economic restructuring and capitalist modernization. 343 
Although this was ·a project of American imperialism, it was undertaken with the conse?t 
and cooperation of certain sections of the Honduran ruling class - in particular, the north 
coast oligarchs who would emerge as the most powerful section of the local elite in the 
decades to follow. Both the foreign and local oligarchy benefited from the transition to 
civilian rule, insofar as it - and the massive introduction of USAID funding and 
interference in civil society organizations that came with it - derailed the growing 
movements for more radical change that were emerging from the workers and peasants' 
organizations as economic conditions had deteriorated. As Joaquin A. Mejia, Victor 
Fernandez, and Omar Menjivar argue in their critique of the 1982 constitution: 
A key element of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy was 
oriented towards reducing the popular movement to its minimum 
expression and destroying the nascent revolutionary 
organizations in the country, to mailntain control over any 
342 See Lapper, 46-103 and Robinson, 120-123. 
343 Robinson, 121. 
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opposition to the project of turning Honduras into 
[Washington's] counterrevolutionary base in the region. 344 
Thus, to the extent that military rule had provided a clear target for the frustrations 
fuelling the growing social movements, those movements could be somewhat deflected 
by having their energies diverted into the electoral politics of the two-party system. 
It is of much significance to contemporary problems that this pe1iod established 
what has been called a "national security state':' in Honduras. The presence of the U.S. 
military itself, along with the counterrevolutionary Nicaraguan Contra forces, was a 
major part of that; hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers were involved in military 
exercises in Honduras, and some 20,000 Contra fighters were trained and based in 
Honduran territory. The U.S. established a number of its own military bases, airstrips, 
training centres and other facilities, and it used massive exercises as both demonstrations 
of its power and as cover for arms transfers to the Contra fighters. 345 Meanwhile, 
infamous U.S. ambassador John Negroponte worked closely with Gen. Alvarez, and 
between 1982-1984 the pair were, for all intents and purposes, the highest authorities in 
Honduras. Upon his election in 1982, President Suazo Cordova was given a twelve-point 
list of 'suggestions' by Ambassador Negroponte, which he was to follow during his term 
if he wanted to benefit from the U.S. occupation. I spoke in 2012 with Dr. Juan 
Almandares, then-director of the Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH), who 
expressed N egroponte' s power in Honduras by telling this anecdote: 
I had a meeting with N egroponte because he said he wanted to 
meet some of the personalities in the country. He invited me to 
dinner with him at the Embassy. When I arrived, some other 
344 Joaquin A. Mejia, Victor Fernandez, and Omar Menjivar, Aspectos hist6ricos, conceptuales y 
sustanciales sabre el proceso Constityente en Honduras, Tegucigalpa, Movimiento Amplio por la Dignidad 
y la Justicia, 2009, p. 20. 
345 Lapper, 77-92. 
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political advisor attended to me; Negroponte was at the table 
with me, but he was seated at a higher level, we were down 
below. He didn't say anything, Negroponte, for twenty minutes 
- he just looked at me. And I didn't say anything either. And 
after twenty minutes, he said, "are you going to be re-elected at 
the university?" And I said, "when are you going to pull out 
American military bases in Honduras, because we don't want 
you here." And he replied, "when you are re-elected." And I 
understood what he meant. 346 
This occupation of Honduran territory was certainly a maJor element of the 
militarization of the country, as the Honduran military cooperated with the occupation 
and sought to strengthen its own position through it. Between 1976 and 1984, the 
Honduran military doubled in size and established a framework of internal control that 
began to look more like those that were established under the dictatorships elsewhere in 
the region. Civilian branches of governance - like immigration, customs, and 
telecommunications - were increasingly militarized, new installations and facilities were 
built across the country, and counterinsurgency units were established.347 The most 
notorious would be Battalion 3-16, a clandestine: organization that would function as an 
official death squad for the state; the first of its kind in Honduras. 348 This new repressive 
apparatus, facilitated by the U.S. occupation, targeted the burgeoning social movements 
that had grown in the 1960s and 1970s to ensure that these movements would not develop 
into significant revolutionary guerrilla struggles. Though limited in size and scope and 
nowhere near the level of Guatemala, El Salvador, or Nicaragua, opposition groups had 
begun to form some small guerrilla factions, and although some of the organizations wef.e 
346 Interview with Juan Almendares, May 4, 2012. 
347 Margarita Oseguera de Ochoa, Honduras hoy: sociedad y crisis politica, CEDOH: Tegucigalpa, 1987, p. 
27-35. 
348 North and CAP A, 87. 
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muted by the re-introduction of civilian rule, others grew bolder in opposition to the U.S. 
occupation. 349 
In a certain sense, the establishment of the national security state brought about 
the very challenges it presupposed; claiming to be responding to internal threats, it was as 
much creating them as it was reacting to them. Robinson describes the two sides of 
Honduran military buildup: 
If participation in the regional count~:rrevolution was one side to 
militarization, the other was to contain the popular movement 
inside Honduras, and more specifically, to prevent it through pre-
emptive repression from developing into a revolutionary armed 
movement ... [To that end], Honduras was visited in the 1980s by 
counterinsurgency and state terrorist methods never before used 
in the country, such as "anti-terrorise:' laws, disappearances, and 
state-organized death squads, as the population fell victim to the 
same mass violation of human rights as in neighbouring 
countries. 350 
Until his ouster in 1984, Gen. Alvarez was at the: heart of the new repressive apparatus. 
An admirer of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet and of the so-called "Argentine 
method" of widespread disappearances during Argentina's 'dirty war' of the 1970s, 351 
Alvarez had been the officer in charge of the violent attacks, jailings, and torture of 
members of the Las Isletas co-operative in 1977, as described above. He expressed a 
fanatical hatred for communism - whether real or exaggerated to cater to the U.S. 
occupation - and claimed that "everything you do to destroy a Marxist regime is 
moral."352 To that end, his Battalion 3-16 kidnapped, tortured, and killed hundreds of 
Honduran civilians in the early 1980s, with particular emphasis on the leaders of the 
349 Barahona, 269-275. 
350 Robinson, 124. 
351 North and CAP A, 87. 
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incipient guerrilla movements, which were largely wiped out. 353 One former member of 
the death squad described his experiences, years later in Toronto, saying: 
At first, we were told to drop any kids we kidnapped in the park; 
later, we were told to kill them too. And instead of shooting, we 
were told to use machetes or knive:s. For torture sessions, we 
used electric shocks, the hood, and the bucket, filled with stones, 
hung from the victim's testicles.354 
For his efforts, the architect of Battalion 3-16, Gustavo Alvarez, was flown to 
Washington to receive a Legion of Merit in 1983. But by 1984, his excesses had become 
untenable to his erstwhile allies in Washington; anti-American demonstrations in 
Tegucigalpa indicated that Hondurans who had ~:xpected a shift to democracy blamed the 
U.S. occupation for the descent into state terror. American aid money was flowing in and 
lip-service was being paid to democracy in Honduras, especially since it was democracy 
the U.S. claimed to be bringing back in its wars against Nicaragua and El Salvador, but 
few were convinced by this farce. As one peasant leader explained, "there is plenty of 
money to build military airports, construct ports and buy arms .. Here you have the 
spectacle of military manoeuvres that cost millions of dollars in the very zones where 
peasants are dying ofhunger."355 
So when younger officers in the Honduran army deposed Gen. Alvarez, the U.S. 
allowed it to take place, in the hopes that his departure would ease tensions and facilitate 
the continued U.S. occupation.356 They were right; after Alvarez, the repressive 
353 North and CAP A, 87. 
354 Jose Valle Lopez, quoted in Acker, 116. This testimony was delivered to Alison Acker in 1988, as 
Canadian-based activism around solidarity with Honduras was building. I will return to this interview, and 
this activism more generally, in chapter 6. 
355 Quoted in North and CAPA, 83. 
356 While this should not invite any sympathy for Gen. Alvarnz, it is perhaps worth noting the speed with 
which U.S. imperialism discards its no-longer-useful allies. The ouster of Alvarez took place just a year 
after his being honoured in Washington, and just five years later he was assassinated in Honduras while 
working as a street preacher for an evangelical Christian church. By contrast, his ally John Negroponte 
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apparatus loosened up a little bit and the United States was able to pursue its aims in 
Central America, using Honduras as a base until its objectives had largely been reached 
in the late 1980s, at a cost of untold thousands of Central American lives. But while 
winning the armed struggles against anti-capitalist guerrilla movements was the primary 
goal for the United States, it is crucial to remember that an almost-equally important 
aspect of the U.S. occupation was shaping the trajectory of capitalist development that 
was to follow. It was, after all, at precisely this moment in the history of world 
capitalism that the crises of overaccumulation, stagnation, and declining profitability in 
the advanced industrial centres was necessitating the neoliberal shift, and the project of 
neoliberal globalization was underway. 357 Central America, like everywhere else, had to 
be forced into the new capitalist paradigm. In Honduras, the military occupation 
facilitated American oversight of this transition, such that by the early 1990s, the 
capitalist classes had undergone a major transfonmation and Honduras no longer looked 
like the 'banana republic' of old. 
But that transition was painful, and it is no surprise that anti-American sentiment 
rose to perhaps its greatest heights during this period. Victor Bulmer-Thomas has argued 
that, from the end of the Cariato in 1948 to the 1l 980s, Honduras retained a continuous 
went on to serve as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, as deputy Secretary of State, and- go figure -
as U.S. ambassador to occupied Iraq. Adrienne Pine, Working Hard, Drinking Hard: On Violence and 
Survival in Honduras, University of California Press, Berkele:y, 2008, p. 55-56. The point of such a 
comparison is to highlight that, in the context of ongoing imperial projects, colonial hierarchies remain 
embedded even in the relationships between class allies. U.S. treatment of its used-up compradors in the 
Global South puts the lie to any claim that nation and race cease to be significant in the era of transnational 
capitalism. 
357 There is no shortage of material on the neoliberal globalization project. David Harvey's A Brief History 
of Neoliberalism is perhaps one of the best systematic overviews of neoliberalism, though it is by no means 
the only one. David Harvey, A Brief History ofNeoliberalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005. 
David McNally's Global Slump offers a compelling picture of neoliberalism - as located in the broader 
history of world capitalism - that informs my own understanding of this period of capitalist development. 
David McNally, Global Slump: The Economics and Politics of Crisis and Resistance, Femwood, 
Winnipeg, 2011. 
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reformist thread: "the pace of reform had always been modest and had occasionally 
ground to a halt, but the direction of change was clear."358 But the transitions that took 
place during the 1980s set the stage for the neoliberal transformation that, in the 1990s 
and 2000s, would bring Honduras' continuous reform to an end, would exacerbate 
poverty, inequality, and social unrest, and would culminate in the social movements that 
would ultimately provoke the 2009 coup and the return of military rule. In the first place, 
the human rights crisis initiated under Gen. Alvarez continued well after his ouster and 
undermined the basis for functional political processes. Alvarez's anti-terrorist laws -
which were not repealed after he left power - made peasant land occupations a 
'subversive' act and radically increased the power of the armed forces to prevent and 
punish them. 359 A key pillar of Honduras' unique developmental path - access to land -
was to be forcibly ended. 
And while Honduras was spared the hyper-violence of its neighbours, it is notable 
that Alvarez's security apparatus continued to target political opponents well after he was 
removed, so that despite the shift to nominally civilian governance, space for political 
critique was, in fact, shrinking; witness the cases of Cristobal Perez, a campesino leader 
who led a May Day demonstration in 1986 and was shot dead in front of his house just 
one week later, 360 or popular Honduran actor Isidro Garcia Espana, hospitalized after a 
brutal beating by police forces after he spoke at an anti-contra event in 1987.361 Indeed, 
beginning in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, human rights organizations 
repeatedly insisted that Battalion 3-16 had been re-activated, though they were often 
358 Bulmer-Thomas, in Bethell, ed., p. 223. 
359 Acker, 122. 
360 Alvarado, 119. 
361 Anne Manuel, Human Rights in Honduras: Central America's 'Sideshow, 'An Americas Watch Report, 
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ignored by the international and, increasingly, the Honduran media. 362 Indeed, the 
violence perpetrated by Battalion 3-16 and the rest of the repressive machine in the 1980s 
possessed a self-sustaining quality; once it had been established in Honduran society, it 
occupied a permanent role, perpetually undermining the progress of democratic rule of 
law and struggles for social justice, as in the early 2000s when Honduras experienced a 
spate of extra-judicial but state-sanctioned vigilante assassinations of children who 
appeared to have connections to street gangs, a point to which I will return. 363 
Journalists, meanwhile, though not officially censored or controlled, experienced just 
enough periodic violence to be sufficiently thre:atened into a kind of 'self-censorship,' 
and they were routinely bribed into writing - or shelving - stories that either flattered or 
criticized the military or its allies.364 
At the same time, the palpable and complete authority exercised by the United 
States over successive Honduran governments in the 1980s was deeply damaging on a 
variety of levels. Though Honduras had suffered foreign domination in multiple forms 
for centuries, the U.S. occupation in the 1980s was unique both in its totality and its 
publicity. Honduran authorities - on behalf of their American overlords - denied the 
presence of the contr.as in spite of widespread knowledge of their whereabouts in the 
international press,365 prompting editorial mockery of Honduras as a 'puppet' of the U.S. 
and accusations by other regional leaders that Honduras had completely surrendered its 
autonomy and sovereignty to 'Yankee imperialilsm. ' 366 All the while, the Reagan 
administration demanded compliance from Honduran leaders - using the USAID funding 
362 Pine, 56-58. 
363 Pine, 56-69. 
364 North and CAP A, 87-88. 
365 Bulmer-Thomas, in Bethell, 221. 
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upon which many of its institutions had become dependant as leverage - whenever it 
needed support for one or another aspect of its regional war. For instance, periodically in 
the mid 1980s, the Honduran government was called upon to 'request emergency 
assistance' from the U.S. in the aftermath of 'attacks' launched against it from Nicaragua 
or El Salvador; in each case, the 'attacks' in que:stion were minor and routine skirmishes 
between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces along the border zones and posed 
no meaningful threat to Honduran sovereignty. These 'urgent appeals' provided 
justification for U.S. manoeuvring but were, in their transparent vacuity, further 
humiliations for the pretence of Honduran autonomy in international politics. 367 
Added to the mix of problems presented by the American occupation was the 
blight of ecological destruction, dramatically intensified during this period. Honduran 
forests were ravaged by cutting, by toxic defoliation and by forest fires that resulted from 
U.S. and contra training exercises. Over 1,000 square km of forested area was destroyed 
in the 1980s, including regions that were part of re-forestation programs designed in 
response to earlier erosion damage. 368 Erosion has been a serious problem in Honduras, 
given its mountainous topography; as the forests have been eliminated, landless peasants 
have settled in deforested areas to try to make ends meet, but the soil is vulnerable to 
erosion, silting, and flooding, and hundreds of families have seen their land become 
useless or have died in floods. In fact, this has contributed to the failure of land reform 
since the 1980s, as some 9,000 of the 22,000 families who received land between 1975-
1988 had to abandon it when it turned to clay.369 To make matters worse, the defoliants 
used by the U.S. military were highly toxic and not only damaged the soil but also 
367 Acker, 125-127. 
368 North and CAP A, 88. 
369 Faber, 142. 
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leeched into the water table, adding to already serious crisis in Honduras' water 
supply.370 These toxic chemicals also produced a resistant strain of mosquito and 
aggravated the spread of malaria,371 while contributing to catastrophic declines in plant 
and animal life upon which Honduran ecosystems are dependant, from massive fish kills 
in the Guayape River to scores of dead birds lining the mangrove channels along the Gulf 
ofFonseca.372 
Even Hondurans who had cooperated with the American occupation were 
becoming disillusioned by the disproportionate distribution of its rewards. The military 
increasingly resented the 'rain of dollars' that fell on American and Nicaraguan Contra 
fighters while their Honduran counterparts sat idle. Politicos from both parties were sick 
of being humiliated by the Reagan administration, and popular opinion, which had never 
favoured the presence of the Americans or the Contras, had become increasingly 
disaffected and volatile, especially as those Honduran officials well positioned in the 
distribution of aid money were accused of unprecedented levels of corruption. 373 
Allegations of growing child prostitution and the spread of sexually transmitted disease -
including HIV/AIDS - in regions servicing U.S. troops further alienated the traditional 
and religious sectors, which joined the various progressive social movements in rallying 
against the American occupation.374 Meanwhile, peasants already frustrated by the 
slowed pace of land reform were increasingly disrupted by conflict along the border and 
were even, by the mid 1980s, finding their lands usurped by the Contras themselves. 375 
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One 450 square km Contra installation in the south had displaced over 16,000 
campesinos by 1987, and the violence perpetrated by Honduran death squads was 
matched by that of the Contras themselves, who terrorized Honduran civilians and even 
members of the Honduran military who were noncompliant, as in the case of Ricardo 
Zuniga, an officer who testified against Contra abuses in the United States, only to be 
assassinated shortly thereafter. 376 As the 1980s wore on and these conditions worsened, 
anti-Contra and anti-American demonstrations in the capital drew tens of thousands of 
people from a variety. of sectors and the burning of U.S. flags was a common occurrence. 
The flames of discontent were fanned by the economic changes that were being 
wrought by - and under - the occupation. With a still small and relatively weak local 
capitalist class, Honduras continued to seek foreiign direct investment, but in the context 
of the escalating conflict, there were few investors to be found. Successive Honduran 
governments, beginning with the military regimes of the early 1980s and proceeding 
through the Suazo Cordova and Azcona administrations, turned to both USAID and the 
IMF for loans, which would be granted on condition of neoliberal reforms of austerity 
and stabilization. 377 The effects of the world recession of 1982 began to set in 
significantly as the still-ubiquitous banana companies slashed wages and scaled back 
their workforce. At the same time, IMF-directed cuts to social services and public 
spending exacerbated growing social crises, and the structural adjustment measures 
imposed on fiscal policy, such as the creation of free ports and tax-free maquiladora-
zones, only undermined the state's ability to finance its skyrocketing debts.378 Prices 
were rising just as wages were falling and unemployment was growing, and although 
376 North and CAP A, 8 8. 
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USAID loans eased the pain a little, they were nowhere near the amount that was needed 
to address the growing social crisis. As poverty afflicted the countryside, people flocked 
to urban centres looking for work, and Tegucigalpa grew in the 1980s to become more 
like the capitals of the other Central American states with, in Woodward's words, 
"accompanying overcrowded housing, suburban development, air pollution and rising 
crime rates."379 By 1986, the Honduran state debt hovered around $2.5 billion,380 well 
beyond anything the state could ever expect to pay back, setting the stage for deeper IMF 
and U.S. penetration of Honduran fiscal policy and the entrenchment of the new 
neoliberal economic order. 
Indeed, as noted briefly above, it is significant that the maquiladora industry -
today a centrepiece of foreign-dominated (and often Canadian-dominated) Honduran 
capitalist development - had its legal and political frameworks established during the 
U.S. occupation. Though the first zona fibre (ZOLi) laws were passed in 1976 and 1979 
to facilitate exports from Honduran ports, the crucial pieces of structural adjustment were 
passed in the 1980s. In 1984, a temporary import law was passed so that foreign 
capitalists could bring materials and equipment into Honduras exempt from duties, 
provided that the products were to be exported, and could avoid paying tax on their 
profits for up to ten years.381 Full-scale maquiladora laws were established in 1987, and 
these industrial processing zones (ZIPs) were designed, legally, as public service 
industries, making it easier to clamp down on attempts by workers to organize. 382 The 
political and legal architecture of neoliberalism, then, was established during the decade 
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of most direct foreign imperial occupation, and as the dramatic U.S. military presence in 
Honduras was to recede in the late 1980s, it left behind it the conditions for Honduras' 
violence-plagued and poverty-stricken 1990s and 2000s, during which new imperial 
powers like Canada would step in to take advantage of Honduras' weakness in order to 
profit from the escalation and entrenchment of the neoliberal project. The next section 
will provide an overview of the neoliberal transformation; I will discuss Canada's 
particular role in Honduran neoliberalism in Chapter 7. 
THE IMPOSITION OF NEOLIBERALISM 
By the end of the 1980s, both the Liberal and National parties had aligned 
themselves to neoliberalism. The Liberals' tradlitional supporters in the merchant and 
commercial classes were comfortable with a move towards IMF-sponsored restructuring, 
and the National Party had undergone a transfonnation whereby the formerly dominant 
strata from the military and landed elite had been supplanted at the core of the party by 
the "new right," made up of the emergent north coast oligarchy centred on the nascent 
maquiladora industry. 383 Conflicts and fractions within the Honduran capitalist class 
were contentious during the 1980s but were suitably enough patched up by the early 
1990s so that its primary institution, the Honduran Council of Private Enterprise 
(COHEP) had selected leaders and endorsed political candidates that lined up with the 
IMF and with USAID in a long term strategy that sought to complete the 
neoliberalization of Honduras under the leadership of a capitalist class rooted in 
Honduras but dependent on its transnational conne:ctions and - as always - on foreign 
383 Euraque, 153-162. 
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investment. 384 This dominant position within the Honduran elite would be represented -
more or less, and with no small amount of pressure from international capital - by every 
administration, led by either party, right up to (and partially including) that of Manuel 
Zelaya. For the Honduran oligarchy, linking up with circuits of capital that originated in 
the Global North was to be the strategy going forward and those factions that succeeded 
in doing so would become the most powerful in the country. 
As noted above, the stage for the neolibe:ral transition was set under the auspices 
of U.S. occupation in the 1980s. Nonetheless, the ongoing violent conflict during that 
time made the prospects for private investm{:nt bleak. As such, neoliberalism in 
Honduras was stillborn; the free port established at Puerto Castillo was empty, and lack 
of taxation did not stop some $100 million per year from fleeing the country, for a total of 
nearly $1.5 billion in capital flight by the end of the 1980s.385 It wasn't until the fall of 
the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1990, with the resultant departure of the U.S. military and 
the gradual regional demobilization and peace process, that the neoliberal reforms had 
any major effects. Indeed, a return to profitability and accumulation in Central America 
was dependent upon a successful transition to peace, which made the New Right an 
unlikely proponent of the process. 
Indeed, this is a point that deserves some emphasis, as there is much literature on 
Central America that celebrates, sometimes perhaps too uncritically, the regional peace 
process and partial demilitarization that took place in the 1990s. William Robinson's 
384 An approach that was ironically encouraged by many otherwise progressive American scholars in the 
heady days following the Peace Accords, as in Schultz and Schultz's important contribution in 1994. 
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work on this period is an unparalleled exception, and I draw significantly from him in this 
sub-section. His assessment of the peace process is incisive - and bears heavily on the 
unpredicted events of 2009 - and is here quoted at length: 
The gradual demilitarization of state: and society that took place 
in the 1990s in Honduras and elsewhere was not a sign of a 
rupture between a period of conflict and one of pacification, as 
so much of the literature proposes. The military became 
anachronistic in the 1990s in Central America once the 
revolutionary forces were contained, peace had been imposed, 
and the structural coercion of the globalization process had taken 
hold. Demilitarization occurred in the 1990s because the 
military and its far-reaching influence became both unnecessary 
and unproductive for the transnational agenda, and because a 
new fraction of the bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic elite was 
vying for hegemony over the internal political system and felt 
constrained by the military. A new bourgeoisie was coming into 
existence and trying to impose a coherent direction on society on 
the basis of larger worldwide transformations and the 
possibilities they opened up.386 
Out of the conflict of the 1980s, then, emerged a very different Honduras in a very 
different world. Counterrevolution had won in Central America and global capitalism 
had been imposed upon the former-communist blocs and, in the era of neoliberal 
globalization, the new capitalist classes needed an efficient and compliant local elite who 
could rule without the cumbersome disruptions of ongoing conflict and military 
domination and who could, instead, guarantee a state of security for profitable 
investments. 387 A small but determined fraction of Honduran capital was ready to lead 
the country through that transformation, in the hopes that it could plug into neoliberal 
globalization and gain access to its rewards. By the mid-1990s, the military' s role in 
governance had been significantly reduced, and after the military was seen to have 
386 Robinson, 130. 
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Programa Seguridad Juvenil en Centroamerica, San Salvador, 2011, p. 218-219. 
169 
bungled its response to Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the civilian government rebuked the 
military and dismissed its highest officers, demonstrating that the neoliberals were now in 
charge. 388 Once their project took hold - as has typically been the experience of poor 
countries linked into the globalization project -- it was no simple matter to get out,· as 
discipline could be enforced by the agencies of international capital without any need for 
significant military interruption. 
As a result, successive Honduran governments capitulated to the neoliberal 
project with a greater or lesser degree of structural coercion. Rafael Callejas (1990-1993) 
championed the project and initiated many of the policies and international agreements 
that allowed it to take root. Carlos Roberto Reina (1994-1997) was elected on a populist 
platform that criticized neoliberalism. But when he tried to dissolve or re-negotiate a 
variety of loans and SAPs, he quickly found himself threatened with suspensions of aid -
which would have crippled institutions that had become dependent on USAID and IMF 
loans - and denial of debt relief. Together, these measures would have plunged the 
Honduran economy into crisis, and the threat of their application successfully altered 
Reina's position. He was replaced by Carlos Flores Facusse (1998-2001) who, himself, 
came from the same fraction of the bourgeoisie as Callejas and happily entrenched 
Honduras even deeper into the neoliberal project. 
That project began in earnest, then, in March 1990, when Callejas launched the 
paquetazo, a "grand package" of economic reform that put several billion dollars of IMF 
and USAID money into maintaining stability through the first major structural adjustment 
policies (SAPs) which included painful austerity measures ranging from crackdowns on 
labour to the elimination of price controls with simultaneous tax hikes on consumption, 
388 Booth, Wade and Walker, 172. 
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as well as moves towards privatizations of state enterprises, reductions or eliminations of 
tariffs on exports and a 50% devaluation of the Lempira.389 Many progressive observers 
- understandably pleased with the end of the civil wars but unable to grapple with the 
gravity of the policies being undertaken in their aftermath - described the reform process 
as if it were 'painful but necessary medicine,' e:ven as they listed the austerity measures 
that were driving poor people even deeper into poverty, from 100% increases in water, 
electricity, fuel, and telephone rates to dramatic layoffs of public employees. 390 
A second set of SAPs was undertaken by the Reina administration, called El Gran 
Proyecto de Transformacion Nacional or "The Great National Transformation Project," 
which sought to insert Honduras more intensely into globalization by promoting non-
traditional exports and marketing the country as a tourist destination. This entaHed 
establishing more and larger free trade zones and spending public funds on energy and 
transportation mega-projects that would facilitate the expansion of business.391 This 
represented massive public infrastructure development that was openly intended to serve 
only private capital's interests; as Roger Marin, a representative of the Reina government 
described, "the primary objectives are designed to satisfy the needs of the international 
community and not the needs of the domestic market."392 Not to be outdone, the Flores 
administration, which took office in 1999 and was made up of many of the architects of 
the earlier SAPs, established a third round of such adjustments in the early 2000s. 
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The effects of neoliberal adjustments like these are well documented in much of 
the critical political economy tradition, and Honduras followed many of the predictable 
patterns. Devaluation of the currency meant that anyone whose savings were held in 
local currency saw rapid and dramatic drops iln the value of those savings, plunging 
people deeper into poverty and making them increasingly desperate for work of any kind, 
even when it paid less than living wages. The shifting of tax regimes away from taxing 
imports and exports and towards taxing consumption meant that while big capitalist firms 
got a break, the tax burden was shifted to those who were reliant on the local market for 
their survival; that is, ordinary people who nee:ded to buy food, pay for services, use 
public transportation and so on. Austerity measures and privatization meant that services 
formerly provided by the state at low or no cost, ranging from health and education to 
provisioning of water and telecommunications, were subject to funding cuts (reducing 
both the number of people who worked in these itndustries and the quality or quantity of 
the services provided) or were sold to private firms who would run these services for 
profit, such that people would have access to less services for higher cost. The free trade 
zones, of course, were havens for capital to exploit labour at higher-than-usual rates, 
taking advantage of already-existing inequality to foster even greater inequality. The net 
result of such policies, whether imposed on people in the advanced capitalist economies 
or in the Global South, was a deeper polarization of wealth between those at the top, who 
benefited from enhanced structural conditions for exploitation and capital accumulation, 
and those at the bottom, whose bodies and resources were squeezed ever harder and wery 
forced to survive on less and less. Extreme wealth and extreme poverty, then, were 
fostered together. 393 This pattern was as evident in Honduras in the 1990s as anywhere. 
393 This section represents a sketch of the general effects of neoliberal policies as they have been imposed 
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The Honduran economy was to see rapid and profound changes as a result of the 
SAPs and the introduction of neoliberalism. Among other things was the immediate 
maturation of the mostly foreign-owned maquiladora industries, especially in electronics 
and apparel, which grew from 26 factories in 1990 to nearly 200 in 1996. In that same 
time, the number of workers in this highly exploitative sector grew from 9,000 to over 
75,000 with some $112 million in clothing exports alone, making the maquiladora 
industry the third largest generator of foreign exchange in the country. 394 Tourism also 
grew rapidly, especially along Honduras' north coast and the Bay Islands, which fostered 
new and similarly exploitative job markets in service provision, as did large-scale 
agriculture, often in new fruits and vegetables grown for export. These emerging sites of 
exploitation and accumulation were increasingly serviced by private-sector organizations 
that worked with the state to promote the new industries and exports, usually financed by 
USAID and IMF money. 395 Privatization pressures led to the sale of Honduran airports 
and energy industries, and an attempt to sell the Honduran Telecommunications company 
(HONDUTEL) th.ough the latter was blocked, leading to further punitive pressures from 
the IMF.396 
Of crucial importance m all of this was the escalation of the process of 
proletarianization of Honduras' peasant classes. Given the importance attributed to 
peasants' access to land in the period prior to the conflicts of the 1980s, and the role that 
access played in forestalling the worst of the violence of the 1980s, it should be 
around the globe, all of which can be applied to Honduras. I will again point to the work of Harvey and 
McNally as excellent sources on these dynamics, and I will here add Petras and Veltmeyer's Globalization 
Unmasked, which does well to bring that broader analysis into the context of Latin America. James Petras 
and Henry Veltmeyer, Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21s1 Century, Femwood, Halifax, 2001. 
394 ERIC, 16-22. 
395 Thorpe, 223-248. 
396 Booth, Wade and Walker, 171. 
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emphasized that the neoliberal tum in Honduras has actively and aggressively 
undermined the remaining spaces of non-capitalist production in that country. Following 
the uprooting of peasant communities which reached high points prior to the 'Futbol 
War' in the late 1960s and the Contra conflicts of the 1980s, a variety of structural forces 
were set into motion under neoliberalism to tear remaining peasants from the land and 
force them onto the capitalist labour market, in the hopes that they would fill up the 
maquiladoras and the service sectors, or enter into wage labour on large-scale 
agricultural or mining operations. The shift from political to economic strategies of 
proletarianization relied on the initial uprooting of peasants by the military conflict, but 
was increasingly characterized by structural reform that included the deeper 
commodification of land, the privitazation of credit mechanisms which effectively 
ratcheted up interest rates and left campesino communities at the mercy of a market that 
had been forcibly opened up to transnational capital. 
Using economic levers recommended- or imposed- by the IMF and USAID, the 
Honduran state, then, uprooted peasants from the land to an extent hitherto unseen in the 
country. As such, the process of land reform that had proceeded with more or less energy 
since the 1950s ground to a halt in the 1980s and was formally terminated in 1992 when 
the Callejas government passed the Ley de lvfodernizacion Agricola. Drafted in 
consultation with USAID and the World Bank, the agricultural 'modernization' law 
reversed land reform and facilitated the transfer of land into private, commercial hands. 
The state body responsible for land reform, the Instituto Nacional Agraria (INA), was 
made largely redundant and lost its autonomy, effectively ending state intervention and 
expropriation of land, while the new package of laws strengthened private property rights 
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and converted all titled land into marketable property. Cooperative lands were converted 
into individual parcels, which gave powerful oligarchs greater opportunities to buy up 
formerly cooperative lands, as the state withdrew most of its support for campesinos, 
especially in the privatization of the National Agriculture Development Bank 
(BANDESA), the sell off of- and subsequent rate increases for- state infrastructure like 
grain storage facilities, and the concurrent abandonment of low-interest loans for peasant 
farmers, all of which served to leave individual :families and cooperatives so desperate for 
cash that they sold their land for infinitely less than its market value. The Lourdes Sugar 
Cooperative, for instance, sold for 3 million lempiras in July 1991, though its book value 
was estimated at L30 million.397 The Ley de Modernizaci6n Agricola, then, represented a 
thorough overhaul of the land system in Honduras and ensured that there would be no 
further toleration of non-capitalist campesino land cooperatives. 
The result, not surprisingly, has been a dramatic migration from rural to urban 
areas, a shift from self-sufficient non-capitalist agricultural production to dependence on 
waged labour, and intensified competition for existing wage work leading to decreases in 
those wages. It was an all-out assault on Honduras' poor and the effects were dramatic. 
Between 1990-1992, per capita income plummf:ted by more than half, dropping from 
$534 U.S. to $204 U.S. in that time.398 All the while, prices continued to rise, and by 
2003, over 75% of Hondurans lived in poverty and could not meet their basic daily 
needs.399 Environmental destruction that had increased under the U.S. occupation was 
exacerbated by the neoliberal adjustments of the 1990s, and deforestation and soil erosion 
continued, making the effects of Hurricane Mitch in 1998 particularly devastating; some 
397 Schultz and Schultz, 298-303. 
398 Woodward, 273. 
399 Pine, 4. 
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11,000 Hondurans were killed and as many as 2 million people - almost one third of the 
population - were left without homes.400 Not surprisingly, many of these people were the 
suburban poor; former peasants who had been forced by neoliberal policies to move to 
the cities to find work. The storm devastated the hillsides surrounding Tegucigalpa 
where so many of the new migrants had set up flimsy shantytown dwellings on recently 
deforested areas; the vulnerable soil was easily washed away, wiping out homes and 
ruining crops.401 Agriculture was devastated and, all told, the storm did upwards of $4 
billion U.S. in damage. 
THE INTENSIFICATION OF POVERTY AND VIOLENCE 
Indeed, Hurricane Mitch can be understood as a kind of litmus test for the 
neoliberal transition; its utterly devastating effects and the social and economic mess that 
it left in its wake was as clear an indication as any that the neoliberal project had created 
a nightmare for poor Hondurans who, in part as a result of that very project, made up an 
overwhelming majority. The already endemic poverty of the 1990s was deepened by the 
storm's destruction, which fell hardest on thos•e who could least afford it, and the 
perception of the hurricane as having 'punished' people who were already so poor sent 
already-impoverished communities into a tailspin of violent crime;402 murder rates in 
400 Booth, Wade and Walker, 171. 
401 Booth, Wade and Walker, 171. 
402 Adrienne Pine's 2008 book Working Hard, Drinking Hard makes an attempt at describing the process of 
creating Honduran subjectivities in the context of a daily life that is, for most Hondurans, regularly 
punctuated by hyper violence. She goes to great lengths to describe the ways that Hondurans are 
encouraged to blame the victims of violence - physical, social, and economic - rather than the perpetrators, 
which has reinforced a kind of shame and self-flagellation. I a.m not entirely convinced by Pine's 
methodology and tone in this study, which I think is characterized by a tendency to draw sweeping 
generalizations about a supposed national subjectivity from limited and somewhat anecdotal evidence, 
which would have been unmistakably influenced by her own presence amongst 'her subjects.' Indeed, 
conversations with activists - Honduran and international - who have spent many long years in the country 
indicate that there is much evidence to dispute Pine's broad claims about Honduran subjectivity. That said, 
the book does contain a good deal of useful insight into a series of contemporary Honduran experiences and 
quite convincingly demonstrates that part of the class project of the Honduran elite has been to criminalize 
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Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula had risen, by the year 2000, to make Honduras one of 
the most violent countries in the Western Hemisphere.403 The increases in violence were 
often linked to street gangs, or maras, themselves sometimes (though not always) 
connected to narco-trafficking; by the tum of the century, there were an estimated 500 
maras in the country with some 100,000 members, mostly drawn from Honduras' urban 
poor.404 Gang violence became a central theme of the 2001 elections and the winner, 
Ricardo Maduro, won on a platform that promised to fight a 'War on Crime,' which 
would only exacerbate the already-bad situation. 
In the period between Hurricane Mitch and the election of Maduro, Honduras 
experienced a spate of extrajudicial killings of children, almost all of them boys who 
appeared to have connections to the maras. The killings were carried out by vigilante 
groups, usually made up of off-duty police or ex-paramilitaries, who patrolled poor 
neighbourhoods, shooting youths who had tattoos or wore clothing that fit into the 
stereotypical image of gang members which, not surprisingly, was closely linked to the 
image of the urban poor.405 Between 1998-2002, somewhere between 1500 and 4500 
youths were killed without any legal process, neither an investigation connecting them to 
criminal activity in the first place nor a juridical hearing sentencing them to any kind of 
punishment. The cause for the discrepancy in numbers was the difficulty faced by 
organizations trying to document the killings. 406 Few attempts were made to even 
investigate the killings which took place with the tacit approval of the state and the 
and individualize poverty, just as its policies have been imposing that poverty on people at ever greater 
levels. On the responses to Hurricane Mitch, see Pine, 89. 
403 Booth, Wade and Walker, 172. 
404 Booth, Wade and Walker, 172-173. 
405 Pine, 58. 
406 Casa Alianza came up with 1569, while groups associated with the Catholic Church estimated over 
4500. Virginia Samayoa, 241. 
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mainstream media, by this point largely owned and controlled by the Honduran 
oligarchy. Ministers in the Flores government criticized the "irresponsible parenting" of 
street children and repeated sensationalized stories of youths who raped their mothers -
fabrications dreamt up by corporate tabloid journalists who contribute to the victim-
blaming process - in order to focus attention on the supposed criminality of the youths, 
rather than the extraordinary extension of impunity to vigilantes who were committing 
murder.407 
Despite a special U.N. report that highlighted both the social and economic causes 
of the growth of maras, and the fact that vigilante assassinations of street youth only 
deepened the violent crisis in Honduras, President Maduro launched his 'War on Crime' 
with the emphasis entirely on a militarized crackdown on criminals rather than any effort 
to reverse the neoliberal project that was producing such dramatic inequality and 
poverty.408 Initially, while violence had been largely kept within poor communities, there 
was rarely cause for notice from the state, beyond campaign rhetoric. But as crime 
increasingly targeted prominent businessmen and officials, maquiladora owners began 
relocating out of Honduras and crime became a primary state concern; once again, the 
needs of foreign capital figured prominently in the: actions of the Honduran state.409 The 
Maduro administration and the corporate media encouraged Hondurans to both fear and 
police one another; criminality was constructed as a 'traditional' characteristic of the poor 
and, by stressing this 'innate' criminal nature of poor people, poverty and violence were 
ideologically connected such that the causal chain - i.e. that the violence of poverty 
encourages other forms of violence - could be reversed to suggest that poverty was a 
407 Pine, 60. 
408 v· · · s 220 rrg1ma amayoa, . 
409 Booth, Wade and Walker, 172-173. 
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result of a criminal nature.410 The victims of neoliberal structural violence, then, were to 
be blamed for their own poverty. Adrienne P1lne describes the link between neoliberal 
capitalist authority and the construction of the 'dangerous' poor: 
Only through ... 'security,' Maduro argued, can private property 
(and hence capitalist civilization) be protected. Though officially 
at peace, daily violence and its representations in Honduras have 
created a culture of terror, which, like all wars, defines the nation 
in terms of its common enemy - in this case, itself. Hondurans 
are not irrational. But the War on Crime, combined with the 
antipoor rhetoric and practices of modem capitalist institutions, 
has engineered an amazing coup over humanism ... while rich 
and poor alike share the reasoning behind the justification for 
genocide, it is primarily the poor who are harmed.411 
Legislation introduced in Maduro' s Ley Antimara strengthened the powers of the 
military and police to deal with suspected gang members, establishing laws that could 
sentence gang members to up to twenty years of incarceration and empowering the armed 
forces to patrol the slums in much the same way that the vigilantes had been doing for 
years.412 It put some 10,000 new police and military officers in the streets, made the 
armed forces 'untouchable,' describing an attack against an officer as an attack 'against 
Honduras,' and extended the powers of the polic1~ to arrest, question, and detain peopl~e 
on suspicion alone.413 Notably, U.S. authorities applauded Maduro's 'zero toleranc~' 
policies especially as he linked them to the dubious threat that Al-Qaeda was organizing 
in Honduras;414 Colin Powell commended Maduro's efforts while thanking him for 
sending troops to assist in the U.S. occupation of Iraq, despite the fact that Cero 
410 Pine, 60-63. 
411 Pine, 82. 
412 Pine, 63. 
413 Booth, Wade and Walker, 173. 
414 Virginia Samayoa, 242. 
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Tolerancia had only amplified the violence that plagued Honduras.415 Indeed, the 
lawlessness of the legal authorities was such that when two deadly fires broke out at 
Honduran prisons in 2003 and 2004, over 170 'suspected gang members' were killed, 
though dozens had only been imprisoned for 'illicit association' and dozens more had 
been changed with no crime whatsoever.416 These fires, part of what some observers 
have described as an 'invisible genocide' against Honduras' poor, were to be reflected in 
an even more horrific prison fire in 2011 that claimed the lives of over 360 people, many 
of whom had been similarly detained without any legal process as part of the crackdown 
against the coup resistance417 (more on this in chapter 5.) The assassinations of youth 
also continued under Maduro, at an average rate of sixty killings per month in 2003.418 
As for the gangs themselves, their numbers were only increased by the 
extrajudicial killings and Maduro's offensive, which made Honduras a more dangerous 
place for young males, pushing many more youths into groups like the Mara Salvatrucha 
and the Mara 18 which seemed to offer some: protection from the myriad forms of 
violence that beset Hondurans on a daily basis. Adrienne Pine observes, quite astutely, 
that "while it is important not to romanticize gang solidarity, over the past two decades, 
gangs have provided one of the few spheres in which poor young Hondurans have had an 
opportunity to construct a defiant, positive, class-based self-image,'' significant in a 
society where poverty is being cast as criminal and reflective of innate inferiority.419 
Given these conditions, it is not surprising that participation in gangs was widespread, 
415 Pine, 196. 
416 Booth, Wade and Walker, 173. 
417 Jessica Isla, "A Chronicle of Hell, Women and Hope," The Americas Program, March 12, 2012. 
Available at http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/6550 . 
418 Pine, 198. 
419 Pine, 195. 
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despite the violence that it, too, entailed. Bolstered in numbers, the maras fought back 
against Maduro' s mano dura, as in 2004 when a bus was bombed in San Pedro Sula in 
retaliation for the possible re-imposition of the death penalty.420 Real violence and 
perceived violence reinforced one another in a feedback loop that saw Honduras become 
one of the most dangerous places in the W este:m Hemisphere. By 2006, the homicide 
rate in Honduras hovered around 46.2 per 100:,000 and Maduro's 'War on Crime' had 
only aggravated the problem, which was compounded by an increase in the use of private 
security forces, which were even less responsible to civilian authorities than the regUlar 
armed forces. In the mid-2000s, state violence against members of street gangs became 
even less effective as it failed to recognize that the maras had been largely incorporated 
into the broader narco-trafficking circuits, themselves closely affiliated with corrupt state 
institutions; as much as 30% of the Honduran police participated and profited from the 
drug trade421 and armed forces Gen. Romeo Vasquez was himself implicated with the 
cartels.422 
The deepening of poverty created by the introduction of neoliberalism and the 
devastation of Hurricane Mitch led to an expansion of physical violence - both in terms 
of the growth of maras and vigilante death squad activity - that had its roots in the 
violence carried out in the 1980s, and was intricately connected to Honduras' full 
incorporation into neoliberal capitalist globalization, oriented as it is to benefit the few -
mostly in the Global North - at the expense of the many. This polarization of wealth also 
420 That promise would be emphasized as part of the Presidential campaign of Porfirio 'Pepe' Lobo in 2005, 
who would lose the election to Manuel Zelaya, but was elected in the fraudulent coup-sponsored elections 
of2009. Booth, Wade and Walker, 173. 
421 Booth, Wade and Walker, 175. 
422 Al Giordano, "Honduras Coup General Was Charged in 1993 Auto Theft Ring," The Narco News, July 
4, 2009. 
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expanded the scope of structural, social, and economic violence, which was inflicted on 
Honduras' poor in the slums, the factories, and. the fields. Adrienne Pine's work on the 
maquiladora industry provides very useful first-hand accounts of the experiences of the 
mostly women workers in the sector. The violence that is meted out by this type of work 
is not always easy to capture. As Pine describes, the factories rarely look the part of the 
Global North perception of the sweatshop: 
Workplace violence .. .is hard to see in a snapshot moment. The 
kinds of visceral horrors conjured up by anti-sweatshop 
campaigns (dingy back-room workplaces, disgusting toilets, 
violent physical abuse, and child and coerced labour) are the 
exception rather than the rule in Honduran maquilas ... the 
complaints most workers have voict::d to me have more to do 
with things less evident on first inspection: the chemicals used in 
production (formaldehyde and others), the lint particles 
(tamo) .. . the aches and boredom associated with repetitive tasks, 
and the unrelenting discipline - and associated humiliation - of 
factory work. 423 
These less-obvious forms of violence are such that it is easier for factory owners to 
convince casual observers that they are providing safe, decent work for people,· while the 
reality is still quite different. 
Waged labour - and especially capitalist factory work - imposes a whole host of 
different forms of alienation, which have been well documented in the Marxist 
tradition;424 maquiladoras in Honduras, emblematic of the neoliberal era, offer a variety 
423 Pine, 157. 
424 Marx, himself, offers some of the best descriptions of alienation under capitalist wage labour, in its 
many facets. In one vivid description, on the introduction of machinery to the factory, Marx writes: "In 
handicrafts and manufacture, the worker makes use of the tool; in the factory, the machine makes use of 
him. There, the movements of the instrument of labour proceed from him, here it is the movements of the 
machine that he must follow. In manufacture, the workers are the parts of a living mechanism. In the 
factory we have a lifeless mechanism, which is independent of the workers, who are incorporated into it as 
its living appendages. 'The wearisome routine of endless drudgery in which the same mechanical process 
is ever repeated, is like the torture of Sisyphus; the burden of toil, like the rock, is ever falling back upon 
the worn-out drudge.' Factory work exhausts the nervous system to the uttermost; at the same time, it does 
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of additional forms of violence and alienation. Workers get sick frequently, whether 
from the chemicals or the physical work, medical care is limited and inadequate, and 
workers are routinely forced to work through the sicknesses while waiting for care, 
making the problems that much worse. As Pine puts it, "the poor become sicker as a 
result of their poverty, and their sickness is otlen exacerbated by the kind of treatment 
poor bodies receive."425 Meanwhile, the factories are a space where capital can ~ore 
directly regulate women's bodies; since employc~rs are legally obligated to pay maternity 
leave, the workplace is structured to be hostile to women who get pregnant. Female 
workers, who typically make up over 80% of the workforce, are routinely subjected to 
pregnancy tests during 'probation periods;' the probation allows employers to pay less to 
workers in that stage and it allows them to choose not to hire women who become 
pregnant.426 The workplaces, themselves, are typically segregated along gendered and 
racial lines, highlighting difference between workers in order to discourage organization 
among them, and - as in maquiladora sectors across Latin America - the unions that 
represent workers are often directly or indirectly employed by the factory-owners and 
serve to undermine, rather than protect, the workers.427 
All the while, Maduro sought to intensify the neoliberal apparatus upon which the 
new Honduras was constructed. In consultation with the IMF, he proceeded with the 
dismantling of social funding and state-run enterprises, pushing a number of new 
privatization schemes and reducing the workforce in the state bureaucracy.428 With 
away with the many-sided play of the muscles, and confiscates every atom of freedom, both in bodily and 
intellectual activity." Marx, 548. 
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conditions getting worse in Honduras, many workers sought relief by plugging into the 
vast migratory networks that saw workers from Central America moving north - with or 
without papers - to work in the United States and Canada. Exploitation of these workers 
is well documented elsewhere and is largely outside the scope of this project,429 though I 
will return to the dynamics of migration in chapter 6. Suffice it to say, here, that the 
worsening situation in Honduras produced a growing supply of cheap migrant labour in 
North America and remittances sent back by those workers became an increasingly 
crucial source of income for many Honduran families; according to Booth and Walker, 
remittances grew from $400 million in 2000 to· $1.8 billion in 2006 and reached $2.7 
billion by 2008, accounting for 20% of Honduras' GDP and acting as a lifeline for some 
20% of Honduran families who were only spared from extreme poverty by the remittance 
money they received.430 
Nonetheless, despite the mounting difficulties facing all but the wealthiest 
Hondurans, there continued to be strength in the organizations committed to resisting 
colonial and class domination. The 1980s .. had be:en a decade of rupture; the movements 
that had been building from the strikes of the 1950s to the peasant movements of the 
1970s were largely squashed by the repressive apparatus of the 1980s. But new 
movements were built out of the difficulties of that period - often in response to the 
violence ushered in by the U.S. occupation - and they continued to resist imperial 
impositions in the form of neoliberal restructuring by a comprador elite through the 
429 Mike Davis and Justin Akers Chacon offer an excellent starting point on these issues in Mike Davis and 
Justin Akers Chacon, No One Is Illegal: Fighting Racism and State Violence on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 
Haymarket Books, Chicago, 2006. I also address these problems, with some emphasis on the situation in 
Honduras, in light of the deaths of several Peruvian migrant workers in Ontario in 2012 in Tyler Shipley, 
"Peruvian Lives on Canada's Conscience," Rabble.ca, Feb 10, 2012. 
430 Booth, Wade and Walker, 174-175. 
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1990s and 2000s. These movements will be discussed in greater detail in the chapters to 
follow; for the moment, it will suffice to highlight a few developments in different 
sectors. 
With respect to the ongoing death squad activities and related forms of state 
violence, organizations like the Human Rights Committee of Honduras (COD EH) and the 
Committee of the Families of the Disappeared and Detained in Honduras (COF ADEH) 
emerged out of the repression of the 1980s and became important participants in 
contemporary struggles. Maquiladora workers increasingly engaged in acts of individual 
and organized resistance, ranging from sabotage and stealing to union drives and 
demonstrations, often bringing well-developedl feminist networks into the sphere of 
production to fight against both capitalist exploitation and the complicated gendered 
dynamics that help sustain it.431 Urban professional classes, civil servants, and trade 
unionists became increasingly defiant in the 2000s in the face of privatization and the 
dismantling of social services, leading protests of some 25,000 people in 2003 in 
response to Maduro's plans to privatize water.432 Peasant movements, undeterred by the 
violence brought upon them, continued to demand access to land, organizing massive 
land re-occupations throughout the 1980s and 1990s, not least of which was a movement 
of some 100,000 peasants in the northwest in 1987.433 Although proletarianization 
weakened the peasant movement, campesino groups increasingly moved to organize 
alongside workers in other sectors, Indigenous and Garifuna groups, 434 women's 
431 Pine, 176-178. 
432 Booth, Wade and Walker, 173. 
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434 The Garifuna's ancestors arrived in the Caribbean on a slave ship that was wrecked and now live 
primarily along Honduras's North Coast as a culturally distinct, often communally organized set of 
communities. UNESCO has declared their culture one of 19 "Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible 
Heritage of Humanity." 
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organizations, and other resistance networks; in 1989 many of these groups came 
together to form the Plataforma de Lucha Ho.ndurefia - the Platform of Struggle - and, 
. later, Cansejo Civico de Organizaciones Populares y lndigenas de Honduras (COPINH) 
- the Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras. These types 
of broader cooperative networks were to be an important legacy of the organizing that 
took place in response to the neoliberal push; as the capitalist class pooled its resources to 
get behind a common class project, so, too, subordinate classes had to build movements 
that would cut across many traditional divides. The joining of many of these struggles 
would, ultimately, be the strength of the resistance networks in the 1990s and 2000s and, 
especially, in the coalition that came together aftermath of the June 2009 coup. 
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CHAPTER FIVE - CONTEMPORARY HONDURAS AND THE 2009 COUP 
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This chapter will focus its attention on the June 2009 coup itself - with an eye to 
its violent and anti-democratic nature - in order to set the context for Canada's response 
to the coup, which will be detailed in Chapter 6. Having established that imperialism'. can 
take a variety of forms, and that many of those different forms have been manifest du\ring 
the over five hundred years of foreign intervention in Honduras, it remains to connect the 
dots between the new Canadian imperialism, in general, and the coup in Honduras, in 
particular. Thus, the purpose of the following chapter will be to demonstrate first: that 
the June 2009 coup was anti-democratic and that it unleashed a dramatic decline in the 
already deplorable conditions of life - in terms of economic, political, social, cultural, 
and physical well-being - for the overwhelming majority of Hondurans; and second: that 
the coup was a violent response to a growing and credible threat from popular social 
movements to the current imperial capitalist order in that country. 
Establishing these two points will be a crucial piece of understanding Canada's 
reaction to - and support for - the coup d'etat as something that cannot be explained by 
Canada's typical discourse which claims to pursue a foreign policy that seeks progressive 
development in the Global South. These next two chapters form, then, a key piece of the 
central argument of this dissertation; if the coup served to undermine democracy, human 
rights and social justice in Honduras, and Canada threw its full support behind that 
process, then something else must be driving Canadian policy, the details of which will 
be the subject of Chapter 7. 
MANUEL ZELAYA AND THE CNRP 
One of the more interesting and perhaps unforeseen consequences of the June 28, 
2009 coup was the way that it transformed Manuel Zelaya into a popular figure in 
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Honduras. He was elected President in 2005 as a member of the Liberal Party which, as 
Chapter 4 described, has traditionally functioned- along with the National Party- as one 
of the two competing parties of the oligarchy, neither known for any history of 
radicalism. Zelaya, himself, was a junior-member of the oligarchy, a wealthy landowner 
from the eastern department of Olancho whose father, Jose Manuel, was implicated in the 
murder of two Catholic priests who were supp011ing escalations of campesino activism in 
1975. The Los Horcones massacre, as discussed in Chapter 4, is often held up as an 
example of how Honduras was different from other Central American countries because 
some of the military officers involved in the incident were tried and imprisoned for their 
participation. Nevertheless, there was still widespread impunity for such crimes; Jose 
Manuel, himself, avoided any culpability in the massacre, and his son's political career 
was not held up in the slightest. 
Nor, initially, did that career show any signs of significant divergence from the 
standard trajectory of Honduran politics. In fact, the only thing that separated Manuel 
Zelaya from someone like Roberto Micheletti - the tremendously unpopular figure who 
emerged as de facto President after the coup -- was that he recognized the growing 
strength of the movements for social reform and learned to work with them. Zelaya's 
presidency became increasingly responsive - at least in relative terms - to the sharp 
demands from trade unions, campesinos, women, Indigenous and Garifuna and other 
marginalized communities for change. But, in spite of the way that he was later 
characterized by many observers - from a variety of political stripes - Zelaya was not a 
hero to Honduras' poor; his Presidency and his role in the social movement are, instead, 
complicated and inconsistent and need to be carefully unpacked. 
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After winning an exceptionally narrow margin in the 2005 elections, Zelaya was 
immediately subjected to a show of strength and defiance from many of those who had 
supported his campaign, facing some two hundred protests in just his first year in 
office.435 These strikes and mobilizations did not materialize out of thin air, nor were 
they spontaneous expressions of discontent; they were a manifestation of the growing 
strength of the new social movements that had begun to coalesce in the late 1980s and 
1990s, as presented in Chapter 4. The militarization of Honduras under the U.S. 
occupation in the 1980s, and the repression and death-squad activity that accompanied it, 
significantly weakened or even snuffed out much of the radical Left and the impressive 
campesino organizing that had characterized the period from the 1950s-1970s. As a 
result, there was limited capacity to muster up opposition to the imposition of 
neoliberalism in the 1990s, especially as the Callejas government was setting up 
alternative parallel structures to existing social organizations in order to weaken and 
divide the movement. So the hammer of structural adjustment, privatizations, foreign 
concessions, theft of campesino and Indigenous land, cuts to social and state services and 
infrastructure, and other austerity measures fell hard on Hondurans who were already 
reeling from the violence and insecurity of the 1980s. The devastating social 
consequences of Hurricane Mitch in 1998 were as clear a signal as any that conditions in 
Honduras had become intolerable. 
It is no surprise, then, that it was around this time that a new generation of social 
movements was beginning to consolidate itself, first in regional organizations based 
loosely around the different departments, or provinces, of the country. These included, 
but were not limited to: the Asamblea Popular Permanente (APP) in El Progreso, the 
435 
"Rocky First Year for Zelaya," Central American Report, February 16, 2007. 
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Movimiento Ambientalista de Olancho (MAO) in Olancho, Coordinadora de 
Organizaciones Populares de Valle Aguan (COP A) in Atlantida, Patronato Regional de 
Occidente (PRO) in the west, Cansejo Civico de Organizaciones Populares y Indigenas 
de Honduras (COPINH) in Intibuca and the Bloque Popular in Tegucigalpa and :the 
southern departments. Most of these groups were, themselves, unions of smaller 
organizations that had been coming together around particular issues and gradually 
connecting up with larger pockets of struggle. For instance, the Bloque Popular - one of 
the key groups - was "a union of unions, anti-poverty groups, and juntas de agua," 
activist networks organized around the protection of public access to clean water, and it 
also encompassed a number of small socialist and communist parties, including the 
Movimiento Democratica Popular, a Marxist-Leninist party, the Tendencia 
Revolucionario, made up of disaffected andl increasingly radicalized government 
workers, and Los Necios, a Marxist student organization that continues to have an 
important presence in the Resistance. 436 
The larger regional groups, like the Bloque Popular and COPINH, began linking 
up in the late 1990s and organized coordinated actions in the early 2000s, including a 
dramatic blockade of the four main highways into Tegucigalpa in 2003. The blockade 
was held from 4am until 2pm, at which point it proceeded to the National Congress to 
confront then-President Maduro directly; the success of this demonstration encouraged 
further cooperation, and thus was created the Coordinadora Nacional de Resistencia 
Popular (CNRP). Ultimately, this structure would be converted into the Frente Nacional 
de Resistencia Popular (FNRP) shortly after the June 28 coup. The CNRP rotated its 
leadership between its different member groups, and I interviewed Juan Barahona, who 
436 Interview with Gilberto Rios, May 8, 2012. 
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was the coordinator of the Bloque Popular and became one of the central leaders of the 
FNRP after the coup. "The social movement was not born with the coup," he explained, 
"but strengthened by it. We had been mobilized for a decade, we had fought against Mel 
Zelaya for two years. "437 
Indeed, Zelaya's inauguration as President in 2006 was met - just a few months 
later - by one of Honduras' largest pre-coup demonstrations; thousands of people 
participated in a national strike, led by the teachers' unions, that shut down many of the 
country's major highways and was met by swift and violent repression from Zelaya's 
government which, according to Los Necios' Gilberto Rios, only further emboldened the 
CNRP to redouble its pressure against Zelaya.438 A few months later, in May 2006, 
Zelaya reached out to the CNRP in an effort to bring the wave of strikes to an end and to 
ask for CNRP support in his plan to join the Venezuelan-led alliance Alternativa 
Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra America (ALBA) in order to participate in the 
PetroCaribe project to significantly reduce energy costs.439 While this ended the strike in 
question, it did little to satisfy the growing demands for change from the increasingly 
well-organized and active movements that had emerged from the wreckage of the 1990s. 
The reforms pursued by Zelaya's government, then, were concessions made in 
order to appease the growing social movements;; it would be wrong to give complete 
credit for them to Zelaya, but similarly inaccurate to understate the significance of these 
reforms and his shift to the Left. While there is a tendency in some progressive circles to 
cast Zelaya as a canny opportunist who switched sides and took on the role of the 
437 Interview with Juan Barahona, May 10, 2012. 
438 Interview with Gilberto Rios, May 8, 2012. 
439 Launched by the Venezuelan government in 2005, PetroCaribe offers member countries the option of 
purchasing Venezuelan oil for reduced prices and with long-term payment options at low interest rates. 
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populist hero when he ran afoul of the oligarchy and was deposed in the 2009 coup, this 
reading is oversimplistic.440 Though Zelaya began as a traditional politician who 
emerged at the height of the neoliberal push, his presidency was markedly different from 
the outset because, as Honduran sociologist Tomas Andino explained to me, Zelaya came 
from a fraction of the Honduran oligarchy - the traditional landowning classes - that was 
being left behind by the embrace of neoliberalism and transnational capital.441 This is a 
piece often missed, even in progressive accounts of the coup, and helps to build a more 
complete picture of the dynamics that led to the 2009 coup. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the structural adjustment policies imposed in the 1990s 
had the effect of attracting more foreign capital and re-orienting the Honduran economy 
towards the production of exports, especially in industrial manufacturing. In addition, 
Hurricane Mitch in 1998 hit the traditional landowner sector - of which Zelaya was a part 
- much harder than the growing maquiladora sector. According to Andino, Zelaya came 
to represent a disaffected section within the oligarchy that was less connected to foreign 
capital and was not reaping the rewards of neoliberalism in the same way, especially 
under the government of Ricardo Maduro. 442 As such, when Zelaya succeeded Maduro, 
he quickly established an administration that had different priorities and, importantly, his 
separation from the most powerful elements of the Honduran oligarchy meant that he 
needed to cultivate relationships with other elements of Honduran society. This would 
440 This is perhaps the most extreme version of that critique, but it nevertheless reflects the spirit of many of 
the Left critiques of Zelaya, which, although not altogether Utnfounded, represent an unhelpful 
oversimplification of the dynamics at play. One example of this position can be found. in Todd Gordon and 
Jeffrey R. Webber, "Imperialism and the Future of the Honduran Resistance," The Bullet, No. 524, July 6, 
2011. I offer a response to that position in Tyler Shipley, "Harper in Honduras: Left Solidarity and the 
Future of Coup Resistance," The Bullet, No. 538, August 25, 2011. 
441 Interview with Tomas Andino, May 9, 2012. 
442 Interview with Tomas Andino, May 9, 2012. 
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prove to be of critical importance because it explains Zelaya's openness to building a less 
oppositional relationship with the social movements that had coalesced into the CNRP. 
Consequently, Zelaya's Presidency was pulled - albeit gradually and 
inconsistently - toward the social movements, and that shift is reflected in the series of 
reforms it enacted. One of these reforms, an increase of approximately 60% in the 
monthly minimum wage from the equivalent of $157 to $289, was to provide some 
immediate, if inadequate, relief for Honduras' poorest workers in the non-maquiladora 
sectors. 443 Under pressure from trade unions and the CNRP, Zelaya imposed the wage 
increase by decree when the Honduran Congress refused to cooperate and, not 
surprisingly, the move elicited an angry response from the oligarchy and most of the 
larger media outlets they possess - a point to which I will return - not to mention those 
foreign companies that do not fall under maquiladora laws, including the infamous 
banana plantations and mining companies. The e:xemption for maquiladora zones is, of 
course, part of the broader capitulation of the Honduran state to foreign capital, but it is 
also worth noting that maquiladora workers are generally better paid than average 
working class Hondurans, so the wage increase was still targeted to assist some of 
Honduras' poorest people.444 
Closely related were a series of reforms designed to reduce the overall cost of 
living for Honduras' poor and working classes. Zielaya's niove towards ALBA, though 
often read in the North American media as part of a nefarious pact with Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez, is better understood as a policy option that would allow him to 
443 Thelma Mejia, "Minimum Wage Increase Bad For Economy," Honduras News, January 6, 2009. The 
decree was passed <?n Dec. 23, 2008 and went into effect on Jan 1, 2009. Pepe Lobo's government has 
taken steps to repeal some of the increase but has not been able to push the minimum wage back down to 
2008 levels. It has, however, refused to give increases in 2010 and 2011 above the rate of inflation. 
444 Pine, 135-191. 
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make good on promises to improve conditions for Honduras' poorest communities, upon 
whose support his political position was increasingly reliant. After all, Zelaya's re-
alignment towards ALBA included signing onto the PetroCaribe initiative - of which an 
overwhelming majority of Central American and Caribbean countries are participants -
under which Venezuela provides oil and gas to those countries at 40% of market price: on 
a 25-year financing plan at just 1 % interest. This decision had immediate benefits for 
Hondurans, in terms of lower energy costs, but of course it also made life easier for the 
Honduran oligarchy whose businesses were much more reliant on energy than the 
average household, which may explain why the same people who later accused Zelaya of 
being a puppet of Chavez were actually rather supportive of the initiative when it was 
introduced. 445 Nevertheless, Zelaya also used the $100 million in Honduran bonds 
purchased by Venezuela to lower the rate that low-income families paid in energy costs, 
to reduce interest rates on housing, and to provide subsidies for single mothers, for 
equipment for small farmers, and for meals in schools across the country.446 
These initiatives were complemented by a plan to convert sections of the 
U.S./Honduran military base at Palmerola into a commercial airport to reduce 
Hondurans' reliance on Toncontin airport in Tegucigalpa, long recognized as one of the 
445 Miguel Caceres Rivera, "Carta a un amigo hondurefio que esta lejos," El Mercurio, July 4, 2009. 
446 Joaquin A. Mejia, Victor Fernandez, and Omar Menjivar, Aspectos hist6ricos, conceptuales y 
sustanciales sobre el proceso Constityente en Honduras, Mov1imiento Amplio por la Dignidad y la Justicia, 
Tegucigalpa, 2009, p. 22. It is worth noting, briefly, that accusations of corruption made by the oligarchy 
against the Zelaya government often hinge around his relations with Venezuela. In particular, the claim is 
that Zelaya was using Venezuelan money to support particular communities that backed him politically -
extending loans and subsidies selectively to his allies. It would not be altogether shocking if there were 
some truth in these claims; every government since the end of the military dictatorship has been accused of 
varying levels of petty corruption. That said, the Truth Commission struck by the coup regime to 
whitewash the coup in 2010 worked very hard to demonstrate that Zelaya' s government was corrupt - as 
part of a broader project to legitimate the coup - and could only come up with rumours and hearsay, a point 
I will return to in Chapter 6. As such, it would not be a farfetched supposition that while there was some 
level of petty corruption in Zelaya' s government, it was not at levels that would make it a significant factor 
for this analysis. 
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world's most dangerous international airpo1ts, given the complicated mountainous 
approach and short runways.447 In legislation passed in 2007, Zelaya's government also 
took action to reduce the environmental consequences of deforestation by designating 
nearly 90% of Honduran territory to be protected against logging, and he resisted 
pressure from the oligarchy to privatize the state electrical company, Empresa Nacional 
de Energia Electrica (ENEE), and the national telecommunications fitm, Empresa 
Hondureiia de Telecomunicaciones, (HONDUTEL).448 Though both enterprises have 
been mired in corruption for decades, the experience of privatizations in Honduras clearly 
indicates that handing those industries directly to the oligarchy would have only 
deepened the extent to which the wealth of the many would be diverted to the pockets of 
the few. 
One of Zelaya's actions that bore much significance for Canadian capital - a point 
to which I will return in Chapter 6 - was his enforcement of a moratorium on the granting 
of new mining concessions to foreign firms. Lih~ many of Zelaya's reformist positions, 
it had contradictory impulses, at once designed as a gesture to appease the social 
movements and, as per Tomas Andino's analysis above, as a wedge against the dominant 
transnational capitalists in favour of his own fraction of the Honduran oligarchy. 
Nevertheless, it was a significant step, and it cannot be considered apart from the pressure 
Zelaya was facing from the CNRP in the context of social and environmental crises 
447 In 2010, a program on the U.S. television station, History Channel, ranked it the second most dangerous 
airport in the world. In addition to being tucked into a valley among steep mountainous terrain, the two 
runways at Toncontin are among the shortest at international airports in the world. After these dangerous 
conditions led to the crash ofTaca Flight 390, which overran.the runway and careened into city streets in 
2008, Zelaya suspended all large aircraft landings and announced plans to divert air traffic to the Soto Cano 
Air Base at Palmerola, jointly run by the Honduran and U.S. militaries. Zelaya's efforts were consistently 
blocked and interpreted as an attack on U.S. regional military power, and it is no small irony that when he 
was deposed in 2009, the first stop was Soto Cano. Plans for the diversion of air traffic away from 
Toncontin were scrapped after the coup. 
448 
"Honduras Politics: Mixed Report Card for Zelaya," Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 2009. 
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caused by mining operations, notable among them the San Martin mine in Valle de Siria, 
owned by the Canadian firm Goldcorp. Pedro· Landa, of the anti-mining organization 
Centro Hondureiio de Promoci6n para el Desarrollo Comunitario (CEHPRODEC), 
recalled that the moratorium was actually first imposed in August 2004, when upwards of 
4000 anti-mining activists converged on Tegucigalpa in a 7-day "Marcha por la Vida" 
and then-President Maduro decreed a temporary suspension of approvals of new mining 
concessions, to take effect at the end of 2005 when his term would be over. Zelaya thus 
inherited the moratorium and had 30 days to approve it, otherwise all outstanding 
concessions would have been granted - a canny move on Maduro' s part that forced 
Zelaya to take a strong position one way or the other.449 CNRP-affiliated anti-mining 
groups like CEHPRODEC held meetings with Zelaya and convinced him to not only 
enforce Maduro' s decree but, furthermore, to add that there could be no consideration of 
any additional concessions until such time as a new set of laws governing mining in 
Honduras could be written and approved. It is worth remembering that, while this was a 
step in the right direction, mines already in operaition continued functioning unabated.450 
Nevertheless, since the new mining code was not prepared during Zelaya's term in office, 
h . . d . f:C · 1 h 451 t e moratonum remame m e 1ect untt t e coup. 
449 Interview with Pedro Landa, May 4, 2012. 
450 Harsha Walia, "Dissecting the Coup In Honduras," The Georgia Straight, July 6, 2009. 
451 Zelaya's government had, in fact, prepared a draft of a new mining code that included higher taxation of 
foreign mining companies, a ban on open-pit mining using toxic chemicals, and stricter requirements 
regarding community consultations. The draft was presented itn May 2009, the month before the coup, and 
was scheduled for debate in Congress in August 2009, which, of course, was scrapped by the coup 
government. The post-coup Lobo government has attempted to bring forward its own new mining codes -
with the full support and cooperation of Canadian authorities, who describe Zelaya's draft as "anti-mining" 
and Lobo's as "pro-sustainable mining" - which failed to enshrine any of the reforms Zelaya's draft had 
proposed, protecting instead the interests of foreign companies over Honduran workers and communities. 
At the time of writing, the social movement has still been able to apply enough pressure to stop it from 
passing, but there is no doubt that the Lobo government will try to get it passed as soon as politically 
possible. For more detail, see Jennifer Moore, "Canada's Subsidies to the Mining Industry Don't Stop at 
Foreign Aid," Mining Watch Canada, June 2012. 
197 
In another significant move, in May 2009 Zelaya applied a Presidential veto on a 
law, passed by the Honduran Congress a month earlier, which would have criminalized 
the use of the "morning-after pill" at the request of the ultra-conservative Christian 
movement.452 The "morning-after pill" has taken on particular significance in Honduran 
feminist circles because, as Andrea Nuila, a lawyer with the group Feministas en 
Resistencia explained to me, "all forms of abortion are criminalized in Honduras," 
making the pill an important exception to the rule of careful regulation of female bodies 
by the state.453 The proposed law was presented by a member of Zelaya' s Liberal Party, 
Martha Lorena Alvarado, and was enthusiasti[cally endorsed by John Smeaton, the 
director of the U.S. anti-abortion organization, Society for the Protection of Unborn 
Children.454 Acknowledging that the President had the right to veto the bill, Smeaton 
encouraged his readers to write to Roberto Miche:letti in his role as President of Congress 
to support its decision. Under pressure from Honduran and international feminist groups, 
notably the Comite de America Latina y el Caribe para la Defensa de los Derechos de la 
Mujer (CLADEM), Zelaya vetoed the bill after it was passed in Congress. When, just 
over a month later, his government was overthrown, the coup government waited only 
one day to pass a bill into law that banned the pill and the two congresswomen who 
introduced the law in the first place were promoted to high-ranking positions in the 
military government.455 
452 
"Congress in Honduras prohibits abortion pill," Catholic News Agency, April 7, 2009. 
453 Interview with Andrea Nuila, May 4, 2012. 
454 John Smeaton, "Honduras votes to ban abortion-inducing morning-after pill," Society For .The 
Protection of Unborn Children, April 10, 2009. 
455 Katherine Ronderos, "Poverty Reduction, Political Violenc'e and Women's Rights in Honduras," 
Community Development Journal, June 9, 2011. Martha Lorena Alvadaro was given the post of Deputy 
Secretary of State. See Adriana Maestas, "Women's Rights and Reproductive Freedoms Under Attack 
With Honduran Coup," Latino Politics Blog, November 16, 2009. 
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ZELAYA AND THE CONSTITUYENTE 
By far the most significant initiative taken by Zelaya's increasingly reform-
oriented government was its decision to support the social movements' call for striking a 
constituent assembly to consider re-writing the Honduran constitution along more 
equitable lines. Indeed, it is no coincidence that this was the project that ultimately 
provoked the full, militarized, ire of the Honduran oligarchy. The push for constitutidnal 
reform came out of the determination, on the part of leading activists in the struggle, that 
the existing legal structures in Honduras severely restricted the possibility of more 
significant reform. The present constitution was ratified in 1982, under the auspices of 
the U.S.-sponsored military dictatorship which was, at the time, presiding over a 
supposed transfer of power to elected civilian authorities, as detailed in Chapter 4. Gen. 
Policarpio Paz Garcia, then-President of the dictatorship, saw in the growing unrest of the 
late 1970s an echo of the revolutionary movements that were growing in strength in 
Guatemala, El Salvador and especially Nicaragua. In an attempt to avoid a similar 
descent into civil war and upheaval, which might have weakened the position of the 
military, depending on its outcome, Paz Garcia moved to return power to civilian 
leadership by calling for a constituent assembly in 1980, which set elections for 1981. 456 
Though the 1981 elections were free of direct military intervention, there can be 
little doubt that the process of developing the 1982 constitution was heavily influenced 
by the dictatorship that presided over it. As Chapter 4 highlighted, the 1980s could 
hardly be described as a success for civilian rule;457 the country was nicknamed the 
456 Booth, Wade and Walker, 168-170. 
457 In fact, for what it's worth, Booth, Wade and Walker only locate the successful transition to civilian 
democracy in Honduras in 1996, after the police came fully under civilian control and the military was 
effectively placed under meaningful control by civilian government. 
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'U.S.S. Honduras' for its complete capitulation to the U.S. Contra Wars and was, for the 
first half of the decade, effectively ruled by Gen. Gustavo Alvarez Martinez and U.S. 
ambassador John Negroponte who, together, founded the Battalion 3-16 death sql.lad. 
Meanwhile, civilian President Roberto Suazo Cordova attempted to amend the riew 
constitution to stay in power after 1985, offering the military another opportunity to 
assert its power to stop him. In so doing, it established once again that it was by far the 
most powerful force in the country, bolstered by an average of approximately $50 million 
per year in U.S. military assistance from 1981-1988.458 
This context framed the signing of the 1982 constitution and, as such, it is no 
surprise that it gained little by way of support from common Hondurans. In their 
important primer outlining the arguments in favour of convoking a constituent assembly, 
Joaquin A. Mejia, Victor Fernandez, and Omar Menjivar argue that the 1982 constitution 
did not represent a legitimate social pact, explaining: 
In the [national constituent assembly] of 1980, not all sectors of 
Honduran society were represented, in fact, it was only for those 
located at the highest levels of political, economic, religious and 
military power in the country, and for that reason, our current 
constitution, instead of being a product of a genuine social pact, 
acts as an agreement between the military and the leaders of the 
traditional political parties with the objective of avoiding a real 
break from the gast so _that they can maintain their privileges, at 
whatever cost.4 · 
They go on to argue that in the context of the late 1970s: 
the economic deterioration for the large majority and the rigid 
and repressive political control over the popular movements 
organized against the oligarchy, given the experience of 
458 Booth, Wade and Walker, 169. 
459 Joaquin A. Mejia, Victor Fernandez, and Omar Menjivar, Aspectos hist6ricos, conceptuales y 
sustanciales sobre el proceso Constityente en Honduras, Movimiento Amplio por la Dignidad y la Justicia, 
Tegucigalpa, 2009, p. 7-8. (Translated from Spanish. All translations by the author unless otherwise 
indicated.) 
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[neighbouring Central American oligarchies], gave a new face to 
the political project of promoting an image of 'democratic' 
change in order to avoid, and legally disarticulate, that which 
was intended by the movements of popular and revolutionary 
struggle in the country. This strategy coincided perfectly with 
the manoeuvres of the United States to convert Honduras into the 
rearguard for its counterinsurgency war in Central America. 460 
Many in Honduras' social movements argue that the problem with the 1982 constitution 
lies not in the document itself, but in the manm~r it was written and the way it has heen 
applied. In an interview in 2012, lawyer J ari Dixon explained to me: 
I don't think the 1982 constitution is a bad constitution. Most of 
it is good. It has respect for human rights, it respects the right to 
work, the right to education, respect for life, health, free 
association, freedom of thought - it's not a bad constitution. The 
real question is, why is it so ineffective? [ ... ] There's no peace. 
There's no harmony. There's no health. There's no work. 
There's no education. There's no security. We are at the 
gateway to a failed state. So why doesn't the 1982 constitution 
work? A functioning rule of law is essential for the constitution 
to work. But the rule oflaw has been broken.461 
Dixon worked in the public prosecutor's office for fourteen years under that constitution, 
believing he could improve society by pursuing cases and rigorously upholding the law. 
When he pursued a corruption case in Copan in 2004, he found himself at odds with his 
Attorney General, who had previously worked for President Callejas and was determined 
to eliminate any connections between Callejas and the corruption cases. Dixon and some 
colleagues were fired for pursuing the cases, and although he would be reinstated 
eventually, he insists that while the constitution itself is fine, the law is applied to the rich 
and the poor only selectively- that is, only when and how it suits the rich.462 
460 Mejia, Fernandez, and Menjivar, 19. 
461 Interview with Jari Dixon, May 10, 2012. 
462 Interview with Jari Dixon, May 10, 2012. 
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Others insist that the document itself is fundamentally flawed. As Bert~a Caceres 
of COPINH noted in a speech in 2009, "not one time are women mentioned in the 
constitution. How is that possible? How in a society where they talk of democracy and 
justice could women not even be mentioned?"463 According to Miriam Miranda, 
coordinator of the Organizacion Fraternal Negra Hondureiia (OFRANEH), "the poorest 
sectors of this country are included in the constitution only to go and vote," and Jorge 
Lara Fernandez, a professor of sociology at the University of San Pedro Sula, added that, 
"poor Hondurans, women, Indigenous people, black Hondurans, people with different 
abilities, people with different sexual preferences are not included in our constitution."464 
Among the many things missing from the current legal apparatus in Honduras, Mejia, 
Fernandez, and Menjivar point to the prospects, in a new constitution, for promoting "a 
new economic model" that would build genuine social equality and promote respect for 
human dignity and social, environmental and cultural rights.465 
Both of these positions are partially right; Dixon is entirely correct to note that the 
capacity to enforce the rule of law has been massively damaged, and the movement 
activists who condemn the 1982 Constitution:' s omissions and shortcomings have 
identified real issues. What is clear is that a process of constitutional reform - navigating 
the debates between the different positions on the foundations of Honduran law - could 
have only been meaningful if it was undertaken democratically, developed by those 
whom it was meant to serve. Having the oligarchy re-fashion their management of 
463 Bertha Caceres, "Speech in Gracias, Lempira" November l, 2009. Transcript available at 
http ://hondurasresists. b logspot. ca/2009I11 /berta-caceres-we-onl y-have-one-option.html . 
464 Jorge Lara Fernandez, quoted in Dawn Paley, "Towards R{:sponsible Global Journalism: Transnational 
Theory, Foreign Reportage, and the 2009 Coup D'Etat in Honduras," Master of Journalism Thesis, Faculty 
of Graduate Studies, University of British Columbia, 2010, p. 62. 
465 Mejia, Fernandez, and Menjivar, 47-74. 
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Honduras from the halls of Congress would have been nothing new; in fact, the mockery 
that Congress made of its own legal system iln its attempts to block the Constituyente 
(more on this below) only emphasized just how corrupt and self-serving was Congress' 
use of that system and its constitution. As Mejia, Fernandez, and Menjivar insist,: the 
2009 coup itself demonstrated that the 1982 constitution had changed nothing in 
Honduras, and had allowed successive governments to rule in the interests of the 
powerful with little regard for the well-being of the majority.466 Honduran doctor and 
professor Rutilia Calderon described the importance of the project at length: 
From 1982 until now [the constitution] has never been invoked 
for the common good, for the good of the excluded sectors of this 
country. If we are therefore to give the Constitutional Reform 
process the characteristics of a social pact that will permit an 
inclusive society, real access to conditions of equality, in the 
eyes of the law and the justice system, then the Constituyente 
makes sense. But if it is only to become once again a measure 
for the powerful groups of the country to continue protecting 
their interests, under the delusion that the demands of the people 
will be attended to through elected representatives, then it will 
not be for the better. The construction of a reform process is not 
to produce a formal document called "The Constitution," it is to 
create new forms of relating between different sectors of society 
- to close the gap of inequality and to attain a just distribution of 
the wealth that this country has.467 
Zelaya's support for a constitutional assembly - along the lines that Calderon describes 
above - generated a rupture with many of his remaining allies in the Liberal Party and 
represented an important victory for social movements that were finally beginning to 
make major gains after years of dedicated organizing work. 
Zelaya' s time in office, then, was complicated and contradictory; on the one hand, 
his own disaffection from the neoliberal project became linked - albeit uncomfortably -
466 Mejia, Fernandez, and Menjivar, 9. 
467 Rutilia Calderon, quoted in Matt Schwartz, "Honduran Resistance Calls for Deepening of Democracy," 
November 10, 2009. 
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with the more substantial critiques of neoliberalism advanced with increasing fortitude by 
the social movements. On the other hand, the movements themselves were unsatisfied by 
the slow pace, inconsistent application, and ofoen contradictory logic of Zelaya's reforms 
and, as a result, the second half of his administration was marked by both major strikes 
and protests against his government as well as significant demonstrations in support of 
proposals that Zelaya was endorsing against the wishes of his peers, especially the project 
for constitutional reform.468 By 2008 and 2009, the lines of struggle had shifted such that 
the executive branch - Zelaya and his closest supporters - was just as likely to side with 
the movement against Congress and the Supreme Court as it was to side with the 
established legal institutions against the movement. 
Indeed, frustrations with Honduras' legal structures had boiled over dramatically 
in April and May of 2008 when seven federal prosecutors staged a 3 8-day hunger strike 
in the Honduran Congress to protest the state's refusal to pursue corruption cases.469 Jari 
Dixon was one of the prosecutors who participated in the hunger strike, as well as a 
three-day sit-in at Congress in January 2009, and after their efforts made little headway, 
he became disillusioned: 
We had hope, before, that we might be able to change the people 
in power, but I realised that this is not about the people in power; 
it is about the system. We could spend hundreds of years taking 
people out of the public prosecutors office or the attorney 
generals office, but ultimately, it is a stmctural problem.470 
Thus, while Zelaya's government was more receptive and responsive to these pressures 
than his predecessors, which was a significant change in the status quo, the degree to 
468 Interview with Gilberto Rios, May 8, 2012. 
469 Dana Frank, "Out of the Past, A New Honduran Culture of Resistance," NACLA Report on the 
Americas, May 3, 2010. 
470 Interview with Jari Dixon, May 10, 2012. 
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which Honduras was transformed under Zelaya. should not be overstated. Booth, Wade, 
and Walker have noted Zelaya' s "contradictory embrace" of both neoliberal projects and 
the populist rhetoric that seemed to oppose them.471 Indeed, many of his senior 
appointments were staunch neoliberals, like Gabriela Nufiez, who in an earlier stint as 
finance minister had "delivered Honduras, bound hand and foot, to the dictates of the 
IMF."472 Though he would later make good on a promise to raise minimum wages, the 
Zelaya of 2007 actually approved a measure to create "differential wage zones" in five of 
the poorest departments, in an effort to drop wages to the floor to persuade maquiladora 
owners to stay in Honduras.473 In 2009, prior to 1the coup, the U.S. Millennium Challenge 
Corporation, by no means a left wing institution, gave Zelaya a positive review for his 
ability to stabilize the Lempira, and to make good on the benefits of joining the 
PetroCaribe oil alliance.474 He was also inconsistent with regard to the security 
apparatus, pledging to crack down on both crime and vigilantism, but then expanding the 
size and scope of the police force and allowing increased privatization of security; even 
former members of the infamous Battalion 3-16 death squad held positions in Zelaya's 
government, belying the notion that Zelaya represented a radical departure.475 
The push for reform, then, came not from Zelaya but from the people; it came 
from ordinary Hondurans organizing around issues that were of direct and senous 
consequence to them. In this sense, Gordon and Webber's arguments above, 
foregrounding the importance of the social movement, have a great deal of merit. 
471 For instance, Zelaya vocally supported both the neoliberal dictates of CAFTA and the alternative 
presented by membership in ALBA. Booth, Wade and Walk1er, 174. 
472 
"Zelaya: Progressive but Pro-Business", Central American Report, March 2006. 
473 Marion Werner and Jennifer Bair, "After Sweatshops? Apparel Politics in the Circum-Caribbean," 
NACLA Report on the Americas, July/August 2009. 
474 Bill Conroy, "Honduran President Zelaya Earns High Marks for Governance, U.S. Agency Scorecard 
Shows," The Narco News, November 21, 2009. 
475 
"Former Human Rights Abusers Now in Gov't," Central American Report, March 3, 2006. 
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Nevertheless, they emphasize this aspect of the pre-2009 dynamics at the expense of a 
more complicated analysis that accounts for the fact that Manuel Zelaya, for his part, 
proved to be significantly more responsive to demonstrations of popular politics than his 
predecessors. His reforms may have been inconsistent and had not radically altered the 
structural realities of Honduran life, but his rnadiness to bend to the will of popular 
movements was unprecedented in recent Honduran history and opened up the prospect of 
real change for the first time since the great strikes of the 1950s. Canadian journalist 
Jesse Freeston, who produced a documentary in 2012 on the campesino movement in the 
Aguan Valley, told me that the Hondurans he has worked closest with felt that Zelaya 
"passed the power test," making good on campaign promises to the poor that previous 
presidents had consistently broken, once in office, and that he had built a different kind of 
relationship with Honduran activists than any previous administration.476 In fact, 
Zelaya's popularity - he is known in Honduras by the nickname "Mel" - is reflected in 
the mythology that is built up around his personal appeal and charisma; popular 
Honduran poet Roberto Sosa describes him: 
Mel has been blessed with a bombproof, coup-proof solidarity 
with the people, along with a gift for plain, unpretentious speech 
and great personal warmth. He has a huge heart, and, contrary to 
what his detractors say, he is open-minded and very intelligent. 
Moreover, he is a lover of poetry. 477 
Even if we acknowledge that these may be exaggerations, and that his degree of affection 
for poetry is not an analytically significant factor, Zelaya is regularly described as 
someone who could speak to people and relate to them, in a manner uncommon among 
the Honduran oligarchy. Populist appeal on its own does not make Zelaya a reformer, 
476 Interview with Jesse Freeston, Aug 23, 2011. 
477 Roberto Sosa, "In Honduras, The Walls Are Talking," The Progressive, November 2009. 
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but what is significant is that there developedl a kind of dialectic between his populist 
character and the social policies he was enacting, as one side kept reinforcing the other in 
a dynamic that was opening increasing space for reform. Dario Euraque - admitted[y a 
former member of Zelaya's government, but a critical one - described the Zelaya period 
thus: 
For the first time in Honduran history, you have a President, with 
all his failures and problems that most of the opposition points 
to, but the fact is that this President, who himself comes from the 
elites of Honduras, put out not only a discourse but even many 
policies that fundamentally questioned the political system of 
Honduras. 478 
With that in mind, Zelaya's endorsement of the Constituyente was arguably the 
most important gain for burgeoning Honduran social movements since the establishment 
of legitimate civilian government in the mid-1990s. Given the power that the Honduran 
oligarchy and foreign capitalists have been able to wield over the past three decades 
through the legal mechanisms of the state, under the 1982 constitution, an opportunity to 
re-organize and re-found the basis for that power, :tf conducted properly, could have made 
a number of much more significant reforms possible down the line. No administration 
for decades prior to Zelaya' s had even considered such a departure from traditional 
Honduran politics - hence the swift and dramatic action taken against it - and, although 
Zelaya did not design or initiate the demand for reform, to ignore the important 
differences between his government and those that preceded him is to profoundly 
misunderstand the context of the coup and the popular resistance that followed. In short, 
what was significant in Zelaya' s time in office was not so much the reforms he passed but 
the prospects for broader reforms embedded in the re-opening of the constitution, a 
478 Dario Euraque, quoted in Paley, 43. 
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project for which Zelaya was willing to provoke the full ire of his own social class to 
defend. 
GOLPE DE ESTADO 
Contrary to the unsubstantiated claims blithely and relentlessly :repeated in the 
North American media since the 2009 coup, nothing in the re-opening of the constitution 
would have allowed Manuel Zelaya to run for re-election that year, though this useful 
misdirection was reinforced regularly by the oligarchy not only to convince the 
international community that the coup was necessary but, as Dario Euraque has argued, 
to convince the military to re-assert its role in Honduran politics so dramatically.479 
Nonetheless, the claim that Zelaya was moving towards making himself "president for 
life" was constantly repeated by nearly every mainstream media outlet in North America, 
and notably Canada's national newspaper, The Globe and Mail, which offered this 
editorial comment a week after the coup: 
It is important that Manuel Zelaya's machinations to rewrite the 
Honduran constitution to allow for a generalissimo clause were 
brought firmly and finally to an end. Like his idol, Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez, who won a referendum earlier this year 
to eliminate term limits, Mr. Zelaya wants to revert to the days in 
which Latin American heads of state: could extend their rule 
indefinitely. 480 
As I will demonstrate, this fabrication hardly stands up to even the simplest examination 
- least of all the invention of a so-called "generalissimo clause" - and it undeniably says 
more about the state of the Canadian mainstream media than it does about Honduras. 
479 Paley, 4 7. 
480 
"Be Like Washington," The Globe and Mail, Jul. 6, 2009. 
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Needless to say, it is worth keeping the Globe and Mail's commentary in mind as this 
analysis proceeds.481 
The process was to be as follows: on June 28, 2009, Hondurans would have voted 
in a non-binding referendum on whether they supported the addition of the cuarta urna -
a fourth ballot - in the general elections scheduled for November 29 of that same year. 
Normally, Honduran elections feature three ballots, corresponding to each of the three 
levels of government, that is, one for the local mayor, one for a diputado or representative 
in Congress, and one for the President. If the June 28 referendum came back with a 
strong 'yes,' Zelaya would have added the fourth ballot asking the question: "do you 
support the creation of a national constituent assembly to re-draft the constitution?" 
Accordingly, the constitution could not have possibly been changed before the November 
29 elections, since it could only have gone ahead if approved in those elections, and so 
Zelaya could not have possibly stood for re-election. In fact, the ·primaries for that 
election had already taken place and the public was fully aware of which candidates had 
481 Speaking of fabrications, some of the most dramatic speculations came from the supposed centre-left, 
which imagined itself too progressive to support the coup, but too clever to support Zelaya, a position 
staked by popular liberal Canadian journalist Gwynne Dyer, whose October 2009 piece on the Honduras 
crisis suggested that Zelaya had intentionally provoked a coup d'etat by pretending that he was going to use 
the Constituyente to run for re-election, such that the military would react against him, thus provoking a 
crisis and creating a context in which rule of law would break down and he could use his new popularity to 
make himself president for life. Quite a story, though Dyer offers no evidence to support it and it ascribes 
to Zelaya a degree of long term diabolical cunning that seems rather farfetched, especially to people 
familiar with Honduran politics in general and Manuel Zelaya in particular. Gwynne Dyer, "Manuel 
Zelaya's Game II In Honduras," The Georgia Straight, Oct. 25, 2009. Perhaps most disappointing about 
Dyer's concoction is that, once upon a time, Dyer was a relatively progressive voice witµ respect to 
Honduras. In the early 80s, he wrote against the U.S. regional wars and took pains to highlight the ways 
that Honduras was set to be "trampled upon" by U.S. occupation and counter-revolution. Gwynne Dyer, 
"Honduras is in the Same Position Today as Cambodia Was a Decade Ago," Kingston Whig-Standard, 
Mar. 28, 1981. 
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successfully moved forward. Zelaya's name was not among them; even had he wanted 
to, it would have been illegal and impossible for Zelaya to be a candidate in 2009.482 
The notion, then, that Zelaya intended to manipulate the process to stay in power 
is patently absurd.483 Rosemary A. Joyce has argued that one of Zelaya's aims in pushing 
for the referendum was to re-engage Hondurans in the electoral process after two decades 
of steady declines in voter turnout and public confidence in elected leaders: "ironically, it 
was precisely to counter public disillusionment: with elected government... that Zelaya 
called for a public consultation."484 Joyce may be right; the Honduran social movements 
had demonstrated their strength in the streets, not with ballots, and it may well have been 
Zelaya's calculation that the Constituyente would have kept the movements' energies tied 
into electoral and legal processes that would limit their radical potential. Nevertheless, 
the Honduran Congress, packed with members of the oligarchy, felt that the re-opening 
of the constitution - under conditions they could not necessarily control - could represent 
a real threat to their stranglehold on power and refused to accept the idea. In response, 
Zelaya pledged, in March 2009, to appeal directly to the people through a referendum and 
vowed to pursue the fourth ballot if the people asked for it. That referendum was 
scheduled for June 28, 2009. 
482 The issue of presidential term lengths, of course, is a conti~sted matter in Honduras as it is in many Latrn 
American countries. The limitations on presidential power would, no doubt, have been part of the 
discussion had a Constituyente been convoked. Many Honduran politicians, including Manuel Zelaya and 
current golpista president Pepe Lobo, have spoken against both the four-year term length and the restriction 
on running for re-election. To which side one falls in this debate is a rather trivial matter; the point is that 
speaking against a four-year maximum is not the same as moving towards becoming "president for life," 
and this accusation against Zelaya in the North American media is made all the more absurd by the fact that 
the United States allows its presidents to run for re-election to one additional full four-year term and 
Canada sets neither a limit on term-length nor any restriction on re-elections. Canada, in fact, theoretically 
allows for the possibility of being "Prime Minister for life" and, in practice, the current PM has been in 
power for over seven years and his most significant predecessor, Jean Chretien, ruled for a decade. 
483 It is also roundly debunked in Alvaro Calix, "Honduras: de: la crisis politica al surgimiento de un nuevo 
social actor," Nueva Sociedad, No. 226, April/May 2010. 
484 Rosemary A. Joyce, "Legitimizing the Illegitimate: The Honduran Show Elections and the Challenge 
Ahead," NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 43, No. 2, March/April 2010. 
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Of course, that process never went ahead because the morning that this non-
binding poll was supposed to happen, Zelaya was abducted by the military and flown to 
Costa Rica. It was clear, months earlier, that the decision to re-open the constitution 
would be contested by the established power strncture in Honduras. Between March and 
May 2009, a variety of different state officials tried to dissuade Zelaya from pursuing the 
referendum; the Supreme Court, the Electoral Tribunal and Congress all claimed that the 
poll would be illegal and, in the days leading up to the referendum, the Attorney 
General's office threatened to have Zelaya arrested if he continued to insist upon it.485 
These claims were based on a law hastily drafled and passed by Congress - just days 
before the referendum - that prohibited any referenda from taking place within six 
months of an election.486 Following the new ruling, Gen. Romeo Vasquez Velasquez -
head of the armed forces and a graduate of the notorious School of the Americas -
announced on June 25, 2009, three days before the referendum, that the military would 
refuse to facilitate the poll by withholding logistical labour, not allowing his staff to 
distribute ballots and boxes. Zelaya had him immediately fired. The next day, the 
Supreme Court ruled that he must be reinstated, but Zelaya dramatically refused, saying, 
"if an army rebels against a president, then we are back to the era of the cavemen, back to 
the darkest chapters in Honduran history."487 Zelaya and his supporters retrieved the 
ballots and boxes themselves and began distributing them across the country. 
Choosing to interpret Zelaya's persistence on setting up for the poll as acting 
against the constitution, based on the clumsily constructed law passed just days before, 
485 Michael Fox, "Honduran Coup: Same Story, Different Stage, New Reality," Third World Resurgence, 
No. 226, June 2009. 
486 Booth, Wade and Walker, 175. 
487 Manuel Zelaya Rosales, quoted in Mario Mencia Gamero, ed, 135 dias que estrernecieron a Honduras, 
Tegucigalpa, 2009, p. 16. 
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the Supreme Court ordered the armed forces to arrest the President. 488 On the morning of 
June 28, Manuel Zelaya was awakened at 5: 15 am to find his home under military 
lockdown, as masked soldiers fired warning shots into the walls and held the President at 
gunpoint. The pre-dawn raid whisked Zelaya out of the Presidential palace in his 
pyjamas and bare feet to the Soto Cano air force base, from which the U.S. operates its 
Joint Task Force Bravo, and then on to Costa Rica.489 Dramatic live video footage, 
broadcast internationally on Venezuela-based Telesur, showed people in the early hours 
of the day coming out to vote and finding the military in the streets, confiscating the 
referendum ballots490; in the capital city, a crowd gathered at the Presidential palace, and 
Telesur ran a video clip of outraged women who slammed their fists into the chests of 
488 At this point, the situation enters murky legal territory, though one might reasonably ask to what extent 
it is useful to interpret the situation by the standard of a legal system that was being re-written in an ad-hoc 
way in order to block one particular act (which sought to set into motion a project to re-establish that very 
legal system). Like the sentient consciousness known as "Hal" in Stanley Kubrick's 2001: A Space 
Odyssey, which stops at nothing to block the human astronauts from re-writing the computer coding that 
shapes its consciousness, the pillars of the Honduran legal system - the Congress and Supreme Court -
were actively undermining the legitimacy of their own system of law in order to stop tli.e referendum that 
might have threatened it. As such, I consider the relative legality or illegality of the referendum to be a 
rather misleading distraction, which I why I am addressing it simply in a footnote. Nonetheless, the 
relevant legal points are as follows: under the Citizen Participation Law of 2006, Zelaya was justified in 
pursuing the referendum and Congress was acting against the constitution in attempting to stop him. 
However, when Congress passed a law prohibiting referenda within six months of an election, it made 
Zelaya's poll illegal and justified his arrest ifhe pursued the project. When Zelaya dismissed Gen. 
Vasquez Velasquez, it was justified under Article 280 of the constitution, which allows the President to 
assign or remove the head of the armed forces. When the Supreme Court had Vasquez Velasquez 
reinstated, it did so based on Article 323, which establishes that the head of the armed forces is not 
compelled to carry out an illegal order, which is how the Supreme Court characterized Zelaya's 
perseverance in pursuing the referendum. On the day of the referendum, it could be argl!led, then, that 
according to the laws Congress had thrown up over the previous three days, President Zelaya could be 
arrested for carrying out what was now deemed an illegal referendum, since it was withia six months of an 
election. However, following Article 102, there is no justification for the subsequent removal of Zelaya 
from the country and, of course, the later presentation by the armed forces - and acceptance by Congress -
of a forged resignation letter was quite obviously illegal. Any persuasive force, then, that the golpistas' 
shaky and ad-hoc legal apparatus to justify Zelaya's removal might have had was utterly discredited by 
their subsequent behaviour which bore no resemblance whatsoe:ver to a constitutional transfer of power but, 
rather, looked every bit the part of a military coup. The legal analysis is drawn from interviews with Jari 
Dixon, May 10, 2012, and Nectali Rodezno, May 4, 2012, and from Angel Edmundo OreHana, "Artfculos 
sobre el golpe de estado en Honduras," CEDOH Boletin Especial, No. 93, September 2009, and Victor 
Meza et al, Golpe de Estado: Partidos, instituciones y cultura politica, Lithopress Industrial, Tegucigalpa, 
2010. 
489 Mencia Gamero, 16. 
49° Calix, "Honduras ... " 
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soldiers they would normally defer to, while scattered crowds elsewhere held impromptu 
demonstrations and performed impromptu street theatre depicting themselves voting 
"yes" to the constitutional assembly.491 
With Zelaya removed, the military cut off electricity, phone service, international 
cable TV and even water to many neighbourhoods in Tegucigalpa and other major cities, 
and took all pro-Zelaya local TV stations off the air - even some international news 
stations were cut off, including CNN and Telesur.492 Ambassadors from Venezuela, 
Nicaragua and Cuba all reported that they were detained and beaten by the Honduran 
armed forces, 493 as police and military violence escalated in the streets, targeting anyone 
who dared to participate in the public demonstrations. Indeed, simply being present in 
the streets was treated as justification for the police and military to attack, using tear gas, 
batons, water cannons, rubber bullets, and even live rounds, often in sudden charges of 
hundreds of heavily armed officers against unsuspecting crowds, who would be 
hammered on their backs as they tried to flee the scene. 494 
In the meantime, nine of Zelaya's ministers were detained, while countless others 
went into hiding, and a special session of Congress was called to hear the presentation of 
a fake letter of resignation, purportedly written by Zelaya, who immediately denied 
having written it.495 Congress agreed to transfer the Presidency to Roberto Micheletti, 
head of Congress, whose first act was to order a 24-hour curfew for all Honduran 
citizens, which would actually last for three days. Anticipating international rebuke, the 
491 Ashley Holly McEachem, "Postcard from Honduras: Birth of the coup," This Magazine, April 7, 2010. 
492 A. Cano, "Golpistas agradecen apoyo en mi tin de autoconvencimiento," La Jornada, July 1, 2009. 
493 T. Rogers, "Leftist Leaders Hold Emergency Meeting Over Honduras Coup: Hugo Chavez, Daniel 
Ortega, and Other Leaders Met in Nicaragua," The Christian Science Monitor, June 29, 2009. 
494 Amnesty International, "Honduras: Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review," November-
December 2010. 
495 William Booth and Juan Forero, "Honduran Military Sends President into Exile: Supportive Congress 
Names Successor," The Washington Post, June 29, 2009. 
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oligarchy acted quickly to defend what had taken place. "I did not get here through the 
ignominy of a coup d'etat," insisted Micheletti.496 Added one of his advisors: 
The decision was adopted by unanimity in the Congress. That 
means all of the political parties. It has been endorsed by sectors 
that represent a wide array of Hondurans - the Episcopal Church, 
the Catholic Church. And well, of course, the armed forces. The 
difficult part will be for the international community to see 
things as the Honduran people see th1~m. 497 
The difficult part might, rather, have been convincing the international community that 
the people in these well-placed institutions of authority actually represented the 
Honduran people in any meaningful way. Certainly the Honduran oligarchy was on 
board; on June 29, 2009, the day after the coup, the most significant organization of the 
Honduran business elite, the Consejo Hondureiio de la Empresa Privada (COHEP), 
issued a statement declaring that "what occurred today [sic] was not the changing of one 
president for another; today, [sic] framed in national unity, respect for the constitution, 
national laws, and institutionalism was achieved." Amil car Bulnes, president of CO HEP, 
added that: 
The private sector worked hard with t:~x-President Zelaya, but in 
the end he turned his attention to other themes, away from the 
country's priorities, from national issues. [ ... ] The transitional 
government should make sure that the:re are no empty stomachs 
by generating job opportunities.498 
Notably, the statements from the golpistas and their supporters, which saturated the 
Honduran mass media, framed the discussion as though the real problem was not the 
coup, but the fact that the international community had condemned it and that most 
countries refused to recognize or do business with the de facto regime. "When it rains, it 
496 Booth and Forero, "Honduran Military ... ". 
497 Booth and Forero, "Honduran Military ... " 
498 Amflcar Bulnes, quoted in Ivan Vasquez, "Cohep respalda gobiemo de Micheletti," El Heraldo, June 
29, 2009. 
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pours," cried El Hera/do. "The poor of this country will be even more impoverished if 
sanctions are imposed." Taking the point further, COHEP's director Benjamin Bogran 
added, "who are they going to sanction? The politicians or the Honduran peop>le? 
Because every time you impose sanctions, it is not the rulers who suffer, but the 
people."499 
In the meantime, the Asociacion Hondureiia de Maquiladores (AHM), an 
association of owners in the maquiladora industry, was busy organizing marches in 
support of the coup, though they had to provide all of the materials and could only gamer 
some attendance by forcing their employees to participate. 500 Outfitted in white t-shirts 
and massive Honduran flags, the pro-coup marches were a fabrication for international 
consumption. As Dario Euraque explained: 
Never in the history of Honduras has there ever been a 
mobilization along the lines of the white t-shirt [march] ... part of 
the way to try to see how new it was, was that they didn't have a 
culture of resistance, of mobilization, so a lot of their music and 
placards and paraphernalia ... was not even local. A lot of it was 
borrowed from Venezuela, Cuban Americans, lots of it was in 
English, peppered with English phrases and very manufactured 
placards and so forth. 501 
In fact, AHM and other organizations representing the oligarchy had been staging rallies 
such as these for months prior to Zelaya's ouster, usually against Zelaya or the proposal 
for constitutional reform, and many Hondurans participated in the so-called "White 
Marches" simply in order to get paid, in sharp contrast to the dangerous and certainly 
unpaid protests that were held in opposition to the coup.502 
499 Benjamin Bogran, quoted in Vasquez, "Cohep respalda ... " 
500 Paley, 44-45. 
501 Euraque, quoted in Paley, 45. 
502 Interview with Luis Aguilar, Nov. 26, 2009. 
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What followed the military takeover has been called the largest sustained peaceful 
demonstration in Honduran history: for 161 straight days, Hondurans took to the streets 
of Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, and cities and towns across the country. The numbers 
fluctuated - sometimes as high as hundreds of ithousands, at lowest ebbs still impressive 
thousands - protesting right up to the day of the "elections" on November 29, 2009. 
Predictably, they were met with widespread and violent repression. Between June and 
November 2009, some thirty to forty people were killed in political violence and 
hundreds more were detained, beaten, kidnapped, raped, and otherwise victimized by an 
increasingly militarized state apparatus.503 On July 5, about a week after the coup, 
Manuel Zelaya attempted to re-enter the country but was prevented from landing at 
Tegucigalpa's Toncontin airport by the military:, which unleashed a torrent of violence 
against the massive crowds that had gathered to greet Zelaya. Nineteen-year old Isis 
Obed Murillo was among those who had gathered., and was shot in the head and killed by 
the army. A few months later, members of his family showed me a shard of his skull and 
told me his story in a community meeting in a small kitchen in Jutiapa, near Danli; Isis 
Obed was the son of a longtime activist in the movement, Jose David Murillo, who was 
detained immediately following his son's assassination. While David Murillo was in 
detention, his daughter - Isis Obed's sister - received a text message from Isis Obed's 
phone, which read, "I am your father HA HA HA. "504 Meanwhile, on September 21, 
Zelaya returned to Honduras a second time and took refuge in the Brazilian embassy, 
503 Interview with Bertha Oliva, Nov. 26, 2009. As I have explained elsewhere, these figures will often 
vary - not because the documentation is sketchy but, quite the opposite, because it endeavours to be airtight 
even under the most difficult circumstances. In a context where politically-motivated violence can be 
easily masked as gang or narco violence (and where the two sometimes overlap) human rights 
documentation has to work very hard to assess which is which and, thus, the estimates tend to be much 
lower than the actual scope of political violence. 
504 COF ADER, "Informe preliminar: violaciones a derechos humanos en el marco del golpe de estado en 
Honduras," June 15, 2009, p. 13-14. · 
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where he remained for some four months, guarded by police under orders to arrest him 
the moment he left Brazili~n territory. 
Nonetheless, the coup and its attend.ant violence produced the unintended 
consequence of cementing the bonds between the very diverse organizations that had 
been working together under the CNRP. That body created the new FNRP soon after the 
coup, and it quickly became the most important popular organization in Honduras. Its 
members and supporters, like the CNRP before it, came primarily from the poor, 
working, and marginalized classes but, unlike the CNRP, the new organization also drew 
people in from the relatively small professional and political classes, including lawyers, 
doctors, left-liberal politicians and civil servants, many of whom were - like Zelaya 
himself - previously the targets of CNRP actions but suddenly found themselves aligned 
with the movement in response to the coup. 505 Marlon Hernandez, for instance, was a 
journalist with Diario Tiempo and was well-connected in the oligarchy, but as a 
researcher with the Liberal Party he increasingly found himself compelled by Honduras' 
profound social inequality and sympathetic to the dlemands of the social movements. The 
coup marked a breaking point for Hernandez who, almost immediately, pledged his 
support for Zelaya and the Resistance.506 The FNRP worked closely with local human 
rights organizations and some foreign NGOs, but its autonomy from foreign interlocutors 
(whatever their intentions) was never in question. The characterization - promoted by 
the oligarchy and its North American allies - of the movement as a Chavez-exported ring 
505 Interview with Juan Barahona, May 10, 2012. 
506 Interview with Marlon Hernandez, October 21, 2012. Hernandez is now a Toronto-based advisor to the 
Zelaya family, who are effectively the leadership of the "28 de Junio" faction of the LIBRE party, which I 
discuss in Chapter 6. 
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of professional troublemakers and socialists was viewed as utterly absurd in a movement 
whose Honduran roots stretched back for decades. 
But the golpistas and their beneficiaiies were determined to stamp out this 
increasingly united movement; repression of the resistance was violent and thorough. 
Human rights groups like the Comite de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos· en 
Honduras (COFADEH) worked tirelessly after the coup to produce detai[ed 
documentation of the brutality. On November 28, 2009, they, as part of a coalition of the 
six leading human rights groups in Honduras, called the Plataforma de Derechos 
Humanos, produced a report detailing the campaign of state terror that had been 
unleashed over the previous five months. That report was presented to the Tribunal 
Supremo Electoral (TSE) on the day before the coup government held "elections" to try 
to legitimize its authority in the country - a process about which I will say more below. 
In a formal declaration demanding that the "elections" be cancelled, on account of the 
impossibility of their being fair and free in the context of the coup and state terror, the 
human rights platform declared: 
(These "elections" are being conducted) in a context of grave and 
systematic violations of human rights. Since the day of the coup, 
we have documented 33 violent and politically motivated deaths, 
torture, cruel and inhuman and degrading treatment, sexual 
assault and restrictions on freedom of association, assembly, 
expression, opinion and more. 507 
They go on to note that holding elections under these circumstances was an absurd 
prospect, given that the same people who were committing this violence were those who 
were supposed to be responsible for running fair elections. They also drew attention to 
some of the highest-profile cases of repression. Carlos H. Reyes, a trade unionist, 
507 Official Statement by Plataforma de Derechos Humanos (CODEH, COFADEH, FIAN, CDM, CPTRT, 
CIPRODEH) to the TSE, Nov. 28, 2009. 
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member of the social movements and, initially, an independent Presidential candidate, 
was hospitalized after a brutal blow from police in a peaceful demonstration. Ulises 
Sarmiento, a well-known member of the Uberal Party who sympathized with the 
resistance, had his home ransacked by soldiers with automatic weapons in the department 
of Olancho. Eliseo Hernandez Juarez, a vice:-mayoral candidate in Macuelizo, Santa 
Barbara, was assassinated. 508 
Not surprisingly, however, the violence was not limited to high-profile politicians; 
rather, it fell hardest on those who had the least resources to protect themselves. Victor 
Corrales Mejia and his son, wor~ing-class members of the FNRP, were arrested in 
November 2009 and beaten in their home. Police arrived in the middle of the night, hit 
Victor in the head and spine with batons, and threatened to kill him. "They kicked in my 
door, they threw me out like I was a sack of com. They want to intimidate us," he told 
me, "but our desire for democracy is stronger than they are."509 In Comayagua, where 
the resistance was strong, the Mayor threatened to give the names and addresses of 
anyone who interfered with the "elections" to the military. In fact, the military sent a 
letter a month before the "elections" demanding such lists from all the Mayors across the 
country: 
The purpose of this letter is to request your support with the 
following: names and telephone numbers of the leaders of the 
community who support the Democratic Civil Unity and that 
work jointly with the municipality for the goodness of the 
people. Leaders' names and telephone: numbers that support the 
resistance movement and that cause unrest in community 
projects. Mr. Mayor, we need this information as soon as 
508 Official Statement by Plataforma de Derechos Humanos (CODEH, COFADEH, FIAN, CDM, CPTRT, 
CIPRODEH) to the TSE, Nov. 28, 2009. 
509 Interview with Victor Corrales Mejia, Nov. 29, 2009. 
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possible so that we can be pre~ared each day in order to 
strengthen our democratic system. 5 0 
At the same time, the media were kept on a tight leash in order to contain the 
resistance. Immediately following the coup, journalists who were not loyal to the 
oligarchy were repressed by the military. Reporters from Venezuelan TV station Telesur, 
who attempted to provide live coverage of the coup, were consistently harassed and the 
few Honduran media outlets brave enough to speak out against the coup saw their 
journalists detained and beaten, their signals interrupted and their equipment 
ransacked. 511 Radio Globo, which emerged as one of the most significant alternative 
media outlets after the coup, quickly resorted to broadcasting almost exclusively online 
from secret locations, after the first months of re:pression. When Globo's programming 
director David Romero chose, on June 28, 2009, to report that a coup was taking place, 
he found himself dragged in front of Gen. Romeo Vasquez Velasquez, who told Romero 
what he should be reporting: 
First [I was told] to recognize that what happened was a 
[presidential] succession and not a coup d'etat. Second, that it 
was necessary because Manuel Zelaya Rosales was violating the 
constitution and wanted to extend his term limit. And third, that 
the nation comes first, that [the coup] was to save the country 
from Chavez.512 
Romero is proud of his station for standing up to the regime: "we've always believed 
Honduras needs profound changes," he said, "and that the oligarchy which has caused 
this country to be in a state of poverty [ ... ] can't keep running the country." He also 
510 Republished by Rights Action, "Honduras Coup Alert #93," Nov. 21, 2009. 
511 Committee to Protect Journalists, "After Honduran Coup, reporters detained, signals blocked," June 30, 
2009. 
512 David Romero, quoted in Paley, 61-62. 
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quickly discovered that he had support, when he saw their station's market share of 7% 
before the coup jump to 28% after, largely in response to their critical coverage. 
Radio Globo was one of a handful of media outlets - including Radio Progreso 
and Radio Uno, television station Canal 36 (Cholusat Sur) and newspaper El Libertador 
- that chose to defy the regime and the rest of ithe corporate media, and faced relentless 
harassment as a result. Some, like Canal 3 6, were shut down altogether after having 
equipment destroyed, signals interrupted, offices ransacked, and editors assassinated. In 
October 2009, Roberto Micheletti issued a Presidential Decree, which was used to take 
critical media off the air for 22 days; Reporters Without Borders highlighted this action in 
a press release on October 21, 2009, noting that: 
Decree 124-2009, a measure published in the official gazette on 
October 7, 2009, allows the authorities to suspend any 
programme or media "fomenting social anarchy" - and, without 
saying so openly, is targeted at those that oppose the coup. 513 
The decree went into effect on September 28, 2009, and it gave authorities the green light 
to "halt the coverage or discussion through any media, be it verbal or printed, of 
demonstrations that threaten peace and public order" or that compromised the "dignity" 
of government authorities or decisions; it was used primarily to justify destruction and 
confiscation of equipment at Radio Globo and Canal 36, the two critical media outlets 
with best nationwide coverage.514 And always lurking behind this systematic harassment 
was the threat of violence against those who did not bend to the regime's pressure, like El 
Libertador photojournalist Delmer Membreno, who was kidnapped and tortured in 
513 Reporters Without Borders, "Anti-Coup Media Resumes Broadcasting, But Closely Controlled," 
October 21, 2009. 
514 Sandra Cuffe, "The Snakes Sleep: Attacks against the Media and Impunity in Honduras," Upside Down 
World, November 23, 2010. 
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Tegucigalpa on the same day that Decree 124-2009 took effect. He described the 
experience to Sandra Cuffe, with his body still marred by bruises and bums: 
They put a balaclava over my head, they handcuffed me, and 
they burned my body. They hit me, and they uttered threats 
against the newspaper I work for:, El Libertador. [ ... ] They 
burned my body with cigarettes. Here [on my arm], my face, and 
my chest. They ripped my shirt and left me without shoes ... "Cry, 
cry! Why aren't you crying, you commie?" That's what they 
said ... They said that the director better be careful, that they were 
following him, and that what they had done to me was nothing in 
comparison to what they were going to do to him. 515 
On the other side, the pro-coup media fell upon themselves to support the regime 
and denounce the FNRP at every opportunity. In his detailed 2009 assessment of the 
media in Honduras, Manuel Torres Calderon argued that the country was a "plutocracy" 
in which the same families who controlled the banks, commerce, agroindustry, energy, 
telecommunications, tourism, the maquiladoras, and the service sector also controlled the 
overwhelming majority of the news and entertainment media.516 Those same oligarchs 
are embedded in the political and judicial system, either directly or by proxy, and exert 
immense influence over the politics of the country by their control of the media. For 
instance: there are four major newspapers in Honduras - El Heraldo and La Prensa are 
both owned by Jorge Canahuati Larach and his family, La Tribuna is owned by former 
President Carlos Flores Facusse, and Diario Tiempo is owned by the family of Jaime 
Rosenthal Oliva, whose family also owns two of the major TV stations. Three additional 
TV stations are owned by the families of Rafael Ferrari and Manuel Villeda Toledo. 
Torres Calderon concludes: 
515 Delmer Membreno, quoted in Cuffe, "The Snakes Sleep ... " 
516 Manuel Torres Calderon, "El poder de los seftores mediaticos en Honduras," in Poderes, Facticos y 
Sistema Politico, 3rd ed, Centro De Documentaci6n de Honduras, Tegucigalpa, 2009, p. 137. 
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There is no precise data on the total wealth that each of these 
families possess. All of these businessmen also control a variety 
of other interests (banking, securities, exports, production, 
imports, telecommunications, data transmission, oil and gas, 
water, etc) alongside their ownership of the major media outlets. 
This is one of the principal problems affecting the quality of 
freedom of speech in Honduras ... 517 
No surprise, then, that almost the entire Honduran media was mobilized to support 'the 
coup. In addition to selective coverage of events and transparently pro-coup reporting, 
the golpista media abandoned any semblance of liberal journalistic integrity by engaging 
in a variety of fraudulent and terroristic practices .. In July 2009, the newspaper La Prensa 
applied an embarrassingly clumsy dose of photoshop to an image it published of a victim 
of state violence, the above-mentioned Isis Obed Murillo, taking tlie time to erase the 
blood that stained his shirt and was dripping from his head.518 On November 1, 2009, 
Belen Fernandez reported that the main Honduran newspapers were taking photographs 
of protestors at FNRP demonstrations and delivering them to the police.519 The media 
even began acting as an unofficial organ of the regime, disseminating its campaign of 
popular intimidation, as on November 8, 2009, when El Hera/do asserted that "calls 
against the election process on November 29 will not go unpunished."520 
Meanwhile, even organizations that were :not directly linked to the resistance -
but which posed other challenges to the state's neoliberal agenda- were being targeted in 
the context of police impunity. On November 28, 2009, the Red de Comercializaci6n 
Comunitaria Alternativa (COMAL), a campesino organization that helps small farmers to 
517 Torres Calderon, 158-159. 
518 
"La Prensa de Honduras borra la sangre de la foto de Isis Obed Murillo," Resistencia Morazan, July 7, 
2009. The writers who exposed the fraud by presenting both the original photo and the printing from La 
Prensa called it a "creepy and macabre manoeuvre." 
519 Belen Fernandez, "Freedom of the Press Acquires New Definitions," The Narco News, November 1, 
2009. 
520 Tamar Sharabi, "Independent Presidential Candidate and Liberal Party Vice-Presidential Candidate 
Among Those Who Withdrew from the Ballot," The Narco News, November 22, 2009. 
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market their produce and runs educational campaigns designed to build networks 
between campesinos and social movements, had its offices attacked, computers and 
money stolen, and employees beaten. I arrived at the COMAL offices in Siguatepeque at 
around 3:30 that afternoon to find the grounds crawling with military and police -
notably from the state-sponsored COBRA paramilitary units - who quickly detained us 
near the gate to the compound. The head of the operation explained to my colleague, 
Adelid Vega, a lawyer working with COFADEH, that the compound was suspected of 
housing guerrillas, and that the police were investigating a report that weapons were 
stashed there. When the military/police brigad<;~ left, we were finally able to enter the 
grounds to survey the damage, which was considerable, and were given the following 
update from director Jose Trinidad Sanchez: 
The police said it was a search-and-seizure of firearms and 
weapons against the safety of the people. They began searching 
all the offices, smashing windows to get in. Like all 
organizations like ours, we have done political work around the 
coup and our strategy towards it. There were pieces of paper on 
how the coup has been for us and how do we want to re-found 
the country. It is not illegal to talk about it, but when they found 
this "evidence" they called it "subversive materials." They took 
everything ... and took a lot of reports on community meetings. 
At the end of the reports were names, which they were very 
interested in. 521 
Alongside the campaign of terror, the oligarchy used its considerable resources to 
undermine the political legitimacy of President Zelaya and those who opposed the coup. 
In a pamphlet distributed by the military in the department of Intibuca on November 14, 
2009, the golpistas asserted that: 
Twenty-first century socialism is the same thing as twentieth 
century communism, only it is more tedious because we know 
that nothing is going to happen. This boring film is being 
521 Interview with Jose Trinidad Sanchez, November 28, 2009. 
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promoted by criminals such as Fidel Castro, Hugo Chavez, 
Rafael Correa, Daniel Ortega and in Honduras by drug-dealer 
Manuel Zelaya Rosales, supported by Latin-American drug 
cartels ... Right now, the ideas of these criminals are being 
enforced by threats: bombs, sabotage, burning of businesses, 
insults, lies and murder ... These people are not civilized. What 
they are doing is truly criminal and similar to the actions of 
communists in the eighties in Central-American countries. 522 
The FNRP categorically denied the claims that they were connected to drug traffickers or 
engaged in bombings and sabotage; there has not been a single identifiable case of such 
violence being brought against the coup regime even once since the coup took place. 523 
PANTOMIME ELECTIONS 
This was the context for the "elections" held by the coup regime on November 29, 
2009 - widespread repression, military lockdown, state terror, and tight control of the 
media - and they could hardly be called circumstances under which democracy is likely 
to flourish. On the day of the vote, the FNRP urged Hondurans to stay home and boycott 
the "farce elections," and that is precisely what happened. On election day- a.day that is 
normally a boisterous street party, with people lining up for free meat from the primary 
political parties, whose red and blue flags would be in full display - Honduras was 
522 
"Is 21st Century Socialism a Project or a Boring Film?" pamphlet distributed by military reservists in La 
Esperanza, Intibuca, on November 14, 2009. Reproduced in El Frente lntibucano de Resistencia Popular 
Contra el Golpe de Estado, Press Release, November 17, 2009. 
523 The only event that comes close is a widely reported but routinely mischaracterized burning of a 
Popeye's Chicken location in Tegucigalpa during a demonstration on August 11, 2009. In what appeared 
to most observers as a fairly obvious case of police infiltration of the rally, a small group of protestors 
began throwing stones at the Popeye's Chicken and inciting others to violence against it. The 
demonstration was carefully and heavily marshalled, and most protestors ignored the provocation, while a 
small group chose to express their understandable enmity against the U.S. fast food chain that exploits 
Honduran labour and pays no taxes to the Honduran state. During the vandalism of the store, Honduran 
police sat a block back and allowed the event to take place, a telltale sign that police provocateurs were 
behind the event, since acts of restraint by the Honduran police in this period were rare. The next day - and 
for many weeks following - the story was plastered all over the golpista media and was used to justify ever 
more violent repression in response. The Popeye's building was left notably untouched for years after the 
event, likely in order to reinforce the idea - especially among foreign reporters - that the FNRP was a 
violent organization, When Popeye's finally tore it down, it was rebuilt as a mega-complex with three 
additional fast food outlets, perhaps to demonstrate it's hydra.-esque ability to return with even more heads. 
For more on the alleged vandalism, see Tyler Shipley, "Between a Bank and a Burger King: Election Farce 
in Honduras," Canadian Dimension, Nov 26, 2009. 
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suspiciously quiet and subdued. Most reports from human rights observers across the 
country suggested that the polling stations had more military and police attending them 
than civilians, which was certainly in line with my own eyewitness accounts. That 
evening, the TSE itself admitted that only around 1.7 million people voted, in a country 
of nearly 8 million, with 4.6 million eligible to vote. That makes for a turnout of around 
35% of eligible voters - about 20% of the entire population - the lowest since the return 
of formal democracy in the early 80s. 524 Of these, some 7% of the votes were reported as 
blank or spoiled, in many cases spoiled in protest, covered in anti-coup statements and 
images. 525 Inexplicably, the TSE nonetheless announced a "projected" turnout of 60%, 
which became the number repeated in almost every international news source;526 the TSE 
never provided a breakdown of how it cam<:: to that number and the only partial 
explanation it offered for the inconsistent figures was a rather absurd decision to exclude 
the 1.2 million absentee Hondurans - those living outside the country - from the total 
number of "eligible voters,"527 despite the fact that they were eligible to vote and many of 
them did.528 For its part, the FNRP estimated a turnout of around 30%, and pre-eminent 
Honduran journalist Felix Molina still insists that :it was likely less than 25%.529 
A few days after the election, video journalist Jesse Freeston of The Real News 
was able to get into the TSE headquarters and produced a video that documented that the 
TSE had generated fraudulent voter totals designe:d to create the illusion that Hondurans 
524 Tyler Shipley, "Where Are The People?" Canadian Dimension, Dec. 1, 2009. 
525 
"Votos nulos y blancos son tercera fuerza" La Tribuna, December 13, 2009. 
526 Fox News in the United States was one of the few exceptions, reporting the absurd figure of 70%; no 
one has yet been able to explain where that number came from. 
527 Todd Gordon, Imperialist Canada, Winnipeg, Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 2010, p. 380. 
528 I spoke with a group of Honduran businessmen living in the United States who were flying back to 
Honduras to vote - because they wanted to support the "democratic process" that Micheletti was fostering 
-on November 22, 2009. 
529 Interview with Felix Molina, May 2, 2012. 
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had not boycotted the election; one TSE employee admitted that the official results were 
"pure fabrication. "530 Indeed, in a special issue of Nueva Sociedad dedicated to the coup 
in Honduras, Alvaro Calix demonstrates that the elections were fraudulent even by the 
standards of minimal liberal democratic norms. 531 It should not come as any great 
surprise that the TSE was involved in the fraudulent consolidation of the coup; two o~ the 
TSE's three presiding judges were illegally appointed to their positions under coup-leader 
Roberto Micheletti. 532 But it is worth remembering that most Hondurans connected to 
the social movements understood that even if th1e vote-counting process had been carried 
out legitimately on election day, these elections were still unquestionably a sham or, as 
Felix Molina put it, a pantomime of a proper democratic process.533 As the Human 
Rights Platform explained in its above-mentioned Nov. 28, 2009 document: 
Holding reliable elections does not depend solely on the 
implementation of sophisticated technology, international 
observers or the strict adherence to the formal process; it also 
requires knowing that there was a cltean process preceding the 
elections, produced by a climate of full freedom, one where 
candidates and the electorate can express themselves openly and 
in a context of absolute equality, without fear of assassination, 
torture, detention and incarceration. 534 
Indeed, an interview I conducted with Edward Fox, a former USAID official, 
Republican Party campaign financer, and an elections observer sent from Washington to 
legitimate the process, demonstrated quite plainly that the few organizations that went to 
Honduras for the elections were not interested in investigating anything that was 
530 Jesse Freeston, "Exclusive: Honduran Elections Exposed," The Real News, December 6, 2009. 
Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 10 _ OuJ qo V tI 
531 Calix, "Honduras ... " 
532 Enrique Ortez Sequeira and David Matamoros were members of Tegucigalpa City Council and the 
National Congress, respectively, and therefore neither was constitutionally entitled to preside over the TSE. 
533 Interview with Felix Molina, November 24, 2009. 
534 Official Statement by Plataforma de Derechos Humanos (CODEH, COFADEH, FIAN, CDM, CPTRT, 
CIPRODEH) to the TSE, Nov. 28, 2009. 
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happening away from the polling stations. 535 As we spoke on camera from Miami 
International Airport on December 1, 2009, Fox claimed to have heard nothing about 
human rights violations, cast suspicion on the groups documenting the violence de~pite 
not being able to name a single one of them, and justified his endorsement of the 
elections by telling me that he had spoken to the U.S. Ambassador who is, Fox reminded 
me, "there all the time."536 His organization, the Washington Senior Observer Group, 
reported that they: 
Witnessed the enthusiastic desire of thousands of Honduran 
citizens to cast their ballots. Many took time to thank us for 
our presence today. Without exception, they expressed 
confidence in the electoral system, pride in exercising their 
right to vote, and a profound hope that their election is a 
decisive step toward the restoration of the constitutional 
and democratic order in Honduras. 537 
They further asserted that they saw "no voter intimidation by any group, individual, or 
party" and that their observations "coincide with those reported by other observers and by 
the media throughout Honduras."538 Nonetheless, when I asked Edward Fox about those 
other observers, the groups that had been documenting the violence and terror, he 
admitted that he had not spoken to any of them. A voiding them must have taken some 
effort because, when the Honduran human rights platform presented its report to the TSE 
on November 28, the U.S. observers were there; in fact, the human rights delegation had 
their meeting scheduled for 2:00 p.m. but had to wait until well after 4:00 p.m. because 
TSE officials were meeting with the unofficial U.S. observers. We were all there 
535 I had met a number of the elections observers a few days earlier, but my encounter with Edward Fox on 
December 1 was entirely coincidental, as we waited together at a luggage carousel in Miami after our 
respective flights out of Honduras. 
536 Interview with Edward Fox, Dec. 1, 2009. 
537 Washington Senior Observer Group, "Statement on the National Elections in Honduras," December 1, 
2009. 
538 Washington Senior Observer Group, "Statement on the National Elections in Honduras," December 1, 
2009. 
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together, and at one point I overheard the U.S. observers chatting amongst themselves 
derisively about the human rights group and about Honduras in general. When I 
confronted Edward Fox on this point, he quickly changed the subject.539 
In addition to the organizations like the Washington Senior Observer Group, the 
coup regime worked diligently to acquire the services of like-minded, far-right 
organizations from around the world. Granma International reported that the job of 
finding election observers was entrusted to the COHEP president, the above-mentioned 
Amilcar Bulnes, and that he managed to find some 300-500 individuals from a variety of 
right wing think tanks and business groups. 540 The list included former Central American 
right wing leaders like Alvaro ArzU from Guatemala and Alfredo Cristiani from El 
Salvador, whose credentials on human rights and democracy only look good when 
compared to the worst offenders of the 1980s. Also invited to observe the elections were 
representatives from neo-Nazi groups like UnoAmerica, which was linked to an 
assassination plot against Bolivian president Evo Morales, and far-right lobby groups like 
the Latin American and Caribbean Network for Liberty, closely tied to the notoriou.s 
National Endowment for Democracy. 
539 This interview was particularly illustrative of the flimsy edifice upon which the regime's legitimacy was 
being built. Fox was not especially careful in his statements with me, at least until he realised that I was 
well-informed, by which point the artificiality of his observation process had been plainly laid bare. As he 
back-pedalled through his denial of state terror and violence, his denial of the coup itself, his demonstrably 
false claims that the Constituyente process had been "overwhe.lmingly rejected," and his admittance that 
most of his investigation in Honduras was a conversation with the U.S. ambassador, the result was a candid 
portrait of the right-wing U.S. ideologue gone back to Honduras to subvert its democratic processes yet 
again, this time using Hugo Chavez and Manuel Zelaya - instead of the Sandinistas and the FMLN - as the 
requisite bogeymen. (Fox claimed to have participated in electoral observation in the 1981 elections, held 
under the military dictatorship and designed to forestall growing social movement activity and secure 
Honduras as a base for U.S. military operations in Central Ame:rica, as described in Chapter 4.) Forced to 
defend his claims against real evidence, his construction of free and fair elections crumbled quickly and 
dramatically. I have provided a transcript of this illuminating interview in Appendix C. 
540 Jean-Guy Allard, "Honduras: Dictatorship Recruiting Right-Wing Extremists as 'Observers,"' Granma 
International, November 12, 2009. 
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These so-called observers, then, worked very hard to avoid observing that which 
was patently obvious to most Hondurans. It wasn't just voters who had boycotted the 
elections; almost all independent candidates in the country withdrew their names, and 
even many candidates from the moderate wing of the Liberal Party - from which Zelaya 
himself was drawn - pulled themselves out of the process in public defiance of what they 
considered farce elections. Indeed, the process that the coup regime put in place could 
perhaps best be described, following the work of Edward Herman and Frank Brodhead in 
the 1980s, as "demonstration elections:" their purpose was never to facilitate any 
meaningful political participation but, rather, to demonstrate enough of the superficial 
edifice of democracy to satisfy its international partners that it could appear legitimate 
enough to support.541 In the context of the North American endorsement of the elections, 
it is worth emphasizing that many of the candidates who boycotted the elections were 
high-profile figures who would have been almost guaranteed to win a first or second term 
in office, had they stood for election. 
The most obvious example, as noted abov1e, was Carlos H. Reyes, a union leader 
who was set to run as an independent candidate on a reformist platform that would have 
likely stolen votes from the center-left Democratic Unification (UD) and the Party of 
Innovation and Social Democratic Unity (PINU), as well as the presiding Liberal Party; 
significantly, President Zelaya had given his endorsement to Reyes rather than the 
Liberal candidate Edwin Santos. Polls across different points in 2009 had Carlos H. 
Reyes ranking as high as third out of six presidential candidates in popularity. Reyes was 
541 Herman and Brodhead originally described this process as: "a circus held in a client state to assure the 
population of the home country [the United States] that their intrusion is well received. The results are 
guaranteed by an adequate supply of bullets provided in advance." Edward S. Herman and Frank 
Brodhead, Demonstration Elections: US-Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam and El 
Salvador, Boston, South End Press, 1984. 
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an active member of the FNRP and, on July 30, 2009, he was bludgeoned in the head by 
a police baton at a demonstration in Tegucigalpa.542 On November 9, 2009, convinced 
that there was no chance that the regime would allow legitimate elections to take place, 
he officially withdrew, stating that, "the observers contracted by the Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal are not a guarantee for the security and transparency of the electoral process 
because they are the same organizations that have justified the coup d'etat. "543 Indeed, 
Edward Fox's comments are a testament to the wisdom of Reyes' concerns. 
Four days after Reyes' withdrawal, he was joined in the boycott by Rodolfo 
Padilla Sunceri, then mayor of Honduras' second-largest city, San Pedro Sula. Padilla 
was a member of the moderate wing of the centre-right Liberal Party and was a popular 
frontrunner in San Pedro Sula, but withdrew.his candidacy on November 13, 2009, citing 
the impossibility of a meaningfully democratic process and adding that "the people don't 
believe in this process." Another prominent candidate to drop off the ballot was Maria 
Margarita Zelaya Rivas, vice-Presidential candidate for Zelaya's Liberal Party and 
Manuel Zelaya's cousin. "My resignation speaks," she stated, "for those that cannot 
express their thoughts for fear that the de facto government will take reprisal against 
them."544 An additional 110 mayoral candidates and 55 congressional candidates, many 
of them leading in their respective races, pulled out of the election in recognition of the 
illegitimacy and unpopularity of the process, though David Matamoros, Secretary of the 
TSE, claimed in La Tribuna that only 0.1 % of the candidates had dropped out of the 
542 
"International Mission denounces the brutal repression of pacific demonstrations," Agencia 
Latinoamericano de Informacion, July 30, 2009. 
543 Carlos H. Reyes, quoted in Sharabi, "Independent Presidential Candidate ... " 
544 Sharabi, "Independent Presidential Candidate ... " 
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election. 545 It is worth repeating here that candidates for these elections had been 
selected through a process of primaries before the June 2009 coup, with the official TSE 
convocation taking place on May 29, 2009. November 29, 2009 was the scheduled date 
for the elections and all of those who withdrew from the elections had been nominated 
prior to the break from democratic order. 
The centre-left parties referenced above (UD and PINU) faced a difficult choice 
with regard to the elections, since state recognition as a legal party - and the crucial 
funding that comes with it - would have been n~voked if they withdrew. Both of these 
parties were split on the question of whether to participate. UD, in patticular, had 
struggled very hard over the past decade to achi1~ve the legal status it had and throwing 
that away was unacceptable to many; it was a party organized out of the few activi,st 
groups that survived the 1980s and was reliant on the support it got from its official 
status, including paid employees for parties that gained seats and L350,000 for campaign 
financing. 546 Tomas Andino, who ran for office with UD in 1997, argues that the party 
was fundamentally co-opted by the oligarchy in 2006 when it entered into an alliance 
with the National Party. By the time of the coup, UD was a marginal player in the 
Honduran left, and its decision to participate in the November 2009 elections was 
disappointing to many but surprising to few. Cesar Ham, the leader of UD who had 
forged the alliance with the National Party in 2006, was widely discredited for supporting 
the coup and was "rewarded" for his decision with a cabinet appointment in the Lobo 
regime, which has only further de-legitimized UD's role in the Resistance.547 Ham was 
545 Sharabi, "Independent Presidential Candidate ... " 
546 Interview with Felix Molina, November 25, 2009. 
547 Interview with Tomas Andino, May 9, 2012. 
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named the director of the lnstituto Nacional Agrario (INA), the agranan institute 
embroiled in the state's efforts to rollback land reforms, of which I will say more belo:w. 
The regime, predictably, denied that there was any momentum behind a boycott 
campaign and clumsily tried to write-off the boycott as a product of "foreign meddling." 
Coup leader Roberto Micheletti told the El Tiempo newspaper on November 16, 2009, 
that hundreds of foreigners had been entering the country in order to disrupt Honduran 
democracy. "We have knowledge of this," he claimed, "our military, supported by our 
allies and friends, have initiated an investigation that has secured information about 
people from Venezuela or Nicaragua coming here to try to cause trouble to the electoral 
process." Micheletti proceeded to use this alleged foreign intervention to justify a 
massive military presence and the threat of drastic penalties for anyone who tried to 
disrupt the elections. 548 
Even speaking out against the elections was made dangerous. As noted above, 
the El Hera/do newspaper promised would-be demonstrators that there would be swift 
punishment for campaigning against the elections, and El Tiempo added that calling for 
any interference to the electoral process could earn a person four to six years in prison. s.:r9 
The regime made certain that these were not empty threats. Renowned environmental 
activist and Goldman-prize-winner Padre Andres Tamayo was charged for calling for an 
election boycott and, after spending several weeks under house arrest in the Brazilian 
embassy, he was deported to El Salvador after having lived in Honduras for twenty-six 
years. Meanwhile, Andres Pavon, director of prominent human rights organization 
CODEH, found himself charged with defamation and impeding the elections after 
548 
"Micheletti: Hundreds of Foreigners Coming In To Boycott Elections," El Tiempo, November 16, 2009. 
549 
"De 4 o 6 aiios de prision a quien infrinja Ley Electoral" El Tiempo, November 11, 2009. 
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making statements expressing fear of more military massacres and encouraging people to 
stay safe at home on election day. 550 
Such fear was not unfounded. As Jose Miguel Cruz rightly notes, "the coup was 
supported and enforced by police officers in the streets who, for years, had been 
identified as responsible for extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses."551 In 
addition to the 12,000 police and 11,000 soldiers on duty on election day, the coup 
regime called up 5,000 reservists on November 13, 2009552 and brought on an estimated 
15,000 private security agents from 14 different companies, temporarily granted military 
fatigues, weapons, and powers. 553 These heavily armed commandos patrolled the streets, 
the voting stations, and the highway checkpoints across the country. As I travelled with 
Honduran human rights observers through different cities and towns in the southern 
departments on election day, and in the days leading up to it, we were subjected to almost 
constant stops and searches, and as we sat in community meetings, we heard story after 
story of intimidation and violence. On the day that the elections took place, I ate dinner 
with a group of people from a small community in Danli, who had hung a banner on the 
main road into town declaring themselves "Melista," saying "no to the elections and yes 
to the Constituyente," and, as we chatted, a group of 10-15 military vehicles rumbled past 
the front door, reinforcing the sense that simply stating opposition to the electoral process 
was enough to bring state violence to your door. 
The boycott was, nevertheless, a demonstrntion of strength by the movement. 
Across the country, the decision to stay home and boycott in silence was carried out by 
550 Sharabi, "Independent Presidential Candidate ... " 
551 Jose Miguel Cruz, "Estado y violencia criminal en America Latina," Nueva Sociedad, No. 226, 
April/May 2010. 
552 Joyce, "Legitimizing the Illegitimate ... " 
553 Tyler Shipley, "Honduras - State of Emergency," Canadian Dimension, Nov. 29, 2009. 
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most Hondurans; in a few cities, pockets of people chose to heed Manuel Zelaya's 
contradictory message (broadcast only the day before the elections) to rally in the streets, 
and where they did they met predictable repression, as in a series of violent clashes in 
San Pedro Sula. 554 The following day, the movement took to the streets in earnest to 
celebrate its defiance of the election process. Across the country, tens of thousands made 
their presence felt; in Tegucigalpa, the movement organized a caravan, which slowly 
snaked through the labyrinthine streets of the capital city, horns honking, FNRP flags 
flying, upturned and uninked pinky fingers in the air in visible demonstration that the 
people had not voted. 555 The caravan was an awe-inspiring display of the strength of the 
movement and, above all, it made it impossible for anyone in the capital city to deny that 
the boycott had been a massive popular demonstration. This is a point worth 
emphasizing, since so much of the whitewashing of the coup would rest upon the 
perception that Hondurans had happily and freely participated in the electoral process. 
Indeed, it is worth returning to the description I wrote the evening after the 
elections: 
Honduras today is like an Orwellian nightmare. A fac;ade of calm 
as soldiers patrol the streets with automatic weapons; a theatrical 
production of democracy in a state that no longer has a 
functioning code of law; a discourse of peace that so completely 
fails to convince, it almost seems like it is intended to mock its 
victims. Indeed, one Elacard yesterday read, "2 + 2 = 5? Do not 
insult us, golpistas. "5 6 
554 It was unclear what motivated Zelaya's last-minute call for the people to take the streets. Zelaya was the 
nominal coordinator of the FNRP, but his being barricaded into the Brazilian Embassy made him somewhat 
disconnected from the movement itself. Some speculated that his call out, defying the official FNRP 
position, was designed to test the movements' allegiance. Others insist that it was a miscommunication 
amongst the leadership. In any event, few people responded to Zelaya's call, and the overwhelming 
majority of Hondurans simply stayed home. 
555 Honduran polling stations use an ink stamp on the pinky finger to demonstrate that a person has voted. 
As such, the waving of an un-inked finger became the visible sign of the boycott. 
556 Tyler Shipley, "Where Are The People?" Canadian Dimension, December 1, 2009. 
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It was all, really, an elaborate piece of theatre. When my flight had arrived in the capital 
a week earlier, packed with North American journalists en route from Miami, the cabin 
announcement said, "welcome to Honduras, a country of peace and justice." A week 
later, as the journalists flew home, the airport kiosks were selling white t-shirts 
celebrating Honduran democracy. For all the energy the regime was putting into 
repressing the social movement, it clearly understood that it needed to construct the 
edifice of legitimacy in the international community in order to bring the coup to its 
successful completion. This required both an t:ffective mimicry of democratic process 
and liberal freedoms, and a complicit audience willing to ignore everything beyond that 
flimsy canvas. Fortunate, indeed, for the golpistas, that they were able to count on a few 
powerful allies to fulfill that role. Chief among them was Canada, which, from the very 
beginning, was the strongest international partner to the coup; the Honduran oligarchy 
and armed forces performed a pantomime of democracy and the Canadian state 
committed itself to assisting in that project. The following chapter will detail Canada's 
support for the coup and its subsequent whitewashing, in light of the analysis I have 
provided here. 
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The previous chapter demonstrated that the coup d'etat in Honduras was a 
reaction by the entrenched Honduran oligarchy against a swelling democratic social 
movement that had successfully pressured the President to adopt policies that 
increasingly reflected the will of average Hondurans instead of the oligarchy. This 
chapter will examine Canada's response to the coup d'etat and the violent repression that 
flowed from it. In particular, this chapter seeks to show: first, that the Canadian state 
went to great lengths to support this violent and anti-democratic coup, in spite of its 
rhetorical commitments to the very values and politics threatened by the coup; and 
second, that repression and resistance continued throughout the period of Canada's 
escalating engagement with the Honduran regime, which included Canada's efforts to 
whitewash that very repression and deny the popularity of the resistance. On the basis of 
these arguments, I will insist that the coup :fits into the long trajectory of foreign 
intervention in Honduras which, in its current form, is most commonly manifest in the 
collaboration between foreign states and capital, and their local counterparts in the 
political-military-capitalist elite. This final point will be introduced here and carried over 
into Chapter 7, which will be primarily interested in explaining the apparent contradiction 
between Canadian behaviour and rhetoric by illustrating concretely Canada's vested 
political and economic interest in protecting the imperial order in Honduras. In this way, 
then, the following two chapters will demonstrate how Canada has put itself forward as 
heir to the colonial and imperial powers that have: plagued Honduras for five centuries, as 
part of Canada's broader global re-positioning as an imperialist country. 
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CANADA'S RESPONSE TO THE COUP 
Having outlined the key developments in the lead-up to, and execution of, the 
coup d'etat in 2009, the next step will be to reflect on Canada's behaviour during that 
time. From the outset, it was notable that Canada's response to the coup was among 1the 
slowest and softest in the Western hemisphere. Consider the reactions from across the 
hemisphere: while Presidents Chavez and Morales of Venezuela and Bolivia predictably 
condemned the coup in strong langUage, even centre-left and liberal governments were 
swift in their rebuke. A statement from Argentinean President Cristina Fernandez de 
Kirchner read, "I do not hesitate to call this a return to barbarity. All countries of the 
continent and the entire international community should demand the return of the 
democratically elected president. "557 The foreign ministry of Ecuador immediately 
asserted that it would recognize no government in Honduras except that of Manuel 
Zelaya, and the Brazilian embassy demanded the "immediate and unconditional" return 
of Zelaya to power. Mauricio Funes of El Salvador expressed his full solidarity with 
Zelaya, and Fernando Lugo of Paraguay insisted that the golpistas should be imprisoned. 
Canada, by contrast, waited the entire day before offering a statement; some 15 
hours after the dramatic footage first hit the airwaves, Canadian Minister of State for the 
Americas Peter Kent finally echoed international calls for the restitution of the rule of law 
in Honduras. But his was certainly one of the softest rebukes of the gofpistas, as he 
"called upon all parties to seek peaceful resolution to the crisis." I emphasize "all 
parties" to highlight Kent's misleading characterization of two sides in conflict, when, in 
fact, there was only one side in a position to exercise power or restraint, the military and 
557 BBC News, "World Reaction: Honduran Crisis," June 28, 2009. 
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oligarchs who had kidnapped a duly elected President, undermined a legitimate public 
consultation and seized dictatorial power by force. Kent's statement read: 
Canada condemns the coup d'etat that took place over the 
weekend in Honduras, and calls on all parties to show restraint 
and to seek a peaceful resolution to the present political crisis, 
which respects democratic norms and the rule of law, including 
the Honduran Constitution. 558 
He makes particular reference to the Honduran Constitution, an interesting choice given 
that the poll disrupted by the coup was gauging public appetite for redrafting that very 
constitution, as discussed above. 
If this was a disappointing first response, Canada's position only became more 
supportive of the golpistas over the following months, despite the relentless and 
unmistakable project of state repression describt:~d above. Canada's official statements 
over these months served both to obfuscate the trnth and misdirect public attention, while 
it's actions offered implicit support to the coup :regime. About a week after the coup, 
Peter Kent told the OAS that the international community had tilted too far in favour of 
Zelaya: "the coup was certainly an affront to the region, but there is a context in which 
these events happened [ ... ] There has to be an appreciation of the events that led up to the 
coup."559 Indeed, Canada's second official statement o:p the coup made certain not to tilt 
towards Zelaya, focusing instead on an insistence that he not return to Honduras until the 
time was right. Before moving into the typical patter of rhetorical calls for non-violence, 
Kent's statement read: 
In light of the mediation process involving representatives of 
President Zelaya of Honduras and the de facto government this 
weekend in Costa Rica, Canada wishes to stand with our 
558 D-FAIT, "Statement by Minister of State Kent on the Situation in Honduras," No. 184, June 28, 2009. 
559 Peter Kent, quoted in M. Lacey and G. Thompson, "Envoy :Prepares to Visit Honduras Warning of 
Obstacles," The New York Times, July 3, 2009. 
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colleagues in the region and reiterate the call for restraint in the 
timing of President Zelaya's return to Honduras. A return to 
Honduras should only occur when at peaceful solution has been 
found and conditions are appropriate. A return to Honduras prior 
to a negotiated resolution is strongly discouraged. Actions 
resulting in violence will not be in the best interests of the people 
of Honduras. 560 
Remarkable, indeed, that Kent's statement should emphasize the need for restraint from 
Zelaya; the statement did not even once condemn the coup regime for its ongoing 
campaign of violence and repression. 
Through July and September, Peter Kent consistently chided Manuel Zelaya for 
"recklessly" attempting to re-enter the country of which he was the legal head-of-state, 
and insisted that he and his supporters negotiate a settlement in good faith with the coup 
regime, again misleadingly suggesting that Zelaya and the Resistance bore some 
responsibility for the crisis and that the coup regime was in a legitimate bargaining 
position. This presentation of events was repeated often, both in international statements 
and in the domestic media: for instance, in July, Peter Kent told the CBC that Zelaya's 
attempts to re-enter the country were "very unhelpful," a remarkable statement given that 
Canada still recognized Zelaya as the legal president with six months left in his term. 561 
All the while, Kent's statements carefully avoided any direct criticism of the coup 
regime, repeatedly "calling on all parties to show restraint" and implicitly blamed Zelaya 
and the FNRP for the violence that was being inflicted on them. When Zelaya returned 
to Honduras in September and was barricaded into the Brazilian embassy, Kent's 
statement expressed concern with "the violence that erupted in the aftermath of President 
560 D-FAIT, "Statement by Minister of State Kent on the Situation in Honduras," No. 200, July 19, 2009. 
561 Grahame Russell, "In Response to Mr. Peter Kent: Canada's Increasingly Complicit Role in Honduras," 
The Dominion, Aug. 2, 2009. 
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Zelaya's sudden return to Honduras."562 The emphasis on the word "sudden" is mine, as 
it implies that the irregularity of the situation should be attributed to Zelaya, as if the 
violence that was unleashed by the repressive coup government was caused by Zelaya's 
"sudden" action, not the rather sudden kidnapping of a President and fabrication and 
forgery of his resignation letter. 
All the while, Canada endorsed a Costa Rica-brokered negotiation between 
Zelaya and the coup regime, but it was evident from the start that the coup regime had no 
intentions of letting go of power; the negotiation served to stall for time while the regime 
prepared for the November elections, which would provide a more satisfactory 
"resolution" to the crisis. Canada repeatedly invoked the negotiations as the best way 
forward, ignoring the fact that one side of the negotiations was a body that had seized 
dictatorial control over the country, and showc~d no intentions of relinquishing that 
I 
control. 563 Predictably, the talks broke down, not long before the scheduled elections but 
what was perhaps most interesting about Canada's encouragement of the negotiations 
was the fact that the emphasis on this process allowed for an important shift in Canada'-s 
language about the coup itself; by October, it was no longer being called a "coup" but, 
rather, a "political crisis." An October 9 statement referenced the "political crisis" fully 
six times, without one mention of a coup d'etat, after which point Canada never again 
referred to a "coup" at all. 564 
562 D-F AIT, "Canada Calls For Restraint and a Negotiated Settlement in Honduras," No. 268, Sept. 22, 
2009. (Emphasis added.) 
563 D-FAIT, "Canada Committed to Advance Peaceful and Prompt Resolution of Political Crisis," No. 298, 
Oct. 7, 2009. 
564 D-F AIT, "Canada Plays Leadership Role in OAS Efforts to Initiate Dialogue in Honduras," No. 303, 
Oct. 9, 2009. 
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Nevertheless, it was the November "elections" that provided the key opportunity 
for Canada to open wide its arms to the coup regime. Even before the process took place, 
with international organizations refusing to send observers to what was so transparently 
an undemocratic process, Canada laid the groundwork for its support in a remarkable 
statement: 
Canada is disappointed with the lack of progress on the 
implementation of the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord, signed by 
both parties on October 30. Unfortunately, this has meant that 
Canada could not provide support for the electoral process. 
Although the elections will be watched closely by the 
international community and members of civil society, there will 
be no formal observation missions from the Organization of 
American States or the UN. 
The peaceful conduct of the November 29 elections will be an 
important step in moving out of the current political impasse. For 
the sake of all Hondurans, we urge that they be run freely and 
fairly, in a safe and secure environment. Although the 
circumstances under which elections will take place are less than 
ideal, Canada calls strongly for a peaceful electoral process free 
from violence. 565 
It is an astonishing feat of doublespeak that allows Kent to simultaneously acknowledge 
that the international community is refusing to fo1mally observe the elections - in clear 
recognition of their illegitimacy - while he also insists that the process will be a key step 
in resolving the "political crisis." It certainly begs the question, how could illegitimate 
elections move forward a process of re-asserting electoral representative democracy? 
As the predictably fraudulent results came in, it became clear that Porfirio "Pepe" 
Lobo, of the National Party, was to be given the Presidency. In contrast to his tardy 
response to the coup in June, this time Peter Kent was the first foreign minister to offer 
his congratulations to Lobo, who lost the 2006 elections to Zelaya and had been a strong 
565 D-FAIT, "Minster of State Kent Calls for Peaceful Elections in Honduras," No. 360, Nov. 27, 2009. 
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supporter of the coup. In his statement, Kent lauded the Honduran people for engaging in 
"relatively peaceful and orderly" elections, run "freely and fairly, with a strong turnout, 
and with no major violence."566 Given the military and police lockdown, the massive, 
daily demonstrations, the complete silence of what was left of the critical Honduran 
press, and the political graffiti that covered nearly every edifice in every comer of the 
capital, it seemed utterly absurd to suggest that Honduras had just witnessed free, 
peaceful, fair elections. Indeed, the reality was quite the contrary, as documented in a 
series of accounts I published at the time. 567 
But the fabrication oflegitimate elections in 2009 was the basis for Canada's re-
engagement with Honduras during Lobo's first year. On January 27, 2010, Lobo was 
inaugurated as Honduran President while over half a million people protested in the 
streets - the second largest public demonstration since the June 2009 coup. Most of the 
Honduran media refused to cover the demonstrations; one station that attempted to show 
the size of the protest, found that the military prevented its rented helicopter, designed to 
assist capturing images from above, from taking off. 568 In the weeks prior to Lobo' s 
inauguration, coup-leader Roberto Micheletti was declared a member of Congress for the 
rest of his life, an unprecedented and absurd appointment for a nominally democratic 
body, and immediately after Lobo took office he successfully proposed and passed legal 
immunity for all of the military leaders of the coup. 569 
566 D-FAIT, "Canada Congratulates Honduran People on Elections," Dec. 1, 2009. 
567 Alvaro Calix, "Honduras: de la crisis politica al surgimiento de un nuevo social actor," Nueva Sociedad, 
No. 226, April/May 2010. I also documented this period, at th~: time, in a series of detailed reports for 
Canadian Dimension. See Tyler Shipley, "They Are Afraid of Us, Because We Are Not Afraid,'' 
Canadian Dimension, November 24, 2009. 
568 Annie Bird, "Disappearing Truth in Honduras: Commissions Cover Up Demands for New 
Constitution," Upside Down World, April 13, 2010. 
569 
"Declaran a Micheletti diputado vitalicio," La Tribuna, January 14, 2010. 
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Peter Kent quickly offered Canada's congratulations, thanked Lobo for 
"generously" providing once-President Zelaya safe passage to exile in the Dominican 
Republic and dispensed the usual distortions, calling the military coup a "political crisis" 
and calling Lobo' s regime a "unity government,"570 perhaps because Lobo appointed 
three cabinet positions to individuals like Cesar Ham who were once associated with the 
left, alongside the hardliners - some with long records of involvement in human rights 
abuses - who received most of the appointments. 571 
Meanwhile, Kent's statement was silent on the assassination of Walter Trochez, a 
27 year old LGBT activist who had been documenting human rights abuses by the coup 
regime, just weeks prior to Lobo's inauguration. Kent's silence on this is made even 
more unbelievable by the fact that the U.S. State Department had issued a statement just 
three days earlier demanding an investigation into Trochez's death. If this wasn't 
enough, Peter Kent's statement congratulating Pepe Lobo was published on the same day 
that he published another public statement, this time on Venezuela. In light of the 
behaviour Kent so staunchly defended in Pepe Lobo, and his silence on the assassinations 
of Walter Trochez and so many others, his statement on Chavez looks patently absurd: 
Canada is concerned over the Venezuelan government's recent 
suspension of broadcasting of six television stations and the 
death of two students in protests related to this action. These 
events are further evidence of a shrinking democratic space in 
Venezuela. Freedom of expression, and access to information 
from a wide range of sources, are fundamental elements of a 
healthy democracy. Canada urges the government of 
Venezuela to immediately restore the transmissions of the six 
affected stations. 572 
570 D-FAIT, "Statement by Minister of State Kent on Inauguration of Honduran President," January 28, 
2010. 
571 Annie Bird, "Disappearing Truth in Honduras: Commissions Cover Up Demands for New 
Constitution," Upside Down World, April 13, 2010. 
572 D-FAIT, "Canada Concerned Over Venezuelan Suspension of TV Stations," January 28, 2010. 
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Even if we accept Kent's basic information on Venezuela as accurate - which should not 
be taken for granted - that which is called "shrinking democratic space" in Venezuela is 
labelled "a process of renewal" in Honduras.573 Indeed, as Todd Gordon and Jeffrey 
Webber reported, Kent's trip to Venezuela in January 2010 saw him meet with a variety 
of groups in the far-right opposition to the Chavez government, though he was unable to 
find time to meet with a single representative of the official government. 574 In a 
remarkable reversal, his time in Honduras less than a month later had him meet with not 
just Pepe Lobo but also three of his cabinet ministers, including Arturo Corrales (former 
spokesperson of coup-leader Roberto Micheletti) and Mario Canahuati (son of 
maquiladora magnate Juan Canahuati and fomLer-president of COHEP). Nonetheless, 
Kent did not meet with any of the myriad community and civil society organizations 
documenting - and often experiencing - the violence and terrorization being perpetrated 
573 It is outside the scope of this project to assess the relative freedom of the Venezuelan media. But a few 
quick observations are necessary here: first, like in Honduras, the Venezuelan media is primarily owned 
and operated in the private sector, by Venezuelan oligarchs for whom the Chavez government has become 
a bitter enemy. The Venezuelan media was complicit in attc:mpts to have Chavez overthrown in 2002, and 
as a result, Chavez has enforced strict controls over the behaviour of private media. In light of the blatant 
manipulation and mischaracterization of the news that emanates from the private media in Venezuela, some 
extent of control against that seems hardly inappropriate. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that any censorship 
- even when it may be partially justified- presents a troubling precedent and, as such, there is no simple 
answer to the problem between Chavez and the media. That said, much can - and should - be made of 
Canada's asymmetrical responses to Chavez shutting down the right wing media in Venezuela and Lobo 
shutting down the left wing media in Honduras. While there was stony silence as left journalists were 
being assassinated in Honduras, Canada was up in arms over the shut down of TV stations in Venezuela; 
liberal Canada got right in on the action, as not just private media but also the CBC took advantage of the 
excuse to hammer the Chavez government. For instance, Jian Ghomeshi of CBC' s Radio Q hosted a 
sanctimonious program with Elias Bitar - whose RCTV station in Venezuela violated laws passed by the 
Chavez government and was shut down - decrying the censorship of the media in Venezuela. But for all 
his haughtiness on Venezuela, Ghomeshi has never bothered to interview Honduran journalists who have 
faced brutal and immediate violence for their work. For his part, President Chavez responded that he 
wouldn't take advice from a right-wing government that had recently closed its parliament, referring to 
Stephen Harper's "proroguing" of parliament between December 30, 2009 and March 3, 2010, to avoid 
discussion of Canadian military abuses in Afghanistan. 
574 In fact, meetings with the actual government of Venezuela weren't even on the itinerary. D-FAIT, 
"Minister of State Kent to Visit Venezuela and Bolivia," No. 31, January 19, 2010. 
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by the state. 575 Justifying his aggressive statements on Venezuela, Kent told the press, 
"in the past, our obsession with consensus and resolving differences within the [OAS] has 
sometimes meant that countries don't speak out against those who are less diligent in 
defending the principles of democracy [for] which we all officially pledged to defend." 
This is an extraordinarily hypocritical statement in light of Canada's relationship to a 
regime in Honduras that took power by military force. 576 
There was, further, a perverse irony in Kent's sanctimony with regard to the 
alleged repression of the press in Caracas. The veteran journalist-turned-Minister never 
once bothered to speak of the complete crackdown on the Honduran press after the coup 
which saw all news outlets, TV, radio and print, forced to choose between supporting the 
coup or being shut-down, sometimes violently. Radio Globo, as noted above, was (and 
remains) under constant harassment since the coup and during Pepe Lobo' s 
administration; its offices were ransacked in September 2009, its signal was disrupted on 
numerous occasions in 2009 and 2010, and its reporters were consistently attacked. 577 
For instance, "Tras la Verdad'' (Seeking the Trnth) was one of Globo's most popular 
shows and was very critical of the coup regime; it's host, Luis Galdamez, was shot on 
September 4, 2010, by gunmen outside his home in Tegucigalpa. He survived the attack, 
but as he said on the air shortly thereafter, "the threats are constant, the persecution is 
575 Todd Gordon and Jeffrey Webber, "Canada's Long Embrace of the Honduran Dictatorship," The Bullet 
No. 330, March 20, 2010. 
576 Peter Kent, quoted in Cindy Chan, "Minister Kent defends free speech rights in Venezuela," Epoch 
Times, February 9, 2010. 
577 An incomplete list of the names of assassinated journalists that year includes Gabriel Fino Noriega, 
Joseph Hernandez Ochoa, David Meza Montesinos, Nahum Palacios, Jose Bayardo Mayrena, Manuel 
Juarez, Jorge Alberto Orellana, Luis Arturo Mondragon, and Israel Zelaya Diaz. 
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constant."578 Felix Molina, one of Honduras' most popular radio journalists and a firm 
supporter of the FNRP, told me that he has to be careful not to be photographed so: that 
the authorities cannot link his face to his name. 579 These are striking illustrations of how 
much democratic space had shrunk in Honduras, where even at the height of the violence 
of the 1980s, mainstream newspapers still felt empowered and willing to report on people 
"disappeared" by death squads like Battalion 3-:t 6. 580 
But Canada's support for the regime that was violently clamping down on the 
media was steadfast, even when it bordered on the absurd. On February 20, 2010, Peter 
Kent concluded a series of meetings with Pepe Lobo, about which I will say more in 
chapter 7, and described his time in Honduras as a "fruitful visit," praising Lobo's efforts 
towards "national reconciliation": 
I have had a very fruitful visit to Honduras, where I had the 
opportunity to meet with President Porfirio Lobo and personally 
congratulate him on becoming President of Honduras. We are 
pleased to see that President Lobo is beginning the process of 
national reconciliation, including supporting the formation of a 
truth commission. This is an important step in healing the 
wounds created by the recent political impasse and for 
Hondurans to regain a sense of trust in their country's democratic 
institutions. 581 
The day after Kent's statement was published, Claudia Larisa Brizuela, daughter of a 
critical Honduran radio journalist and union organilzer, was assassinated on the front steps 
of her house in San Pedro Sula, killed in retribution for her father's involvement in the 
578 Luis Galdamez, quoted in Jackie B. Diaz, "Freedom of the Press Threatened in Honduras," Jnfosurhoy, 
March 23, 2011. Available at: 
http://www.infosurhoy.com/cocoon/saii/xhtml/en GB/features/saii/features/main/2011/03/22/feature-O 1 
579 Interview with Felix Molina, May 2, 2012. -
580 Pine, 51. 
581 D-F AIT, "Minister of State Kent Concludes Successful Visit to Honduras," February 22, 2010. 
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peaceful resistance to the coup.582 Canada issued no statements on Brizuela's murder, 
and the pro-coup Honduran newspaper La Tribuna insisted that the police were "hot on 
the trail" of gang members suspected of the killing, though it was obvious to her father, 
Pedro Brizuela, that she was targeted in order to silence him. 
Indeed, the weeks leading up to Kent's ''fruitful visit" were particularly bloody in 
Honduras. Kent's statement was released on Ft:bruary 20; consider events that preceded 
it. On February 3, the body of Vanessa Zepeda Alonzo, anti-coup activist in the Social 
Security Employees Union, was thrown out of a car in Tegucigalpa. On February 15, 
gunmen on motorcycles shot to death Julio Hmez Benitez, an active member of the 
Workers Union of Aqueducts and Sewer System (SANAA) outside his home in Brisas de 
Olancho, Tegucigalpa. On February 17, critical journalist Enrique Gudiel, from Danli, 
found his seventeen-year-old daughter Dara dead. He had already been _given a warning 
to end his critical broadcasts; his daughter had been kidnapped once before. When 
Gudiel found her the second time, she had been hanged. Strange fruit, indeed, that 
Canada's representative was endorsing in Honduras. 583 
Violent retribution for anti-coup journalism became an expected risk of doing the 
work after June 2009, and it was particularly pronounced in the early part of Pepe Lobo's 
government. Despite reporting his regular death threats to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights {IACHR) while covering the ongoing agrarian conflicts in 
the Aguan Valley, Nahun Palacios was shot repeatedly in his car on March 14, 2010 by 
582 Belen Fernandez, "Honduran newspaper discovers murder after 3 days," Pulse Media, February 27, 
2010. 
583 The reader will, I hope, forgive my use of Peter Kent's words to draw out the twisted irony of Canada's 
disingenuous statements. "Strange Fruit" was, of course, the title of Billie Holiday's famous song, written 
by American Marxist Abel Meeropol in 1936 in response to the continued practice of White Supremacist 
lynchings in the American South. That Peter Kent should describe his visit to Honduras as 'fruitful,' just 
three days after a young girl was hanged in a politically motivated killing, should be a reminder of the 
macabre indifference with which imperial powers regard the victims of their machinations. 
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gunmen with AK-47s. Nine months earlier, on June 30, 2009 - just two days after the 
coup - Honduran soldiers had broken into his home and held his children at gunpoint 
while destroying his video equipment. No proper investigation was conducted into his 
death, and his body was exhumed in August 2010 with the case left "unsolved." Palaciios 
was news director at Aguan Television Canal 5, and had covered FNRP events and the 
repression of poor farmers by prominent golpista Miguel Facusse. 584 
ONGOING REPRESSION - CAMPESINOS, TEACHERS, ACTIVISTS 
All of this had to be selectively and wilfully ignored in order for Canada to 
maintain its position in support of the Lobo government, and the above description is but 
a small piece of the overall picture of repression that has characterized Honduras under 
the coup regime. Indeed, direct targeting of movement activists is not the only form that 
the violence has taken; the rupture of the rule of law at the highest level accelerated the 
breakdown of all civil society institutions that worked to limit the aggression of local and 
foreign oligarchs, such that the capitalist classes and armed forces have been able to 
crack down on any person or group that threatens their interests - whether directly linked 
to the FNRP or not -with impunity. An illustrative example can be found in the ongoing 
conflict between campesino communities in the Aguan Valley and the estate of Miguel 
Facusse, a member of one of Honduras' most powerful families and one of the central 
figures behind the coup. Members of the peasant community of Guadalupe Camey were 
asserting their access to land to which they believed they had a legal right, but that had 
been forcibly taken over by Facusse. In fact, according to a FIAN-Honduras document of 
November 16, 2010, the land was bought in 1977 - illegally according to the Constitution 
584 Sandra Cuffe, "The Snakes Sleep: Attacks against the Media and Impunity in Honduras," Upside Down 
World, November 23, 2010. 
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at the time - by a U.S. citizen who was forced to tum the land over to the Honduran 
government in 1983 for the construction of a joint U.S.-Honduran military base. When 
the base - which had been used to train Honduran military in torture techniques585 - was 
dismantled, the land was sold to wealthy cattle ranchers, despite protestations in the 
community that the land was owned by the state and legally ought to be turned over to 
landless peasants through INA, the national agrarian institute. In 1993, after much 
struggle, the state formally agreed to distribute the land in question among landless 
campesinos in the region, but the cattle ranchers who had moved in did not cede the land 
and the state refused to confront them, leaving campesino groups to defend their land on 
their own against the powerful and wealthy oligarchs who routinely used private security 
. t k d h . 586 compames o attac an arass campesinos. 
Not surprisingly, this already dangerous conflict for Honduran campesinos was 
made far worse by the June 2009 coup, as its architects were members of the same 
oligarchy that dominates the Aguan Valley. Indeed, Miguel Facusse - one of Pepe 
Lobo's closest associates - occupies several hundred acres in the region and his hired 
guns have showed little restraint in efforts to evict the campesinos; in November 2010, 
four activists in the Movimiento Unificado Campesino del Aguan (MUCA) were killed by 
private security guards - some of them ex-paramilitaries from Colombia - working for 
Facusse.587 The attack, which also left four people wounded and two "disappeared," was 
carried out as part of an eviction of members of M:UCA claiming their legal right to the' 
585 Peter Lackowski, "A State of Siege in Northern Honduras: Land, Palm Oil and Media," Upside Down 
World, November 30, 2010. 
586 FIAN-Honduras, "Violence and Death in the Aguan Valley," Nov. 16, 2010. 
587 In October 2009, the UN Special Rapporteur on the use of mercenaries reported that Honduran 
landowners had hired 40 members of the Self Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), classified as a terrorist 
organization by the US government. 
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land. Yet, Honduran police did not arrive until the violent eviction was in its eighth hour, 
and they did nothing to assist the MUCA activists; the end result of the anival of police 
was the completion of the eviction and the maintenance of Facusse' s occupation of the 
land.588 
MUCA had spent nearly a decade building up its legal case around the land, but it 
consistently found that whenever its cases came: close to bearing fruit, the prosecutors in 
question would be bribed and the cases would be thrown out. Nevertheless, MUCA grew 
in strength and continued to file lawsuits and stage demonstrations, including a dramatic 
36 hour occupation by some 500 campesinos of a key stretch of highway in February 
2006, just a few days after Manuel Zelaya took office.589 MUCA was able to reach an 
agreement with the Zelaya government to have the situation properly investigated and, 
unlike his predecessors, Zelaya appeared to be making good on his promises.590 MUCA 
maintained its pressure - occupying one of Facusse's African palm processing plants on 
June 8, 2009 - and as of June 12, 2009, MUCA had a second agreement with Zelaya to 
have a detailed legal report on MUCA's claim to the land within thirty days. When I 
spoke to Joni Rivas, one of MUCA's co-directors, in May 2012, he was quick to note that 
although MUCA had been vocally and publicly demanding action from the Zelaya 
government, they had to acknowledge that his administration had been somewhat 
receptive to those demands. On June 19, 2009, Zelaya visited the Aguan personally, to 
guarantee that the land would be returned to the campesinos, and the oligarchy responded 
588 FIAN-Honduras, "Violence and Death in the Aguan Valley," Nov. 16, 2010. 
589 Interview with Joni Rivas, May 3, 2012. 
590 Peter Lackowski, "A State of Siege in Northern Honduras: Land, Palm Oil and Media," Upside Down 
World, November 30, 2010. 
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with an assassination attempt against Fabio Ochoa, a lawyer working on MUCA's case, 
on June 23, 2009.591 
Five days later, Zelaya was overthrown and the coup regime subsequently 
reversed all of the progress made under Zelaya by the simple introduction of 
overwhelming physical force including, in one case, the complete physical destruction of 
an entire community. On July 13, 2011, Amnesty lntemational's Canadian office issued 
an urgent call for support for the victims of military/police attacks against the community 
ofRigores, which had left some 500 people homdess and displaced: 
The eviction order was issued on May 23, but the community 
was not informed. The police arrived in Rigores at 10 am on June 
24 and told community members that they had two hours to pack 
up and leave. At around 2 pm, the police began to destroy 
communal buildings, people's homes and their belongings. 
Nobody was offered alternative housiing, resettlement or access 
to productive land, or compensation, either in advance of or since 
the eviction. Nor was anyone guaranteed safe access to tend their 
crops, many of which were destroyed during the eviction. 
Around 80 people, mainly women and children, have taken 
shelter in the Rigores Community Centre, about 3 km away. The 
centre is not designed for people to live in. The building is 
overcrowded, and lets in rainwater, lleaving half the building 
constantly wet. The centre has very few toilets and washing 
facilities. The community members, particularly young children, 
are at risk of disease. The community depends on the land from 
which they were evicted in Rigores for their survival. 592 
Despite Amnesty's efforts, the repression went on without interruption; just days after the 
Amnesty report, on July 17, 2011, two more campesinos from MUCA were killed. The 
following week, on July 23, 2011, one of MUCA's leaders, Julian Alvarenga, was killed 
in a marketplace where he was buying food with a friend, who was also wounded in the 
591 Interview with Joni Rivas, May 3, 2012. 
592 
"Update and Action for the Campesinos ofRigores, Aguan" Honduras Resiste, July 13, 2011. 
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attack.593 As of my May 2012 interview with Joni Rivas, MUCA reported that hundreds 
of its members had been detained and charged with crimes - often theft - and fifty-six 
campesinos had been assassinated by paramilitaries, police and military in the serviqe of 
large landowners like F acusse. 594 
The Lobo government has also targeted Honduran teachers, whose 65,000-
member union, the Federaci6n de Organizaciones Magisteriales de Honduras (FOMH), 
has been among Honduras' strongest and most defiant civil society sectors over the past 
decade. Between 1997-2009, teachers managed to pressure four consecutive 
governments into writing, signing and actually implementing the Teachers' Statute, 
which institutionalized regular pay increases and benefits. 595 As noted above, the 
teachers' unions were instrumental in pushing Manuel Zelaya to adopt a number of 
reform-minded positions, they were important in the building of the CNRP, and in the 
aftermath of the coup the teachers have often occupied crucial roles in the FNRP. 
Between June 2009 and June 2011, teachers engaged in a variety of job actions, including 
a hunger strike in June 2010 to protest firings of school officials connected to the 
FNRP,596 and two major strikes in August and October of that same year in response to 
593 
"Latest News," Honduras Resiste, July 23, 2011. 
594 This number, however, is still growing and, as such, successive drafts of this chapter yield higher figures 
each time. In a September 2012 draft, I had to include the assassinations of two lawyers who were 
handling MUCA's cases, Antonio Trejo Cabrera and Manuel Eduardo Diaz Mazariegos. It is also, as 
always, the lowest possible estimate since many deaths can only be indirectly attributed to political 
repression. It also excludes the many people victimized as a result of circumstances created by the violence 
and insecurity, as in the case of five Honduran Pepsi employees, killed on August 15, 2011, by security 
guards who mistook them for members ofMUCA. 
595 Daniel Altschuler, "Between Resistance and Co-optation: The Politics of Education in the Honduran 
Crisis" in NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 43, No. 2, March/April 2010, pp. 23-29. 
596 Kari Lydersen, "Fired for Opposing Coup, Honduran Educators Go On Hunger Strike," Working In 
These Times, July 5, 2010. 
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the Lobo governments' refusal to pay millions of dollars in back pay and an estimated 
$159 million in "missing" pension money. 597 
Predictably, the repression has fallen hard on the teachers. They have been 
among the most regularly targeted for state violence; popular high school teacher Blas 
Lopez was discovered dead from gunshot wounds on January 30, 2010, just three days 
after Pepe Lobo was inaugurated. In March 2010, well-known teacher and activist Jose 
Manuel Flores was shot to death in front of his students at the high school where he 
taught.598 A year later, on March 18, 2011, Ilse: lvania Velazquez Rodriguez was killed 
during a police attack on the offices of the Jnstituto Nacional de Prevision de/ Magisterio 
(INPREMA), which the teachers had occupied to demand the millions of dollars owed to 
their pension fund. 599 Alongside the campaign of violence, Lobo and his associates used 
their domination of the Honduran media to paint a masterful smear campaign against the 
teachers, calling their strikes "human rights violattions" and suggesting that the teachers 
were akin to terrorists.600 The public campaign against the teachers helped spur on the 
creation of largely pro-coup parents' organizations601 that helped bring momentum to the 
regime's clamp down by de-legitimizing the teachers' demands; that is, teachers were 
597 Kari Lydersen, "Angered by President 'Pepe,' Teachers Strike Again in Honduras" Working In These 
Times, Nov. 5, 2010. 
598 Maquila Solidarity Network, "New Wave of Repression Targets Opponents of Honduran Coup," The 
Bullet, May 6, 2010. 
599 According to COFADEH, police reported the death as caused by a 'traffic accident.' In fact, Velazquez 
Rodriguez was part of a group of teachers attacked by police during a peaceful demonstration; as police 
fired tear gas into the crowd, people became asphyxiated and confused and a forced evacuation route 
became blocked. In the melee, Velazquez Rodriguez was hit in the face by a tear gas canister, knocking 
her out; she fell to the street and while laying unconscious on Boulevard Francia, she was hit by a car. As 
such, COF ADEH declares Velazquez Rodriguez a victim of state repression, not a traffic accident. 
Honduras Resiste, "Urgent Action from COF ADEH," June 16, 2011. 
60° Kari Lydersen, "Angered by President 'Pepe,' Teachers Strike Again in Honduras" Working In These 
Times, Nov. 5, 2010. 
601 Some, like the Federaci6n de Asociaciones de Padres y Madres de Familia por la Educacion de 
Honduras (F AP AMEH) have made efforts to present themselves as 'politically neutral' and interested only 
in bettering the Honduran education system, while others like Volvamos a Clases ("Let's Return to Class") 
are transparently pro-coup and anti-union. 
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criticized in the context of their particular material struggles - around the underfunded, 
understaffed and overstretched education system - and this made it easier for the regime 
to delegitimate the broader coup resistance, in which they played a crucial role. The 
mobilization of public anger towards the teachers was manifest in direct and sometimes 
violent actions by parents against teachers' strikes, and made it easier for the state to 
justify it's own crackdowns on teachers in the resistence.602 
Meanwhile, far from reining in the violence, the Lobo government increasingly 
facilitated and encouraged it through a series of new laws that emboldened the already 
deeply repressive apparatus. In November 2010, the regime passed new 'anti-terrorist' 
laws, which criminalized a variety of movement organizations and severely restricted 
rights of free association. In the months that followed, Congress amended the 
constitution to allow police to forcibly enter peoples' homes without a warrant and to 
detain people without charge for up to 48 hours.603 With help from its North American 
partners, the Honduran regime drafted and passed a related law that empowered the 
police and armed forces to intercept peoples' private communications for surveillance. 604 
What is more, extensions to the definition of the crime of "sedition" allowed the 
Honduran police, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(UNHCHR), to arrest anyone "engaged in actions with a political dimension, such as 
painting graffiti with a political message or the simple act of participating in a political 
demonstration. "605 Lobo also proposed the creation of a new tax on businesses but, rather 
than use it to moderately re-distribute wealth, he intended to earmark the money for 
602 Daniel Altschuler, "Between Resistance and Co-optation: The Politics of Education in the Honduran 
Crisis" in NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 43, No. 2, March/April 2010, pp. 23-29. 
603 Gordon and Webber, "From Cartagena to Tegucigalpa ... " 
604 Interview with Felix Molina, May 2, 2012. 
605 Peace Brigades International, "Report of the Short-Term Mission to Honduras," October 2011. 
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increased security costs. The proposal has taken different forms and it remains unclear 
exactly how it will look when it is passed; at one point, the proposal was to place a 2% 
tax on the profits of mining companies, later it was amended to affect anyone who had 
over L150,000 in their bank accounts. Whatever it ends up looking like, the tax is meant 
to cover Lobo's commitment to the police of an additional Ll.5 billion in each of the mext 
five years. The point, as Felix Molina puts it, is that it will reinforce the relation~hip 
whereby "the oligarchy pays for the police force it wants."606 
Things have, predictably, only gotten worse for groups and individuals either 
connected to the social movement or engaged in any activity that could undermine the 
interests of the oligarchy, the narco gangs, the state, or the armed forces. In February 
2011, COFADEH published the following updatt::: 
On the 25th of February, 2011, at 8:13pm, Jose Trinidad 
Sanchez, [Executive Director of the Network for Alternative 
Community Trade (COMAL)], received a text message on his 
cellphone with the following text: "Trinidad WE KNOW 
WHERE YOU ARE YOU LIVE IN EL PORVENIR your days 
are limited so enjoy what you have :robbed from Comal as of 
today count down your days you are being watched you dog." 
This is not the first act against Trinidad or the members of his 
family. In August, 2010, his 25-year-old son Jorge Luis ... was 
detained and subject to mistreatment by agents of the 
Preventative Police who accused him of being Cuban. After 
hitting his head against ~ wall, handcuffing him and throwing 
him against the sidewalk, they expelled him from the department 
and ordered him not to return. 607 
I spoke with Trinidad in 2009 when the COMAL offices were first ransacked by the 
military (as described in Chapter 5) and as we surveyed the damage he told me, "we 
606 Interview with Felix Molina, May 2, 2012. 
607 COF ADEH, "Urgent Action: Human Rights Defender Threatened and Given Ultimatum," March 7, 
2011. 
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represent the poorest people here. We help them to sell their product, but we also teach 
them why they are poor. For this, we are a threat."608 
To be interpreted as a threat, then, is to be targeted for violence. Cases like that of 
Trinidad Sanchez are common, and the patterns are repeated in every sector that seems to 
present a challenge to the current order. Labour unions continued to be aggressively 
harassed by state violence, as on March 1, 2011:, when an active member of the Sindicato 
de Trabajadores de la Jndustria de la Bebida (STIBYS) was shot in the face on his way 
to work; Eduardo Argueta Santos had recently denounced the systematic targeting of 
trade unionists. 609 In the same month, Miriam Miranda, renowned Garifuna activist and 
leader in OFRANEH, was arrested, beaten, and detained for hours without access to 
medical attention. In the litany of racially charged insults that she received from police, 
it was clear that the assault was politically motivated.610 In February 2011, Annarela 
Velez was targeted because she was the vice-president of C-Libre, a civil liberties 
watchdog organization. Students who demanded free education were routinely attacked; 
in 2011, hundreds of students were incarcerated or charged with criminal offenses and 
many faced extreme violence, like 17-year old Nahun Alexander Guerra, who was killed 
on August 22, 2011. 
Human rights observers themselves, not surprisingly, are directly targeted. In 
December 2011, COFADEH released a report that detailed the myriad ways that its work, 
and that of other human rights organizations, was being undermined, ranging from direct 
violence against human rights observers and advocates to attempts by the state to 
608 Interview with Jose Trinidad Sanchez, November 28, 2009. 
609 U.S. Labor Education in the Americas Project (USLEAP), "Honduras News Labor Update," March 
2011. Available at: htto://www.usleap.org/files/Honduras%20News%20Labor%20Update March.pdf 
610 Miriam Miranda, "Honduras: El golpe de Estado, sus hered1eros y la criminalizaci6n de la protesta 
social," Honduras Resiste, Mar. 29, 2011. 
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criminalize their organizations using the new anti-terrorist laws.611 COFADEH's own 
staff, for instance, were regularly threatened and intimidated, and the patterns are often 
similar: text messages or phone calls that threatened violence against individuals and 
their loved ones, often containing personal information designed to show the victim that 
they have been watched. Victims are followed in the streets, by men on motorcycles or 
by vehicles with dark, tinted windows. Sometimes the vehicles will park outside 
peoples' homes and stay there for days. Other times the same vehicle will pass by a 
victim multiple times, daily, over a sustained period of time. Sometimes warning shots 
will be fired, or menacing messages will be left at peoples' homes, or armed men will 
actually force themselves into peoples' homes. The regularity with which these threats 
are followed up by actual physical attacks makes them genuinely and profoundly 
terrifying for the victims.612 
Meanwhile, as of December 2011, over 650 human rights workers - individuals 
working feverishly to document this campaign of terror- were facing criminal charges as 
a result of their work. According to COFADEH: 
Defenders of human rights, especially women working in poor 
communities, are also themselves victims of abuse on the part of 
agents of the state. It has become common for the authorities to 
refuse to offer any protection and to fail to comply with their 
responsibility to investigate or sanction those responsible for the 
attacks. 613 
611 Claiming, for instance, that COF ADEH's efforts to document the violence against organized campesino 
movements in the Aguan constitutes support for terrorist activities, since those groups are increasingly 
being labelled "terrorist" groups in order to justify their repression. COF ADEH, "Informe: Situaci6n de 
defensores de derechos humanos en Honduras," Tegucigalpa, December 2011. 
612 A quick scan of COF ADER' s regular reports demonstrates these patterns and, indeed, when I've 
travelled and worked with COF ADER, FIAN and other human rights documenters, I've heard these types 
of stories over and over again. 
613 COF ADER, "Informe" p. 26. 
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Indeed, feminist and women's groups consistently report that their attempts to document 
and defend human rights abuses against women are met with open hostility from state 
authorities. Gladys Lanza, veteran activist in the women's movement in Honduras and 
president of the Movimiento de Mujeres por la Paz "Visitacion Padilla, " described an 
example of the routine violence she and her colleagues face: 
We live in fear. We can't go out at night. One woman who 
works here [documenting violence against women] was assaulted 
right in front of our building. We took a video of the assault to 
the police and they did nothing. She was badly beaten, her 
clothes were ripped, she had bruises on her arms, her things were 
taken. But the police did nothing.614 
This is not an exceptional situation but, rather, it is the norm. Organizers and workers in 
the women's organization Centro de Estudio de la Mujer-Honduras (CEM-H) were, for 
instance, constantly harassed and intimidated by armed men who followed them on 
motorcycles, entered their homes without warrants, and sent threatening messages, while 
they tried to organize demonstrations around the Day Against Violence Against Women 
in 2010. The demonstrations, too, were subjected to repressive violence from local and 
national authorities.615 
What is more, the extreme violence meted out by the state, since 2009, 
exacerbated already-existing patterns of violence in Honduras, some of which I discussed 
in Chapter 4. Gladys Lanza reports that after the coup, violence against women rose by 
50%; in 2009, there were 108 women murdered before the June 2009 coup, but over 300 
women were murdered between July and December. These figures only represent those 
women who were killed; they do not include the tens of thousands of women who were 
beaten, raped, tortured or subjected to other forms of violence. According to Lanza: 
614 Interview with Gladys Lanza, May 7, 2012. 
615 COFADEH, "Informe," p. 27. 
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[In 2010], there were more than 18,000 complaints of domestic 
violence. Most of these are never dealt with at all; of the 18,000, 
over 11,000 were never even investigated. This tells us that 
women are not guaranteed any safety in this country. We 
discover that the police are involved in organized crime - how is 
a woman facing violence going to trust the police? Many times 
it is in the very police stations where they are attacked and 
raped.616 
The grafting of direct political violence onto a pre-existing matrix of social 
violence is a crucial piece in understanding this moment in Honduras, and is perhaps best 
exemplified in the acceleration of the extra judicial killings of youths, as described· in 
Chapter 4. Though the killings received a fair bit of attention in the late 1990s, this 
violence actually persisted throughout the 2000s; Casa Alianza reports that between 1998 
and 2009 there were 4999 violent deaths of youths under 23 years of age. After the coup 
d'etat, the numbers of youth killings shot up evm higher; in 2008, a total of 2154 youths 
were killed, but in 2009, the total reached 2578.617 As in the case of violence against 
women, then, the coup served to invigorate and empower the forces of reaction; an 
existing culture of impunity for killing urban poor youth was buttressed by an example of 
impunity at the highest level, and the endorsement of violence and the entrenchment of 
the Honduran right made it easy for the definition of the "dangerous youth" to be 
expanded to encompass political activists, so that violence against both politicized and 
non-politicized youth increased. In an important document analyzing this violence, as it 
occurs across Central America, Claudia Virginia Samayoa et al describe this dynamic 
and the concurrent response: 
In the context of a constitutional and institutional rupture, 
Honduran youth have begun to confront the reality that this 
ongoing problem raises a series of challenges for the youth and 
616 Interview with Gladys Lanza, May 7, 2012. 
617 Virginia Samayoa et al., 227. 
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for the population in general. In this context, the youth and the 
popular organizations and the parfa~s and movements of the left 
in opposition to the de facto government are added to the balance 
of forces in resistance, manifest in the growth of democratic, 
progressive and leftist tendencies. This new block came together 
after June 2009 and caught the attention of the state security 
forces, which have focused their repression systematically and 
selectively against this sector of the population. 618 
Indeed, while liberal observers from the Global North often demand to see spec:i:fic, 
verifiable cases and figures for "political killings" or "coup-related violence," the reality 
is that the coup served to exacerbate existing and ongoing violence and further blur the 
distinction between "political" and "common" criminality, such that a neat separation of 
these categories is neither possible nor analyticallly meaningful. 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION? 
In light of the overview I have just provided with respect to the complicated and 
ongoing repressive campaign pursued by the Lobo regime throughout its term in office, 
one can only reflect on the regime's creation of a so-called Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission with rather mirthless irony. The Commission was passed into Honduran 
law on April 13, 2010, and held its "investigations" between May 4, 2010 and July 7, 
2011, concurrent to the repression documented above, and it was widely and immediately 
discredited as another sham for the whitewashing of the regime - how can there be 
reconciliation when the crimes are ongoing? On the day the Commission was 
inaugurated, Bertha Oliva of COF ADEH note:d that the Presidential decree that 
established the commission did not even deign to admit that what happened in June 2009 
was, in fact, a coup d'etat. She added that any meaningful attempt to bring reconciliation 
of any kind would require that all sides of a disput{~ be included in the process; naturally, 
618 Virginia Samayoa et al., 229. (Translated from Spanish. AH translations by the author unless otherwise 
indicated.) 
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Lobo handpicked the commissioners to ensure: that the results came out favourably for 
the golpistas.619 That COFADEH - and countless other groups that opposed the col!.lp -
continued to face daily, violent repression while the Commission conducted it_s inquiry 
made the legitimacy of its "findings" a laughabl1e proposition. 
Undaunted by, or wilfully ignorant of, Bertha Oliva's comments, Canada 
enthusiastically supported the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and was eager to 
send a representative to sit on the commission. Said Peter Kent: 
Canada strongly supports the creation of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. The commission is essential to 
advancing the process of national reconciliation and dialogue 
across all sectors in Honduras. Its work will also help Hondurans 
regain confidence in their democratic institutions.620 
Indeed, not only did Canada provide political support for the commission, it offered 
logistical support by sending Canadian corporate law consultant Michael Kergin to sit as 
a commissioner. Peter Kent's office announced its congratulations to Kergin, noting, 
with brazen disregard for reality, that "Canada was deeply involved in all efforts to reach 
a peaceful, negotiated solution to the political impasse in Honduras, and has committed to 
assisting the country with its reconciliation process."621 On Kergin, Kent added: 
Canadian participation in the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission is a clear reflection of Canada's commitment to the 
Americas. Mr. Kergin is a distinguished Canadian diplomat with 
extensive experience in the Americas and in the promotion of 
Canadian values of democracy and human rights. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission will greatly benefit from his 
contribution. 622 
619 Bertha Oliva, "A Real Truth Commission for Honduras," May 4, 2010. 
620 DFAIT, "Canada Supports Creation of Honduras Truth and Reconciliation Commission," April 15, 
2010. 
621 DFAIT, "Canada Supports Creation of Honduras Truth and Reconciliation Commission," April 15, 
2010. 
622 DFAIT, "Canada Supports Creation of Honduras Truth and Reconciliation Commission," April 15, 
2010. 
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"Distinguished" is precisely how corporate law firm Bennett-Jones described 
Michael Kergin when it hired him earlier in 2009 to be a senior consultant. "Mr. Kergin 
has had a distinguished career in public service," said CEO Hugh McKinnon,623 whose 
firm specializes in matters related to energy and resource-extraction companies and 
describes itself as having a "sterling profile as the leading energy and natural resources 
firm in the country."624 However, what distinguishes Michael Kergin most- with respect 
to his role on the Honduran Truth Commission - must be his connection to another 
infamous Latin American coup d'etat: the 1973 overthrow of Chilean President Salvador 
Allende. Kergin joined Canada's foreign service in 1967 and in the 1970s he was posted 
in New York, Cameroon and, most notably, in Chile. It is worth pausing briefly to reflect 
on Canada's foreign policy behaviour towards Chile during Kergin's era; when 
democratic elections came out in favour of openly Marxist-inspired Salvador Allende in 
1970, Canada immediately suspended all foreign aid and petitioned the IMF to withdraw 
support from Chile. When Allende invited then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to 
Santiago, he refused. This remarkably hostile attitude towards a democratically elected 
government stood in stark contrast to Canada's. position in 1973, when Allende was 
overthrown by a violent military coup. Within three weeks of the September 11 coup, as 
Gen. Augusto Pinochet consolidated power and foar and repression gripped the country, 
Canadian Ambassador Andrew Ross wrote to Ottawa: 
I can see no useful purpose to withholding recognition [of 
Pinochet's regime] unduly. Indeed, such action might even tend 
to delay Chile's eventual return to the democratic process.625 
623 Hugh McKinnon, "Bennett-Jones Welcomes Michael Kergin As Senior Advisor," Jan 5, 2009. 
624 Bennett-Jones LLP, "Practices," available at http://www.bennettjones.com/Practices/. 
625 Andrew Ross, quoted in Yves Engler, The Black Book of Canadian Foreign Policy, Femwood, Black 
Point, 2009, p. 99-100. 
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That refusing to recognize a military regime o:n the basis of the illegality of its accession 
and the violence of its rule could be called "withholding recognition unduly" is 
remarkable in itself, as is the half-hearted hope for Chile's "eventual" return to 
democracy. Pinochet's dictatorship was one of the most notorious in recent Latin 
American history, and Canada's support for :it certainly did not hasten the return to 
democracy; Pinochet held power for some 1 7 years and he died as a process had been set 
in motion to have him indicted by an international tribunal for crimes against humanity. 
But in 1973, Canada happily extended its arms to his regime, re-opening trade relations 
and foreign aid, which amounted to over $1 billion in aid and loans - including money 
loaned for the purpose of purchasing Canadian military technology for the state and its 
secret police agency (DINA)- and the same amount in direct foreign investment.626 
While Kergin himself was likely only marginally involved in establishing 
Canadian policy towards Chile in this period, it is instructive to witness the similarities 
between Canada's position on Chile in the 1970s and its position in Honduras in the 
2000s. Moreover, Kergin's institutional location and experience in Chile in the 1970s 
speaks volumes about the perspective he would bring to bear on the Honduran coup. 
Following his time in Chile, Kergin was named Canada's ambassador to Cuba, a post he 
held during 1986-1989,627 a period in which Canada's continued relationship with Cuba 
has been characterized as one in which Canada largely served as the eyes and ears of the 
United States in hostile territory: U.S. state department officials acknowledged that 
Canada provided the best military intelligence it had on Cuba, as Canada's 
Communications Security Establishment (CSE) used the Canadian Embassy in Havana as 
626 Engler, 100-101. 
627 Government of Canada, "Michael Kergin," online profile at: 
http://www.canadaintemational.gc.ca/washington/offices-bureaux/amb/kergin.aspx?view=d. 
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an interception point for the private communications of high-ranking Cuban officials. 628 
After his time spying on Cuba, Kergin filled a variety of diplomatic posts in Washington, 
primarily that of Ambassador (2000-2005), after which Kergin entered into semi-
retirement with corporate law firm Bennett-Jom:s, as noted above. 
Bennett-Jones claims to be "a leading business law firm founded and focused on 
principles of professional excellence, integrity, respect, and independent thought.''629 
Those lofty claims, however, stand in stark contradiction to their actions and the clients 
they represent. In 2012, their website boasted of their work on behalf of much-maligned 
Canadian mining company Barrick Gold, advocacy for Compass Petroleum Ltd, 
purchases by Canadian subsidiaries of British Petroleum, and other work with a variety of 
similar corporations.630 Bennett-Jones had experit:mce in Honduras directly, in its work on 
behalf of Canadian investors who were defrauded by the Canadian owners of the 
Merendon mining project in Honduras.631 It is clt::ar that Michael Kergin had a great deal 
of expertise with respect to international trade and corporate law. It is unclear how that 
should qualify him to sit on a human rights commission following a coup whose leaders 
were cosy with the firms that Kergin represents in his day job. 
In the context of Canada's broader interests in Honduras - to which I will return 
in Chapter 7 - Kergin appeared to be a perfect fit for the role; his diplomatic postings in 
other Latin American countries provided some legjtimacy for his inclusion in the panel 
while his strong connection to the Canadian corporate sector ensured that he would not be 
easily convinced to push hard against the new regime. In addition to Kergin, the 
628 Engler, 19-21. 
629 
"Bennett-Jones Welcomes Michael Kergin As Senior Advisor," Canada Newswire, Jan 5, 2009. 
630 Bennett-Jones, LLP, "Our Work," available athttp://www.hennettjones.com/Ourwork/ . 
631 Jennifer Wells, "Ponzi Canadian Style," Toronto Star, September 20, 2009. 
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commission was headed by former Guatemalan vice-president Eduardo Stein, and the 
other commissioners were former Peruvian justice minister Maria Amadilia, and Julieta 
Castellanos and Jorge Omar Casco, president and former-president of the National 
Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH) irespectively, both of whom supported the 
coup.632 This was, in effect, a coalition composed of Pepe Lobo's arms-length alliies, 
proposing to investigate claims of human rights violations while they continued to take 
place. As Annie Bird succinctly put it, "while the US and Canadian governments ... 
assist the Honduran government in creating the illusion of 'reconciliation,' death squads 
assassinate journalists, teachers and unionists."633 
Indeed, it is worth underlining the fact that Canada's participation in the 
Commission flew in the face of a number of international organizations that vehemently 
rejected the legitimacy of the project. The C<::ntre for Justice and International Law 
(CEJIL), drawing on reports from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (a 
sub-committee of the OAS), detailed the circumstances that made the Honduran Truth 
Commission irredeemably flawed and concluded: 
The inauguration of a truth commission with such significant 
flaws should not be cause for celebration. Nor should it smooth 
the road to the unconditional reintegration of Honduras into the 
international community. The legal and economic limitations 
with which the Commission begins its work undermine its 
operation and the results it may obtain. Far from providing 
support for a serious process of reconciliation, they may generate 
new sources of indignation. 634 
Among other things, CEJIL noted that the Commissioners were handpicked supporters of 
the regime, that the Commission was not empowered to investigate human rights abuses, 
632 Thelma Mejia, "Honduras: Disputed Truth Commission to Investigate Coup" JPS, May 5, 20 I 0. 
633 Annie Bird, "Disappearing Truth in Honduras: Commissions Cover Up Demands for New 
Constitution," Upside Down World, April 13, 2010. 
634 CEJIL, "Reflections on the Opening of the Honduran Truth Commission." 
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that the perpetrators of the coup had already be:en granted legal amnesty for their actions, 
and that Pepe Lobo had specifically expressed that the Commission was "not for judging 
anybody, but rather for finding reconciliation for the Honduran people,"635 to which the 
CEJIL report responded by insisting that "avoiding the assessing of responsibility is a 
guarantee that impunity will be perpetuated."636 
The Commission released its findings just over a year later, on July 7, 2011, timed 
to coincide with the signing of the Cartagena Accord and the reintegration of Hond~ras 
into the OAS. Predictably, the Commission offered little more than bland 
recommendations for minor reform to Honduran governance structures, expending much 
energy on detailed speculation around the possibility of corruption :in the Zelaya 
government, but refusing to place any direct responsibility for the violence and repression 
of the coup and its fallout on any of the individuals involved in actually perpetrating it. 
While the Commission acknowledges that what happened on June 28, 2009 was, indeed, 
a coup d'etat, it worked hard to locate the coup in a context of constitutional violations by 
the Zelaya government. 
Canada's representative, the above-mentioned Michael Kergin, reflected on his 
experiences on the Commission in September 2012, and his short article is an excellent 
articulation of the Commission's position and, especially, Canada's angle within it. As 
background to the coup, Kergin's piece details, rather extensively, speculation that 
Zelaya's government was implicated in corruption. After exhausting every possible 
accusation of corruption and illegality, Kergin briefly acknowledges that it is all 
speculation and none of it could be proven, before reaching the conclusion that all of the 
635 Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo, quoted in Radio America, "Presidente Lobo instala Comisi6n de la Verdad," May 
5, 2010. 
636 CEJIL, "Reflections ... " 
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primary figures in the coup d'etat were implicated in actions that broke with the 1982 
Constitution.637 Cleverly, then, Kergin leaves the impression that, while no one quite 
followed the letter of the law, the crisis was fomented by Zelaya, who had increasingly 
become a puppet of Hugo Chavez, and who, in pursuing the Constituent Assembly in the 
first place, had "borrowed a leaf from the Chave:z playbook." Indeed, the mild critique of 
the golpistas comes at the tail end of many pages of speculative denouncementS' of 
Zelaya's behaviour, ranging from "rampant rumours" of Venezuelan development money 
"funnelled" to labour and peasant organizations and "slush funds," to the "abrupt" raising 
of the minimum wage without Congressional approval, to "peaked anxiety over President 
Zelaya's closeness to Chavez." Meanwhile, Ke:rgin consistently presents the Honduran 
armed forces, Congress, and Supreme Court as acting with restraint in the face . of 
. . 1 d d . b Z 1 638 1rrattona an angerous provocations y e aya. 
Kergin reiterates Canada's early claims that the November 2009 elections were 
free and fair, and that the Lobo government is therefore legitimate. Meanwhile, he 
expends just one paragraph describing the "clumsy" reaction of the armed forces to the 
rising of Zelaya's "partisans," noting that a dozen people were killed by "disproportionate 
use of force," and that eight other people appeared to have been assassinated. Following 
Peter Kent's portrayal of Zelaya's attempts to re-enter Honduras in 2009 as "reckless," 
Kergin describes Zelaya's efforts as "melodramatic" and implicitly connects the increased 
repression in that period to Zelaya's behaviour. In describing the process of the 
Commission itself, Kergin acknowledges that Zelaya and the Resistance - again labelled 
637 Michael Kergin, "The Honduran Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2010-2011)," Optimum Online, 
Vol. 42, No. 3, September 2012, p. 42-45. 
638 Kergin, "Honduran Truth Commission ... " 
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"Zelaya's partisans" - refused to participate andl created a rival Truth Commission which, 
despite the efforts of the official commission, would not cooperate with his. 639 
Kergin rather ironically relates the Commissions' finding that the Honduran 
constitution needs reform, offers a number of other banal observations about the need for 
more transparent governance and rule of law, and presents rather toothless 
recommendations for reparations for "verifiable" cases of human rights abuses. Of 
particular interest is the following paragraph, which I quote in full: 
The [Commission] concluded that [human rights] violations were 
broadly prevalent during the five months of the de facto 
Micheletti government. There are indeed factors which might 
explain, but do not excuse, the excessive use of force during this 
period: a traditional culture of violence in Honduras, 
decentralized control over a widely imd thinly dispersed police 
force; and a lack of professional training at the operational level. 
The small country was also suffering collective paranoia out of 
its isolation from the international community, exacerbated by its 
former president testing its borders with support from South 
American heavy hitters such as Brazil, Venezuela and 
Argentina. 640 
Several of these statements require brief unpacking. First, it needs be noted that by 
articulating in such detail the "explanations" for the "excessive" use of force, Kergin 
implicitly does justify those actions, even if he half-heartedly protests that they cannot be 
justified. Second, it is interesting that, despite acknowledging that it was a coup d'etat, 
Kergin describes Honduras' "former president testing its borders," conveniently 
forgetting that Zelaya was still legally the presid1ent when he "tested" those borders.641 
Finally, it is rather noteworthy that Kergin feels entitled to partially explain the post-coup 
639 Kergin, "Honduran Truth Commission ... " 
64
° Kergin, "Honduran Truth Commission ... " p. 55. 
641 Kergin is referencing Zelaya's two attempts - the first unsuccessful - to re-enter Honduras after being 
kidnapped and exiled. Even the framing of these attempts at "testing the borders" serves to suggest that 
Zelaya was engaged in some sort of provocation. 
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violence on a "traditional culture of violence in Honduras," a statement that smacks of a 
kind of colonial victim-blaming; since Hondurans are "traditionally" violent, according to 
Kergin, we shouldn't be too critical of one group of Hondurans for being violent to 
another. 642 Instead, presumably, the colonial power should intervene to make them· less 
violent, even though that very colonial power is, inevitably, inflicting violence of one .sort 
or another upon its subjects.643 This, of course, is where Kergin's claim ultimately leads: 
his critique of a decentralized and unprofessional police force opens itself perfectly to the 
colonial suggestion that Canada should train the Honduran armed forces to be more 
professional. This is, in fact, what has happened. (I will return to Canada's participation 
in training and police reform in the following chapter). 
642 Adrienne Pine does well to interrogate the notion of a violent Honduran subjectivity in Working Hard, 
Drinking Hard. 
643 It is well outside the scope of this project to dig into the myriad cultural manifestations of colonialism, 
but it is worth briefly highlighting this point. Of course, there is a culture of violence in Honduras, which 
this dissertation has described in some detail. But, as Chapters 3 and 4 endeavoured to demonstrate, that 
culture cannot be separated from the successive waves of violent colonial interventions, subjugations and 
impositions. Describing a "culture of violence" as a product of centuries of colonialism is very different 
from suggesting that there is something inherently violent in a given community, the latter of which has 
been a central component of colonialism for hundreds of yt::ars. The so-called "mission civilisatrice" upon 
which the colonizers embarked, supposedly to bring the "darker" nations in the "light," to bring them out of 
"primitive savagery" into "rational enlightenment," is obviously reliant on the assumption that, indeed, the 
people who were the subjects of colonial interventions were inherently backward. The material purposes of 
the colonial project - thievery, expansion, exploitation - arc subsumed into the cultural justifications that 
give it true form. The victims of colonialism are blamed foir it; "it may be painful but it is for their own 
good," say the colonizers. "They must be broken from their backwards, violent, ignorant, savage ways." 
The colonizers insist that they aren't stealing land and riches and labour, they are simply spreading the best 
of civilization to those who need a helping hand. The violent destruction of entire cultural forms, the 
disrupting of human societal bonds, and the forced re-education into the culture of the colonizer, are 
common manifestations of this discourse, and can be seen in colonial projects ranging from the Canadian 
"residential schools" designed to "beat out the Indian" from surviving Indigenous people in Canada to the 
banning of local customs, ceremonies, family and community structures and even languages, in the 
European conquests of Latin America and Africa. Naturally, this discourse, and the practices that flow 
from it, take a variety of different forms in different times allld places, but they are a consistent and 
insidious element of the colonial project and one can see the discourse at work very clearly in Michael 
Kergin's discussion of Honduras' "traditional culture of violence." This analysis is drawn from the 
scholarship typically associated with postcolonialism, of which much of it accepts the basic arguments I 
have replicated. A few different articulations of these arguments can be found in: Frantz Fanon, The 
Wretched of the Earth, Grove Press, New York, 2004. Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, 
Beacon Press, Boston, 1991. Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, Vintage Press, New York, 1993. 
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Kergin' s colonial arrogance stretched as far as to claim - in spite of a nationwide 
social movement that was demanding a re-opening of the Honduran Constitution to 
popular amendment - that Hondurans did not like Zelaya's version of participatory 
democracy, preferring instead "the Honduran norm" of representative democracy and the 
two-party system.644 Kergin seems to imply that Hondurans just don't want to have; too 
much say in how their lives are governed and would prefer for someone to tell them what 
to do. 645 In light of Kergin' s reflections, then, it is hardly surprising that Canada gushed 
with enthusiasm at the Commission's findings and its tepid criticism of the regime; newly 
appointed Minister of State for the Americas Diane Ablonczy expressed hope "that 
Hondurans will never again experience such an ordeal," ignoring the rather obvious fact 
that the ordeal was ongoing.646 Further emphasizing Canada's complicity in the project 
to whitewash the Honduran coup is the fact that 10% of the Commission's report was 
placed in a Canadian library, to be kept classified :for 10 years. 647 
THE CARTAGENA ACCORDS 
644 Kergin, "Honduran Truth Commission," p. 54. 
645 Again, this echoes the colonial justifications described above, though it represents a slightly different 
version; in this case, the colonizer relies on the discourse of its subjects' "backwardness" to justify 
supporting anti-democratic or otherwise reactionary local leadership. The notion is that the colonized 
subjects are not yet "ready'' for democracy, wealth, autonomy or whatever else popular social movements 
might be demanding. Think of the responses colonial powers always give to assertions of anti-colonial 
struggle; the French couldn't possibly leave Algeria, what would become of the Algerians? Or the Israeli 
answers to Palestinian liberation struggles, which have consistently claimed that Palestinians were not 
capable of responsibly governing their own state. The same discourse justifies Canada's ongoing 
colonization oflndigenous people, whose demands for self-government are always countered by claims 
that they would govern themselves irresponsibly and, as such, still need the Canadian state to take care of 
them. Indeed, Canada extends the same logic to Afghanistan, which it has occupied for over a decade, 
ostensibly because it would fall into chaos and violence if Canadian troops weren't there to take care of 
things. Memmi is particularly poignant on this: "whenever the colonizer adds, in order not to fall prey to 
anxiety, that the colonized is a wicked, backwards person with evil, thievish, somewhat sadistic instincts, 
he thus justifies his police and his legitimate severity. After all, he must defend himself against the 
dangerous, foolish acts of the irresponsible and, at the same time - what meritorious concern! -- protect him 
against himself1" Memmi, 82. 
646 D-FAIT, "Canada Pleased With Release of Honduran Truth .and Reconciliation Commission Final 
Report," July 7, 2011. 
647 Todd Gordon and Jeffery R. Webber, "The Cartagena Accord: A Step Forward for Canada in 
Honduras," The Bullet, No. 526, July 13, 2011. 
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Coinciding with the release of the Trnth Commission findings, and against the 
backdrop of the steady, continuing cycle of resistance and repression, on May 22, 2011, 
Pepe Lobo's government signed the Cartagena Accord, along with representatives of 
Colombia and Venezuela, which dramatically altered the terrain upon which ·the 
relentless state violence was taking place. The: Accord negotiated the return of former-
President Manuel Zelaya and other political exiles to Honduras with a promise to h~ve 
charges against them annulled, and it included other guarantees with regard to upholding 
rule of law, ensuring protection of human rights, and carrying out public referenda on 
matters of significance. It also specifically asserted the legal right of the FNRP and 
associated organizations to form a political party to contest the 2013 elections. 648 
Much of the Accord smacks of a kind of absurdity. The passage that guarantees 
that the government should keep tabs on the protection of human rights, "in a specfal 
way," seems rather comical in a context where, surely, protection of human rights ought 
to be taken for granted. Its assertion of the responsibility of the government to allow 
public referenda is another ironic piece, given that Zelaya was ostensibly overthrown 
because he was pursuing just such a referendum. As Dana Frank wryly noted, only the 
repatriation of Zelaya was not already a legal responsibility of the government of 
Honduras, though perhaps Lobo' s regime does not consider itself beholden to those laws 
since it did not take power legally.649 Jari Dixon, a member of the public ministry fired 
by the coup regime when he began attending FNRP rallies in his time off, explained in 
648 The full text of Cartagena can be accessed through the website of La Tribuna. "Acuerdo para la 
Reconciliaci6n Nacional y la Consolidaci6n del Sistema Democratico en la Republica de Honduras," La 
Tribuna, May 22, 2011. Available at: http://www.latribuna.hn/2011/05/22/acuerdo-para-la-reconciliacion-
nacional-y-la-consolidacion-del-sistema-democratico-en-la-republica-de-honduras/ 
649 Dana Frank, "Ousted President's Return to Honduras Doesn't Mean Repression Is Over," The 
Progressive, May 27, 2011. 
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2009 that the coup itself broke the constitution and, as a result, nothing from that moment 
can be considered properly legal or illegal, as "the entire system of the rule of law 
became a falsehood. "650 It is worth adding, as well, that the so-called "Compliance 
Commission," headed by the foreign ministers of Venezuela and Colombia to ensure that 
all parties adhere to the Accord, was designed to have no more than rhetorical power. 
Nevertheless, the Accord led to Zelaya's return on May 28, 2011. His return, 
which came at a moment of particular difficulty and discouragement for the FNRP, 
produced an immediate surge of hope and excitement in Honduras. According to Jesse 
Freeston, the crowd that gathered to meet Zelaya at the airport was the largest single 
congregation of Hondurans in one place in the country's history.651 Nonetheless, 
Zelaya's re-entry into the dynamics of the Resistance produced mixed reactions: while 
some applauded the amnesty granted to the exiles and believed that the Accord would 
open up space for democratic dissent, others viewed the Accord with suspicion and 
openly wondered whether it would lead to any real changes in. the climate of repression in 
Honduras. Bertha Caceres, General Coordinator of COPINH, explained: 
Everyone is happy that Zelaya has returned ... his right of return 
should have always been unconditional. He's a human being and 
he has a right to return to his country. However, we believe the 
Cartagena Accord is in accordance with U.S. strategy ... the 
Resistance is not reducible to Mel Zelaya. 652 
Indeed, one of the primary consequences of the Accord - and this was no doubt 
understood by all of the parties involved in creating it - was to thrust Manuel Zelaya back 
into the centre of the storm. His re-introduction to the Resistance not only changed the 
650 Interview with Jari Dixon, November 26, 2009. 
651 Some claim the number to be as high as one million people, which would represent some 12% of the 
entire Honduran population. See Jesse Freeston, "Massive Turnout for Zelaya Launches New Chapter of 
Honduran Struggle," The Real News, June 23, 2011. 
652 Bertha Caceres, quoted in Gordon and Webber, "From Cartagena to Tegucigalpa ... " 
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dynamics within it, about which I will say more shortly; it also changed the way it. was 
perceived outside of Honduras. If the Resistance amounts to Zelaya himself, then the 
return of Zelaya effectively ends the crisis and Honduras goes back to normal. 
On the strength of this claim about Zelaya' s return and the successful spinning of 
the Truth Commission, Honduras was granted re-entry into the OAS. In a context where 
gross human rights violations were continuing to take place, the Accord simply provided 
another piece of the flimsy democratic veneer for the coup regime, effectively endorsed 
by the perceived-victim of the coup, Manuel Zelaya. Naturally, this led many in the 
Resistance to question the logic of Zelaya's decilsion. Before the coup, President Zelaya 
was often the target of political actions, strikes and demonstrations, and he was 
considered not so different from the oligarchs who had ruled the country for decades. 
Indeed, even the golpistas themselves recognized that Zelaya was once one of their own; 
as Adolfo Facusse put it, "Mel Zelaya is one of us and - well - it just got out of his 
control. But the people think that he is an instrument of Chavez and that the fight is with 
Chavez."653 The bargain Zelaya struck with the coup regime in May 2011 secured his 
own re-entry to Honduras and, given the status he gained as President-in-exile, he carried 
much sway in the Resistance; after all, its current form had coalesced around the demand 
to have him reinstated. Upon his return to Honduras, he quickly - and somewhat 
controversially - mobilized the FNRP around the creation of a new political party which 
would contest the 2013 elections. 
This does not sit well with many of the committed activists for whom resisting the 
coup was simply one part of a larger struggle for social justice in Honduras, for the 
653 Morgan Lee and Alexandra Olson, "Honduran Coup Shows Business Elite Still In Charge," Associated 
Press, August 5, 2009. 
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creation of an Espacio Refundacional, or a refoundation of the country. One such 
Espacio activist is Carlos Amador, the son of Honduran writer Ramon Amaya Amador, 
whose Pris ion Verde is one of Honduras' most important and enduring pieces of 
literature. According to Carlos Amador, the move towards electoral politics - ushered 
along by the repatriation of Zelaya - served only the interests of the regime, who sought 
to water down the Resistance: 
The Cartagena Accord opened up possibilities for resolving a 
critical 'problem' of the Resistance that the Obama 
administration had been seeking to solve since the initial coup -
how to channel the popular mobilization into an electoral path, 
how to defeat the Resistance in the streets, and how to stamp out 
the construction of popular power and direct democracy outside 
of parliamentary institutions. 654 
Even organizations that try to tow a careful line between the divisions in the Resistance 
have acknowledged that the Cartagena Accord threatens to undermine, rather than 
strengthen, the capacity and security of the movement. COF ADEH initially offered a 
cautious response to the Accord, asserting its tmst that former-President Zelaya signed 
the agreement in good faith, but insisting that the coup regime could not be trusted to 
carry out even the minimal steps it pledged in the Accord. In their communique, 
COF ADEH noted that the text used in the document reflected "doubts, ironies, intentions 
and evasions" on the part of the regime.655 They ajlso likened the discourse of the Accord 
to that used by Presidents Callejas, Maduro, and Flores in the 1990s - some of whom 
helped edit the text of the Cartagena Accord - in attempting to bury the memory of, and 
escape responsibility for, the violence and state terror of the 1980s. Indeed, the text itself 
is evidence enough of the Accord's superficiality: 
654 Carlos Amador, quoted in Gordon and Webber, "From Cartagena to Tegucigalpa ... " 
655 COFADEH, "Human Rights are not subject to political negotiation," May 24, 2011. 
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While admitting that during the political crisis there have been 
people who consider that their human rights were violated, the 
Government of Honduras, through the Ministry of Justice and 
Human Rights, commits to attend these denunciations in order to 
contribute to the reconciliation of Honduran society within a 
framework of verifiable guarantees ( ... ) and awaits support from 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights.656 
It should be apparent that the language used - "there have been people who consider that 
their human rights were violated" - is both a slap in the face to the many victims of the 
regime and an almost unbelievable denial of responsibility for those crimes. It is, 
moreover, eerily similar to the language that Canadian officials have used. 
A month after COFADEH's statement on the Accord, director Bertha Oliva spoke 
with Todd Gordon and Jeffrey Webber and added to her earlier doubts: 
Those of us who are here on the ground, who understand the 
reality of the human rights situation, think the Accord is a trap. 
We know that before the Cartag1ena Accord, during the 
Cartagena Accord negotiations, and during the reintegration of 
Honduras into the OAS violations of human rights continued ... 
the OAS is not interested in human rights. On the day of the 
readmission of Honduras into the OAS there were serious 
violations of human rights occurring. 657 
I have already reproduced a sketch of those violations above, but it is worth adding to 
that list the less severe but equally troubling cases of some of Zelaya's closest associates. 
Enrique Flores was President Zelaya's Chief of Staff and was exiled with Zelaya in the 
Dominican Republic, following the inauguration of Pepe Lobo. Upon the signing of the 
Cartagena Accord, which guaranteed "the return:, safety and freedom of the former 
officials of the government," Flores boarded the same plane as Manuel Zelaya and 
returned, together with his former President, to Honduras. On their arrival, Flores was 
656 Fulltext of the Cartagena Accord can be found here: http://www.latribuna.hn/2011/05/22/acuerdo-para-
la-reconciliacion-nacional-y-la-consolidacion-del-sistema-democratico-en-la-republica-de-honduras/ 
657 Bertha Oliva, quoted in Gordon and Webber, "From Cartagena to Tegucigalpa" 
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put under house arrest and charged under trnmped-up accusations of corruption. As 
Gordon and Webber astutely observed, "that the Honduran state would detain such a 
high-profile figure is a warning that no one who crosses the dictatorship will be protected 
from its punitive actions." They added that the arrest of Flores "reveals the l!ltter 
confidence with which the state is willing to carry out its agenda even with the ink of 
Cartagena barely dry."658 
There are plenty of reasons, then, to be suspicious of the motivations behind the 
Cartagena Accord and Canada's support for it. Having said that, it is clear that the 
majority of Hondurans support the new party, the Partido de Libertad y Refundacion 
(LIBRE), and it gave an embattled movement a shot in the arm at a time that it 
desperately needed one. The crowd that gathen::d to greet Zelaya at the airport marked 
the largest single gathering of Hondurans in one place in the country's history, and 
organizers in the FNRP had to take seriously the fact that - while he did not emerge from 
the social movement itself - the coup had made him, by far, its most popular figure and, 
indeed, the most popular figure in the country. The movement had been fully mobilized 
for eighteen months and its organizers and supporters were exhausted and demoralized; if 
Zelaya could rejuvenate the movement, it would make a world of difference. 
THE MOVEMENT AND THE PARTY 
The severity of the crisis in Honduras and the total collapse of legitimate civilian 
government begs the question, posed by people in the Espacio Refundacional, how can 
engaging in an electoral process possibly lead to a change of the system itself? It is the 
central question that has been debated in the movement since the signing of the Cartagena 
658 Gordon and Webber, "From Cartagena to Tegucigalpa" 
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Accords.659 Over the course of 2012, predictably, the context for the debate became .ever 
more complicated. Manuel Zelaya's wife, Xiomara Castro de Zelaya, was quickly named 
LIBRE's Presidential candidate, but there soon emerged five separate currents within the 
party, one of which was subsequently disbanded. I spoke with leaders and activists in 
most of the five currents. Four of the five come out of the traditional Liberal Party 
apparatus and draw not-unfounded criticism and scepticism from the social movement 
side of the FNRP. These currents almost ce:rtainly represent the best hope for the 
golpistas and their imperial allies of co-opting the movement into more easily 
manipulated reformist politics, a point that was particularly evident to me as I met the 
leaders of these currents in mid 2012. 
One of these currents is the Movimiento Resistencia Progresista (MRP), led by a 
successful and wealthy public notary, Rassel Tome. Tome asserted that MRP was the 
backbone of the movement and bragged about the tortures and indignities he faced for 
having supported Zelaya during the coup. It is worth noting, however, that his political 
experience is based primarily in the Liberal Party and that the "tortures" he experienced 
while barricaded in the Brazilian Embassy with Zelaya were - by his own admission -
limited to sound cannons and bright lights that made it difficult to sleep.660 Not pleasant, 
to be sure. But it speaks volumes about his relationship to the social movement and, 
indeed, to the Resistance at. large, that he should decry these discomforts without 
mentioning the extreme levels of violence melted out to less privileged movement 
activists. Indeed, his distance from the movement is reflected in the ideology he proudly 
espoused; "other countries have globalization," he explained, "and we want to participate 
659 I discuss the complicated politics of this moment in greater detail elsewhere. Please see Tyler Shipley, 
"Left International Solidarity in Post-Coup Honduras," Upside Down World, September 26, 2012. 
660 Interview with Rassel Tome, May 9, 2012. 
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in globalization... we are not into extreme positions like socialism, which failed, or 
capitalism, which also failed."661 Leaving aside the obvious question of what social 
formation he thinks Hondurans want - if neither socialism nor capitalism - and by what 
means they would bring about this revolution, what is truly significant is that Tome 
suggests that Hondurans want globalization. While blaming "globalization" for the 
struggles that Hondurans have faced would be: oversimplistic, it should be quite clear 
from the descriptions of the social movement that I offered (see Chapter 5) that it has 
historically positioned itself against those manifestations of imperialism and 
neoliberalism that are most often identified with "globalization." It is rather apparent, 
then, that Rassel Tome and the MRP offer little representation of the will· of the 
movement. 662 
The other three Liberal Party-based currents offer much the same as MRP. The 
fifth current, however, represents something quite different. This fifth group is called the 
Fuerza de Refundacion Popular (FRP), and it irepresents those elements most closely 
connected to the social movements within the political party. The FRP's presence in the 
LIBRE party is what most distinguishes LIBRE from the traditional Liberal party and the 
question that is perhaps most important here is whether FRP and other candidates drawn 
from the social movement will be able to influence significantly the direction that the 
new party takes, which were put to the test in November 2012 when the party held its 
internal primaries. Its members are typically longstanding activists within the movement, 
661 Interview with Rassel Tome, May 9, 2012. 
662 Indeed, in my experience, movement activists had little regard for Tome, considering him a political 
opportunist who had conveniently jumped into LIBRE as a gamble that it will be a better bet for his own 
personal ambitions. The day that I spoke with Tome, I fell rather ill and had to postpone a few other 
interviews; it quickly became a popular joke within movement circles that speaking to Rassel Tome had, 
quite literally, made me sick. 
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who are convinced that the electoral process is the only option for the movement at this 
point. Juan Barahona has been one of the most recognizable faces in the movement for 
two decades, beginning as a leader of the Bloque Popular, and he is also one of the m.ost 
prominent figures in the FRP. As he explained to me, "in the 1980s, the Left could take 
power by force. But today, we take power through popular democracy."663 He and other 
members of the FRP are committed to projects for radical change. When I asked if a 
LIBRE victory would usher in a period of social democracy, Barahona replied by 
pounding his desk, "no more social democracy, no! We want socialism!" He went on to 
add that he understood why people were wary of the electoral process and the LIBRE 
party, but that it would do no good "to sit with our arms crossed, refusing to participate" 
when the party had gained so much momentum and looked to be the primary alternative 
to the oligarchy in this moment. 664 Another prominent member of FRP, Gilberto Rios, 
acknowledged that LIBRE was not a revolutionary party, but insisted that it was 
democratic and progressive, and that this made it a critically important space for the Le.ft 
to find some space to build upon the more radical politics that emanated from the social 
movement. 665 
Hope, then, lies in the prospect of LIBRE nominating candidates drawn largely 
from the FRP and the social movement, who would stand a very good chance of winning 
in the national elections in 2013, assuming for the moment that a legitimate election 
process went forward. That assumption, of course, is rather tenuous. At the time of 
writing, there has already been significant repression targeting LIBRE candidates. I was 
in Tegucigalpa in May 2012 when journalist and LGBT activist Erick Martinez was 
663 Interview with Juan Barahona, May 10, 2012. 
664 Interview with Juan Barahona, May 10, 2012. 
665 Interview with Gilberto Rios, May 8, 2012. 
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disappeared and assassinated, not long after being named as a potential LIBRE diputado 
candidate. He was one of many popular figures in LIBRE, and especially in the FRP, 
who have been threatened and harassed. As the November 2013 elections draw nearer, it 
will likely become increasingly clear that Honduras remains under a coercive military 
dictatorship that will not cede power to any par1ty that appears to genuinely represent the 
will of Honduran social movements. Canada's behaviour around those elections will, no 
doubt, be instructive. 
THE FNRP PERSISTS 
It is worth concluding this chapter by acknowledging that, although the Honduran 
state has clamped down hard on journalists and controls most of the large-scale media 
outlets, the strength and commitment of the FNRP is such that the crimes of the coup 
regime are still regularly and thoroughly documented and reported. Human rights 
organizations like COFADEH and FIAN continue to risk their own members' lives in 
keeping track of the relentless attacks, and in conducting proper investigations into major 
crimes like murder, work that the police often refuse to do. The state claims most 
political assassinations to be the result of routine gang violence; for instance, on May 3, 
2010, Lobo's Minister of Security Oscar Alvarez told La Tribuna: 
I guarantee that in all of the cases [of the journalists' murders], 
there is no connection to indicate that it is due to their work as 
journalists. That is to say that there is no person or people trying 
to silence journalists; it is simply that, just as other people, after 
their work as reporters, journalists spend their time on their own 
personal situations.666 
That position was echoed by Lobo's Vice-Pre:sident Maria Antonieta de Bogran, 
reinforcing the fact that it is up to human rights organizations, community groups, and 
666 Oscar Alvarez, quoted in Cuffe, "The Snakes Sleep ... " 
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independent journalists to determine which attacks really are related to gang and narco 
conflicts, which one are politically motivated, and which are a combination ofboth.667 
Indeed, the latter point is key, since that work is so complicated by the fact :that 
the regime regularly uses its discreet connections to the gangs to distance itself from 
political attacks. Though the rank-and-file of Honduran gangs tend to be young work~ng-
class men and boys, many gangs are connected to - and populated by - fotmer police and 
paramilitaries who in many cases still maintain close ties to the official organs of :the 
state. In fact, members of the Resistance have regularly asserted that coup-plotter 
General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez - general of the armed forces during and after the 
coup and appointed head of HONDUTEL under Pepe Lobo's government - had links to 
the 'Mara Salvatrucha' (MS-13) gang.668 In addition, the large network of "legal 
vigilantes" described in Chapter 4, who operated as extra-judicial executioners in the 
1990s and early 2000s, continue to occupy a space somewhere between police and death 
squads. In 2007, a former security minister acknowledged that some 30-50% of 
Honduran police were involved in organized crime and narco gangs,669 and by 2012 
police corruption was so rampant that the state was forced to make much ado about a 
police reform commission to be headed by widely respected Honduran historian, Victor 
Meza, who nevertheless expressed grave doubts about the prospects for reforming an 
667 Adrienne Pine's above-mentioned Working Hard, Drinking Hard provides an excellent overview of the 
complicated terrain of gang violence in Honduras, prior to the 2009 coup. Even before the coup, Pine notes 
that Honduran police exaggerated the extent and severity of gang violence in order to bolster their own 
power and that the problem of gang violence in Honduras is both a product of poverty and isolation in poor 
communities and, at the same time, is used to justify violent policies and practices towards Honduras' poor. 
668 Vasquez Velasquez was arrested in 1993 for participation in a series of auto thefts connected to narco 
gangs and supposedly called himself part of a 'gang of 13.' It isn't entirely clear that this was a reference 
to MS-13, but Vasquez Velasquez has undoubtedly been implicated in gang and narco activity for decades~ 
Bertha Caceres notes in 2009: "He's a car thief from the "B's" gang. This country has become a narco-
politics country." Al Giordano, "Honduras Coup General Was Charged in 1993 Auto Theft Ring," The 
Narco News, July 4, 2009. 
669 Ismael Moreno, "Insecurity, Criminality, Hidden Powers and Visible Roots," Envio 312, July 2007. 
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institution that was "infiltrated at every level by criminal organizations."670 These 
networks and connections, built up between the official and unofficial wings of the 
repressive apparatus, make it easy to understand how state violence could be plausibly 
dressed up to look like gang violence, if its targets weren't so obviously and consistently 
opponents of the coup regime. 671 
Nonetheless, the work of documenting the violence continues to be done; 
alongside grassroots human rights and community organizing is a network of courageous 
Honduran journalists, supported by a variety of international independent news media in 
getting their message to a wider audience, who have made it all but impossible for 
anyone to claim ignorance of the ongoing repression in Honduras under the Lobo regime. 
The availability of this documentation - in Spanish and English, from sources Honduran 
and international, from local organizations like FIAN to international NGOs like 
Amnesty International - casts a particular pall over Canada's decision to put its full 
diplomatic, political, and economic weight behind the coup regime. 
670 Interview with Victor Meza, May 10, 2012. Meza, whose scholarly work on the Honduran labour 
movement is the most thorough and important work of its kind, has been critical of the coup from the 
beginning. Nevertheless, he seems to exercise a well-developed ambivalence - an adaptation for self-
preservation, perhaps, given the danger of expressing critical views in Honduras - whereby he both 
acknowledges the deep, structurally-rooted nature of the problems in Honduras while, simultaneously, 
expressing a curious and contradictory optimism with respect to the prospect of resolving Honduras' 
problems through semi-official organs like the police reform commission he is heading. When I suggested 
to him that, if the police and the state are as corrupt as he thinks they are, won't they surely respond with 
violence to any attempt to meaningfully reform it, his response was, "yes, I recognize the danger and 
difficulty. In fact, a journalist was kidnapped 20 meters from this office yesterday." Yet, in the same 
breath, he insists that a coalition of civil society groups have come together around the commission and that 
he believes it can work. I return to the matter of police refonn- and Canada's role in that process - in 
Chapter 7. 
671 All of this is reminiscent of Charles Tilly's 1985 assessment of statecraft as organized crime; Tilly 
argues that war-making and state-making can be described as '"protection rackets" in which "banditry, 
piracy, gangland rivalry, policing and war-making all belong on the same continuum," and where the same 
coercive force that creates danger (ie. the state, the police, organized crime) offers itself as the protection 
from it. In a case like contemporary Honduras, Tilly's comparison of the state to a crime syndicate actually 
comes real; no longer simply an analogy, the state is more or lc~ss a criminal organization and the criminal 
gangs are more or less the state. See Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," 
in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, ed., Bringing the State Back In, New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 169-192. 
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In June 2009, Canada was slow and soft in condemning the first military coup in 
Honduras since the 1970s. In November 2009, it was only by intentionally ignoring a 
well-organized campaign by human rights organizations - and working very hard to do 
so - that Canada could claim Honduras had see:n free and fair elections. In 2010, it was 
only by pretending not to notice the daily rep01is of ongoing state violence that Canada 
could contribute to a so-called Truth Commission that would inevitably produce only the 
truths its sponsors wanted to spin. In 2011 and 2012, the news from Honduras continued 
to be grim, and continued to be widely accessible to anyone with an internet connection 
and fifteen minutes; even mainstream liberal organizations like Amnesty International 
published hundreds of pages of reports detailing the human rights catastrophe in 
Honduras. And yet, Canada spearheaded the campaign to reintegrate Honduras into the 
OAS, and Stephen Harper was the first head-of-state to visit the country thereafter and 
actually began directly supporting its police and military infrastructure. Since it is 
impossible that Canada could have made these dt:cisions without some awareness of the 
human rights catastrophe in Honduras, we can only assume that Canadian officials know 
what is happening in Honduras and - in full awareness of the anti-democratic violence 
taking place - have chosen to support its current course. 672 It is to explaining this 
apparent contradiction, in light of my arguments about Canada's new role in global 
politics in Chapter 2, that the next chapter will be d1evoted. 
672 Especially in light of the dozens of petitions and open letters that have been addressed to the Prime 
Minister and his cabinet, and the many public demonstrations held in Canadian cities and independent 
media reports that have been circulated in Canada. 
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In the previous chapter, I argued that Canada's behaviour towards Honduras 
following the 2009 coup d'etat amounted to a systematic program of support for a regime 
that had taken power by force, against the will of popular opinion and mobilization, and 
with violent consequences for the majority of Hondurans. Since this flies in the face of 
Canada's standard presentation of its foreign policy goals, and since the previous chapter 
demonstrated that Canada's support for the coup regime was calculated, systematic, and 
long-term, the purpose of this chapter will be to explain this apparent contradiction. As 
such, this chapter will bring the central argument of this dissertation full circle, 
hearkening back to the analysis offered in Chapter 2 of the new Canadian imperialism. 
Indeed, what is most telling about Canada's reilationship to Honduras is the extent to 
which Canadian capital has taken advantage of Honduras' circumstances to extract 
profits from its people and resources, and the extent to which the Canadian state has 
worked to secure those circumstances. 
Canada has emerged as Honduras' second largest investor,673 with over $600 
million in foreign direct investment (FD I), 674 and the social movements - whose growing 
power was represented by the possible re-opening of the constitution in 2009 - were 
increasingly posing a threat to the flow of profits. Significantly, since the 2009 coup, the 
forces that were threatening Canadian profits have been hammered down, and the 
conditions for long-term profitable Canadian investment in Honduras have been 
substantially improved. This chapter will be devoted to documenting Canada's direct 
investments in Honduras - with particular attention to the mining, garment, and tourist 
673 Gordon, Imperialist Canada, p. 177. 
674 Todd Gordon, "Canada Backs Profits, Not Human Rights, in Honduras," Toronto Star, August 16, 2011. 
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industries - and, perhaps more importantly, Canada's broader project for the construction 
of a Honduras that will be "right" for Canadian capital across a variety of industries. 675 
CANADA'S DIRECT INVESTMENTS - MINING 
There is perhaps no better place to start than the mines, where the intersection of 
Canadian capital and Honduran workers forms part of broader legacies for both parties. 
Canada's ill-reputed mining companies have left a well-documented trail of crimes 
against the communities they affect - crimes against human security and health, against 
the environment upon which those societies are built, and against those communities' 
very social fabric itself - that stretches from the diamond mines of Canada's north to the 
gold mines of Central America to the copper and cobalt mines of the Congo.676 For 
Hondurans, the experience of struggling against :rapacious mining companies, of course, 
stretches at least as far back as the Spanish conquest, during which time thousands of 
Indigenous people were enslaved and forced to work in mines around Tegucigalpa, San 
Juancito, and elsewhere, as documented in Chapter 3. 
The encounter between Canadian mining companies and Hondurans has followed 
predictable patterns. The first thrust came in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, as 
Canada extended to Honduras an aid and reconstruction package worth $100 million over 
four years, provided that Canadian companies be permitted to move in and assess 
675 This is a reference to the now infamous words of Smedley Butler, speaking as a former member of the 
U.S. marines, describing himself as having been a "racketeer" for American business. "I helped in the 
raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. I helped purify Nicaragua 
for the International Banking House of Brown Brothers in 1902-1912. I brought light to the Dominican 
Republic for the American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras right for the American fruit 
companies in 1903." Smedley Butler, quoted in Jules Archer, The Plot to Seize the White House, New 
York, Hawthorne Books, 1973. 
676 A reliable and consistent source for information on Canadian mining operations is the organization 
Mining Watch Canada, which publishes seasonal newsletters and, periodically, larger investigative reports. 
Please see: http://www.miningwatch.ca/home 
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H d ' . . 1677 on uras mvestment potentta . As Honduran social institutions were being 
disarticulated by the wrenching introduction of neoliberalism, Canadian mining firms 
quickly determined that they could establish a profitable presence, and established a 
national association, the Asociaci6n Nacional de Mineros (ANAMINH), to negotiate a 
new mining code with the Honduran government. The 1998 mining code that came out 
of those negotiations embodied the very laws that the Coordinadora Nacional de 
Resistencia Popular (CNRP) and the social movement struggled against throughout the 
2000s and included provisions for lifelong concessions to foreign companies, minimal 
taxation, and subsurface land rights for "rational resource exploitation. "678 
Indeed, that mining code was challeng1ed by community movement activists, 
largely from the Valle de Siria, as unconstitutional and, remarkably, the challenge was 
upheld by the Honduran Supreme Court in 2005. Karen Spring and Sandra Cuffe 
describe this important development: 
On October 4, 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that 13 different 
articles of the General Mining Law contravened the Honduran 
Constitution and were thus declared null and void. The articles in 
question dealt with issues including the forced expropriation of 
lands in the name of public interest, royalties, workers' rights, 
677 Ashley Holly, "Shame on Canada, Coup Supporter," The Tyee, July 9, 2009. The influx of foreign 
capital after Hurricane Mitch follows the patterns described in Naomi Klein's important The Shock 
Doctrine. Klein's argument is that capital seeks and seizes upon natural or social disasters in order to take 
advantage of the dislocation and weakness of the affected peoples and states, in order to move into 
otherwise blocked spaces or establish new spaces for profitable investment (by coercing states to sign free 
trade agreements, re-write legislation around investment, labour or environmental codes, or simply moving 
in at a moment of need and offering services that local companies can no longer functionally offer, thus 
displacing them semi-permanently.) Klein makes a convincing case for what she calls "disaster 
capitalism," and while I think she overemphasizes the need for natural disasters, she does acknowledge that 
capital also finds ways to construct these "shock" conditions whenever it sees a need. Indeed, her "disaster 
capitalism" could be better described simply as "capitalism," since the history of capital has been propelled 
forward by precisely the dynamics she describes; the dramatic: and violent uprooting of the peasantry in 
England, the shock and dislocation of colonial invasions and occupations, or the fomenting of debt crises in 
the Global South are all examples of unnatural disasters, created in large part by capital, that created 
"shock" conditions upon which capital seized and turned to its advantage. Naomi Klein, The Shock 
Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Vintage Books, Toronto, 2007. 
678 Holly, "Shame on Canada." 
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and environmental impact assessments. The Supreme Court 
ruling also set important jurisprudence in the country, 
recognizing the right to a healthy environment, the precautionary 
principle, the importance of consultation, and the fact that mining 
is "highly contaminating and damaging to life." 
In the wake of the Supreme Court decision, mining concessions 
in Honduras were suspended and a temporary moratorium on 
new concessions was enacted. The grassroots movement of 
resistance to mining held demonstrations and actions throughout 
the Zelaya Administration both to ensure the ongoing renewal of 
the moratorium and to demand a new mining law banning open 
pit metallic mining. Work on draft: legislation to that effect, 
developed by affected communities and NGOs alongside 
presidential advisors, was cut short by the 2009 coup. A 
Congressional Committee had also been working on a mining 
law proposal re~uiring fifty per cent State involvement in all 
mining ventures. 79 
Nevertheless, Canada emerged after 1998 to become Honduras' leading foreign investor 
in mining, taking advantage of the very laws det:med unconstitutional in 2005. Indeed, 
just a few months before the 2009 coup, Canadian companies were actively and 
aggressively pressuring the Zelaya government to roll back the ruling. A comprehensive 
report by the Americas Policy Group (APG) of the Canadian Council for International 
Cooperation (CCIC) described these companies' behaviour: 
Canadian companies and other multinational corporations took 
part in joint pressure campaigns, which included tactics such as 
freezing investments. In the months before the coup, a Canadian 
mining company was one amongst a consortium of five that 
reportedly offered to invest $1. 75 billion dollars in Honduras 
should the 2006 executive decree prohibiting new mining 
concessions be overturned. 680 
Much of my analysis of the Honduran mining sector is developed out of a series 
of interviews with Pedro Landa, a longtime activist in the alternative development 
679 Karen Spring and Sandra Cuffe, "Canada and Chile Meddling in Honduras's Economic and Security 
Policies," Upside Down World, May 21, 2012. 
68° Canadian Council for International Cooperation, "Honduras: Democracy Denied," Report from the 
CCI C's Americas Policy Group with Recommendations to the Government of Canada, April 2010, p. 17. 
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organization Centro Hondureiio para la Promoci6n de/ Desarrollo Alternativo 
(CEHPRODEC), who came to Canada in March 2011 to testify before the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) in Ottawa, in 
an attempt to convince Canadian officials that a free-trade agreement with the coup 
government would only deepen the disastrous consequences of the coup. 681 His 
testimony then was, obviously, ignored, and he returned to Ottawa in January 2012 to 
speak against Canada's participation in the re·-writing of the Honduran mining code. 
Before the coup, Zelaya's government had been working with the social movements to 
develop a mining code that would be more just; a complicated struggle that was, by no 
means, going exactly the way movement activists might have wanted. Nevertheless, 
there was dialogue, there was progress, and there was an expectation that further progress 
could be made with continued pressure from the social movement. At the time of the 
coup, a draft proposal for a new mining code had been prepared; it would have 
strengthened environmental and labour regulations and introduced a comprehensive 
community consultation process. 682 
Ironically, since the coup, the regime has used the lack of an existing mining code 
to justify writing its own - a radically different version from that being developed by 
Zelaya's government, which has been heavily influenced by the interests of foreign, 
especially Canadian and Chilean, mining companies and trade and diplomatic officials; 
When Pedro Landa came to Canada to speak against the new mining code, he described 
the many ways it was designed to benefit the companies instead of the communities; it 
681 Mary Durran, "Honduran Partners Mobilize Against New Mining Law," Canadian Catholic 
Organization for Development and Peace, January 22, 2012. 
682 Harvey Beltran, "Coup Leaves Nation Without Mining Law," Business News Americas, September 25, 
2009. 
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failed to ban the cyanide-leeching open-pit method, it failed to protect Honduran water 
systems, it offered further tax breaks to companies, it made concessions easier to grant 
and harder to repeal, made community consultations a rare exception, and it limited 
public access to information about mining operations. 683 
In an interview in 2012, Landa gave me an overview of the current scope of 
mining and energy concessions in Honduras. j[n Santa Barbara, 76 mining concessions 
and 3 mega dam proposals; in Copan, 14 mining concessions; in La Paz, 3 mining 
concessions and 4 mega dams; in Valle, 12 mining concessions; in Choluteca, 18 mining 
concessions. Almost all of these concessions fall on or around Indigenous territories and 
communities. 684 In total, there were 154 conce:ssions that had been granted before the 
moratorium on new approvals was passed by Presidents Maduro and Zelaya (as explained 
in Chapter 5) of which nearly 100 have been owned by Canadian companies at one time 
or another during their operation. In 2011, 200 additional concessions were requested; of 
those, 150 were requested by Santos Gabino Carvajal - a former manager at the El 
Mochito mine and the President of ANAMINH - on behalf of the Canadian company 
Breakwater Resources Ltd. Breakwater, which operated two mines in addition to El 
Mochito, was subsequently bought out for $663 million by a company called Nyrstar, 
headquartered in Belgium, which now operates the: El Mochito mine.685 
It is not easy to gain access to reliable information with respect to the specific 
concessions and operations in Honduras but, using information that CEHPRODEC was 
able to acquire through the organization that reviews applications for concessions, 
683 CEHPRODEC and an array of Honduran civil society groups signed onto a letter detailing their critiques 
of the new mining code and its continued unconstitutionality. I have reproduced that letter as Appendix F. 
684 Interview with Pedro Landa, May 4, 2012. 
685 
"Breakwater Resources agrees to $663 million all-cash takeover by Nyrstar," Proactive Investors USA 
& Canada, June 15, 2011. 
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Direccion Ejecutiva De Fomento a la Mineria (DEFOMIN), I will offer a brief overview 
of the scope of Canadian mining operations in Honduras before turning, in some detail, to 
some of the most notable cases. The Maya Gold Company, based in Quebec and mostly 
focused on mining in Morocco, owns a concession of some 120,000 acres in Honduras, 
primarily in Choluteca. The two largest sites in its project are located in Casas Viejas 
and El Triunfo. 686 Also in Choluteca is the gold and silver concession at Camporo 
(formerly called Cacamuya), owned by First Point Minerals, based in Vancouver; this site 
was first detailed for mining exploration by th1~ Rosario Mining Company in the late 
1930s.687 First Point also owns a silver, zinc, and copper concession near the village of 
Los Cedros. Vancouver-based Standard Mining controls eleven exploration projects, 
including the Zopilote concession, over 304 square miles mostly in Santa Barbara, in the 
foothills of the Sierra de Omoa.688 In the early 1990s, Kennecott Companies and US-
based Fisher Watt Gold established a partnership to explore the mountains around the 
town of Minas de Oro; that company sold the project to Tombstone Exploration Corp, 
then based in Nanaimo, though now headquartered in the United States, which will now 
own the mining concession for 40 years. 689 
This partial list gives a sense of the scope of Canadian operations, but it is worth 
describing a handful of these projects in some detail, starting with the troubling case of 
686 Interview with Pedro Landa, March 3, 2013. 
687 
"Camporo Property," First Point Minerals Corp, March 7, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.firstoointminerals.com/s/Camporo.asp 
688 Omoa was, rather ironically, the site of a Honduran prison where striking banana workers were sent in 
the struggles of the early 20th century; the commander of the Omoa fortress famously sided with the 
workers and set them free in 1916, as discussed in Chapter 3. Victor Meza, Historia de/ Movimiento 
Obrero Hondureiio, Tegucigalpa, Guaymuras, 1980, p. 13. 
689 All of this information, summarized by Pedro Landa in our i.nterview, comes from a series of documents 
that CEHPRODEC was able to obtain from DEFOMIN which detail each concession (prior to 2009) 
specifically, by department, including the names and companies represented by the applicants for the 
concessions. For brevity's sake, I cite here just one of the documents in question. DEFOMIN, "Listado de 
solicitudes metalicas otorgadas, departamento de Francisco Mo:razan," Registro publico de derechos 
mineros, April 15, 2010. 
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the San Andres mine in the Department of Copfa, on a site first explored by the infamous 
Rosario Mining Company. A subsidiary of the Quebec-based Noranda ran the mine 
between 1974-76, but dropped the concession on account of what it considered excessive 
taxation. When the Honduran constitution was re-drafted under the military dictatorship 
in the early 1980s, the tax codes for mining concessions were changed, and the mine was 
re-opened. It was bought by Greenstone Resources in 1995, then operated by Yamana 
Gold, and it now belongs to Aura Minerals. All of these were Canadian firms. 
Greenstone Resources, for its part, went bankrupt in 2000, after having razed the village 
of San Andres amidst promises of rebuilding the community elsewhere. When it went 
bankrupt, it owed La Union (the municipality where San Andres is located) some 
$100,000 and had not fulfilled most of its promises to the communities it had destroyed; 
over 90% of the people it displaced did not have legal title to the land they were promised 
by the company. 690 
San Andres was the first open-pit mine in Honduras, making extensive use of 
cyanide, a toxic chemical best known in the North for its ubiquitous use in murder 
mystery novels.691 It is, then, no mystery that cyanide is a killer; the San Andres mine 
uses cyanide to leech some 4 million tons of ore each year.692 It has also managed to spill 
tons of the poisonous chemical into the Rio Lara - the primary river in the region's water 
690 Michael Marsh, "From Quebec to Copan: Globalization and the Case of San Andres Minas," Mining 
Watch Canada, June 25, 2001. Available at: htto://www.miningwatch.ca/qu-bec-copan,.globalization-and-
case-san-andr-s-minas 
691 Agatha Christie's Sparkling Cyanide, for instance, involved a murder disguised as suicide in which the 
killer used a few drops of cyanide in a glass of sparkling wine. These stories are significant only because 
they illustrate that it is rather common knowledge that even a drop of cyanide is lethal, putting into sharp 
relief these mining companies' use of thousands of tons of cyanide in their operations on or around 
communities that may or may not have agreed to their presenct::. 
692 Aura Minerals Inc., "San Andres Technical Report," March 28, 2012, p. 7-15. Available at: 
http://www.auraminerals.com/files/San%20Andres%20Tech%20Report%2028%20March%202012-
FINAL v002 m3a5ge.pdf 
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system upon which four major communities are reliant - with predictably murderous 
results. A variety of health crises ranging from skin disease to respiratory collapse have 
plagued the communities of San Miguel, Azacualpa, Campo Plantonares, and San 
Andres; the latter was forcibly relocated to make way for the mine in the first place. In 
2003, the Rio Lara served up 18,000 dead fish, as clear an indication as any that the water 
supply had become completely toxic; similar incidents in 2006 and 2009 only reinforced 
communities' awareness that the mine was slowly poisoning their land and bodies.693 
In addition to the cyanide leaching, the company used explosives to open the mine 
in the first place which, combined with the deforestation of nearly 5000 trees, led to a 
crisis of soil erosion and a collapse of the fertility of agricultural land in the region. The 
lack of fertile soil for cultivation, of course, meant that communities which once survived 
on small scale agricultural production were no longer able to sustain themselves, and 
many of the community members have had to take on the dangerous and poorly paid 
work in the mine itself; the results for the affected communities, then, have amounted to a 
dramatic collapse in the quality of life. 694 Aura Minerals is actively pursuing four more 
adjacent sites - for which concessions were applie:d in 2002695 - which have not yet been 
granted, but they will now be considered 1:1flder the new Honduran mining code; as noted 
in Chapter 6, Canada actively encouraged and assisted the Lobo regime in pursuing the 
new mining code, a point to which I will return. 
Perhaps the most notorious case of Canadian mining in Honduras is that of the 
San Martin mine in the Valle de Siria, owned by Vancouver-based Goldcorp. The San 
693 Xiomara Orellana, "La ruptura de un tubo de la minera Yamana ocasion6 la muerte de peces," La 
Prensa, March 20, 2009. 
694 Canadian Mining in Honduras, "Case Study, San Andres, Copan," Available at: 
htto://mininginhonduras. wordoress.com/case-study-san-andres-copan/ 
695 Aura Minerals, "San Andres Technical Report," p. 131. 
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Martin mine was actually shut down in 2008, but its legacy remains profoundly present in 
Honduras; in fact, the Honduran owners of its local subsidiary are currently facing 
criminal charges in Honduras for failing to act on knowledge of the dangerously high 
levels of acidity and heavy metals - lead, arsenic, and mercury - the mining operation 
deposited in the regional water supply. 696 Juan Almendares, former director of the 
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Honduras (UNAH) in Tegucigalpa and long time 
activist in Honduran social movements, led countless medical brigades to the Valle de 
Siria during and after its eight-year operation, and he reported that when the mine opened 
in 2000, 8% of people living in the region had suffered skin diseases. By 2010, the rate 
had increased to 80%. 697 
Indeed, when I interviewed movement activist Carlos Amador in May 2012, he 
described the Valle de Siria as having been "condemned to death" by Goldcorp's mine: 
We have denounced this company and :it should be denounced at 
the international level; the health problems it has left in Vane de 
Siria have been documented and they amount to a full medical 
emergency ... we have seen things there that we have never seen 
before and the situation is going to get much worse before it gets 
better. The people are very worried, as it just keeps getting 
worse and worse. 698 
Amador, who had just returned from a medical b1igade with Dr. Almendares and has 
testified at Goldcorp shareholder meetings in Canad.a, described health disasters that had 
resulted from lead and arsenic poisoning: skin disease, diseased hair follicles such that 
696 Rights Action, "Canadian Mining Company Faces Criminal Charges Over Mine Pollution After 
CAFOD Investigation," Upside Down World, August 16, 2010. 
697 Honduras Accompaniment Project (PROAH), "Press Conference about Health Impacts of San Martin 
Mine and Honduras' Proposed Mining Law," August 28, 2012. 
698 Interview with Carlos Amador, May 8, 2012. 
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women in their 30s were losing their hair, high levels of lead in people's blood, even a 
recent case where a woman had lost twin babies as a result of arsenic poisoning. 699 
According to Amador and other community activists, Goldcorp operates with 
complete impunity in Honduras; the company, however, denies that there are any 
problems in the Valle de Siria. In fact, they are quick to note that the Honduran state has 
confirmed that if there are any health problems in the region, they are not the 
responsibility of the company, which insists that any problems must pre-date the mine. 
Indeed, said Amador, "the executive director of Goldcorp was here in Honduras in 
December, he claimed that he was in the mine, that he bathed, and ate, and that he was 
fine. I'd like to know what he was eating." In 2007, responding to pressure from the 
social movements associated with the CNRP, the Honduran public health ministry took a 
series of blood samples from some 60 people in the Valle de Siria and discovered that 
their blood was laced with dangerously high levds of arsenic, lead, mercury, cadmium, 
magnesium, chromium, and nickel. The results o:f the study, however, were not released 
until 2011, at which point two executives from Goldcorp were taken to the Honduran 
court to defend themselves against charges that they had contaminated the environment 
and caused serious medical crises. The judge ruled in favour of the company, despite the 
fact that one of the people tested in 2007 - five-year old Lesly Yaritza - died in 2010 
after suffering from a degenerative muscle condition in her legs that left her barely able 
to walk at the time of her tragic and premature death.700 
699 Interview with Carlos Amador, May 8, 2012. 
700 Lauren Carasik and Grahame Russell, "Honduras: Goldcorp Inc and the Death of Lesly Y aritza," 
Indigenous Peoples Issues and Resources, December 24, 2011. Available at: 
http://indigenouspeoplesissues.com/index.php?option=com _ content&view=article&id= 13400 :honduras-
goldcorp-inc-and-the-death-of-lesly-yaritza&catid=30&Itemid==63 
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Meanwhile, Goldcorp faced no sanction from the Canadian state and is hailed by 
the Canadian media as an exemplar of corporate social responsibility. 701 The company 
has been named one of the best 100 Canadian companies to work for, by The Globe and 
Mail, and even one of the top 10 companies, by the National Post. 702 In 2011, Goldcorp 
spent a quick $25,000 to whisk five Canadian Members of Parliament down to 
Guatemala to be wined-and-dined around its mining operations there, 703 at just the same 
moment that momentum was gathering around a social movement-led health tribunal 
investigating Goldcorp's activities in Central America which, not surprisingly, found 
Goldcorp guilty of major violations of public health and safety: 
We find Goldcorp guilty for its activities in Honduras, 
Guatemala and Mexico, which we find to be seriously damaging 
to the health and the quality of life, the quality of environment, 
and the right to self determination of the affected Indigenous and 
campesino communities. We also find the States where the 
701 So-called "corporate social responsibility" (CSR) is a dubious concept at best, and certainly one that can 
hardly be said to apply to Goldcorp. Emerging in the 1970s as part of a rhetorical shift to re-brand the 
corporation as a benevolent institution, CSR was more fully embraced in the 1990s in response to the 
growing popularity of the anti-globalization movement. Proponents of CSR typically argue that 
corporations ought to be responsible not just to their shareholders but also to their stakeholders; that is, 
rather than be solely concerned with making profits, they should consider the consequences of their actions 
on anyone that might be affected. While this sounds like a noble goal, the iron laws of capitalism are such 
that companies that genuinely place social welfare about profits will, almost inevitably, find their profits 
dwindling and will be faced with the choice of abandoning their CSR efforts or going bankrupt. Though a 
handful of examples seem to defy this expectation, they can usually be explained by the fact that companies 
that appear to have good records of responsible behaviour can market themselves as such and, as a result, 
people will be more likely to support their products. One may reasonably ask whether CSR, then, actually 
amounts to a new form of marketing, especially in a context where it is often exceedingly difficult for 
consumers to validate companies' claims of their own responsible behaviour. If Goldcorp, for instance, can 
claim to be socially responsible and receive public accolades for its behaviour when the reality of its 
activities is so dramatically different from this portrayal, it casts a rather absurd light on the entire notion of 
CSR. The phenomenon, however, remains powerfully popular and has spawned a massive academic and 
popular literature among those who wish to find a way to save capitalism from itself and who see CSR as a 
way out of the destructive patterns of profit-seeking behaviour. For a few different takes on CSR, please 
see Joel Bakan, The Corporation, Penguin Books, Toronto, 2004. Bill McKibben, "Hype VS Hope: Is 
Corporate Do-Goodery for Real?" Mother Jones, November/December 2006. Milton Friedman, "The 
Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits," New York Times Magazine, September 13, 
1970. 
702 
"Awards and Recognition," Goldcorp.com. Available at: 
htto://www.goldcom.com/English/Responsible-Mining/ A wards--Recognition/default.aspx 
703 Kady O'Malley, "Lobby Watch: MPs reveal cost details of Goldcorp-funded Guatemala trip," CBC 
News Online, October 22, 2012. 
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accusations come from guilty of being complicit and 
irresponsible for not protecting the rights of those affected by 
mmmg. We also find the Govenunent of Canada guilty for 
supporting and promoting in various ways the irresponsible 
mining investments in Mesoamerica. 704 
The Health Tribunal was organized by a coalition of over 40 organizations from 
across the Americas and used liberal international guidelines as its benchmarks, including 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), the 
International Labor Organization's convention number 169 (IL0-169), the World Health 
Organization (WHO)'s Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)'s Declaration on the Rights and Duties of 
Man. 705 The twelve judges were drawn from civil society organizations in seven 
different countries, including Canada, and they were primarily doctors, academics, public 
health officials, and human rights defenders. 706 Goldcorp executives, for their part, 
continue to boast about the supposedly responsible way in which they have shut down the 
San Martin mine, despite the ongoing health crises it is causing and its condemnation by 
the Health Tribunal. Indeed, Goldcorp is actively pursuing other operations in Honduras. 
On the same day that I spoke with Carlos Amador, he was warned that he could face 
criminal charges for his activism against a massive deforestation project on a 1,866 
hectare concession to Goldcorp miles away from San Martin. 
Goldcorp has extracted a great deal of wealth from Honduras and around the 
world; the Canadian media proudly reported in 2012 that Goldcorp was making record 
704
"Verdict," Tribunal Popular Internacional de Salud, July 15, 2012. Available at: 
http://healthtribunal.org/the-final-verdict/ 
705 
"Overview," Tribunal Popular Internacional de Salud, July 15, 2012. Available at: 
http ://healthtribunal.org/ overview/ 
706 Canadians involved in the project included Dr. David Heap from the University of Western Ontario, 
Judith Deutsch from the University of Toronto and Claudia Campero from the Council of Canadians. The 
complete list of judges can be found at: http://healthtribunal.org/the-final-verdict/ 
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profits, which reached as high as $5.4 billion in 2011.707 By the end of that year, 
Goldcorp's total value was nearly $30 billion, and while the San Martin mine had ceased 
operations, Goldcorp continued to be a major presence in Central America and was still 
actively seeking new operations in Honduras. Aura Minerals, for its part, has been 
recording an average of $280 million in annuail revenues,708 though, notably, its profits 
have been less than projected and no doubt its managers are anxious to increase 
productivity to prevent a sell-off.709 The point is not whether one company or another is 
successful in its operations; rather, the point is that Canadian companies are heavily 
committed to making their Honduran operations successful and that, in the context of the 
coup and the behaviour of the military government, it has been in the interests of these 
companies that the Canadian government supp01t the military government so that these 
companies would enjoy the best possible conditions for making profits. 710 
Indeed, what is crucial here is that none of the profits that Canadian companies 
have been extracting from the mining industry in Honduras would be possible without a 
compliant Honduran state committed to allowing these companies to behave in the ways 
that they do. The growing strength of the social movements in the 2000s posed a threat 
to Canadian mining profits insofar as they were insisting on a major increase in the level 
707 Fiona Anderson, "Goldcorp hits revenue high," Vancouver Sun, February 16, 2012. 
708 Aura Minerals, Inc. "Management's Discussion and Analysis, For The Three and Nine Months Ended 
September 30, 2012," November 13, 2012. http://www.auraminerals.com/files/MDAQ32012.pdf 
709 This online investor's guide, called "Happy Capitalism," advised prospective investors in 2011 to be 
careful with Aura: http://www.happycapitalism.com/20111041 aura-minerals-inc-trving-to-reverse-a-steep-
decline/ 
710 Indeed, a complicating piece of the story here that doesn't fit into the central argument but needs to be 
remembered is that capital can leave Honduras as quickly as it enters. It is entirely possible that the coup 
regime could fail in its 'race to the bottom' project of attracting further foreign investment; Canadian 
companies could discover that conditions for profitability in their Honduran operations might not be good 
enough and, as a result, they might choose to invest elsewhere. My argument that the Canadian state - in 
partnership with Canadian and Honduran capital - is supporting a compliant Honduran state in constructing 
conditions for profitability in Honduras is not disproven if those profitable conditions are not created. That 
would simply mean that the project was unsuccessful, a very real possibility in the volatile world created by 
capitalist globalization. 
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of Honduran state intervention. Whether by creating stronger labour, health, or 
environmental regulations, enforcing existing ones, forcing companies to pay higher 
taxes, forcing companies to carry out legitimate community consultations before breaking 
dirt on new operations, or by any number of other means, Hondurans were expressing a 
clear and vocal message that the status quo -· mega-profits for Canadian firms at the 
expense of Hondurans - was not acceptable.711 To the extent that Zelaya was listening, 
and that the Constituyente might have actually made some of those changes real, 
Canadian firms had much to lose from that reform project and much to gain by a 
resurgent Honduran Right in power. 
This dynamic is as visible in the mining sector as anywhere, since it was no secret 
that Zelaya' s moratorium on new concessions was blocking the further development of 
potentially profitable investment in mining and since Canada was so active in writing the 
new mining code. In 2010, Canadian Ambassador Neil Reeder and CIDA representative 
Daniel Arsenault were in Honduras for meetings with Breakwater Resources about how 
to influence the direction of the new mining code.712 Sure enough, over the following 
months, high-level discussions between Canadian and Honduran state officials and 
mining companies were held regularly, and a DFAIT mission in 2011 reported that 
"Honduras is in the process of transformation from the anti-mining Zelaya administration 
to the pro-sustainable mining and pro-CSR Lobo government,"713 a rather farcical 
misrepresentation for those familiar with the situation. By 2012, Canada's role in 
developing the new mining codes was public knowledge; the Honduran newspaper El 
711 Interview with Pedro Landa, May 4, 2012. 
712 Todd Gordon, "Military Coups are Good for Canadian Business: the Canada-Honduras Free Trade 
Agreement," The Bullet, March 8, 2011. 
713 DF AIT, quoted in Jennifer Moore, "Canada's Promotion ... " 
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Hera/do proudly asserted that ministers from the two countries had agreed that Honduras 
would "contract consultants using Canadian funds to analyze the law in order to ensure 
that it includes minimum international standards and such that the experience of Canada 
is also reflected in the law."714 
Though both countries cloak their statements in the discourse of corporate social 
responsibility, the proposed legislation itself put the lie to this rhetoric. On January 23, 
2013, the new mining code was passed, despit<~ contravening plenty of the basic rights 
guaranteed to Hondurans under the 1982 constitution, and despite the fact that 91 % of 
Hondurans reported that they did not support the status quo for mining operations, as 
reflected in the new code.715 The new laws gave mining companies almost unlimited 
access to water for use in their operations, leaving only 10% of the country's wa~er 
protected for Honduran communities. Concessions were re-opened to being granted and 
the new laws allow for concessions with no limits; theoretically companies could be 
granted parcels of land in perpetuity. They place no restrictions on the use of acid 
drainage, and therefore leave no protection for communities against long-term 
groundwater contamination.716 At the same time, they assert that no authority can declare 
any territory permanently prohibited from mining, generating a legal loophole that 
companies will likely be able to use if they seek concessions on territory otherwise 
protected by the Honduran state. Calling mining an activity of "public interest," the new 
laws provide no safeguards for communities which fall within concessioned territory, 
714 El Hera/do, quoted in Jennifer Moore, "Canada's Promotion ... " 
715 Marvin Palacios, "De cada 100 hondurenos y hondurenas, 91 se oponen a la mineria a cielo abierto," 
Defensores en linea, March 27, 2012. Available at: 
http://www.defensoresenlinea.com/cms/index.php? option=com content&view=article&id= 193 8 :de-cada-
1OO-hondurenos-y-hondurenas-91-se-oponen-a-la-mineria-a-cielo-abierto&catid=5 8: amb&I temid= 181 
716 Jennifer Moore, "Honduran Mining Law Passed and Ratified, but the Fight is Not Over," Mining Watch 
Canada, January 24, 2013. Available at: http://www.miningwatch.ca/news/honduran-mining-law-passed-
and-ratified-fight-not-over 
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which will only make it easy for mining companies to displace Indigenous communities 
from their land. 717 They deepen the shroud of secrecy around mining operations, 
allowing companies to withhold technical and financial information from the public.718 
Finally, the "security tax" that the Lobo government had proposed in 2012 was 
added to the new mining code such that companies will pay a 2% tax to the state th~t is 
earmarked specifically for security costs. As I argued in Chapter 6, this tax will only 
deepen the relationship between the security apparatus and the mining companies that 
they are now directly being paid to protect.719 The new mining code, developed with the 
direct input of Canadian state officials, will serve to open Honduran people and resources 
to ever greater exploitation at the hands of Canadian enterprise, offering a rather stark 
demonstration of the collusion between the Canadian state, the Honduran coup regime, 
and Canadian mining companies. 
CANADA'S DIRECT INVESTMENTS - MAQUILADORAS 
Quebec-based Gildan Activewear announced record profits in the final quarter of 
2012 - some $89 million in just three months - and boasted of a strong positive outlook 
for 2013. 720 It is also one of the most infamous sweatshop employers in the world. With 
a laundry list of labour violations so well-documented that they make up a major portion 
of the company's "Wikipedia" entry721 and, with over 18,000 employees, it is the largest 
717 Indeed, ANAMINH director Gabino Carbajal reassured investors that the new laws would not interfere 
with their operations. Reuters reported that he "applauded th1e law and did not believe the caveat of giving 
locals a deciding say would be a problem," which suggests rather clearly that the law does not actually give 
locals a deciding say at all. Reuters, "Honduras ends mining moratorium, approves taxes," January 24, 
2013. 
718 Interview with Pedro Landa, March 3, 2013. 
719 Interview with Pedro Landa, March 3, 2013. 
720 Gildan, "Gildan Activewear Announces Record Quarterly Results and Projects Strong Earnings Outlook 
for Fiscal 2013," Press Release, November 29, 2012. 
721 Wikipedia, of course, is not a source of reliable information. It can, however, be an interesting 
benchmark of public opinion and information; since its entries are collectively written by Wikipedia users, 
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private-sector employer in Honduras. 722 Like its counterparts in the mining industry, 
Gildan is heralded by the Canadian mainstream media as a leader in responsible 
corporate practices, named by the Globe and Mail and MacLean 's as being among 
Canada's top 50 "corporate citizens."723 Nevertheless, the company has been publicly 
shamed for its practices on a consistent basis since it began shifting its manufacturing 
from North America to the Global South in the late 1990s, with its Honduran operations 
among its most notorious. 
Details of Gildan's activities are very difficult to obtain, especially as its host 
government in Honduras is increasingly protecting companies from public scrutiny, as 
evidenced in the new mining code described above. The maquiladora industry is 
particularly notorious in this regard. When Honduras made international headlines in the 
1990s following an expose of Kathie Lee Gifford's celebrity-branded clothing line, it was 
a result of an exhaustive series of investigations through garbage dumps and rubbish bins 
in Honduras and the Dominican Republic by Charles Kemaghan and the National Labour 
Committee (NLC). As Joel Bakan describes in his important work on the modem 
corporate form, The Corporation: 
Following garbage trucks to dumps and then sifting through what 
they leave behind is helpful, Kemaghan has found, for 
discovering the locations of factories in the new global economy 
and for finding out what goes on inside: them ... "They hide these 
factories and sweatshops around the world," says Kemaghan, 
and refuse requests for the factories' names and addresses 
they can provide a useful sketch of public perceptions. It is instructive, then, that Gildan's record of 
violent, abusive, exploitative, and often illegal labour practices make up the majority of its Wikipedia entry, 
signalling that there is a widespread awareness of Gildan's record, despite the Canadian state's support for 
its activities. 
722 Steven Chase, "In a Bid to Enter New Markets, Harper Lands Free-Trade Deal with Honduras," The 
Globe and Mail, September 6, 2012. 
723 Gildan, "Recognition," available at: http://www.genuinegildan.com/en/company/recognition/ 
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"because they know it's easier to exploit teenagers behind locked 
metal gates, with armed guards, behiind barbed wire."724 
Kemaghan's interventions with the NLC in Honduras were somewhat effective in 
exposing the outrageous conditions in Honduran sweatshops to North American 
audiences and were an important part of the building momentum around anti-sweatshop 
activism in North America at that moment. The legacy of that work is contested in 
Honduras. The Honduran media - controlled by the same parties as the maquiladoras -
framed Kemaghan as a "puppet" of the imperial powers and treated the Honduran 
sweatshop workers who collaborated with Kemaghan as if they, too, were traitors to the 
country. Even the maquila workers were divided on whether it made sense to rely on 
Northerners' support in the struggles in their own workplaces.725 
Nevertheless, Kemaghan and the activists he worked with in the late 1990s did 
important work in a moment when the Honduran social movement was just beginning to 
recover from the trauma and dislocation of the 1980s. But by the late 2000s, local 
worker-activists no longer relied on outside assistance in locating and documenting 
sweatshop operations. Between reports from movement activists and Gildan's own 
records, then, it is not impossible to construct a fairly clear picture of the company's 
operations in Honduras. According to Gildan's annual report for 2011, it operated three 
major textile facilities in Honduras, in addition to two smaller sock factories and a 
network of smaller sewing operations. Indeed, the company called Honduras its "largest 
manufacturing hub" and has been actively constructing new facilities and acquiring 
existing workshops in Honduras since the June 2009 coup; in 2012 Gildan bought out 
724 Joel Bakan, The Corporation, Penguin Books, Toronto, 2004, p. 65-66. 
725 Adrienne Pine, Working Hard, Drinking Hard: On Violence and Survival in Honduras, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 2008, p. 140-155. 
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Anvil Knitwear, which ran its own textile factories in Honduras including the Star S.A. 
factory in El Progreso, a case to which I will return. It is nota~le that one of Gildan's 
other major manufacturing hubs is in Haiti, arguably the poorest country in the Caribbean 
basin and another country where Canada's political interference is well-documented.726 
It would be outside the scope of this project to detail Gildan's complete record of 
exploitative behaviour in Honduras over the past decade. Instead, I will highlight those 
cases where the Canadian state cannot have claimed ignorance of Gildan' s record in 
order to demonstrate the extent to which the Canadian state has supported the company 
directly or indirectly, especially in its support for the coup regime since 2009. As far 
back as 2002, Gildan's factory in El Progreso was. a source of some embarrassment, as its 
miserable treatment of workers was brought into the Canadian mainstream by a CBC 
television special. Health and safety violations, less than living wages, sexual harassment 
and gender-based discrimination against its primarily female workforce, and a litany of 
other exploitative measures made international headlines, and the workers at the El 
Progreso factory began organizing to form a union and fight back.727 In 2003-04, nearly 
100 workers were fired for being involved in the unionization effort, but the Canadian 
government, under the Liberal leadership of foan Chretien, brazenly ignored the 
mounting evidence of Gildan's labour violations and awarded it, through the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), an "Excellence in Corporate Social and 
Ethical Responsibility Award," to bolster its legitimacy as it denied that it was 
726 As noted in Chapter 2, Canada was instrumental in the overthrow of the democratically-elected 
government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004 and has subsequmtly become part of a semi-permanent 
occupation force in the country. See Justin Podur, Haiti's New .Dictatorship: The Coup, The Earthquake 
and the UN Occupation, Pluto Press, London, 2012. 
727 The segment, titled "Sewing Discontent," was aired as part of the program Disclosure, but is no longer 
available at the CBC website, despite being referenced in the sidebar to related news articles, such as this 
one, published around the same time, on anti-sweatshop activism in Canada. 
http://www. cbc. ca/marketolace/pre-2 007 /files/home/ cu ti tout/ index. html 
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mistreating its workers. 728 Honduran and Canadian labour organizations continued to file 
official complaints, and when the pressure became too great, Gildan simply closed the 
factory, laid off its 1800 workers, and shifted more production to its other plants. 729 The 
case of the El Progreso plant is important insofar as it demonstrates that the Canadian 
state was, as far back as the early 2000s, directly implicated in Gildan's behaviour. 
This dynamic has followed Gildan wherever it has gone in Honduras. Between 
2008 and 2011, the U.S.-based labour NGO Workers Rights Consortium (WRC) 
documented systematic persecution of workers who were trying to organize unions at 
Gildan and Anvil factories. Workers would be fired or threatened with being blacklisted 
across the sector so that they would not find any work, would suffer verbal, physical and 
sexual harassment from managers and from other workers, and received death threats 
which, as Chapter 6 described, had to be taken v1ery seriously in the Honduran context.730 
At the one factory where workers successfully formed a ·union, Star S.A., the union 
leaders have faced constant harassment. As WRC reported: 
In early May, a worker from the cutting department approached 
[union president W aldin] Banegas in 1the training room and said, 
"it would be cheap to get you all killed. They will charge me 
5,000 lempiras to kill all six of you.~'' It was clear that he was 
referring to the six members of the union's leadership 
committee ... Workers who choose to form unions are well aware 
of this context, and have legitimate: reason to be extremely 
concerned about threats of violence. According to the 
[International Trade Union Confederation], at least fifteen union 
leaders have been killed in the last three years. 731 
728 Gordon, Imperialist Canada, p. 250-251. 
729 Gordon, Imperialist Canada, p. 251. 
730 Workers Rights Consortium, "Case Summary, Star, S.A. (Honduras), October 1, 2008. Available at: 
htto://www.workersrights.org/Freports/Case%20Summary%20-%20Star%20 Honduras .pdf 
731 Workers Rights Consortium, "Workers Rights Consortium Assessment, Star, S.A. (Honduras): Findings, 
Recommendations and Status" October 12, 2012. Available at: 
htto://www.workersrights.org/Freports/WRC%20Assessment:%20re%20Star°/o20%28Honduras%29%20-
%2010.12.12.pdf 
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WRC's most recent report on the Star, S.A. factory makes it very clear that not only was 
management aware of the threats, they were often in collusion with the perpetrators. A 
useful demonstration of that collusion can be found in the story of Rafael Magana, a 
particularly aggressive anti-union worker who has been accused of threatening unioq.ists 
since the mid-2000s. During a 2009 job action, Magana told a union leader "the time you 
have left to live is the time I give you. I have you in my hands." In 2012, he said he would 
"destroy" the union and told another activist that "the cemetery [was] full of brave people." 
WRC reports on his relationship to Gildan/ Anvil management: 
Multiple workers provided evidence that Human Resources staff 
at Star not only tolerated Magana's behavior, but colluded with 
certain workers in promoting anti-union messages in the plant. 
According to credible, mutually corroborated worker testimony, 
Magana enjoyed a privileged relationship with Human Resources 
Manager Wendy Aguirre and met with her regularly in her 
office. Magana's meetings with her also often included two other 
workers who also are vocally anti-union. Aguirre did not meet 
regularly with other workers· with similar job responsibilities. 
Magana and these other two workers often had access to 
information before other workers, indicating that they received 
information from Aguirre or other managers. 732 
WRC was in communication with Gildan while carrying out the report, but Gildan denied 
any knowledge of the anti-union activities: 
Gildan states that, "we have not been provided with and are not 
aware of any evidence that these complaints of harassment were 
in fact reported to management." The workers who were the 
victims of this harassment, however, t~estified to the WRC that 
they reported these incidents to management repeatedly, both 
before and after Gildan's [2012] acquisition of the plant [from 
Anvil Knitwear].733 
732 Workers Rights Consortium, "Workers Rights Consortium Assessment, Star, S.A. (Honduras): Findings, 
Recommendations and Status" October 12, 2012. Available at: 
http://www.workersrights.org/Freports/WRC%20Assessment%20re%20Star%20%28Honduras%29%20-
%2010 .12 .12 .pdf 
733 Workers Rights Consortium, "Workers Rights Consortium Assessment, Star, S.A. (Honduras): Findings, 
Recommendations and Status" October 12, 2012. Available at 
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Moreover, it is worth describing in a bit more detail the nature of Gildan's 
treatment of its employees, even under "normal" conditions, in order to fully grapple with 
what the Canadian state is endeavouring to support. As noted above, the best source of 
credible information on the conditions of Honduran sweatshops today are the workers 
themselves. One of the most important Honduran organizations involved with 
maquiladora workers is the women's collective, Colectiva de Mujeres Hondurenas 
(CODEMUH), and I have interviewed, on a few occasions, one of its gene,ral 
coordinators, Maria Luisa Regalado. Among other things, she reports that the women 
employed by Gildan often work up to eleven-hour shifts and avoid getting up to go to the 
bathroom for fear of not meeting their quotas. The quotas themselves are reinforced by 
dividing the women into "teams," with each team responsible for a certain level of 
production and punished collectively if that level isn't met; for instance, company 
supervisors will sometimes withhold workers' lunch tickets if their team fails to meet its 
quotas.734 
The result, predictably, is that the women are encouraged to discipline one 
another to work harder, and as many of them develop serious health problems, they are 
injected with painkillers by company doctors in ordler to prolong their ability to work. As 
their bodies collapse and their productivity falls:, they are dropped into lower wage 
categories. Indeed, the workers are routinely assessed for what percentage of fitness they 
are at and paid accordingly; that is, if the doctor claims that a worker is operating at 50% 
physical capacity, she will be paid at 50% of the full wage. When the painkillers are no 
http://www.workersrights.org/Freports/WRC%20Assessment%20re%20Star%20%28Honduras%29%20-
%2010.12.12.pdf 
734 Interview with Maria Luisa Regalado, May 11, 2012. 
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longer enough and workers are no longer able to keep up, they are often fired without 
warning or compensation. 735 
Among the package of neoliberal shocks that the Lobo government has passed 
since the coup is a new set of regulations around temporary work, which has given 
employers like Gildan an ideal loophole to get around the relatively minor social 
securities that do exist in Honduran law. Under the new temporary work laws, Gil~an 
hires temporary workers for periods of up to two months and then lets them go 
completely; during that time they have no access to any social security, no leaves or 
support for pregnancy, and no vacation time. In addition, Gildan is often able to cloak its 
activities by using subcontracted companies; for instance, Gildan forces potential 
employees to submit to humiliating physical examinations, conducted by a private 
Honduran firm. Regalado describes the examinations: 
The exams are physical and psychological. It is very invasive; 
the women have to take their clothes off, down to their 
underwear. Doctors touch every part of their body, and if they 
let on that they feel any pain at all, they may not get the job ... 
the women have to get down on their knees and they are touched 
on the legs, their arms, their shoulders:, everywhere. 736 
These allegations are dramatic, and they are supported by nearly every 
investigation into factory conditions with the 1exception of those undertaken by the 
company itself. 737 In 2008, Adrienne Pine reported the complaints she most commonly 
735 Interview with Maria Luisa Regalado, May 11, 2012. 
736 Interview with Maria Luisa Regalado, May 11, 2012. 
737 In 2011, for instance, CODEMUH presented a comprehensive complaint to the Fair Labor Association 
(FLA) about Gildan's treatment of its workforce. Gildan responded by initiating an examination of its own 
practices which, not surprisingly, came back with a rosy picture of a socially responsible company. 
CODEMUH sent the complaint back to the FLA, but the response from that organization was disappointing 
to CODEMUH and its supporters in the North American-based Maquila Solidarity Network, which claimed 
that the FLA report ignored the root causes of the problems at Gildan factories and did not investigate the 
long-term health problems associated with working at Gildan. Please see Maquila Solidarity Network, 
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heard: "the chemicals used in production {fotmaldehyde and others), the lint particles 
(tamo) ... the aches and boredom associated with repetitive tasks, and the unrelenting 
discipline - and associated humiliation - of factory work."738 Pine goes on to describe a 
conversation she had with a doctor who had once worked for one of the maquiladoras, 
who explained that workers who needed treatment had to work while they waited to see 
the doctor, lest productivity should drop, meaning that their bodies were being pushed 
even as they were trying to get help for existing problems. 739 
What is more, the maquiladoras are notorious for the regulation of their workers' 
reproductive rights, enforcing regular pregnancy tests and hiring and firing women based 
on the results; this regulation of women's bodies is significant, especially in light of the 
measures the coup regime itself has taken to institutionalize the same restrictions at the 
state level, 740 and it is worth quoting Pine at length on this: 
Pregnancy is a great threat to prodm~tivity and a high cost to 
employers, who are legally obligated to pay maternity leave. 
When applying for a maquiladora job, and again after the two-
month probation period during which new hires are paid at a 
reduced rate, a young woman must submit to a pregnancy test. If 
the test result is positive, she is not hired; thus her "training 
period" provides cheaper labour for the employers. As [former 
maquila doctor] Dr. Zavela said to me, "the pregnancy test is the 
true employment test." Employers try to get around paying 
"FLA investigation ignores root causes of workplace injuries:," September 5, 2012. Available at: 
http://en.maquilasolidarity.org/node/1087 
738 Pine, 157. 
739 Pine, 159. 
740 It is also, however, worth noting that there are contradictory logics at work here. On the one hand, the 
increased regulation of women's bodies is a project shared by the maquiladora industry (which is seeking 
to stop women from getting pregnant and taking maternity leave) and the state (which is seeking to placate 
the maquiladora owners but is also catering to far-right Evangelical Christian movements and a patriarchal 
tradition that is somewhat bolstered in Honduras by the increase in women's employment spurred on by the 
maquila sector.) There is an agreement by the predominantly male leaders of state and industry that 
women's bodies should be controlled by men, but there is a contradiction that arises between the different 
goals these groups have; factory owners want productive workers, so they want to prevent pregnancy and, 
as a result, they sometimes force women to use birth control or provide abortions from company doctors, 
while the traditional patriarchal leadership seeks to ban all fon:ns of contraception and coerce women to 
behave with 'moderation' and chastity. 
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maternity leave by making the workplace so inhospitable to the 
pregnant worker that she quits, thereby forfeiting the severance 
pay due her had she been fired. In some factories, women are 
obligated to take birth control pills and, if they do become 
pregnant, are faced with the choice between keeping the baby or 
keeping the job. Dr. Zavela informed me that in the maquila 
where he worked, management encouraged doctors to provide 
b . . 741 a ort1ons as a cost-savmg measure. 
CODEMUH has filed hundreds of reports of health violations at Gildan's factories -
mostly muscular-skeletal issues in the shoulders and backs as a result of conducting some 
40-50 repetitive actions per minute - and despite consistent efforts to dialogue with the 
company on these matters they have found that, rather than supporting workers with 
health problems, Gildan actually punishes them. 742 
Moreover, as noted in Chapter 6, the physical and structural violence inflicted on 
the women in Gildan' s factories has a direct relationship to the broader dynamics of 
violence in Honduran streets and homes, especially since 2009. To cite just one example, 
as Gildan requires more and more hours of work from its employees, and as those hours 
go later into the night and are not up for negotia1tion, women find themselves forced to 
travel home from work well after dark, where th•ey often face harassment and physical 
violence from men in the streets, especially police. "In one meeting, we had twelve 
women from the factories and we asked if any of them faced violence to and from work," 
Regalado reported. "Every single one of them saidl that they had been assaulted between 
one and three times."743 
It is hard to imagine the Canadian state openly declaring itself in favour of the 
dynamics described here. Nevertheless, it is predsely these conditions that Honduran 
741 Pine, 164. 
742 Interview with Maria Luisa Regalado, May 11, 2012. 
743 Interview with Maria Luisa Regalado, May 11, 2012. 
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social movements have been struggling against over the past decade, and Canada's 
endorsement of the military regime since 2009 has placed it firmly on the side of 
maquiladora owners like Gildan. Canada's position cannot be explained by ignorance; 
CODEMUH sent an open letter to Prime Minister Harper in 2011 in anticipation of the 
Canada-Honduras FTA, insisting that the Canadian government take Gildan's 
mistreatment of workers seriously: 
The Honduran Women's Colle:ctive, CODEMUH, has 
continually and systematically produced information about the 
vulnerable position faced by workers in the maquila industry in 
Honduras, about the violation of human and labour rights, and 
the damages done to the health of workers by their work 
activities, especially in the company Gildan Activewear, a 
transnational company owned by Canadians. [ ... ] We demand 
that you ask promptly for a report on labour and human rights 
conditions for the women and men who work at Gildan 
Activewear installations in Honduras; and that the Canadian 
government monitors working conditions for workers with 
Canadian transnationals. The Canadian government must force 
companies to comply with national laws, international 
conventions and international treaties to do with human and 
labour rights and corporate social responsibility.744 
It does not appear that the Canadian government will pursue CODEMUH's requests to 
force Gildan to comply with international labour treaties. Instead, Gildan continues to 
receive accolades for its commitment to corporate social responsibility in the Canadian 
media, and when Prime Minister Harper signed the FT A in Honduras, he "praised 
Gildan's conduct in Honduras" as a leader in responsible behaviour after a visit to one of 
its factories, and he asserted that "[Canada is] always concerned about the image and 
record of Canadian companies when they are involved in business anywhere in the 
744 CODEMUH, "Open Letter," August 12, 2011. Available at: 
http://www.waronwant.org/attachments/Codemuh%200pen%20Letter%20to%20Canadian%20%20Prime 
%20Minister%20English.pdf The full text of the letter is reproduced here as Appendix G. 
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world."745 His comments buttressed the statements made the previous year by Peter 
Kent, who claimed that "Canadians should be proud" of Gildan Activewear and its peers 
in Honduras.746 Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the coup, when even U.S. sweatshop 
employers Nike and Adidas spoke out against the interruption of democracy and the 
violent repression, Gildan proceeded with "business as usual," and suggested that the 
coup would potentially be good for Gildan since it would likely bring a more business-
friendly government. 747 
CANADA'S DIRECT INVESTMENTS - TOURISM 
The third significant sector for Canadian investors in Honduras is the growing 
tourist trade on the country's north coast and the Bay Islands. In the months following 
the 2009 coup, letters poured into Ottawa and Washington from the North American 
residents in the region, pressuring their governments to support the coup regime and its 
commitments to developing the tourist industry. Tom Stollery, Canadian investor in 
Villas Paraiso Escondido, a 40-acre resort on the North Coast, wrote to Prime Minister 
Harper on behalf of the company in July 2009 to express concern over its "support" for 
President Zelaya. As I described in Chapter 6, Canada could hardly be said to have 
supported Zelaya. Nevertheless, the letter from Canadian investors is instructive: 
If Zelaya is allowed to return to power in Honduras and with 
outside influence from the ALBA group of countries it will result 
in the loss of democracy, freedom of speech and human rights 
for all Hondurans. The removal of democracy in Honduras will 
stop foreign investment and will result in financial losses to 
745 Steven Chase, "Harper Exits Honduras With A New Free-Trade Deal," The Globe and Mail, August 12, 
2011. 
746 Peter Kent, quoted in Maxwell A. Cameron, "A Diplomatic Theatre of the Absurd: Canada, the OAS 
and the Honduran Coup," NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 43, No. 3, May/June 2010, p. 20. 
747 Canadian Council for International Cooperation, "Honduras: Democracy Denied," Report from the 
CCIC's Americas Policy Group with Recommendations to the Government of Canada, April 2010, p. 19. 
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foreign and Canadian investments in that country. This loss of 
investment will ultimately cam\e economic hardship for 
Honduras and its people which is already one of the poorest 
countries in the western hemisphere. 748 
Notwithstanding the dubious claim that Zelaya - and not the coup government - posed a 
threat to Honduran democracy and human rights, it is worth noting how quickly and 
clearly the terrain of the letter's discourse shifts to the protection of Canadian investment. 
Stollery may well have been right that the direction Zelaya was taking could have 
resulted in financial losses to Canadian investors, given this project of social democratic 
reform, but his insistence that Canadian investment in Honduras was protecting people 
from economic hardship is rather unconvincing. 
Another letter-writer from a North American resort complained that tourism was 
suffering as a result of the "lies" being told about bloodshed in Honduras and insisted 
that: 
Roatan is an island over 30 miles from the mainland of 
Honduras. Roatan is technically a part of Honduras, but they are 
worlds apart in culture and geographical location. The political 
unrest occurred only on mainland Honduras. On the island of 
Roatan, we have had no incidents of any kind. It remains 
peaceful, tranquil and beautiful. 749 
The author of this letter was, of course, not entirely incorrect. The tourist enclave in 
Honduras' north is worlds apart from the rest of the country, insofar as it increasingly 
functions as a tropical playground for North American adventurers and retirees, protected 
from the realities of Honduran life by an infrastructure and security apparatus designed to 
748 Tom Stollery, quoted in Rights Action, "Pro-Coup North Americans in Honduras," November 10, 2009. 
Available at: http://www.rightsaction.org/Alerts/Honduran coup resistance day136 alert88 111009.html 
749 Penelope Leigh, quoted in Rights Action, "Pro-Coup North Americans in Honduras," November 10, 
2009. Available at: 
http://www.rightsaction.org/Alerts/Honduran coup resistance day136 alert88 111009.html 
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invisibilize the stark inequality and exploitation that makes Honduras such a pnme 
location for these resorts and villas in the first place. 
Indeed, the attraction for Canadian investors is the price; with some property 
being sold for as little as $85 per square foot, the emerging North Coast retirement 
communities are becoming increasingly popular among Canadian seniors looking for a 
cheaper place to set up in the sun.750 Tourism from Canada represents the largest source 
of income in the industry in Honduras, and as property developers gradually expand their 
scope in the country's north, the result is increased conflict between land developers and 
local communities. In particular, North Coast developers are snapping up land - buying 
it for cheap, through a variety of often-sketchy means - that is claimed as protected land 
by Honduras' Garifuna people. As far back as 1992, the Marbella Tourist Corporation 
began seizing land near Triunfo de la Cruz, prompting conflict between the company and 
the newly formed Comite de Defensa de las Tierras de Triunfo de la Cruz (CODETT) 
which culminated, in 1997, in the murder of thriee community leaders and incarceration 
on trumped up charges of a fourth. 751 
As the industry grew, it often took the form of ecotourist developments like 
marine parks and biological reserves which were promoted in the language of 
sustainability and environmental protection but actually served to facilitate the grabbing 
of Garifuna land for ultimately destructive and unsustainable practices. One 1993 decree, 
for instance, banned any extraction of marine life from the North Coast waters, 
effectively criminalizing local fishing and lobster catching, essential aspects of Garifuna 
750 Dawn Paley, "Snowbirds Gone Wild! Canadian Retirees and Locals Clash in Honduras," This 
Magazine, November 4, 2010. 
751 Tanya Kerssen, Grabbing Power: The New Struggles for Land, Food and Democracy in Northern 
Honduras, Oakland, Food First Books, 2013, p. 76. 
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cultural and economic life. This, despite the fact that Garifuna practices were, in fact, 
environmentally sustainable and woven into the fabric of community life; Garifuna 
fishing posed no threat to fish stocks, but bannilng fishing facilitated the establishment of 
scuba diving resorts and marine reserves for tourists. 752 Similar restrictions were app:lied 
to practices like logging; indeed, while foreign mining companies were deforesting 
massive swaths of land on their concessions, small Garifuna communities were being 
blocked from minor, sustainable, subsistence practices like using local palm trees to 
repair their homes. 
Meanwhile, the tourist projects that have moved in have not, themselves, adhered 
to any meaningful standards of sustainable development. Envio correspondant Ismael 
Moreno describes: 
Many of the new roads on [the Bay] Islands are unstable and 
promote widespread erosion, siltation of offshore coasts, and 
deterioration of steambeds and waterbeds. Shoreline 
construction of hotels, restaurants, marinas, beaches, and housing 
has destroyed mangroves and corals. Hundreds of wells have 
been dug indiscriminately, leading to saltwater infiltration of the 
groundwater, disruption of groundwater flows and diminished 
stream quality. 753 
Overdevelopment of scuba projects and other tour:ist activities weakened the North Coast 
ecology - and the Garifuna communities that had traditionally protected it - and left the 
region especially vulnerable to disasters like Hurricane Mitch. Tourist businesses 
gradually bought up land by taking advantage of ambiguities in the nature of land titling 
- ie. buying land from individual Garifuna "landowners" rather than negotiating with the 
communities at large - usually beginning with forested or coastal territory, so that the 
developments came to more or less surround the actual villages and settlements. This 
752 Kerssen, 7 6-77. 
753 Ismael Moreno, quoted in Kerssen, 79. 
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slowly cut the communities off from their resource bases and weakened them such that it 
became easier to buy out individual residential. plots, hastening the full encroachment of 
companies in traditional territory. 754 
What is more, the supposed benefits of the increased tourist trade have yet to 
"trickle down" to the Hondurans who claim the land as their own. 755 Tanya Kerssen 
describes the experience: 
[Neoliberal initiatives] have succ<::eded in restructuring the 
northern coast to facilitate investment and accumulation by both 
international investors and the Honduran oligarchy. Indeed, 
Garifuna communities have been boxed in on all sides, with 
Facusse's palm oil and Dole's pineapple plantations; the 
enclosure of coastal waters and wilderness areas for tourism; the 
criminalization of subsistence activities; and the usurpation of 
community lands. 756 
As Honduran journalist Felix Molina describes it:. the North Coast region is experiencing 
a "new Apartheid," as walls are being built - quite literally - to keep the Garifuna 
separated from the growing community of Canadian retirees. 757 Indeed, it appears that 
Garifuna culture holds less appeal, to the northerners who bring down their dollars to 
experience a sterilized version of local custom:. than that of the Maya; the resorts 
typically offer tokenized presentations of "traditional Mayan culture" even while they are 
actively undermining the t~aditional existence of the Garifuna. 758 
The emblematic case of Canadian investment in Honduran tourism is that of Life 
Vision Properties, owned by Canadian pornography magnate Randy Jorgensen. Building 
754 Kerssen, 79-80. 
755 Whether tourism can ever have positive local impacts is rather debatable. Julian T. Pinter's 2010 film 
Land, filmed in Nicaragua not far from the Honduran tourist enclaves, offers a bleak look at tourism and 
land development as neo-colonialism. Julian T. Pinter, Land, ih Art, 2010. 
756 Kerssen, 84. 
757 Interview with Felix Molina, May 2, 2012. 
758 A dynamic reminiscent of my analysis of North American fascination with the 'mysterious' Maya, in 
Chapter 3. 
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on two decades of success and notoriety with his Adults Only Video retail chain, 
Jorgensen now buys and sells property in Honduras through Life Vision and constructs 
the infrastructure on those sites through his Jaguar Construction company.759 Indeed, 
Jorgensen is positioning himself as one of the key figures in the development of the 
North Coast tourist industry, his "Banana Coast" cruise port development poised to 
become Honduras' largest. The collusion betwieen Jorgensen and the Honduran state is 
not veiled: Life Vision Properties' website features a promotional video in which Pepe 
Lobo himself speaks directly to potential investors, assuring them that Honduras is an 
attractive place for their money: 
Honduras is located in the heart of America in a region that acts 
as the central axis for Global commerce. As a nation, we have 
made significant progress in terms of infrastructure, technology 
and innovation. We have subscribed free trade agreements that 
grant our products access to major markets in the world in a 
highly competitive manner. We have a new legal and regulatory 
framework for investment promotion and protection making us 
one of the most attractive places to invest in Latin America. Join 
us. Come to Honduras. 760 
With direct support from the Honduran state and armed forces, it is hardly a surprise that 
Jorgensen is not worried about local opposition. \Vhen Canadian journalist Dawn Paley 
asked him about Garifuna claims that his properties were being built on land that belongs 
to them collectively, his response was instructive: 
For Canadians, the easiest way to compare it is to compare it to 
our own native Indians in Canada ... Depending on what's going 
on, they may or may not decide that they have a land claim going 
on ... As soon as there is any development going on generally, 
the Garifuna start checking around and seeing if there isn't some 
759 Karen Spring, "Canadian Porn Kings, Tourism 'Development' Projects, Repression and the Violation of 
Indigenous-Garifuna Rights in Honduras," Rights Action Bulletin, February 14, 2011. 
760 Porfirio 'Pepe' Lobo, quoted in Life Vision Properties promotional video, available at: 
http://www.realestate-investments.co/ caribbean-real-estate-for-sale/ 
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way that they can extort some funds or something out of whoever 
is doing that development.761 
It seems quite clear from Jorgensen's dismissive response to the idea of Indigenous land 
claims - in Honduras or Canada - that he does not take seriously even the possibility that 
the Garifuna could have a legitimate grievance. 
But Garifuna communities have been organizing against Jorgensen and the 
emerging tourist trade since the mid-2000s. Evaristo Perez Ambular, a Garifuna 
organizer based in Trujillo, has been struggling for nearly a decade against Canadian 
companies: "there are many Canadians in our communities on the coast, and we haven't 
seen a positive presence from them," he said. "They use our bridges and our roads, and 
they don't leave us a thing."762 Much of the property held by Jorgensen was bought for 
cheap from one individual falsely claiming to represent the Garifuna communities in the 
region in 2007. Community leaders have denied that the individual ever had the right to 
sell the land, but the Honduran state has uphdd Jorgensen's right to the land and 
Jorgensen is currently developing a plan to build a $15 million port at Trujillo to receive 
cruise ships with an attendant set of resorts and shopping malls. 763 
Even if Jorgensen had acquired the land through a legitimate process, there is no 
consensus on whether foreign tourist enclaves are beneficial to their host countries. What 
is clear, in the Honduran case, is that they have displaced communities and upset 
customary practices - fishing, shipping, agriculture, and the complex dynamics and 
networks of traditional Garifuna culture - and have replaced those practices with an 
industry that adds very little new value to the Honduran economy. The money that does 
761 Randy Jorgensen, quoted in Paley, "Snowbirds ... " 
762 Evaristo Perez Ambular, quoted in Paley, "Snowbirds ... " 
763 Karen Spring, "Canada's Ongoing Support for Honduras Regime," Rights Action Bulletin, January 10, 
2011. 
320 
trickle into the pockets of Hondurans comes predominantly in the form of the low wages 
paid to resort service staff and in the growing market for cheap Honduran prostitution.764 
International reporting on the HIV crisis in Honduras' north regularly refer to the rapidly 
increasing rate of prostitution, but it typically fails to connect it to the concurrent rise in 
North American tourist development, as if a "natural" Garifuna "promiscuity" were the 
real cause of the problem. 765 
Indeed, Jorgensen's advertising campaigns for his tropical resorts typically feature 
attractive young women in bikinis on the beach:. and he was accused in 2001 of making 
pornographic films with underage Honduran women as actors. 766 Meanwhile, the sex 
industry has exploded since the resorts - and foreigners - started arriving en masse. 
Dawn Paley reports on a chilling interview with a disgraced Ontario Provincial Police 
officer who now lives in Trujillo: 
[Former OPP officer Rick Mowers] rattles off how much cheaper 
things are in Honduras, from rent and food to crack cocaine and 
sex. "Here sex is, in the whole country, sex is $10. So if you go 
downtown, and you stop and the girl gets in your car, it's $10, 
200 lempiras, for you to go have intercourse," he says. Mowers 
didn't mention the AIDS epidemic in the north-coast region, 
where over 60,000 people have HIV I Al[DS, the highest infection 
rate in Central America. 767 
764 Paul Jeffrey, "Sex Tourism Plagues Central America," Response Magazine Online. Available at: 
http://gbgm-umc.org/response/articles/sextourism.html 
765 For instance, the Pulitzer Centre treats the problem as though it were rooted in a cultural naivety about 
the importance of using condoms. See Jens Erik Gould, "HIV and the Garifuna: Coming to Tem1s with a 
Virus," Pulitzer Centre, January 30, 2013. In an article published a week earlier, the same author 
acknowledged that "the Garifuna have one of the highest HIV rates in the W estem Hemisphere" and that 
"their culture and language are in jeopardy" but he insists that "HIV is one of the greatest threats to their 
survival" and says nothing about the assault on Garifuna social and cultural institutions that has led to the 
dramatic increases in prostitution and HIV. Jens Erik Gould, "The Forgotten: HIV and the Garifuna of 
Honduras," Pulitzer Centre, January 23, 2013. 
766 
"Charged: Randy Jorgensen," Maclean 's Magazine, December 3, 2001. 
767 Paley, "Snowbirds ... " 
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As in the mining and garment manufacturing industries, it is clear that Canada's 
position on the military coup is in line with the interests of its entrepreneurs on the North 
Coast. Where Zelaya's reformist project increasingly opened the door to dialogue with -
and even state support for - Garifuna communities struggling against these Canadian 
enterprises, the coup government has opened its arms to the tourist trade and 
demonstrated a violent disregard for Garifuna activism. When, for instance, some 200 
Garifuna people established a temporary camp near Vallecito to demand that the state 
demarcate clearly the boundary for Garifuna land title, the Jnstituto Nacional Agrario 
(INA) representatives sent by the Lobo government did little to protect the Garifuna 
activists from heavily armed security personnel, in the employ of local oligarchs 
connected to the tourist trade as well as other North Coast industries, who used violence 
and intimidation to try to dissuade the camp from staying put. 768 The camp was largely 
organized by OFRANEH, the largest Garifuna-based activist organization in Honduras, 
and from the state's refusal to intervene to protect the camp from violence, OFRANEH 
concluded: "it is because [the Lobo government] supports and endorses the theft of land 
by the groups who have taken control of the tenitory in the Vallecito area."769 That 
conclusion seems eminently convincing, especially given the violence that individual 
organizers in OFRANEH have faced since the coup, as detailed in Chapter 6, and given 
the rapidly expanding militarization of the region, largely in support and protection of 
private interests. 
MAKING HONDURAS "RIGHT" FOR CANADIAN CAPITAL 
768 Kerssen, 84-85. 
769 OFRANEH, "Crisis en Vallecito (Colon): Aclarati6n Publica ante Infundios del INA," August 29, 2012. 
Available at: htto://ofraneh. wordpress.com/2012/08/29/crisis-en·-vallecito-colon-aclaracion-publica-ante-
infundios-del-ina/ 
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While the direct investment of Canadian capital in Honduras demonstrates the 
immediate interests that the Canadian state is serving in its suppo11 for the coup 
government, arguably the most important piec1e of the relationship is to be found in the 
broader project that Canada is actively supporting in Honduras. Just as Smedley Butler 
was hired to make Honduras "right" for the banana magnates a century ago, Canada is 
today looking to secure a Honduras that will be ':'right" for Canadian investments across a 
variety of sectors. In a summary of Canada's new aggressive foreign policy, Greg Albo 
notes how Honduras fits in: 
Canada is now using its diplomatic offices and overseas funding 
to support destabilization efforts of governments identified as 
insufficiently 'market oriented.' This role has been evident in 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Honduras, and Ecuador. 770 
Indeed, it would be a tremendous oversimplification to imagine that Canada's posture in 
Honduras could be explained by a simple, straight line between the interests of individual 
companies and state behaviour. While it is clear that Canada's foreign policy in 
Honduras is partly shaped by the immediate needs of companies like Goldcorp, Gildan 
and Life Vision, this picture needs to be complem1ented by an understanding of Canada's 
broader interests in Honduras and, indeed, in Ct:ntral America and other parts of the 
Global South more generally. 771 
770 Greg Albo, "Fewer Illusions: Canadian Foreign Policy Since 2001," in Jerome Klassen and Greg Albo, 
ed., Empire's Ally: Canada and the War in Afghanistan, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2013. 
771 As argued in Chapter 2, there are a variety of factors that go into the determination of so many little 
pieces of Canadian foreign policy decision-making and the claim here is not that these factors are all simply 
reducible to the protection of Canadian economic interests. These factors include but are not limited to: the 
ideologies of the ruling political parties of the moment, the particular discourses and relationships that 
shape bilateral state relations, the individual personalities of tht: political agents themselves, the input of 
civil society groups, the positioning of the mass media on various issues, the ideological mood of the 
general public at a given moment, and the strength of micro- and macro-level lobby groups. The argument 
inherent in this project, however, is that of all the considerations and factors that shape Canadian foreign 
policy the most powerful and influential are those that come from the interests of capital. From there, this 
project is seeking to identify more particularly how those interests come to be defined - to understand the 
323 
----, 
What is at stake in Honduras, from the perspective of the Canadian state, is· the 
promotion and protection of the conditions necessary for further profitable investment. 
The Zelaya government not only threatened to undermine the profits of existing Canadian 
businesses in Honduras, it was making moves that might have made Honduras a less 
profitable place to do business in general. There have been a number of developments, 
before and since the coup, that point to this broader agenda. I will use the remainder of 
this chapter to identify the most visible demonstrations of Canada's larger neoliberal 
project in Honduras and the effects that this project has on Honduran people; once again, 
the purpose will be to illustrate that Canada pursues this agenda in spite of its harmful 
effects on the human rights, economic security, and social well-being of Honduran 
people, thus putting the lie to the idea that Canada's foreign policy takes seriously the 
rhetoric of supporting democracy, human rights, and prosperity abroad. 
As Albo notes above, central to the Canadian project in Honduras has been the 
de-stabilization of the reform projects that would have threatened its "market 
orientation." The agenda that Canada has pursued in Honduras since the coup speaks 
directly to this emphasis on prying Honduras open to ever-deeper degrees of foreign 
investment and exploitation. There is no better example of this than the proposal -
developed out of a right-wing think tank called the McDonald-Laurier Institute - for the 
creation of so-called "charter cities" in Honduras. The idea was to establish in Honduran 
law the right of the state to grant territorial concessions to businesses within which they 
would possess virtual city-statehood, with their own laws, police, and foreign relations. 
The Globe and Mail celebrated the idea in April 2012: 
political economic logic of the new Canadian imperialism - and to highlight the measures the Canadian 
state is willing to take on behalf of Canadian capital. 
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If you took a stretch of unused land in a troubled, developing 
nation like Honduras, set it up as a largely independent 
jurisdiction with the kind of rules-based governance that 
Canadians are used to, could that new system take hold? Could 
it rub off on other parts of the country and, over time, transform 
entire regions? ... the answer to all three questions is, most 
likely, yes. 772 
The author of the article, Jeremy Toro bin, adds that Canadians could and should help 
govern the charter cities, and he argues that, while some people might call this a form of 
imperialism, it would have material benefits for everyone and, thus, it shouldn't matter 
what we call it. He even points to the example of British control of Hong Kong as an 
example of how "successful" such colonization can be. He concludes: 
There is a strong argument in the "enlightened self-interest" 
category, aside from [charter city advocate] Professor Romer' s 
projections about the impact on global output, or the potential 
windfall for Canadian companies that might build some of the 
infrastructure for the new cities or, eventually, have billions more 
overseas customers who can afford to buy their products. 
Namely, Canada and all advanced economies have a stake in 
ensuring the massive urbanization occurring this century actually 
makes lives better instead of creating giant new filthy, chaotic, 
overcrowded slums... Canadians are proud of their 
internationalist credentials, and [charter cities] could be a 
template for doing good work abroad that has lasting effect, and 
that gets the most bang for our buck. 773 
There is much to unpack in Torobin's article, and in the "charter city" proposal itself 
which, as of 2012, had been passed into Honduran law. Torobin describes the "charter 
cities" as being placed on "unused land," a claim which must immediately be questioned. 
It can hardly be claimed that there is any "unused" land in Honduras, assuming the 
definition of "use" is broader than the Lockean claim that land is only "in use" if it is 
772 Jeremy Torobin, "How 'Charter Cities' Could Lift the Global Economy," The Globe and Mail, 
September 12, 2012. 
773 Torobin, "Charter Cities." 
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being used to create profits. 774 Land is, instead, used for a variety of .other purposes, 
whether as hunting and fishing territory, as ceremonial space, as a corridor that connects 
communities, and for countless other purpos1~s. The existing proposals for "charter 
cities" in Honduras have mostly fallen on tenitory that is claimed by Indigenous and 
especially Garifuna communities, where the notion of "use" is far broader than that of the 
capitalist ideologues who seek to turn it into a corporate concession. As OFRANEH 
argues: 
Paul Romer's propaganda talks about building "Charter Cities" 
in uninhabited places. Unfortunatdy, in Honduras they are 
trying to dispossess the Garifuna people of half of our territory in 
order to create the RED (Special Dievelopment Region). The 
level of disinformation and violence that exists in this country 
reveals that multiple human rights violations will be caused by 
the establishment of a neocolonial project in the 21st century. 775 
If OFRANEH, the primary organization representing the people whose "unused" land 
would be used for a "charter city," considers it a neocolonial project, then this is surely a 
critique that needs to be taken seriously. 
Indeed, Torobin's further claim that Canada should participate in establishing, 
through the "charter cities," a "rules-based" society like its own, brims with colonial 
774 In Locke's most important theoretical work, his Two Treatises on Government, he lays out the 
intellectual cornerstones for the seizures and enclosures of land that were crucial to the emerging agrarian 
capitalism and colonialism. The key piece here is that Locke .locates legitimate private ownership of land 
in the "use" of that land, where "use" is defined as extracting 1he highest possible profits from that land. 
As such, in examining the 17th century North American context, he notes the difference between "all the 
Profit an Indian can gain" from a piece of land in America and. that which an English capitalist might 
derive, insisting that the more profitable English process gives the English capitalist the natural right to 
own that land. This argument lent itself perfectly to the colonial project in North America - since 
Indigenous practices could be claimed "wasteful" and seized to put to more profitable use - and is based on 
an understanding of "use" of land that is wholly rooted in capitalist exchange values. This logic has 
animated the process of "enclosing the commons" that has continued, more or less, since the establishment 
of capitalist social relations and which is evident in the case of the seizing of Garifuna territory for tourist 
and plantation operations and "charter cities." See John Locke, Two Treatises on Government, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 285-303. My argument here is drawn in part from Ellen Wood, The 
Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View, Verso, New York, 2002, p. 109-112. 
775 OFRANEH, quoted in Tim Russo, "Vallecito Resists, Satuye Lives! The Garifuna Resistance to 
Honduras' Charter Cities," Upside Down World, September 18, 2012. 
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arrogance and fails to grapple with the fact that Canada has been actively encouraging the 
impunity and lawlessness that presently govern Honduras. 776 In the meantime, he notably 
makes little effort to conceal the colonial nature of the "charter city" proposal, instead 
opting to defend the virtuous effects of previous colonial efforts. In the original 
McDonald-Laurier paper promoting the idea, Brandon Fuller and Paul Romer argue that 
"many [Chinese people] will acknowledge that:, if they had a chance to replay history, 
they would gladly and voluntarily offer Hong Kong to the British."777 This is a 
remarkable - and notably unsubstantiated - statement that suggests that colonized people 
would ultimately choose their colonization for all the supposed benefits it brings. While 
there is not space here to get into much detail, it is worth pausing on this argument, 
central to the rhetorical justification of the "cha11ter city" proposal to which Canada has 
given its full support; consciously or not, this is an almost perfect contemporary 
replication of the "mission civilisatrice" justification of colonization that underpinned the 
tremendous expansion of direct colonialism in the late 19th century, not to mention the 
776 It also demonstrates a remarkable blindness to the degree of impunity and lawlessness that manifests in 
Canada in a variety of spheres. Though it is outside the scope: of this project to critically assess the 
Canadian justice system, there is widespread doubt that Canada provides any measure of equality or justice 
in its policing and political-legal system. Organizations and communities that would question the Canadian 
justice system include advocates for missing and murdered Indigenous women whose cases are rarely 
pursued, immigrant and migrant worker associations who are kept in vulnerable circumstances and, thus, 
excluded from access to social and legal institutions for fear of being deported, poor and racialized 
communities that are regularly subjected to police violence, Lt::ft and activist organizations that are targeted 
for police infiltration and selectively run through the time- and resource-consuming legal system on 
charges that rarely stick, victims of domestic and gender-based violence, and urban homeless and street-
affected people who are routinely picked on for simply being impoverished, among countless others. 
Indeed, these and other spheres in which the Canadian justice system proves to be a far cry from its 
rhetorical ideal are often sites of struggle from Canadian social movements. As such, I offer here a list of 
activist organizations that have cropped up in response to each of the problems I highlighted above: on 
murdered Indigenous women, see "No More Silence," at http://nomoresilence-nomoresilence.blogspot.ca/ . 
On migrant workers issues, see "Justicia 4 Migrant Workers" at http://www.justicia4migliantworkers.org/. 
On police targeting of activists, see "Movement Defence Committee," at http://movementdefence.org/ . On 
gender-based violence, see "Native Women's Association," at htto://www.nwac.ca/. On the 
criminalization of poverty, see "Ontario Coalition Against Poverty," at http://www.ocap.ca/. 
777 Brandon Fuller and Paul Romer, "Success and the City: How Charter Cities Could Transform the 
Developing World," McDonald-Laurier Institute, Ottawa, April 2012. 
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justifications at the heart of the colonial project that brought Spain to Honduras in the 
first place. 778 As such, it is instructive to note that a central justification for one of 
Canada's great projects in Honduras echoes perfectly those of imperialisms of the past. 
By the end of the piece, Torobin finally comes around to the really compelling 
motivation for the "charter cities" - the potential profits they could create. Given the 
778 The "mission civilisatrice" was a central piece of the justification of French colonialism, and emerged: as 
a rhetorical device in the great expansion of colonial empir.es in late 19th century. But the idea behind it -
that colonial powers were actually providing a benevolent service to their occupied colonies by bringing 
"civilization" - dates back to the original 'discovery' and occupation of the Americas. It manifests 
differently across different moments, but central to this idea is the assumption that European civilizations 
were more advanced and enlightened and that the colonized would ultimately benefit from the imposition 
of a more developed social structure, a process Rudyard Kipling infamously declared "the white man's 
burden" (this would be extended to settler colonies like Canada, the United States, Australia, South Africa 
and Israel, insofar as they were culturally dominated by European settlers and their descendents). This 
dynamic can be traced through different generations of colonialism in Central America, as Chapters 3 and 4 
demonstrated; the genocide in the Americas was justified, in part, by the claim that Indigenous people were 
"savage" or "barbaric," just as the imposition of U.S. manifest destiny in the 19th century was framed as a 
way for a benevolent big brother to help a smaller, weaker one "grow up." American intervention in the 
region from the 1950s to the 1980s was often justified as a project to save Central Americans from 
themselves, when they made "foolish" and "backwards" decisions to support social reform and revolution. 
Even the discourse of "international development" that emerged prominently in the 1990s is rooted in the 
idea that the metropolitan power is "ahead" and that it should take efforts to help poorer countries to "catch 
up." Practitioners of this version of International Development often express deep (and no doubt genuine) 
confusion when it appears that the communities they are trying to "develop" are not interested or refuse to 
do it the way that the developers expect. The response is to insist that "we are trying to help," and to assert 
that if these people would just listen to us, they would realise that these efforts are for their own good. In 
all of these "civilizing" doctrines, there is always, then, the assertion that the colonizers are providing a 
kind of painful medicine, "tough love" or "shock therapy;" people might resist them at first, out of 
backwardness, but that they will ultimately be thankful for the benevolent "helping hand." This is evident 
in Romer' s justification of the "charter cities" and in his use of Hong Kong as an example. The claim that 
most Chinese people would be glad that Hong Kong was seized by the British is unsubstantiated and 
ahistorical; Hong Kong was occupied in order to guarantee a controlling British influence in the Opium 
trade, and marked a broader prying open of China to foreign concessioning that would last for nearly a 
century, culminating in fascist Japanese occupation in the 1930s and 40s. These dynamics were hotly 
contested at the time; British intervention in China was a major contributing factor in the largest peasant 
uprising against the Qing dynasty - the Taiping Rebellion - and the erosion of Chinese sovereignty and the 
catastrophic failures of governance that accompanied it - such as the great famine of the late 19th century -
were among the grievances that ultimately led to the successful communist revolution in 1949. That Romer 
should use this as an example of a successful colonial intervention demonstrates a profound ignorance of 
the Chinese experience and it is clear that this ignorance extends to contemporary Honduras. On the 
"mission civilisatrice," see Robert J.C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, Blackwell, 
Oxford, 2001. On U.S. "manifest destiny", see William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American 
Diplomacy, New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1972. On the Taiping Rebellion and the dismantling of 
Chinese sovereignty, see Jonathan D. Spence, God's Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong 
Xuiquan, W.W. Norton and Co, New York, 2006. On the colonial roots of the Chinese famine, see Mike 
Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World, Verso, New York, 
2001. On Canada's adoption of the 'mission civilisatrice' in it's foreign policy, see Sherene H. Razack, 
"Canada's Afghan Detainee Torture Scandal," in Jerome Klassen and Greg Albo, ed., Empire's Ally: 
Canada and the War in Afghanistan, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2013, p. 367-387. 
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exploitative and damaging record of Canadian companies in Honduras, there is every 
reason to think that the "charter cities" would operate in largely the same way. After all, 
the "charter cities" would not attract foreign investment if they were less profitable than 
investing in Honduras proper, and if the "charter cities" protected the rights of workers, 
communities, or the environment, the costs of doing business there would be driven up. 
Indeed, what seems much more likely is that the "charter cities" would be even more 
exploitative and would be even further insulated from the prospect of intervention by a 
social-democratic, reform-minded Honduran government. That is, enshrining a kind of 
hyper-neoliberalism in the legal architecture of a "charter city" and establishing its 
autonomy from the Honduran state could potentially serve to forestall the prospect of a 
resurgent social movement forcing a future Honduran government to move towards 
reform. This is, of course, a very real concern and a central piece of the current regime's 
campaign of terror and violence against the FNRP, which is presently organized and 
running campaigns for the 2013 elections. 
The Globe and Mail's rhetoric around "doing good work," then, is rather 
unconvincing. What is clear is that Canada has supported the "charter city" idea 
wholeheartedly. In 2011, Canadian senator Gerry St. Germain was in Honduras 
promoting the idea, calling it "an historic moment" for the country.779 In 2012, 
Ambassador Cameron Mackay followed up with a major effort to promote the FT A and 
the "charter cities," telling the Honduran media that there was some $25 million in new 
Canadian investment waiting to flow into Honduras when the conditions were right for it. 
Notably, he repeated often that Honduras needed to do a better job of maintaining peace 
779 Faustino Ord6fiez, "Honduras, a la vanguardia en atracci6n de capital," El Hera/do, July 25, 2011. 
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and security; "without security, there can be no investment," he told La Tribuna.780 
Given the violence that Canada condoned against activists in the social movement, it 
seems clear that the security Mackay is referring to is that of private capital; indeed, 
Canada's increased involvement in the security apparatus in Honduras is a point to which 
I will return below. 
Security in the "charter cities," of course, would be provided by the businyss 
interests that owned the concession and would, no doubt, look similar to the mercenary 
forces currently employed by local oligarchs and transnational companies, only with ev~n 
less legal recourse for the Honduran state to temper their violence. This was a point that 
J ari Dixon, a former public prosecutor whom I quoted in Chapters 5 and 6, returned to 
repeatedly in an interview I conducted in 2012, shortly after the "charter city" laws were 
passed by the Honduran Congress. "This is a tragedy; even the narcotraffickers could 
start a charter city," he explained, referring to the fact that narco gangs and the oligarchy 
are intricately linked, and both are linked to foreign capital. 
The "charter city" laws remind me of \Villiam Walker in the 19th 
century; he landed at Trujillo with an army, declared himself 
president of Nicaragua, on behalf of the gringos, inviting in the 
Americans and the Canadians. It's a modem form of the same 
thing. But people haven't realized yet that this is what it means. 
It's already been passed into law. We'rn just waiting for the time 
that we won't be allowed to go to the: beach, to use our own 
rivers, because we're not citizens of the "charter city" and it will 
be too late to struggle, because these people will be so protected. 
Look at how hard it has been for Argentina to take back the 
Maldives. Once those foreigners are installed here, it will be so 
hard to get rid of them, because their countries will protect them. 
The U.S. state, the Canadian state, they will protect the 
foreigners that arrive.781 
780 
"Canadienses incentivan a la responsibilidad empresarial," La Tribuna, February 2, 2012. 
781 Interview with Jari Dixon, May 10, 2012. 
330 
Towards the end of our interview, Dixon offered a compelling picture of Honduras' 
ongoing colonization. Indeed, Dixon insists that there is a thread that connects William 
Walker's colonial adventure, to the banana companies, the mining companies, the 
occupation in the 1980s, and the coup and its aftermath; that thread, he insists, is 
imperialism. His analysis, which is shared by many in the social movement in Honduras, 
forms a key piece of the central thrust of this dissertation and, as such, I quote him here at 
length: 
This is a new colonization. There are so many people who see 
that we are being colonized. Foreigners are coming here to take 
advantage of our poverty and misery, and our country is perfect 
for them to exploit. People are told that this foreign investment 
will be good for us, that people can go work in the "charter city," 
that they will make money, that their Hves will change, but it's a 
lie. We've heard it before. We had people who worked in the 
mines, who worked on the banana plantations, just to earn 
enough to eat. And the people never got pulled out of poverty. 
The banana companies - Standard, Cuyamel - they came in and 
bought up the presidents, the congress, the mayors. They ran this 
country in the 1930s, 40s, 50s. By the 1980s, the 90s, it was the 
maquilas, they were supposed to employ millions of Hondurans 
and bring people out of poverty, but now look at the women 
working there, they make less than the :minimum wage. 782 
The "charter city" legislation was passed in the Honduran Congress in 2012, after just 10 
days of discussion. J ari Dixon is part of a group of lawyers who have filed an injunction 
against the legislation, which they deem unconstitutional, but Congress has threatened to 
overrule any injunction brought against the "chartt::r city" laws. As they presently stand, 
the laws allow for the creation of territorial concessions within Honduras that will have 
the following powers, as described by Honduran journalist Sandra Marybel Sanchez: 
1. They will be autonomous, will be h:~gally incorporated, will 
have their own administrative system, they will create their 
782 Interview with Jari Dixon, May 10, 2012. 
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own laws and they will have their own legal jurisdiction ... 
composed of national or international experts. 
2. They will be authorized to enter into international agreements 
and treaties related to trade and cooperation in matters within 
their competence. 
3. They will be able to enter into agreements with national or 
international intelligence services to combat organized crime. 
4. They will be authorized to have and operate their own police 
force, which may be strengthened by entering into bilateral 
agreements with other countries and regions. 
5. The cities will have their own budget, to fix the taxes/rates 
they will charge and to collect and manage their own taxes. 
6. They will be able to establish their own migration and 
immigration policies and rules, and control whatever 
transportation system admitted within its area of 
control/jurisdiction. Sea and ai:r craft/vessels will have 
assured access to the city. 
7. They will establish their own civil service and it is unclear 
what will be done with existing labour codes and statutes for 
teachers, doctors, etc. 
8. They will establish their own policies and law governing 
migration and immigration, and will control any 
transportation system under the jurisdiction of the 
concession. Sea and aircraft will be: assured access to the city 
and when it arrives, the city sets the rules, controls and fees 
being charged. 783 
In sum, they would have a "director" who would function as a president, following a 
separate set of legal, judicial, and tax codes, with their own free trade agreements, and 
arrangements with international financial institutions, and they will make their own 
immigration laws, all of which will be enforced by their own police and military. 
CANADA AND (IN)SECURITY IN HONDURAS 
Indeed, returning to the point about security, it is likely that the police and 
military for "charter cities" would be largely drawn from the same ranks that are 
783 Sandra Marybel Sanchez, "Ni una revoluci6n, mucho menos una elecci6n revertini las "Ciudades 
Modelo" jEs ahora o nunca!," Vos el Soberano, August 8, 2012. Available at: 
http://voselsoberano.com/index.php?option=com content&view==article&id=14076:ni-una-revolucion-
mucho-menos-una-eleccion-revertira-las-ciudades-modelo-ies-ahora-o-nunca&catid= 1 :noticias-generales 
(Translated from Spanish. All translations by the author unless otherwise indicated.) 
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currently carrying out all manner of repression in Honduras. That security apparatus is a 
central component of Canada's imperial project in Honduras, insofar as it protects 
Canadian investments, as Cameron Mackay' s comments above suggest. Canada has 
cultivated close relationships with the coup regime's key people regarding security. Luis 
Alberto Rubi, for instance, was invited to Ottawa to speak on a panel in 2011 organized 
by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) on "Confronting Crime and 
Impunity in Central America."784 Ironic, indeed, that Rubi should speak on crime and 
impunity, given that he is Pepe Lobo' s Attorney General and was a central figure in 
establishing the shifty legal architecture behind the coup. Indeed, cables unearthed by 
Wikileaks demonstrated that Rubi "was directly involved in the decision to remove 
Zelaya and used the legal apparatus under his control to stifle dissent and 
intimidate/persecute members of Zelaya' s team." 785 
The point here, worth underlining, is that the security apparatus Canada is 
buttressing in Honduras is precisely the apparatus of anti-democratic state terror that 
Chapters 5 and 6 described in detail. In fact, that apparatus is so anti-democratic and 
corrupt that it cannot even be described as acting solely on behalf of the golpistas. In 
October 2012, the son of coup-supporter Julieta Castellanos, director of the Universidad 
Nacional Auton6mia de Honduras (UNAH), was killed by police under mysterious 
circumstances.786 The incident sparked a major controversy, especially given that 
Castellanos had actually been a supporter of the coup and participated in the Truth and 
784 Latin American and Caribbean Solidarity Network, "Harper Trades in Human Rights for Economic 
Concessions in Honduras," Press Release, August 9, 2011. 
785 Latin American and Caribbean Solidarity Network, "Harper Trades in Human Rights for Economic 
Concessions in Honduras," Press Release, August 9, 2011. 
786 Dana Frank, "Which Side is the U.S. On?" The Nation, June 11, 2012. 
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Reconciliation Commission that had served to absolve the regime for its overthrow of the 
President. The assassination of Castellanos' son highlighted the fact that while the 
Honduran police was carrying out political viofonce on behalf of the regime, it was also 
an integral part of the apparatus of organized crime in Honduras; that is, the police act 
with impunity, but their violence can fall in a variety of different directions depending on 
the money and personalities involved. As lawyer Nectali Rodezno explained in our 
interview: 
If you want to talk about cleaning up the police, you have to 
completely take the institution apart and rebuild it from the 
bottom up. It's incredible - a police officer who makes $2000 a 
month can have a house worth two or three million - where do 
they get this money from? I realize from being around the courts 
and the legal system in my work that they gain this money 
through extortion, through war taxes, and through protecting the 
criminals who charge such taxes.787 
Indeed, over a two-hour interview, Rodezno discussed dozens of different cases and 
contexts that detailed the level of corruption, some of which I reproduced in Chapter 6, 
not least of which was the fact that the police themselves are charged with the process of 
investigating complaints of police corruption and violence. According to Rodezno, that 
corruption ranges from relatively minor, daily offenses right up to the very top-level 
connections between police, the state, and the narco gangs. 788 As Honduran social 
787 Interview with Nectali Rodezno, May 4, 2012. 
788 A few brief examples include: 1) the pursuing and profiting from the ubiquitous "war taxes" that are 
charged by criminal gangs against people working in a variety of industries, like taxi-driving, as payment 
against the possibility of being targeted for violence; 2) the summary assassinations of people who run 
afoul of the criminal gangs, the state or the police itself, without investigations; 3) the selective protection 
of politicians from physical violence, for those politicians who resist attempts to reform the police, thus 
reproducing the existing levels of corruption; 4) the managing of the penal system such that new arrivals in 
Honduran jails go through a "diagnostics" department, run by police, that charges taxes on inmates to 
determine whose cases will be investigated and who will be given preferential treatment in the prison 
system; 5) direct links between police and criminal gangs that are exemplified in cases like that of the 
"disappearance" of hundreds of state-owned guns which, eventually, were discovered in the hands of narco 
gangs. These are only a handful of the cases that could be discussed. As Rodezno concluded in our 
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scientist Leticia Salomon insists, rule of law and democratic functioning in Honduras are, 
fundamentally broken. 789 
Of course, a complicated understanding of this dynamic has to acknowledge· the 
fact that individual police officers who try to defy the corruption and violence of the 
institution are, themselves, systematically rooted out by that corrupt system. Alejandro 
Fernandez explains this in an article for the Nicaraguan journal Envio: 
Will the current police purge do any good? Are there any good 
cops in our precincts? Dr. Ricardo says that several of his 
patients are police officers. He says their life is hell, because 
they're pressured by a chain of command that has made the 
institution into a public calamity. Those who don't want to stain 
their hands inevitably end up tainted by their peers' misdeeds or 
six feet under with their mouth seale:d forever. At one time we 
watched the law of silence in mafia movies and now we see it 
multiplied tenfold in this small country where nobody is safe, not 
even the strongest or the richest. 790 
Julieta Castellanos was outspoken in her anger at the police for the assassination of her 
son and the outcry prompted the Lobo government to announce a Police Reform 
Commission - the "current purge" to which Fernandez refers above - which would be 
charged with the task of determining how to reform the institution, which even Lobo 
acknowledged was riddled with corruption. The commission would feature five members 
and would be chaired by pre-eminent Honduran historian Victor Meza. I interviewed 
Meza at the offices of the Centro de Documentaci6n de Honduras (CEDOH) and he 
expressed hope that the reform commission could tum things around. Nevertheless, even 
he could not deny that the deck was stacked against it: "once, I believed the police could 
interview, the corruption functions as a 'chain,' in which one sphere of corruption feeds into another chain, 
such that the entire system is dysfunctional. Interview with Nectali Rodezno, May 4, 2012. 
789 Leticia Salomon, "Golpe de estado, clase politica y proceso electoral," LASA Forum, Volume XLI, Issue 
1, Winter 2010. 
790 Alejandro Fernandez, "A Sad Christmas Ballad," Envio, No. 378, January 2013. 
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help solve the problem. Soon, I realized they were part of the problem. Now I see that 
they are the problem."791 Indeed, while Meza was careful in our interview to be 
measured in his comments - no doubt aware of the potential ramifications for him should 
he veer too far from the accepted line of the Lobo government - he had to acknowledge 
that the commission was likely to receive all manner of intimidation and violence should 
it seek to significantly alter the dynamics in the Honduran police: "I recognize the 
difficulty. A journalist was recently kidnapped twenty meters from this office."792 
The prospects, then, for the commission to "clean up" the Honduran police seem 
dim. A more likely scenario, however, would see the commission propose measures to 
"professionalize" the police and orient them more effectively towards the protection and 
security of private property. It is notable that, of the five people on the commission, one 
was to be Chilean and one Canadian. 793 Canada and Chile are the number one and two 
foreign investors in Honduran mining, and Victor Meza had to admit that: 
The Canadians surely support their own interests here, especially 
in natural resources. One of our CEDOH studies showed that 
52% of violent conflicts in Honduras are associated with natural 
resource extraction. 794 
Sure enough, in May 2012, Canada named Adam Blackwell to the police commission; 
Blackwell, a current Canadian representative at the OAS where Canada pushed hard to 
have Honduras re-instated after the coup, is a former ambassador to the Dominican 
Republic, where he was outspoken in his support: for mining legislation that favoured 
791 Interview with Victor Meza, May 10, 2012. 
792 Interview with Victor Meza, May 10, 2012. 
793 The Chilean government named Aquiles Blu Rodriguez, a General in the national police who retired 
shortly after being implicated in a massive drug-trafficking coverup, to the Honduran commission. Even 
members of the Honduran Congress have raised questions about having such a figure on a police reform 
commission. 
794 Interview with Victor Meza, May 10, 2012. 
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Canadian companies. 795 In fact, Blackwell's public statements in the Dominican 
Republic in the early 2000s are eerily reminiscent of those recently made by Cameron 
Mackay in Honduras, as reproduced above. In 2003, he pressured the Dominican 
government to accept new proposals for mining legislation; the Dominican newspaper El 
Ca'ribe reported that Blackwell was insisting that "certain changes in the mining laws 
[were] required to entice serious investments in this area." 796 Blackwell also noted that 
Placer Dome, a massive Vancouver-based mining consortium, was holding back on $JOO 
million in investment until the new mining laws were passed. A few months later, 
Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien visited the country and celebrated the passing of 
the new mining code. A year later, Canadian private capital controlled some 90% of 
Dominican mining, much of which had previously been state-run. 797 
Given 1) the common theme in Canada's public statements in 2012 about the 
necessity for stronger guarantees of security in Honduras in order to protect its 
investments; 2) the social conflict that has emerged around all of the major sites of 
Canadian enterprises in the country; and 3) the appointment of a commissioner with a 
history of pursuing precisely those goals in another country, it seems a rather predictable 
conclusion that the Canadian interest in the reform commission will be to try to orient its 
direction in favour of a police force that would serve the interests of Canadian capital. 
This appears to be the course that Canada will chart, despite the fact that those interests 
continue to be in contradiction with the extension of human security and social justice for 
Hondurans affected by those enterprises. 
795 Karen Spring and Sandra Cuffe, "Canada and Chile Meddling in Honduras' Economic and Security 
Policies," Upside Down World, May 21, 2012. 
796 Karen Spring and Sandra Cuffe, "Canada and Chile ... " 
797 Karen Spring and Sandra Cuffe, "Canada and Chile ... " 
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This is a troubling prospect, given the dynamics I have described over the 
previous three chapters. It is emblematic of the shift in Canadian state priorities that it 
has found an ideal partner, in business and politics, in one of the most violent regimes in 
the western hemisphere, in one of its poorest countries. Evidently, it has also found a 
military partner in that regime; in August 2011, the Honduran Congress approved a 
proposal for joint exercises in Honduras with the: Canadian Armed Forces.798 The Harper 
government denied that Canada was planning to send troops to Honduras but, later that 
month, an Edmonton magazine reported that troops in Alberta were being given Spanish-
language training as part of their preparation for deployments in Latin America. The 
report is worth quoting at length, given the Harper government's denial of plans to send 
troops to Honduras: 
The [training] program uses film industry professionals to create 
realistic villages and towns to help soldiers get a feel for what it 
will be like to work in non-English speaking countries. 
According to those planning these exercises they have now put 
away the Afghan flavour villages in favour of Spanish-speaking 
set-ups. But it is not for entertainment. 
"It just adds a more robust training to fully prepare the soldiers 
before they deploy," one of the exercise planners, Major Stu 
Smoley, said. "It's training formed units. It has nothing to do 
with recruit training. It has nothing to do with recruiting. It has 
everything to do with preparing soldiers for when they go off on 
operations." 
Although the military deny they have plans to deploy they do 
say, "Exercises conducted by CMTC (Canadian Manoeuvre 
Training Centre) are generic in nature, but specific enough to be 
798 Steve Rennie, "PM dismisses rights concerns as he touts tradt:: pact with Honduras," The Canadian 
Press, August 12, 2011. Available at: htto://www.ipolitics.ca/2011/08/12/human-rights-concerns-cloud-
hamers-honduras-trade-talks/ 
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tailored to whatever the Canadian Forces expect to encounter 
when deployed." 799 
It was not a stretch, then, to suggest that Honduras would be among the places Canada 
was training its soldiers for deployment, despite Ottawa's denial, especially given that the 
Harper government has become increasingly secretive about its foreign deployments. 800 
In fact, rumours swirled through the Honduran social movements in late 2011 fuat 
Canadian troops were already on the ground there. Sure enough, though it is unclear 
when they arrived, by mid-2012 Canadian soldiers had their boots on the ground as part 
of an international military medical force. Reports from "Operation Beyond the 
Horizon" suggested that it was a humanitarian aid project, but it is, nevertheless, 
noteworthy in the contemporary Honduran context that Canadian soldiers are establishing 
their more permanent presence, especially given that Canadian troops have already been 
running training exercises and participating in counter-narcotics operations, a point to 
which I will return. 801 Significantly, Lieutenant-Commander Debbie Pestell told the 
media that delivering medical support was actually only the secondary goal of "Beyond 
the Horizon," the first being: 
To work together as nations so that if we ever have to quickly 
deploy together we've already had that experience with 
799 Chandra Lye, "Canadian Forces to undergo Spanish language training in Alberta," YegNews, August 29, 
2011. Available at: http://www.yegnews.com/2011-08-29-canadian-forces-spanish-language-training-
alberta-1425/ 
800 In fact, the Harper government has been sarcastically awarded the "Code of Silence" award from the 
Canadian Association of Journalists (CAJ) several years in a row, dating as far back as 2007. In the press 
release announcing the award in 2012, CAJ President Hugo Rodrigues claimed that "the death grip on 
information has long frustrated journalists in this country, but it may now be reaching a point where the 
public at large is not only empathetic, but shares it." That CAJ offers such a stem critique is noteworthy, 
given the extent to which the Canadian mainstream media can usually be counted upon to, more or less, 
fundamentally support the structures of class power and privilege in Canada. Please see Canadian 
Association of Journalists, "Harper government wins Code of Silence Award, again," Press Release, April 
28, 2012. Available at: http://www.caj.ca/?p=2657 
801 Interview with Felix Molina, May 2, 2012. 
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interoperability and logistics and tactics and time and getting 
everybody spooled up and working together. 802 
That Canadian troops have a primary goal of preparing for quick joint deployment with 
the Honduran military that overthrew a democratically-elected president in 2009 - and 
has more or less ruled Honduras ever since - is indicative of the extent to which the 
promotion of democracy is not a Canadian priority. 
These links are not entirely new; Canada has been training military personnel in 
Honduras and elsewhere throughout the 2000s. 803 Indeed, many of the perpetrators of the 
2009 coup are graduates of U.S. and Canadian training programs, and in 2011 Canada 
was organizing comprehensive workshops on military-police cooperation through the 
Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.804 Nevertheless, active participation in military operations 
in Honduras represents an escalation of its prior engagements. The Canadian military 
participated in a major counter-narcotics campaign called "Operation Martillo" in mid-
2012, organized by the U.S. and carried out across Central America and especially in 
Guatemala and Honduras; it was deemed a "complete success" despite the fact that a U.S. 
helicopter was implicated in the murder of four Honduran civilians in La Moskitia.805 
What is more, while Harper was in Honduras to sign the FTA in 2011, he pledged $9.2 
million in undisclosed support for security plans in the country.806 That is, Canada is 
802 Debbie Pestell, quoted in "International Forces train with and assist Hondurans during Beyond the 
Horizon 2012," video posted online by "armysouthPreview," May 10, 2012. Available at: 
htto://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3PqjyyFjUY A 
803 Gordon, Imperialist Canada, p. 312. 
804 Emma Feltes, "Laboratory, Honduras," The Dominion, June 8, 2012. This is a rather ironic 
development given that the Honduran military and police have essentially functioned as different branches 
of the same organization since the coup and, arguably, the collusion between the military and police has 
contributed to the overall degree of terror and impunity that has reigned in Honduras since 2009. 
805 Adam Williams, "Operation Martillo Deemed a "Complete Success" in Guatemala, Honduras," 
Dialogo, July 23, 2012. 
806 
"Canada and Honduras sign free trade pact," AFP, August 12, 2011. Available at: 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afu/article/ALeqM5h2amSz9V97yfb9ZskxzzFgvOj10w?docld=CNG. 
5abd991586b6d2b 107b52196f47587cc.31 
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now actively collaborating with and financing the architecture of repression described in 
Chapters 5 and 6; the significance of this cannot be overstated, as it suggests that 
Canada's support for the coup regime is actually expanding from tacit political support, 
to overt diplomatic work, to direct technical and material assistance. 
It is worth pausing to remember that Canada is not alone in this project. As 
elaborated in Chapter 2, Canadian imperialism -- in Honduras and elsewhere - is distinct 
from U.S. imperialism but deeply linked up with it. The increasing presence of Canadian 
troops in Honduras, for instance, is taking place alongside a growing U.S. military 
presence as well.807 Though it is beyond the scope of this project to detail the ongoing 
U.S. involvement in Honduras, it is worth drawing out a few points here. As noted 
above, in May 2012, the U.S. deployment in Honduras was directly involved in a 
massacre of four Indigenous people in the jungle region of La Moskitia. Many months of 
tireless investigations by community organizations in Honduras - and North American 
allies - were able to piece together a relatively clear picture of events. A definitive report 
by Greg McCain described it thus: 
On May 11th on the Rio Patuca near Abtuas, a small municipality 
in the Moskitia, a helicopter titled to the US State Department 
sprayed bullets into a pipante, a long, narrow dugout canoe, 
which carried sixteen locals. Four people were killed: 28-year-
old Juana Jackson (six months pregnant), 48-year-old Candelaria 
Pratt Nelson (five months pregnant), 14--year-old Hasked Brooks 
Wood, and 21-year-old Emerson Martinez Henriquez. At least 
four more were seriously injured. The DEA confirms that its 
Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team (FAST) participated 
in the operation supporting a Honduran National Police Tactical 
Response Team. 808 
807 The United States has, more or less, played a similar role in post-coup Honduras to that played by 
Canada, though with rather less vigour. Greg Grandin, "Honduras, Obama and the Region's New Right," 
LASA Forum, Volume XU, Issue 1, Winter 2010. 
808 Greg McCain, "The DEA and the Return of the Death Squads," Counterpunch, June 15, 2012. 
341 
That the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) should be directly involved in a civilian 
massacre is a rather predictable consequence of its ongoing partnership with the 
Honduran military that has been committing such offences with regularity since 2009. 
But it is a further reminder of what Canada is ]plugging itself into, as it enters into joint 
military projects with the U.S. and Honduras. 
The incident took place under the auspices of "counter-narcotics" operations, 
which, ironically, had been celebrated in a series of major articles in the New York Times 
and Washington Post, just a few weeks before the massacre. Thom Shanker's piece in 
the New York Times noted that the U.S. had established three new operating bases in 
Honduras and described what he called "the nation's new way of war," with "small-
footprint" missions that are designed out of the counter-insurgency tactics used in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.809 Shanker added that "American troops [in Honduras] cannot fire 
except in self-defence, and they are barred from responding with force even if Honduran 
or DEA agents are in danger," a regulation that was evidently broken just a few weeks 
later. 810 This incident is worth highlighting because it further demonstrates that the 
impunity with which Honduran military and police operate extends to the foreign 
militaries working with them. U.S. and Canadian troops, then, cannot be counted upon to 
follow even the limited degree of restraint imposed by the terms of their agreements with 
the Honduran military. This is a rather worrying fact, given the legacy of U.S. military 
occupation in the 1980s. And, since no one from the DEA faced any reprisal for the 
massacre in La Moskitia, it is rather difficult to deny that foreign forces in Honduras act 
with impunity, which does not bode well for the social movements who are seeking to 
809 Thom Shanker, "U.S. turns its focus on drug smuggling in Honduras," The New York Times, May 5, 
2012. 
810 Shanker, "U.S. turns its focus ... " 
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defend themselves against the further parcelling out and selling off of their land and 
resources. 
The increased North American military presence - and the impunity that 
continues to reign in Honduras - is just one piece of the project to impose a hyper-
neoliberalism on that country to facilitate further profitable investment or, put differently, 
to secure more easily exploitable Honduran resources and labour. Indeed, as Annie Bird 
argued in our interview: 
the claim is that the emerging regional security apparatus is 
being built for the war against drug trafficking. The reality is 
that its strongest partners are not 'failed' states but those run by 
drug trafficking networks, where the people in power are almost 
indistinguishable from the narco gangs.81 
Indeed, Bird locates Honduras' increasing militarization in the context of the deeper re-
militarization of the entire region, particularly as part of the regional security partnership, 
Sistema de la lntegracion Centroamericana (SICA),812 which is widely considered to be 
driven by the interests of powers outside of the actual alliance - primarily the United 
States, Canada, and Colombia - which increasingly cooperate with the Honduran regime. 
"Nicaragua is not considered a partner in the drug war," Bird argues, "despite having 
recorded the highest number of actual drug hits. So, in fact, the real war here is against 
those who are resisting global capital and it's neoliberal projects."813 Bird describes the 
broader regional security apparatus, as it is being applied in Honduras, modelled after the 
Colombian example: 
The Colombian model being promoted. through SICA draws 
heavily on two elements: one is surveilllance technology, the 
811 Interview with Annie Bird, May 10, 2012 . 
. 
812 Not to be confused with the Secretaria de lntegraci6n Econ6mica Centroamericana (SIECA) which is a 
regional organization established to facilitate economic integration across Central America. 
813 Interview with Annie Bird, May 10, 2012. 
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other is so-called neighbourhood informants, they were known in 
Guatemala as "military commissioners," people who essentially 
spy on the community and then inform the military about who 
are the criminal elements ... they produce these lists of people to 
be arrested, and not even necessarily those who actually commit 
any crimes, but rather those who are leaders of the social 
movement.814 
Bird's analysis is compelling because it links the Honduran case into the broader 
regional dynamics. While this dissertation cannot possibly address the entire spectrum of 
regional problems, it is worth briefly situating Honduras in these dynamics. Drawing her 
analysis from the well-documented "Plan Puebfa Panama" preparations, Bird argues that 
transnational capital and its state-level representatives had, broadly speaking, a three-
pronged strategy for the deep imposition of neol:iberalism in Central America, following 
the end of the regional wars of the 1980s. Those three prongs, according to Bird, were: 
first, the legal architecture for the re-entry of capital after the wars, as manifest in the 
restructuring of the respective states, the signing of CAFT A and bilateral FT As, and the 
gradual re-writing of legal codes around natural resources, public services, and other 
potentially profitable industries. Second, the construction of the physical infrastructure -
from a series of new highways, railroads and seaports to hydro dams, electrical 
integration and transmission lines - for the effective development of new production, 
shipping, and distribution centres.815 Finally, the establishment of a reliable security 
814 Interview with Annie Bird, May 10, 2012. 
815 The details of these projects are painstakingly laid out, in great detail, by Nieves Capote in La Dictadura 
de/ Capital, No.2: Del P.P.P. al Projecto Mesoamerica, Otros Mundos A.C., San Cristobal de las Casas, 
Mexico, 2010. Much of this infrastructure is in the process of being constructed, often hy North American-
based firms benefiting from subsidies from North American development agencies like CIDA and from 
host governments. Among the many developments that touch Honduras are the major inter-American 
highways - the Corredor de! Pacifico and the Corredor de! Atlilntico - designed to bypass the busy 
Carretera Panamericana, as well as a series of highways cutting across the isthmus and the Corredor 
Turistico, which connects the Gulf Coast tourist destinations from Cancun to Trujillo. The Honduran 
sections of the highway, from Puerto Barrios to Trujillo, was concessioned to the company Autopistas de! 
Atlantico for 30 years, in December 2012. The company is based in Spain but its majority shareholder is 
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apparatus to protect businesses looking to take advantage of the new conditions and 
profitably exploit their concessions.816 This final element of the broad strategy is, 
according to Bird, only now beginning to fall into place, and the coup and the project to 
establish and support a compliant - and necessarily repressive - security apparatus in 
Honduras is a key element of that regional plan. 817 
Indeed, given all of this, it appears profoundly significant that Canad~an 
investment in Honduras, and Canadian cooperation with the Honduran government, have 
been dramatically increased since the military coup in 2009. That is, there is a direct 
correlation between state violence and the intensification of neoliberalism, on the one 
side, and Canadian participation in Honduras on the other. The coup was not incidental 
to Canadian investment in Honduras; rather, iit spurred it forward. Bilateral trade 
between the two countries increased by 9.3% from 2009-2010, and it jumped over 22% in 
the U.S. commercial and investment bank, Citigroup. "Gobi1~mo concesiona por 30 aiios el corredor 
turistico de Honduras," La Prensa, December 12, 2012. Capote's analysis of the P.P.P. also details the 
construction of an inter-connected electrical system across Central America through the Sistema de 
lnterconexi6n E/ectrica (SIEPAC) and the hundreds of hydroelectric dams and power stations being built 
across the region - some 40 major hydroelectric facilities and over 50 microgeneration plants in Honduras 
- concessioned to private companies but massively subsidized. 
816 Interview with Annie Bird, May 10, 2012. 
817 Bird's analysis here is compelling, but it is by no means th,e whole story. Alexander Segovia's excellent 
three-part assessment of regional integration in Central America, for instance, complicates the picture by 
highlighting a significant shift in the regional power dynamic8 away from the old oligarchies connected to 
agroexport and towards the new transnational capitalist classe8 rooted in non-traditional sectors like 
maquiladoras, tourism, and the service industries. Indeed, his 2007 assessment was prophetic insofar as it 
was a conflict between the old and new oligarchies that animated much of Manuel Zelaya's presidency and, 
arguably, helped pave the way for the right wing coup in 2009. Significant in Segovia's accow1t- and this 
is an important element to insert into Bird's argument- is that the emerging elite in Central America have 
not simply plugged into North American plans, but have in fact led a process of regional integration for 
their own purposes. The growth of the maquiladora industry and the dramatic rise in migration to the 
North America- and the dollar-denominated remittances sent back to Central America- created the 
conditions for rising consumption by local elite. As such, regional markets have become more significant 
in the strategic planning of the new Central American elite, and the broader neoliberal plans that North 
American capital has made for the region (as described by Bird) have found willing partners in the Central 
American business councils and chambers of commerce, which use the increasingly integrated regional 
architecture to its own advantage. As such, Segovia's analysis offers a useful reminder that the existence of 
predatory and imperialistic foreign powers does not preclude th,e possibility of local agents participating, 
benefiting or even taking a lead role in establishing the apparatus that facilitates those imperial projects. 
See Alexander Segovia, "The Concentration of Power: More Integration and Inequality," Envio, No. 307, 
February 2007. 
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2011.818 This very clearly suggests that Canada's support for the coup regime 1s 
connected to its direct economic interests in Honduras and its broader political economic 
interests in the Central American isthmus. Canada's participation in the interruption of 
both the liberal democratic political system and, more importantly, the broad-based social 
movement in Honduras in order to promote those political economic interests, fits 
perfectly the definition I have offered of imperialism. Indeed, the assertion that Canada 
is behaving as an imperial power in Honduras comes first and foremost from Hondurans 
themselves. J ari Dixon's compelling sketch of a Honduras being re-colonized by 
Canadian capital should be as clear an indication as any that Canada can no longer hide 
behind the mythology of its peacekeeping past; the peaceful, democratic social movement 
in Honduras, like so many in the Global South today, names Canada directly as its 
enemy.819 There is perhaps nothing that could validate the central argument of this 
dissertation more than this simple and stubborn fact. 
818 Government of Canada, "Canada-Honduras Relations," Febmary 2013. Available at: 
http://www. canadaintemational. gc. ca/ cos ta rica/bilateral relations bilateral es/ canada honduras. aspx?view 
=d 
819 Honduran historian Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle reports, for instance, that the coup and its aftermath 
provoked discussion of the creation of a new Latin American Community of Nations that would include 
Cuba but exclude the United States and Canada. Canada's status as a pariah would come as a great shock 
to the 'Middle Power' enthusiasts who, in the 1960s and 70s, imagined that Canada could mediate between 
U.S. imperialism and Latin American development. Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle, "The 2009 Coup and the 
Struggle for Democracy in Honduras," NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 44, No. 1, January/February 
2011, p. 16-21. 
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The preceding analysis has demonstrated that Canada's deeper imperial 
engagement in the world has come at great cost for the victims of the new Canadian 
project. The emphasis that this dissertation has placed on Honduras served to 
demonstrate that, even in Canada's less direct imperial campaigns, the consequences of 
Canada's behaviour are deeply troubling and represent a rupture from anything 
resembling its rhetorical mobilization of peace, freedom, democracy or human security. 
What is more, they represent a significant escalation of Canada's efforts to seize upon the 
advantages of the global capitalist world order and, indeed, to play an ever greater role in 
shaping and perpetuating that order. Far from being a "middle power," a neutral or 
sensible arbiter of relations between imperial powers and peripheral states, Canada has 
emerged as a secondary component in the U.S.-led empire of capital, with a ruling class 
that is coherent and organized and that has fully signed on to its role in international class 
struggle. 
In drawing these conclusions, of course, it is necessary to recall that the "Canada" 
described throughout this dissertation is not a monolithic, unified body. In the first place, 
the above analysis uses "Canada" to refer to Canadian government and state institutions 
and the interests they represent. That is, the Canada that is projected into the world is a 
construction that is driven by the complex interaction between political parties, 
institutional bureaucracies and policy-makers, and the vast array of private interests that 
intervene to push policy in particular directions. Those private interests, as I demonstrate 
in Chapter 2, have increasingly come to occupy a central role in the generation of 
Canadian policy. Nothing in thi~ analysis implies that every individual politician, policy-
maker, lobbyist or, indeed, Canadian citizen is personally and self-consciously committed 
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to the politics of imperialism that I have attributed to Canada; political parties, state 
institutions, and civil society at large are all spaces of intense internal contestation. There 
are, indeed, countless individuals within nearly every category of Canadian society that 
may object, vocally and materially, to. the new Canadian imperialism. What is 
significant, and what this dissertation has contributed to demonstrating, is that those 
voices have become outnumbered and outvoted, and that they are increasingly being 
circumvented by new structures of political decision-making. 
Canada, then, is increasingly represented by those who would have it behave as 
an imperial power for the benefit of a small network of wealthy Canadians. Indeed, what 
should be most alarming is that the analysis provided in this dissertation details only one 
example of the new Canadian imperialism. While Honduras, the central case study I 
have used, has taken on greater significance for Canada since the opening that the 2009 
coup provided, it remains a relatively minor component of Canada's broader imperial 
agenda. While Canada is Honduras' second largest foreign investor, that country 
represents only a fraction of total Canadian investment; the Latin American region as a 
whole received some $27.9 billion in 2007, still riepresenting only 20% of all Canadian 
FDI, with the highest amounts going to Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Chile.820 
Honduras, in fact, receives as little as 0.1 % of Canadian investment, and the patterns of 
support that the Canadian state provides to its capital in Honduras are replicated - with 
adaptations for the particular dynamics in different countries and regions - in most of the 
places where Canadian capital has gone. Todd Gordon's work in Imperialist Canada and 
elsewhere has provided a useful overview of the foll sweep of Canadian FDI and the 
820 Todd Gordon, "Positioning Itself in the Andes: Critical Reflections on Canada's Relations with 
Colombia," Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies Vol. 35, No. 70, 2011, p. 56-57. 
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imperial politics that follow it, from Africa to the Andes, and if one were to bring these 
cases in, the violence and injustice that permeate this dissertation would be magnified 
exponentially. 
This dissertation has used the case of Honduras to demonstrate one piece of what 
is a broader trend. In conclusion, then, it is worth briefly broadening the scope of this 
analysis, in order to contextualize the study of Canada and Honduras and to demonstrate 
the extent to which it is, in fact, emblematic of the wider shift in Canadian politics. To be 
sure, Canada's participation in the occupation of Afghanistan has to be considered one of 
the most significant imperial adventures in Canadian history and the degree of human 
suffering that it has provoked is almost impossible to calculate. The occupation, ongoing 
for over 12 years now, has left that country devastated, left thousands of civilians killed 
and left some 70% of surviving Afghans living in poverty under the NATO-approved 
Afghan government, whieh has notably re-introduced the most conservative social 
policies the war was ostensibly fought to eliminate, including laws that allow husbands to 
rape their wives.821 Far from rebuilding Afghanistan, Canada has helped oversee the 
neoliberal dismantling of a state that achieved some economic growth and social equality 
in the 1970s and 80s. Indeed, prior to U.S. fomc~nting of a proxy war with the Soviet 
Union in the 1980s, the non-Soviet Marxist-inspired leadership of the People's 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan had instituted a complicated reform program that 
included redistribution of land, sweeping new measures for gender equality, and a 
comprehensive education and literacy program for Afghans of all ages and genders. 822 
821 Jerome Klassen, "Methods of Empire," in Jerome Klassen and Greg Albo, ed., Empire's Ally: Canada 
and the War in Afghanistan, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2013, p. 151. 
822 John W. Warnock, "Afghanistan and Empire," in Jerome Klassen and Greg Albo, ed., Empire's Ally: 
Canada and the War in Afghanistan, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2013, p. 56-57. 
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Much of that work was undone in the civil wars that followed U.S. and Soviet 
intervention, and what remained was totally undlermined by the 2001 NATO invasion and 
occupation. After dropping billions of tons of bombs and reducing Afghan infrastructure 
to rubble, Canadian aid for reconstruction has been paltry and directly tied to the military 
occupation itself, as part of campaigns to win the "hearts and minds" of Afghans. What 
is more, much of the money that Canada has spent on Afghanistan has gone directly to 
Canadian companies operating in the new neoliberal framework that the puppet Karzai 
government has pushed through; at least 50% of :reconstruction money gets recycled right 
back into Canadian corporate profits and salaries.823 Not surprisingly, the extreme 
violence of the occupation has actually filled th1e ranks of the Taliban and other armed 
resistance groups who, quite reasonably, do not consider the foreign presence benevolent; 
Canada, for instance, is directly implicated in the torture of civilian detainees who are 
stripped, beaten, frozen, electrocuted, deprive:d of sleep, sexually assaulted and 
humiliated, attacked with dogs and often ultimately killed. 824 
This is drawn out in Sherene Razack's crucial contribution to Empire's Ally, in 
which she foregrounds the deep colonial logic and nature of the occupation, exploring the 
significance of Canada's involvement in the torture: of Afghan detainees and connecting it 
to the 1993 torture scandal in Somalia. Razack refuses to accept the instrumentalization 
of torture, eschewing the idea that Canadian soldiers submitted their victims to torture 
simply to gain military information; rather, she insists that the violence of the torture act 
is designed to mark the colonized body with its "savage" status. The message, Razack 
argues, is that the "civilized" world of the coloniz1er is considered important enough to 
823 Klassen, Empire's Ally, p. 161. 
824 Klassen, Empire's Ally, p. 167. 
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justify destroying "uncivilized" bodies in order to protect it, even when the intervention is 
rhetorically premised on humanitarian aims: 
The West understands peacekeeping and humanitarian 
interventions as an encounter in which "civilized" nations 
confront the savagery of cultures and peoples that have not yet 
entered modernity ... Canadian soldiers imagined themselves as 
disciplining and keeping in line, through practices of violence, 
uncivilized Somalis whose resentment and anger at western 
peacekeepers who had come to save them they could not 
comprehend. 825 
In the case of Somalia in 1993, the actions of Canadian torturers were more or less 
forgiven in the Canadian public as acts driven by heat exhaustion, poor leadership, and 
the ungratefulness of those they had gone to protect. This suggests, argues Razack, "a 
nation that ultimately remembers the torture as a moment of its own kindness and 
superiority," which partially explains the underwhelming response in the Canadian public 
to accounts of torture in Afghanistan and other acts of violence by the Canadian military 
abroad.826 
To be sure, the experience of Honduras over the past four years suggests that 
torture cannot be explained simply in terms of W estem "civilizing missions," since, put 
simply, Hondurans have been torturing Hondurans. Nevertheless, Razack's argument 
may still resonate in that context, if one considers the collusion between the Honduran 
military - which describes its project as "modernizing" even while it tortures its own 
people - and the Canadian state, which has endeavoured to facilitate and legitimate the 
regime committing such violent acts. As this dissertation demonstrated, the Canadian 
state has had to work hard to ignore the widespread reports of repressive - sometimes 
825 Sherene Razack, "From the Somalia Affair to Canada's Afghan Detainee Torture Scandal: How Stories 
of Torture Define the Nation," in Jerome Klassen and Greg Albo, ed., Empire's Ally: Canada and the War 
in Afghanistan, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2013, p. 378-379. 
826 Razack, Empire's Ally, p. 380. 
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shocking and brutal - violence in Honduras since the 2009 coup. As the authors in 
Empire's Ally have painstakingly shown, tht:: Canadian state has similarly accepted 
torture as part of the "mission" in Afghanistan. Whatever contestation may be taking 
place within the Canadian state, it is clear that the pro-torture position has the upper hand; 
a fact that, itself, speaks volumes. What is more~, returning briefly to Razack's point, the 
extent to which the broader Canadian public has. accepted torture as part of the toolkit of 
imperial benevolence is, itself, a striking demonstration of a colonial frame of mind. No 
less striking is the openness with which that mindset is proclaimed, as when a right wing 
columnist asserted in a major newspaper in 2001 that "what the Afghans need is 
colonizing. "827 
Afghanistan, then, is just one more case study that would have to be included in 
any complete picture of the new Canadian imperialism. Like the great empires it is 
mimicking, Canadian imperial politics cannot be contained in one or two volumes; what 
is required is a wholesale intellectual engagement in the disciplines of Canadian Politics, 
Canadian Studies, Canadian Political Economy and Canadian Foreign Policy with the · 
fact of Canadian imperialism, such that case studies like this one on Honduras can be 
linked up and connected with similar studies on Canada's relationships in Afghanistan, .in 
Colombia, in Mexico, in Israel and occupied Palestine, in Chad and elsewhere. That 
work is underway, of course; Empire's Ally, much cited in this dissertation, has provided 
the best comprehensive analysis of Canadian imperialism in Afghanistan yet, and Justin 
Podur's Haiti's New Dictatorship is among the efforts at building this analysis in Haiti, 
though its emphasis is not necessarily on Canada, as much as the United Nations mission 
827 Mark Steyn, "What the Afghans need is colonizing," National Post, October 9, 2001. 
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of which Canada is a key component.828 Todd Gordon's above-noted Imperialist Canada 
has attempted to bring some of these cases together, and other scholars have sought to 
sketch out scattered pieces of this problem. Nevertheless, this project is in its infancy and 
much more work is required; it is my humble hope that this dissertation can provide a 
kind of template for future work that could b1e done to re-examine Canadian foreign 
policy elsewhere in light of a thorough and complicated understanding of the new 
Canadian imperialism and the political economic dynamics by which it is animated. 
Indeed, in conclusion, it is the urgency of this project that I wish to highlight. The 
changes inherent in the Canadian state's decision to seize its opportunity for a greater 
imperial role are affecting a dramatic and wholesale shift in Canada's perception in the 
world and - even more troubling - in Canadians' perception of the world. As the 
postcolonial theoretical tradition has so effectively demonstrated, imperialism, being so 
profoundly in contradiction with the values most associated with social justice, requires a 
variety of delusions and deceptions to be made palatable to people who might otherwise 
recoil at its naked assertion of the power of one over another. Colonizers seek to 
convince themselves - and sometimes those they are colonizing - that their colonization 
is necessary, benevolent, well intentioned or otherwise just. 829 Imperialist powers, then, 
typically project narratives about themselves that justify their actions and, as Canada has 
828 Justin Podur, Haiti's New Dictatorship, Toronto, Between the Lines, 2012. 
829 An evocative illustration of this project can be found in Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness, in which 
the primary narrator, like Conrad himself, struggles with his own ambiguous position with respect to the 
colonial 'idea.' As the narrator famously remarks: "the conquest of the Earth, which mostly means the 
taking it away from those who have a slightly different compl1:::xion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, 
is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back 
of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea - something you can set up, 
and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to." Conrad struggles to understand how a belief in progress 
and human development can be expressed by the violent subjugation of one people by another, and this is 
the intellectual and spiritual problem that will increasingly face Canadians as the reality of Canadian 
imperialism becomes increasingly difficult to deny. Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, New York, W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1988. 
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delved deeper and deeper into imperial politics, Canadian culture has increasingly 
produced the ideological material necessary to justify it. 830 
There may be no better example of this than the winner of the 2008 Governor 
General's Literary Award, National Post columnist Christie Blatchford, who is a key 
figure in the new Canadian right and whose award-winning Fifteen Days represents 
perhaps the most straightforward - and offensive - justifications of the new Canadian 
imperialism. Blatchford's book, written as a series of vignettes of her experiences 
embedded with the Canadian military in Afghanistan, opens with a quotation drawn from 
one of the great cheerleaders of classical imperialism, Rudyard Kipling, and the first line 
of the first chapter reads, "by July 2006, Task Force Orion was a killing machine."831 
Blatchford is signalling from the get-go that she: is not interested in denying Canadian 
imperialism, as some liberal and left-nationalist observers might; she is seeking to 
celebrate it. 
A few pages later, Blatchford narrates a scene between a Canadian solider and an 
Afghan, wherein the Canadian stumbles upon a wounded Afghan and decides to take him 
in for medical support, but not before asserting Canadian superiority: 
"Willy had to calm me down because I was pissed," he says ... 
[To the wounded Afghan,] "if I was under the bush there, 
bleeding, and you came across me, what would you do to me?' 
And he said, 'Oh I'd take you back to my compound and heal 
830 The long history of post-facto construction of imperial justifications has been touched on in a few 
different forms across this dissertation. It is worth adding, here, the recognition that the process of 
constructing those justifications does psychological violence: to the colonized, of course, insofar as it 
writes narratives that denigrate or completely erase them from the history of human development, but also 
to the colonizers, who are encouraged to develop an obviously false consciousness - a necessarily self-
deceiving narrative - of the world in which they live. This poilnt is made eloquently by Frantz Fanon and 
Jean-Paul Sartre, among others, in the context of French colonialism in Algeria. See Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Critique of Dialectical Reasoning: Theory of Practical Ensembles, Vol. I, London, Verso, 1976. See also 
Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, New York, Grove Press, 2004. 
831 Christie Blatchford, Fifteen Days: Stories of Bravery, Friendship, Life and Death from Inside the 
Canadian Military, Toronto, Anchor Canada, 2008, p. 2. 
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you up,' and I said, 'that's bullshit ... That's bullshit. Because 
I'm better than you, because we 're better than you, I will heal 
you up and patch you up and take you back. "'832 
In Blatchford's tale, the Canadian military is in Afghanistan because Afghanistan needs 
an imperial power. Afghans need people who are better, to show them how to 
themselves be better. The extent of Blatchford's colonial arrogance is matched only by 
the soldiers she idolizes, whose comments, peppered through the book, are as clear an 
articulation of imperial logic as one could possibly imagine and make it hard to view the 
Canadian occupation as anything but imperialist. Reflecting the logic described by 
Razack above, Canadian soldier Ash Van Leeuwen tells Blatchford: 
We're not saving Afghanistan so that we can do free trade with 
them after; I mean, you can import rugs to Canada, but it's not an 
industrial country. We build infrastructure, provide education 
for children. The girls never had it. And it's not taking away 
from their culture; it's kind of showing they're being 
empowered. Look how long it took to get women's rights in 
North America, and we're in a country [Afghanistan] that's back 
two thousand years. It's like walking with people out of 
National Geographic. 833 
There is much to unpack in these statements. Cle:arly, Van Leeuwen had been prepared, 
presumably by his superior officers, to effectively deny the claim that Canada is 
motivated by economic concerns (though he either misunderstands or misdirects on the 
matter of how Canada takes advantage of free trade). He is also trained to speak to 
Canada's advancement of education and women's rights in Afghanistan, though his 
claims to that end are largely a fiction that is well dismantled in Klassen and Alba's 
work. His suggestion that Afghanistan "never had" infrastructure, education or a 
women's rights movement is simply inaccurate; indeed, as noted above, in the late 1970s 
832 Jon Hamilton, quoted in Blatchford, Fifteen Days, p. 7. (Emphasis mine.) 
833 Ash Van Leeuwen, quoted in Blatchford, Fifteen Days, p. 62-63. 
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Afghanistan had a complicated political scene that came to be dominated by a secular left 
coalition that was accomplishing a great deal of what Van Leeuwen falsely attributes to 
the Canadian occupation. 834 But most telling is his conclusion that Afghans are "back 
two thousand years." That, in his mind, they have walked out of the pages of Natio.nal 
Geographic is a disturbingly patent and straightforward articulation of colonialism that 
would, in fact, be right at home with the Rudyard Kiplings of a century ago. 835 This 
casual assertion that Afghans are obviously and essentially backwards, tribal, and pre-
modem, speaks directly to the imperial character of Canada's occupation as manifest in 
its foot soldiers. If it looks like imperialism, functions like imperialism and is justified 
using imperial logic, it seems rather straightforward to assert that this is, indeed, 
imperialism. 
It is the willingness of average Canadians - be they soldiers, policy-makers, or 
newspaper columnists - to more or less unabashedly declare itself an imperial power, 
with the caveat that Canadian imperialism is good and necessary, that should raise serious 
alarm bells for those Canadians who imagine themselves to be committed to social 
justice. Indeed, of all the further studies that this dissertation suggests, it seems the most 
urgent should be a re-assessment of Canadian social and political culture that takes 
seriously the notion that imperial politics, following Albert Memmi, change both the 
imperial power and the targets of its aggression: "for if colonization destroys the 
colonized, it also rots the colonizer."836 The dramatic ruptures from human sociality that 
834 Warnock, Empire's Ally, p. 43-73. 
835 This particular characterization fits into Edward Said's beautiful articulation of "Orientalism," or the 
creation of the colonized subject as something altogether different from the colonizer, an Other that is 
necessarily pre-modem and backwards but simultaneously mysterious and intriguing. Edward Said, 
Orienta/ism, New York, Vintage Books, 1994. See also Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, New 
York, Vintage Books, 1994. 
836 Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, Beacon Priess, Boston, 1991, p. xvii. 
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are required to justify colonization of another people, indeed, cause profound and 
sometimes existential harm even to colonizers themselves. As Aime Cesaire so astutely 
noted in 1955, the fascism that tore Europ{: asunder in the 1930s and 40s was a 
manifestation of colonialism come home. 837 
That imperialism represents a "highest stage" of capitalism - an argument that 
Lenin developed from Marx's gestures, late in his life, to the crucial role that colonialism 
played in the reproduction of capitalism - was, indeed, an argument that implied that 
imperialism signalled the weakness of the capitalist social order. While Lenin perhaps 
overemphasized the teleology that would see the capitalist powers tum to imperialism 
shortly before their inevitable downfall, 838 it is nevertheless instructive to note that 
imperialism is a tendency that is motivated by desperation to find new sources of profits; 
an expression of the manic logic of accumulation, it is desperate, rapacious, calculated 
and ruthless all at the same time, and it leads to the prioritizing of profits over every other 
normative concern. Marx and Engels poignantly describe the insecurity and mania - the 
spiritual illness - of trying to be imperial capital, in the Communist Manifesto: 
The need of a constantly expanding market for its products 
chases the bourgeoisie over the entirn surface of the globe. It 
must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions 
everywhere. 839 
It is, notably, need of capital that is doing the chasing; the would-be capitalists are the 
chased. While we should not necessarily feel sympathy for those who would align with 
capital to exploit others, it is worthwhile to consider the effects on a society that commits 
837 Aime Cesaire, Discourse on Colonialism, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1972. 
838 Arguably he emphasized these claims as part of the immediate political project of building the very 
revolutionary movements he hoped would imminently overthrow capitalism. V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The 
Highest Stage of Capitalism, New York, International Publishers, 2002. 
839 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto~, Toronto, Penguin, 2002, p. 223. 
358 
-- T~-----
itself, wholesale, to an inherently violent project and to ask what effects this will have on 
that society. 
Canadian capitalists are, indeed, "chased" by the need to expand; as Thomas 
D' Aquino, former President of the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, noted, 
"Canada's leading players are all engaged actively in expansion abroad for the simple 
reason that Canada does not have enough room for them to achieve global scale."840 The 
shift in Canada to an openly imperialist politics, then, renders impossible the prospects 
for Canada's promotion of a "less exploitative" global capitalist system and that, in tum, 
reflects back on Canada's domestic politics, which, themselves, are becoming 
increasingly unequal, exploitative and cruel. In the early 1990s, I was a student in the 
Canadian high school system, attending Canadian Studies classes that encouraged us to 
try to think through questions of "Canadian identity." We typically asserted that 
Canadian identity was rooted in being something different from the United States; that 
we were kinder, gentler, more thoughtful and more considerate, both as individuals and in 
the foreign policies of our country. However mythical this may have been, it is 
significant that the political moment required a citizenry who believed in that particular 
idea of Canada. Flash forward a decade or two, and Canadian identity is increasingly 
rooted in an aggressive patriotism; Canadians are 1~ncouraged by the state, by the media, 
by public institutions, in sporting spectacles, and increasingly by one another to loudly 
and proudly represent a bigger, stronger, tougher Canada.841 
840 Thomas D' Acquino, quoted in Henry Heller, "Review of Todd Gordon, Imperialist Canada," Historical 
Materialism 20.2, 2012, p. 224. 
841 Examples range from beer commercials that forcefully assert the statement, "I am Canadian," to the 
2010 Canadian Olympic slogan, "Own the Podium," to the near-constant hammering of the language of 
toughness and Canadian-ness in the presentation of professional hockey. For more on this see Tyler 
Shipley, "Pro-Sports, Anti-Olympics: Reclaiming the games, from the Games," The Bullet, No. 314, 
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Canadian culture, then, is undergoing a transformation requisite to the structural 
changes in the Canadian political economy 1that are manifesting visibly in the new 
Canadian imperialism. This transformation not only serves to ideologically sustain a 
Canadian state that behaves in profoundly different ways than it used to, it also 
complicates the picture of who gets to be included in "Canada." If Afghans are "two 
thousand years behind," where does that leave Afghan-Canadians? If Haiti is a "bas~et 
case" that should be thanking Canada for its intervention, are Haitian-Canadians the 
saviours or the saved? If Canada is exporting prosperity and development to Honduras, 
how do we address the Hondurans who spend lhalf of their time working for less than 
minimum wages on Ontario farms as part of migrant worker programs, driven to this 
work by the utter lack of other opportunities in the Honduras that Canada is helping to 
create? 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, what does the new Canadian imperialism 
tell us about the original Canadian imperialism? The claim, noted in Chapter 2, that 
Canada has "no colonial history," is a remarkable denial of the genocide that marked 
Canada's origins, and it obscures the fact that the original colonization of Indigenous 
nations is an ongoing project that plays out in the daily, "domestic" politics of Canada. 
The new assertion of Canadian patriotism consistently finds expression in conflicts 
between Indigenous communities and white settllers; at the site of a land conflict in 
Southern Ontario, for instance, white settlers at Caledonia have mobilized counter-
protests against Indigenous demonstrations in which they wave Canadian flags and sing 
February 19, 2010. Please see also Tyler Shipley, "The NHL and the New Canadian Militarism: National 
Game, International Shame" Canadian Dimension, Vol. 47, No. 4, July/August 2013. 
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"Oh Canada" at Indigenous protestors who quite rightly claim that the Canadian state is 
breaking the treaties it signed with them. 842 
Canada, then, is a settler colony that has blossomed into an imperial power, with a 
thread of colonial logic that connects its past to its present in a profoundly unflattering 
way. Canada's emergence since the Cold War as a full-fledged imperial power is rooted 
in shifts in the deeper political economy of Canada and it would be wrong to imagine that 
this change is simply a function of different people, different political parties, or different 
ideas; Canada's brief "peacekeeping moment" was not motivated solely by benevolence 
or some natural Canadian predisposition to "do good," even if many Canadians were and 
are well-intentioned and progressive. Nevertheless, it would be similarly wrong to 
assume that Canadian policy is wholly predetermined by political economic dynamics; 
activist organizing - whether in trade unions, in social movements, in civil society or 
elsewhere - can and has made an impact on Canadian politics in the past. Indeed, if there 
is any hope that Canadians can be a force for a better world, it is surely rooted in the 
prospects of those activist organizations gaining traction and, ultimately, provoking a 
rupture in the Canadian state that would radically transform the Canadian polity. 
There is, then, inspiration to be taken from the Honduran social movements that 
were at the centre of this dissertation. In contrast to the colonial logic that sees Canada as 
the ideological guide for its colonial dominions to follow, Canadian social movements 
should be seeking to learn from and adapt movements like that in Honduras, which have 
mobilized around particular and immediate community needs with a vision of radically 
transforming the Honduran state. Indeed, when I interviewed Suzanne Dudziak, a key 
842 I've been present at Caledonia when this has happened, and have documented the events in photos. It 
has also been reported by the CBC and is currently written up at "Caledonia Update: Peace, Order and 
Good Government, eh?," May 23, 2006, available at: htto://www.pogge.ca/archives/001135.shtml 
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activist in the Canadian-based Latin America ~forking Group (LAWG) in the 1980s, one 
of her strongest reflections on the success of that work was that the Canadian and 
Honduran movements learned from one another.843 The setbacks that the current 
movement in Honduras has faced speak to the fact that the international capitalist class 
knows how to cooperate when it is under threat. The international working class has 
demonstrated that capacity in the past, and Canadian activists need to remember that past 
and re-engage with it; links between activists in the North and South have been fruitful in 
the past, as the experiences of LAWG demonstrate. It is my sincere hope that this 
dissertation can help to provide a framework for understanding the dynamics of this 
moment, with the aim of building stronger networks of collaboration and cooperation 
between the social movements confronting imperialism in Honduras, in Canada, and 
ultimately, throughout the world. 
843 Interview with Suzanne Dudziak, April 7, 2012. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Letter from Religious Women's Pilgrimage for Peace to Allan J. 
MacEachen, February 2, 1984.844 
Right Honourable Allan J. MacEachen 
Secretary of State for External Affairs 
Department of External Affairs 
Government of Canada 
Ottawa, Ontario KlA 002 
Dear Mr. MacEachen, 
We wish to acknowledge your letter of December 23, 1983 and to thank you for your 
detailed reply. We regret that your letter still le:aves some basic questions unanswered, 
particularly regarding the nature of our visit, the Honduran security question, and our 
Canadian aid program. Our own recent personal experience with the Honduran 
government and our continuing concern for the people of Honduras prompts this reply to 
your letter. We would greatly appreciate your early response to this further inquiry. 
Firstly, as members of the Religious Women's Pilgrimage for Peace we had planned for 
and committed several days to the specific purpose of prayer and witness for peace in 
Central America. Our purpose, which was known publicly through the media in Canada, 
the U.S., and Honduras before the pilgrimage began, was clear and pacific in intent. We 
would expect that your response to the actions of the Honduran government and to the 
issues raised in our letter would be clearly based on the peaceful and prayerful nature of 
our pilgrimage. 
Our question remains, then, what the Canadian government will do in view of the 
obvious purpose of our visit and the actions take:n by the Honduran authorities in not 
allowing us entry and the interpretation and gross distortion contained in their assertion 
that we are part of some "international communist conspiracy", that we intended to block 
roads and wreak internal havoc, that we are part of a Nicaraguan opposition movement 
opposing Archbishop Obando y Bravo, etc. Rather than dealing with the reasons for 
stopping a peaceful pilgrimage, it attacks our motivations and justifies their actions by 
referring to U.S. precedents for refusing entry for foreigners. As you may be aware, a 
similar Christian initiative for peace was undertaken earlier this past year where 
Canadians visited the Soviet Union and Washington making religious observances and 
exchanging views at the highest levels. In neither case were they refused entry. Several 
members of this earlier initiative also participated in our pilgrimage. 
We, therefore, find it difficult to understand the exkmt to which your reply of December 
23rd appears to give unquestioned credence to the Honduran communique. We regret that 
the tone of your letter and the apparent lack of further investigation seem to indicate that 
the interpretation of Honduran officials in their unfortunate statement is accepted by the 
844 Source: Latin American Working Group Archives, Scott Library, York University. 
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Canadian government as the truth of the matter.. To your understanding, is it the position 
of the Honduran government to refuse entry to Christians of peaceful and prayerful 
intent? If it is, what is the response of the Canadian government to such a refusal? We 
would also like to know if the Canadian government has lodged a letter of complaint with 
the Government of Honduras for their refusal to permit entry to the pilgrimage. If this 
has not yet been done, we would like to know why not? 
Secondly, we were interested in your remark concerning "grave threats to Honduras 
internal security" as a justification for the massive and unprecedented U.S. military 
involvement in that country. Could you please elaborate on the evidence for this? To our 
knowledge there have been no acts of aggression towards Honduras by any neighboudng 
country. Furthermore, it appears that apart from the Honduran and U.S. support, of 
"contra" incursions into Nicaragua, the Honduran army intervened in El Salvador (June 
1982), offers support and training to the Salvadorean army through CONDECA (Puerto 
Castillo) and consistently violated Nicaraguan territory and air space or lends its support 
for U.S. personnel to do so as evidenced recently in the helicopter incident on the 
Honduran-Nicaraguan border. We would thus like to understand the basis of your 
statement and if it represents a change in Canadian policy in favour of the U.S. buildup in 
Honduras and the U.S. assumption that peace will be won in the region by means of 
military force or threat of force? 
Thirdly, our questions to you concerning the meaningfulness of Canadian aid in such a 
context remain unanswered. We would greatly appreciate an explanation of how the 
current Canadian aid program, particularly our government-to-government aid, is 
meeting the very basic and real needs of the Honduran people? This remains a very 
serious question for us and one of some urgency given current articles on the state of 
underdevelopment in that country and the real toll this is having on the vast majority who 
are the poor of Honduras. In light of the Honduran government's priority on military 
spending and the increase of human rights violations and internal repression, how does 
our aid program benefit the poor majority of Honduras? 
Lastly, we share with you a sincere hope that the Contadora peace initiative will succeed 
and that political and not military solutions will be uppermost on the Canadian agenda for 
bringing peace to the region. We regret that recent news reports of the January 
Contadora meeting indicate that the Government of Honduras appears to be interested 
only in delaying and even diluting the progress made during 1983 on implementing the 
21 points all countries agreed to. We would like to ask you what kind of effective 
support is Canada giving the initiative beyond your statements that the Contadora is a 
worthwhile process? 
Again, we thank you for your response to our concerns and say that we look forward to 
your considered attention to the matters we have raised above. 
Sincere wishes for peace in this New Year, 
Yours Truly, 
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Sr. Marilyn Matz FCJ 
Provincial Superior 
Faithful Companions of Jesus- Canada 
For the Religious Women's Pilgrimage for Peacie 
Sr. Murial Gallagher, Superior General Sisters of Providence, Kingston, ON 
Sr. Fluerette, Sister of Providence 
Ms. Marsha Sfeir, Board member, Ecumenical Forum of Canada 
Ms. Roseanne Pellizzari, Catholic Laywoman and mother 
Sr. Mary Jo Leddy, Provincial Coordinator, Sisters of Sion, Canada-USA Province 
Mrs. Donna Sinclair, United Church Observer 
Ms. Mary Thompson Boyd, National Office, United Church of Canada 
Mrs. Jean Wright, Peace Network, United Church of Canada 
Sr. Helen Zettle, representative of the School Sistiers of Notre Dame 
Sr. Suzanne Dudziak, Sister of Sion, Coordinator of the Canadian group of the Religious 
Women's Pilgrimage for Peace 
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Appendix B: Open Letter to Honduran President Rafael Callejas from Canadian civil 
society groups and individuals, early 1990s. 845 
ASESINATO DE LIDERES SINDICALES HONDURENOS PROVOCA GRAN 
DESILUSION E INDIGNACION EN CANADA 
Los esfuerzos de los pueblos y gobiemos centroamericanos para traer la paz, democracia 
y justicia a sus patrias han sido observados con gran simpatia y esperanza por los 
canadienses. El traspaso reciente de la presidencia hondurenfi.a, de un civil electo a otro 
de un partido politico opositor, fue recibido en Canada como un signo mas de la 
consolidacion de instituciones democraticas en d istmo. Pero con profunda desilusi6n e 
indignaci6n, nos enteramos de los asesinatos de los lideres sindicales Francisco J av.ier 
Bonilla y Ramon Antonio Briceno. 
l Que significan las instituciones democraticas si no se mantienen el derecho a la libre 
organizaci6n y el estado de derecho? Cuando la violaci6n de estos principios implica la 
tortura y el asesinato de lideres populares, es el deber de toda la comunidad de naciones 
de expresar su indignaci6n y reclamar justicia. 
Llamamos a Su Excelencia Presidente Rafael Leonardo Callejas a hacer todo lo que este 
en su poder para traer a los asesinos a los tribunals de justicia, poniendo fin a la 
impunidad con la cual tales crimenes han sido cometidos hasta la fecha en Honduras, 
para romper con el legado de represi6n heredado de la oscura era de las dictaduras 
militares. 
Lloyd Axworthy, Diputado Federal, Parlamento de Canada. 
Bill Blaikie, Diputado Federal, Parlamento de Canada. 
Dan Heap, Diputado Federal, Parlamento de Canada. 
Stan Keyes, Diputado Federal, Parlamento de Canada. 
Richard Allen, Diputado, Parlamento Provincial de Ontario. 
John Addison, Alcalde, Dundas, Ontario. 
Confederacion de Sindicatos Canadienses (CCU.) 
Sindicato Nacional de la lndustria Automovilistica, Aerospacio y de Implementos 
Agricolas del Canada (CAW.) 
Sindicato Unido de Trabajadores del Acero de Amelica - Division Canada (USW A.) 
845 Source: Latin American Working Group Archives, Scott Library, York University. 
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Sindicato Unido de Trabajadores de la Industria Electrica, Radio y Maquinaria del 
Canada (UE.) 
Union Canadiense de Empleados Publicos (CUPE.) 
Union Nacional de Empleados Gubemamente Provinciales (NUPGE.) 
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Appendix C - Excerpt from Gabriel Garcia Marquez's One Hundred Years of Solitude: 
The new Aureliano was a year old when the tension of the people broke with no 
forewarning. Jose Arcadio Segundo and other union leaders who had remained 
underground until then suddenly appeared one weekend and organized demonstrations in 
towns throughout the banana region. The polic1e merely maintained public order. But on 
Monday night the leaders were taken from their homes and sent to jail in the capita~ of 
the province with two-pound irons on their legs. [ ... ] They were set free, however, 
within three months because of the fact that the government and th€ banana companies 
could not reach an agreement as to who should feed them in jail. The protests of \the 
workers this time were based on the lack of sarn[tary facilities in their living quarters, the 
non-existence of medical services, and terrible working conditions. They stated, 
furthermore, that they were not being paid in real money, but in scrip, which was only 
good to buy Virginia ham in the company commissaries. Jose Arcadio Segundo was put 
in jail because he revealed that the scrip system was a way for the company to finance its 
fruit ships, which without the commissary merchandise would have to return empty from 
New Orleans to the banana ports. The other complaints were common knowledge. The 
company physicians did not examine the sick but had them line up behind one another in 
the dispensaries and a nurse would put a pill the colour of copper sulphate on their 
tongues, whether they had malaria, gonorrhoea, or constipation. It was a cure that was so 
common that children would stand in line several times and instead of swallowing the 
pills would take them home to use as bingo markers. The company workers were 
crowded together in miserable barracks. The engineers, instead of putting in toilets, had 
a portable latrine for every fifty people brought to the camps at Christmastime and tht.?y 
held public demonstrations of how to use them so that they would last longer. The 
decrepit lawyers dressed in black who during other times had besieged Colonel Aureliano 
Buendia and who now were controlled by the banana company dismissed those demands 
with decisions that seemed like acts of magic. When the workers drew up a list of 
unanimous petitions, a long time passed before they were able to notify the banana 
company officially. As soon as he found out about the agreement, Mr. Brown [the 
company executive] hitched his luxurious glassed-in coach to the train and disappeared 
from Macondo along with the more promine:nt representatives of his company. 
Nonetheless, some workers found one of them the following Sunday in a brothel and they 
made him sign a copy of the sheet with the demands while he was naked with the woman 
who had helped to entrap him. The mournful lawyers showed in court that the man had 
nothing to do with the company and in order that no one doubt their arguments they had 
him jailed as an impostor. [ ... ] 
Tired of the hermeneutical delirium, the workers turned away from the authorities in 
Macondo and brought their complaints up to the higher courts. It was there that the 
sleight-of-hand lawyers proved that the demands lacked all validity for the simple reason 
that the banana company did not have, never had had, and never would have any workers 
in its service because they were all hired on a temporary and occasional basis. So that the 
fable of the Virginia ham was nonsense, the same as that of the miraculous pills and the 
Yuletide toilets, and by a decision of the court it was established and set down in solemn 
decrees that the workers did not exist. 
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The great strike broke out. Cultivation stopped halfway, the fruit rotted on the trees, and 
the hundred-twenty-car trains remained on the sidings. The idle workers overflowed the 
towns. The Street of the Turks echoed with a Saturday that lasted for several days and in 
the poolroom of the Hotel Jacob they had to rurnnge twenty-four-hour shifts. That Was 
where Jose Arcadia Segundo was on the day it was announced that the army had heen 
assigned to establish public order. [ ... ] 
Many years later that child would still tell, in spite of people thinking that he was a crazy 
old man, how Jose Arcadia Segundo had lifted him over his head, almost in the air, as if 
floating on the terror of the crowd, toward a nearby street. The child's privileged 
position allowed him to see at that moment that the wild mass was starting to get to the 
comer and the row of machine guns opened fire. Several voices shouted at the same 
time: 
"Get down! Get down!" 
The people in front had already done so, swept down by the wave of bullets. The 
survivors, instead of getting down, tried to go back to the small square, and the panic 
became a dragon's tail as one compact wave ran against another which was moving in the 
opposite direction, toward the other dragon's tail in the street across the way, where the 
machine guns were also firing without cease. They were penned in, swirling about in a 
giant whirlwind that little by little was being reduced to its epicentre as the edges were 
systematically being cut off all around like an onion being peeled by the insatiable and 
methodical shears of the machine gun. [ ... ] 
[The next day, Aureliano Segundo] read an extraordinary proclamation to the nation 
which said that the workers had left the station and had returned home in peaceful groups. 
The proclamation also stated that the union leaders, with a great patriotic spirit, had 
reduced their demands to two points: a reform of medical services and the building of 
latrines in the living quarters. It was stated laiter that when the military authorities 
obtained the agreement with the workers, they hastened to tell Mr. Brown and he not only 
accepted the new conditions but offered to pay for three days of public festivities to 
celebrate the end of the conflict. Except that when the military asked him on what date 
they could announce the signing of the agreement:, he looked out the window at the sky 
crossed with lightning flashes and made a profound gesture of doubt. 
"When the rain stops," he said. "As long as the rain lasts we're suspending all activities." 
It had not rained for three months and there had been a drought. But when Mr. Brown 
announced his decision a torrential downpour spread over the whole banana region. It 
was the one that caught Jose Arcadia Segundo on his way to Macondo. A week later, it 
was still raining. The official version, repeated a thousand times and mangled out all 
over the country by every means of communication the government found at hand, was 
finally accepted: there were no dead, the satisfied workers had gone back to their 
families, and the banana company was suspending all activity until the rains stopped. 
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Martial law continued with an eye to the necessity of taking emergency measures for the 
public disaster of the endless downpour, but the troops were confined to quarters. During 
the day the soldiers walked through the torrents in the streets with their pant legs rolled 
up, playing with boats with the children. At night, after taps, they knocked doors down 
with their rifle butts, hauled suspects out of th<;:ir beds, and took them off on trips from 
which there was no return. The search for and extermination of the hoodlums, murderers, 
arsonists and rebels of Decree No. 4 was still going on, but the military denied it even to 
the relatives of the victims who crowded the commandant's offices in search of news. 
"You must have been dreaming," the officers insisted. "Nothing has happened· in 
Macondo, nothing has ever happened, and nothirig will ever happen. This is a happy 
town." In that way they were finally able to wipe out the union leaders. 
Gabriel Garcia Marquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude, p. 300-310. 
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Appendix D - Letter from Cuyamel Fruit Vice-President H.V. Rolston to company 
lawyer, 1920. 
1. So that our great sacrifices and enormous investments will not have been made in 
vain, we must acquire and control as much national and private land as we can 
afford and absorb. 
2. Our aim must be the enrichment of our company, and we must keep open every 
opportunity for new exploitation. In short, we must acquire as much land as our 
strategic interest requires, in order to guarantee our future growth and · 
development and increase our economic power. 
3. We must make our contract so tight that nobody can compete with us, not even in 
the distant future. Any business that becomes established must be under our 
control and adapt itself to our established principles. 
4. We must obtain concessions, privileges, franchises, exemptions from obligations 
which might restrict our profits and those of our associates. We must put 
ourselves in a privileged position in order to impose our commercial philosophy 
and defend our economic interests. 
5. It is necessary to cultivate the imagination of our local vassals and get them to 
accept the idea that we are going to get rich, and to do the same with politicians 
and the leaders we intend to use. Observations and careful study shows us that a 
people degraded by alcohol are easy to assimilate to our destiny and use. It is in 
our interest to take care that the privileged class bows to our will, because we 
need them for our exclusive benefit. Generally, men such as these have no 
principles, strength of character or patriotilsm; they yearn only for positions and 
reward, which lead them on to further appetite. 
6. These men must not be allowed to act on their own initiative, but only in set 
circumstances under our immediate control.. 
7. We must break with friends who have been in our service but who we consider to 
have been weakened by loyalty to us; sooner or later they will betray us. We 
must distance ourselves without making them offended and treat them with 
deference even though we no longer use them. It is their country, their natural 
resources, their coast, their people we still need. Little by little we shall acquire 
them. 
8. In general, all discussion and planning musit tum on these words: power, wealth, 
work, discipline and method. We must proceed with subtlety, not risking to 
espouse principles or justify our claims to power. No acts of charity, no claims to 
notice, in short, nothing that might reveal our real intentions. If our projects end 
badly, we will develop a new strategy, b1;'! more modest, more simple, more 
"simpatico," even, perhaps, virtuous. 
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9. We must disrupt the growing economy of this country and increase its problems 
in order to favour our own aims. We must prolong its tragic, stormy life, plagued 
with revolution; the wind must blow only upon our sails and the waves wet only 
our keels. 
10. We come, therefore, at an end. You know the men better than I do. When I 
arrive I will show you a list of the lands we must acquire, immediately where this 
is possible. 
(Originally printed in Longino Becerra, Evoludon Historica de Honduras, p. 149-150. 
This translation taken from Alison Acker, Honduras: The Making of a Banana Republic, 
p. 65-66.) 
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Appendix E-Transcript oflnterview with Edward Fox, Dec. 1, 2009. 
Tyler Shipley: So, to start, can you just tell me who you are, what you were doing in 
Tegucigalpa, what your role was? 
Edward Fox: My name is Edward Fox, I was an independent international observer, I 
came down last Friday, spent the last few days in Honduras - Sunday, of course, as 
an election observer in the Tegucigalpa area and the suburbs of the city. 
TS: Ok, so can you give me your impressions of what happened on Sunday and the 
context around which happened. 
EF: Yes, from, well, there are different levels of election. From the local level, I visited 
more than a dozen voting places, schools, several dozen tables. And the areas tha,t I 
went into and visited personally were peacefol, were calm, there was a very positive 
nationalistic attitude. Every single voting arna that I went to, people came up to me 
and thanked me for being there. I saw no protesting, I saw no indications of attempts 
to disrupt and intimidate, by either side, in fact no one even indicated their support for 
any of the major candidates. It was about the: importance of the country of Honduras 
and what the individuals viewed as a national commitment to demonstrate that they 
could move forward with this election. 
TS: So you didn't think that the militarization of the country, the militarization of voting 
stations, was problematic or intimidating in any way? 
EF: No, I did not. I saw both police and military at each of these places. They did not 
interfere. They were not engaged in interacting with the public. They were there, for 
the most part, standing off to the side. At no time did I see them do anything that 
would be intimidating. As most people know, having the military involved in this is a 
normal part of the process. They are the organization which has the capability, the 
logistical ability to support this process. As a matter of fact, as of thirty days ago, 
they were no longer under the control of the President, they were under the control of 
the chairman of the Electoral Tribunal. 
TS: So what about the human rights violations that have gone on since June 28? 
COFADEH, CODER, and other human rights groups in Honduras have been 
documenting many cases of police brutality, beatings, kidnappings, disappearances, 
there have been thirty-two people killed - what is your sense of that and how that 
affected the election process? 
EF: Well, it's, uh - it's outrageous if, in fact, there are human rights violations going on,. 
by anybody. No doubt about that. 
TS: You didn't speak to any of the human rights groups as part of the work of an 
observer? 
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EF: I, uh - in the schedule that I had, I was focused on the electoral process, not 
investigating the broader aspects of the political debate and dialogue in this country. 
However, I did read about those, I did prepare myself by going to meetings and going 
online and reading a lot of material before I came here. I've been aware of wh;at's 
been going on in Honduras for a long time, I was an electoral observer in 1981; so 
this is not new to me, Latin America is not new to me and, quite frankly, the role of 
the military in whatever human rights violations here - I saw none of that and tqere 
may or may not be - I am not questioning and disputing that, that is not the purpbse 
of my visit here. But I must tell you that it is not confirmed information, it is reports, 
and uh, I have not seen any evidence that would indicate that the crisis that happetb.ed 
here in June produced anything that - you know, as sad as it may be - that fuad 
anything to do with this election. The process was begun well over a year ago, the 
primary process, which was run while Zelaya was in the presidency, no one 
complained then about the process. Nobody questioned in the slightest the role of the 
tribunal and its legitimacy, and no one involved in the political crisis in June w~re 
[sic] on the ballot, were [sic] engaged in it, and uh, therefore, why one wanted to try 
to de-legitimize a constitutional processes [sic] in a political way, I did not see that, I 
did not believe that it was linked. 
TS: Of course, there were a lot of people who said that the situation changed dramatically 
on June 28, a lot of those people were out in Tegucigalpa yesterday, thousands .of 
people in the streets celebrating the fact that they didn't vote - the official results 
from the TSE stated that there were only 1.7 million people who voted in a country of 
over 8 million. Do you still, in that context, foel that the five days you had to observe 
the elections was enough? That is a huge degree of absenteeism in a country of 8 
million. 
EF: Oh sure - there's never enough time - you would have to spend all the time down 
here, so, do I wish I had more time? Sure. Vfould've I done more [sic]? Sure. But 
given the time that I had and relying - you know - I met with a variety of people 
including the U.S. ambassador and others, to discuss his view, and he's here all the 
time. And I felt comfortable with the info1mation I received and the briefings I 
received that, on my own, I wasn't going to uncover anything in the last minute that 
would be dramatically different than the reports I had received from a variety of other 
people on those important issues. 
TS: Right, so you spoke to the U.S. ambassador a.bout human rights issues in Honduras, 
but you did not speak to local groups - COFADEH, CODER, FIAN - the human 
rights groups that are in Honduras -
EF: - that's correct. No, I did not. That's correct -
TS: - and yet you didn't see that as a problem in terms of your ability to accurately, 
adequately and fairly judge the process? 
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EF: I didn't meet with the ambassador to talk about those things, I met with him to talk 
about the electoral process, and we had an opportunity - and if I had had an 
opportunity I would have talked to them, I normally try to do that, this time I did not. 
So it's not that I was excluding that, it's that where I had an opportunity and when I 
had time, I raised those kinds of issues. So, I think it's an important thing, but I, you 
know, the United States had not been an enthusiastic supporter of what happei;led 
here, so I don't know why they would be covering up things! So I thought that was a 
good thing to do - find the ambassador who has been very critical of a lot of things, 
let him tell me what they are. But he did not - in his list of things that concerned him 
- he did not make human rights violations, murders, rapes, he did not indicate that 
that was verifiable or part of a major concern that the United States had. 
TS: So, thirty-two people have been killed since the coup, perhaps you weren't aware-
EF: - you say that. I don't know that to be a fact. Nobody else has given me that 
information; I haven't had it verified by any authoritative sources. 
TS: But I thought a lot of the observers were at the TSE on Saturday, when the five 
leading human rights groups in Honduras actually presented a document that detailed 
all of this, gave it to the TSE, and launched a formal complaint against the elections, 
precisely on these grounds. I'm very surprised that you, as an observer, wouldn't 
have come into this information. 
EF: Well, I arrived late on Friday, late Friday afiternoon, I did not attend that particular 
session, if they were there, I didn't know about it. I came down here to try and look 
at the electoral process, because I believed that the way it was being put forward was 
critical for this country to be able to make a decision - when you have a crisis, 
whether you believe that what happened to Pn~sident Zelaya was horrible, or correct, 
how do you move forward from there? Even he indicated that his tern1 of office :is 
over in a month. So what's the best thing to go forward? That's to have an election! 
To allow people to vote and select a new leader! That's what I saw and that's what 
they did. 
TS: And yet, so many people have been saying for so many months that the solution was 
a constitutional assembly, to rewrite, reform th~: constitution -
EF: - no, no, no, that was overwhelmingly rejected!' 
TS: Well no, it wasn't actually even put to a vok~, because the day that the first non-. 
binding vote was supposed to happen, there was a military coup. So it hasn't been 
voted on. 
EF: Uh, well, uh - you call it a coup, I don't believe it was a coup. The civilians in 
charge of both branches of government, uh, overwhelmingly - first of all, they told 
President Zelaya repeatedly that he was not following the mandates of the court and 
congress, told him not to do things and he insisted on doing things, and then they issued, 
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uh- look, I don't have time for this, you've made up your mind, good for you. My bags 
are here and I have to go. Maybe you should move to Venezuela if you love Chavez so 
much. 
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Appendix F - Open Letter Published by MiningWatch Canada from Honduran Civil 
Society Groups in Opposition to Proposed Mining Law, Tuesday, January 24, 2012 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras 
The below signed organizations alert the Honduran people to the National Congress' 
decision to approve a proposed mining law, writiten by the National Congress' Legislative 
Commission led by deputy Donaldo Reyes Avelar for disrespecting the demands that the 
citizens of this country have been making in this regard for the last decade. 
Our organizations have demanded that the commission create space for debate and 
discussion such that a collective process may take place to develop a mining law with 
real citizen participation and in which the rights of campesino and indigenous populations 
would be privileged, protected and guaranteed, along with the conservation and 
protection of the environment and, above all, that the right of communities to determine 
their own development be respected. 
With regard to our demands, the Mining Commission informed us on Monday January 
16th that the ruling on the mining bill was finished and that they had committed 
themselves to hand it in to the President of Congress before the end of the current 
legislative session, given that they were under "enormous pressure from investors. " They 
also indicated that they were predisposed to meet with social organizations, 
environmentalists and human rights defenders to inform them about its contents, which 
was contrary to our demand for active and effective citizen participation. 
Upon reviewing the proposed law that we received from the Mining Commission, we 
find that its content is more damaging than the current law, which it tries to rectify, in 
continuation with the servile way in which our riches have been handed over to national 
and foreign investors, behind the backs of the Honduran people. 
This proposed law developed by the Mining Commission behind closed doors seriously 
violates the territorial, cultural, and spiritual rights of indigenous and afro-descendent 
peoples, as well as their full and legitimate right to autonomy and rights under 
Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization, revealing its colonialist and 
racist intent to exterminate original peoples. 
This proposed law also attempts to: 
1. Continue promoting open-pit mining, 
2. Open the door not just for multinational corporations, but also for foreign 
governments to become title owners of mining concessions, 
3. Fail to guarantee and protect access to wate:r for communities, privileging its use 
by the mining industry, in an open violation of the human right to water, 
4. Ensure, within the context of creating incentives for investments, the validity of 
tax loopholes so that companies don't pay taxes, 
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5. Reduce requirements for granting of mining concessions, paving the way for 
investors and making it difficult for communities to defend their natural 
resources, 
6. Reduce and eliminate the majority of reasons for which mining concessions can 
be cancelled, which coincides with content of an earlier bill that was being 
debated, 
7. Restrict and impede access to information regarding mining activities, deeming 
this information (technical and financial) as confidential and only available to the 
mining authority, 
8. Only consider binding community consultation under exceptional circumstances 
and not as a general norm. Also, the consultation process is only established for 
production licenses, which entails the automatic granting of concessions given the 
potential lawsuits that companies could bring against the state [presumably under 
free trade agreements or other investment protection agreements], 
9. Promote administrative silence as an expedited way to approve requests that 
mining companies make. 
But the principal trap within the proposed Mining Law is found in Article 103, which 
reads: "Upon approval of this law, those applications which are currently in process will 
continue to be processed through to completion under the law in place when they were 
submitted, without prejudice to the revision, evaluation and rectification which these 
applications could entail." 
This means that the more than 300 mining proj1ects that have still not been approved, 
which were suspended by Executive Decree, will be processed under the current mining 
law. This is the same law that was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of 
Justice. This disposition contradicts article 105 of the proposed mining law, which 
revokes Legislative Decree 292-98 that contains the General Mining Law. As such, the 
proposed law hands the whole country over to the mining companies so that they can 
destroy it as they like. 
Given this situation, we call upon social organizations, environmentalists, indigenous and 
afro-descendant peoples, and human rights organizations, to express their repudiation, 
rejection and condemnation of the contents of this proposed law, as well as of those 
deputies that are trying to make a fool of the Honduran people by acting in the interests 
of multinational mining companies and not of their own people, whom they are 
constitutionally mandated to serve. 
We also demand that the President of the National Congress respond to our insistence 
that space be created for public debate and creation of a mining law that is truly patriotic, 
that incorporates the demands and proposals of the people, and not to carry out a simple 
information process as the mining commission has done. 
The indigenous peoples who sign this declaration, signal that if this law is approved, we 
will not recognize this law nor what takes place by extension, nor those who approve it. 
We also make clear that with this law or without it, we have the right to self-
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determination and dignity, and are not prepared to accept our own death and the 
continuation of colonialism. 
Finally, we conclude that if this law is approved behind closed doors and behind the 
backs of the Honduran people, the National Congress and the deputies of the Mining 
Commission will be those responsible for the social conflict that this will generate, when 
the Honduran people exercise their rights to the defense of their territory, the protection 
of the environment and the protection and safeguarding of life, and the integrity of people 
and their goods. 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras, January 24, 2012. 
Honduran Centre for the Promotion of Community Development (CEHPRODEC) 
Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras (COPINH) 
Civic Alliance for Democracy (ACD) 
Committee for the Defence of the Flora and Fauna of the Gulf of Fonseca 
(CODEFFAGOLF) 
Regional Environmental Committee of the Siria Valley 
National Association for the Promotion of Ecological Agriculture (ANAFAE) 
Centre for Investigation and Promotion of Human Rights (CIPRODEH) 
The Santa Barbara Environmental Movement (M.A.S.) 
Madre Tierra Association 
Association of Non Governmental Organizations (ASONOG) 
Popol N ah Tun Foundation 
Environmental Network of the Municipalities of Comayagua and La Paz 
(REDAMUCOP) 
Fundambiente 
Association of Environmentalist and Agro-Forestry J oumalists (AHP AAF) 
Network of Nature Defence Committees of Choluteca and Valle 
National Roundtable on Advocacy for Risk Management (member of the steering 
committee of SINAGER) 
Committee of Journalists for Life and the Freedom of Expression 
Environmental Defence Committee of the Guisayote Reserve 
Honduran Ecumenical Institute for Community Se:rvice (INHESCO) 
National Network of Mine Affected Communities 
Defence Committee of the Rights of the Indigenous People ofYamaranguila 
(COPRODEDPIY) 
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Appendix G- Open Letter from Honduran Women's Collective, CODEMUH 
Choloma, Cortes, August 12, 2011 
TO: 
The Right Honourable Stephen Joseph Harper, Prime Minister of Canada; 
Mr. Porfirio Lobo Sosa, President of Honduras; 
Mr. Africo Madrid, Secretary of State for the Interior; 
The International Community; 
Especially to the Honduran people: 
The Honduran Women's Collective, CODEMUH, has continually and systematically 
produced information about the vulnerable position faced by workers in the maquila 
industry in Honduras, about the violation of human and labour rights, and the damages 
done to the health of workers by their work activities, especially in the company Gildan 
Activewear, a transnational company owned by Canadians. This information has been 
given to governments and the entities responsible for labour law enforcement in 
Honduras; national and international social movements and organizations; human rights 
protection systems; and the Fair Labour Association (FLA). 
We have taken our cases to judicial bodies, both national and international, using legal 
channels in a responsible way. We have used international and inter-American systems, 
investigating, documenting, informing, publicizing, raising awareness and presenting 
proposals so that the entities responsible for applying justice would act. These entities 
should implement monitoring, follow up and pre:vention actions for effective protecti0n 
that ensures human and labour rights for the working population. In addition, we have 
alerted these bodies to the fact that Gildan Activewear is violating the Constitution of tl;l.e 
Honduran Republic and other labour laws, by implementing long work days and a system 
of unachievable production quotas. 
Prime Minister Harper, there have been constant reports of Canadian company Gildan 
Activewear's anti-organizing and anti-union policies, among other labour violations. For 
example, Gildan El Progreso in Honduras closed in 2004 to avoid the certification of a 
union, and recently in the Dominican Republic there have been reports of the same 
policies with regards to the trade union there. Otht:r reports have surfaced of violations of 
other human and labour rights of workers, such as the right to live without violence, the 
right to work, health and life. 
Presently, Gildan Activewear is contravening the legal regulations for labour, with 
regards to treaties and international conventions that protect occupational health and 
safety, by implementing 4x4 shifts in their factories, where workers work for 4 days 
straight, 11.5 hours per day, and then have 4 days off. With this system, it's common that 
on their days off, workers do extra hours, up to 2 day shifts or 2 night shifts. This means 
that the work week can be 69 hours long, with a salary of $89.99 US Dollars (L$1700 
Lempiras) per week. 
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The production goals or quotas imposed by Gildan Activewear are the highest in the 
industry in Honduras. To earn $89.99 per we:ek, workers have to produce 550 dozen 
pieces every day, and are exposed to awkward postures, executing up to 40,000 repetitive 
movements in their joints, tendons, and muscles per day. These conditions produce 
Occupational Musculoskeletal Injuries (MSI). There is clear exploitation of workers in 
poor countries, juxtaposed with reporting that sales have been high during the 2011 fiscal 
year. In Honduras, Gildan does not pay taxes because they are exempt, so it is abs:urd 
when we see that a company with such a high level of exploitation of the work force has 
been applauded as one of the 50 best Canadian corporations and one of the 20 most 
responsible companies. 
Based on these problems, workers from Gildan Activewear who are members of 
CODEMUH have presented proposals, and have asked the national authorities of the 
Labour and Social Security Secretariat to <loan ergonomic inspection and evaluation: of 
the textile and clothing manufacturing companies. CODEMUH has also presented 
thematic reports to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on Rights to Highest Attainable Standard of Physical, Mental 
Health. We have also presented a complaint to the Fair Labour Association, denouncing 
the dangerous conditions for safety, hygiene, lack of ergonomics and work organization, 
low salaries, lack of pay for overtime and other benefits, as well as discrimination and 
workplace harassment. 
CODEMUH has received complaints from more than 100 workers at Gildan Activewear. 
Of this group, 20 workers have rulings for a change in workstations, recommending. a 
prohibition of repetitive movements in their shoulders, lifting their anns above should~r 
level, alternating seated and standing postures, and performance of exercises every 2 
hours. As well, 15 workers have received rulings qualifying their Occupational Risks 
with a Partial Damage Percentage given as a result of an occupational injury, all of them 
with MSis. These rulings have been given by the Honduran Social Security Institute. This 
shows that work conditions and work organization damage the health of workers, 
especially with relation to the length of the work day and production goal system. 
Given these facts, Mr. Prime Minister, and conside:ring that your visit to Honduras is to 
promote a bilateral Free Trade Agreement between Honduras and Canada, we propose 
the following: 
1. The Free Trade agreements that Honduras has signed with "first world" or 
"developed" countries, especially North American countries, have only brought 
higher levels of discrimination, labour exploitation, accidents and occupational 
illnesses, as well as making the working population poorer, especially young 
women. 
2. Free Trade Agreements are conceived and designed fundamentally so that 
transnational companies and their registered brands can exploit the working 
population and produce huge profits, totally oblivious to the fact that in order to 
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obtain their production and profits, there are people, women and men, who risk 
their lives, and that there are labour and human rights laws that must be respected. 
We demand that you ask promptly for a report on labour and human rights conditions for 
the women and men who work at Gildan Activ1ewear installations in Honduras; and that 
the Canadian government monitors working conditions for workers with Canadian 
transnationals. The Canadian government must force companies to comply with national 
laws, international conventions and international treaties to do with human and labour 
rights and corporate social responsibility. As well, companies must perform ergonomic 
studies of work stations with the active participation of workers and organizations with 
experience in occupational health and safety, such as CODEMUH, with the objective of 
correcting any deficiencies. 
Taking into account that for Honduras, Free Trade Agreements have meant higher levels 
of exploitation, of labour and human rights violations, loss of job sources, higher labour 
risks, deepening of poverty and other proble:ms: we denounce and condemn that 
Honduras is proceeding to ratify a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with Canada without 
even studying the impacts of CAFT A. 
Jobs Yes, BUT WITH DIGNITY! 
- 30 -
For more information: 
CODEMUH: 011-504-2669-1180 
Maria Luisa Regalado, General Coordinator, mobil1e: 
011-504-9620-2032 or 011-504-3314-9354 
Email: mujeresfem@codemuh.123.hn 
Website: http://www.codemuh.net 
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LIST OF INTERVIEWS846 
846 This list contains only the interviews which are directly cited in the text. I conducted several other 
interviews which did not find their way directly into the dissertation, and those I have chosen not to list. 
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Felix Molina, November 24, 2009. 
Felix Molina, November 25, 2009. 
Luis Aguilar, November 26, 2009. 
Jari Dixon, November 26, 2009. 
Bertha Oliva, November 26, 2009. 
Jose Trinidad Sanchez, November 28, 2009 
Victor Corrales Mejia, November 29, 2009. 
Edward Fox, Dec. 1, 2009. 
Jesse Freeston, August 23, 2011. 
Edwin Espinal, August 24, 2011. 
Alison Acker, February 10, 2012. 
John Foster, February 18, 2012. 
George Sorger, February 24, 2012. 
Chris Rosene, March 9, 2012. 
Suzanne Dudziak, April 7, 2012. 
Felix Molina, May 2, 2012. 
Joni Rivas, May 3, 2012. 
Pedro Landa, May 4, 2012. 
Nectali Rodezno, May 4, 2012. 
Andrea Nuila, May 4, 2012. 
Juan Almendares, May 4, 2012. 
Edwin Espinal, May 5, 2012. 
Gladys Lanza, May 7, 2012. 
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Gilberto Rios, May 8, 2012. 
Carlos Amador, May 8, 2012. 
Rassel Tome, May 9, 2012. 
Tomas Andino, May 9, 2012. 
Juan Barahona, May 10, 2012. 
Victor Meza, May 10, 2012. 
Annie Bird, May 10, 2012. 
Jari Dixon, May 10, 2012. 
Maria Luisa Regalado, May 11, 2012. 
Marlon Hernandez, October 21, 2012. 
Pedro Landa, March 3, 2013. 
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